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ABSTRACT 
The objective of this thesis is to provide advice on how to establish a reliable system of 
financial accountability in Serbia, as a condition for EU membership. The creation of a 
functional financial accountability system in Serbia is important not only for further 
Serbian development, but also to secure efficient and effective use of the EU/Member 
States monies, which are already being used in Serbia. 
The acquis communautaire prescribe certain obligations for the aspiring Member States 
in the area of financial accountability. However, as these requirements represent just 
basic elements of a system of financial accountability, there is a need to analyse other EU 
Member States financial accountability frameworks in order to get inspiration and 
provide options for further development of financial accountability in Serbia. 
In this light, this thesis analyses financial accountability systems of two EU Member 
States: UK and France and a supranational EU system, which are then compared with the 
Serbian system. The legal frameworks of these systems of financial accountability are 
analysed against their socio-historical backgrounds, focusing on the key challenges they 
face in both their strategic developments and everyday work. 
The conclusion of this thesis is that Serbia has still not met the financial accountability 
conditions for EU membership outlined in the acquis communitaure. The comparative 
socio-Iegal analysis has demonstrated that the application of pure, more advanced 
Western European models of financial accountability would not be possible in the 
transitional Serbian environment. However, specific elements of these systems, 
exemplified in the emerging European system of financial accountability, could be well 
applied in the Serbian context. A creation of a sound financial accountability system in 
Serbia will take a significant amount of effort on the part of all financial accountability 
actors in Serbia whose roles need to be enhanced simultaneously so that the balance of 
the financial accountability system is achieved and maintained, both in the pre-accession 
phase and, hopefully, upon obtaining membership. 
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Financial Accountability as a Condition for EU Membership 
Introduction 
Objective of the study 
This thesis is a contribution to a debate as to how to establish an effective financial 
accountability system in Serbia, which would facilitate Serbian integration into the ED. 
The creation of a sound financial accountability system is one of the key elements for 
further progress in economic and social reform in Serbia. The establishment of an 
effective system of control and audit powers over spending of public money should 
prevent the misuse of public funds and combat the high incidence of corruption that 
plagued the Serbian public administration in the 1990s and provide better value for 
money of use of public funds. Sound financial accountability is also a precondition for 
setting up closer relations with the EU, as one of the main objectives of the Serbian 
Government. Therefore, reforming the financial accountability system will be a key part 
of the reform agenda in the years to come. 
This study must be seen against the background and in the context of Serbian efforts to 
become a member of the ED. After the democratic changes in 2000, important steps have 
been taken in this regard. The Copenhagen Council in December 2002 and Thessaloniki 
European Council of June 2003 confirmed the European perspective of state union of 
Serbia and Montenegro and underlined the European Union's determination to support its 
efforts to move closer to the European Union. 1 In April 2005 the European Commission 
approved a Feasibility Report that assessed positively the readiness of Serbia and 
Montenegro to negotiate a Stabilisation and Association Agreement. The negotiations 
IThe Thessaloniki European Council explicitly states that the Western Balkan countries are to become 
members of the EU "once they meet the established criteria". Cf Presidency Conclusions of the 
Thessaloniki European Council, 19 and 20 June 2003. 
1 
process started in October 2005,2 but was suspended in early May 2006 due inadequate 
cooperation with the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) 
in the Hague. Shortly after the suspension of the negotiations, the majority of the 
Montenegrin population voted for independence on the referendum of 21 May 2006, 
which resulted in the creation of two fully sovereign states of Serbia and Montenegro. 
Both countries have shortly gained recognition of the international community and will 
naturally continue European Union accession process as two fully independent states. 
The accession of Serbia and other countries of the Western Balkans to the EU constitutes 
a particular challenge for the EU. The overall EU enlargement policy is put to the serious 
test of whether it is able to transform the region of states of weak governance and divided 
societies, with recent history of armed conflicts? A clear political perspective for EU 
accession is one of the key drivers for continuity of reforms in these countries. But it is 
also clear that Serbia and other Western Balkan countries can join only once they meet all 
EU membership criteria, including conditions regarding financial accountability. 
The concept of financial accountability is the key concept of this thesis. Accountability is 
defined through operationalisation of 4 key questions: "of whom", "for what" "to whom" 
and "how". Financial accountability is primarily understood as the relationship between 
the citizens, as accountors, and the Government, as an accountee, where the citizens hold 
the Government to account for the stewardship of public money. The essence of financial 
accountability is an obligation of the Government to assure the citizens that money is 
spent in the best possible and effective way. The Government has to provide answers and 
justifications for its actions and to regularly inform the public on how it spends the public 
funds.4 
2 The commencement of negotiations for Stabilisation and Association Agreement in October 2005 has 
symbolically marked 5 years from democratic change in Serbia. 
3 EU Commission, Communication from the Commission: 2005 enlargement strategy paper. Brussels, 
November 2005, COM(2005)561, www.europa.eu.int, p. 2. 
4 Cf S. Redlynch, "Holding to Account, The Review of Audit and Accountability for Central 
Government", February 2001, www.hm-treasury.gov.uk . 
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The next level of analysis of financial accountability encompasses the complexity of 
government's institutions, rules and procedures, which provide an accountability 
framework at the central government level. Financial accountability is exercised typically 
between numerous actors within the government, and in particular between the executive 
and the parliament. Legally speaking, the financial accountability relationship is 
embedded in the parliament's authorisation of the public expenditure by legislation.5 
Expenditure legislation provides a framework of law, which is the basis for calling the 
Government to account for its actions. Therefore, our analysis will focus on the financial 
accountability relationship established after the parliament's approval of the expenditure, 
i.e. parliament's entrustment of the public money to the government. We shall also, 
however, analyse the process of Parliamentary approval of the expenditure, as one of the 
key aspects of ex-ante financial accountability. 6 We shall then examine the variety of 
accountability mechanisms to ensure that money is spent in accordance with 
parliamentary wishes.7 In this sense, the emphasis is placed on the legal/regulatory 
framework and accountability mechanisms inside the executive (internal accountability 
mechanisms) and external accountability devices (external accountability mechanisms), 
which are to support and secure the stewardship of public money. 8 
Furthermore, it is important to stress that financial accountability mechanisms are not 
isolated phenomena, but mutually interrelated elements, which are in the process of 
constant interaction, mutually supporting their structures and functions. For this reason, 
we introduce the concept of a financial accountability system,9 which consists of different 
mutually related elements/mechanisms of financial accountability. The effectiveness of 
financial accountability as a system depends mostly on the existence of a proper balance 
5 Appropriation Act in UK and Budget Act in France and Serbia as well as permanent legislation 
authorising conditions and purposes of expenditure. 
6 Cf D. Coombes et aI, The Power of the Purse, (London George Allen & Unwin Ltd), 1976. 
7 Cf F. White, K. Hollingsworth, Audit. Accountability and Government, (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1999) 
p.3. 
8 The World Bank, Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Country Financial Accountability Assessment, 2002. 
9 Cf L. Bertalanffy, General Systems Theory, (George Braziller Publishers), 1969. 
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between its different supporting mechanisms, so that weaknesses in one form of financial 
accountability can be compensated for by controls through other mechanisms. 10 
In this thesis financial accountability is analysed through two key levels - the national 
level and supra-national level of the EU. Whereas the financial accountability 
relationship established at the national level is rather straightforward, the financial 
accountability created at the supra national level of the EU is more complex and requires 
further theoretical discussion, as will be elaborated in Chapter IV. Special attention shall 
also be paid to the EU requirements for the acceding countries in the area of financial 
accountability, i.e., internal financial control, internal audit and external audit. 
It is not in dispute that the EU has a keen interest in building and strengthening the 
financial accountability system in Serbia and other acceding countries, as potential future 
members of the enlarged European Union. The EU has already been investing significant 
funds to strengthen the Serbian Government institutional structure and revive its 
economy. Only the establishment of an effective financial accountability system would 
be able to guarantee that the provided money has been spent in accordance with its 
intended purpose and in the most efficient and effective way. An ineffective system of 
financial accountability may also be costly for the EU as it may generate additional 
burdens on the control institutions, such as the European Court of Justice and the 
European Court of Auditors. This is why it is of utmost importance to prepare Serbia and 
other potential candidate countries to manage EU funds - both during the pre-accession 
phase and upon achieving membership. 
The issue of the candidate states' financial accountability has not been only the concern 
of the EU institutions, but also of the current Member States, especially those who 
significantly contribute to the EU's budget. Bearing in mind that about 80 % of the EU's 
budget is managed and implemented solely by the Member States, both the EU and the 
10 Cf T. Verheijen, M. Millar, "Refonning public policy processes and securing accountability: Ireland in a 
comparative perspective", International Review of Administrative Sciences, [1998], p. 98. 
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Member States are worried about the ability of aspiring Member States to protect the 
European Union's financial interests when managing EU funds. 
Serbia has recognized the importance of establishing a sound financial accountability 
system and although many important reforms in this area have been started, results are 
still far from satisfactory. In the Serbian Government's view, the financial accountability 
framework should rest on the three key pillars: a strong Treasury, efficient internal 
controls and independent external audit, as a basis for the efficient democratic, 
Parliamentary control of the public finances. However, the attention of the Government 
given to these three elements has not been equal. Greater emphasis has been placed on 
the establishment of a functional Treasury system, expected to be a vital Government tool 
for managing resources, monitoring their use and supporting line managers in programme 
delivery. 1 1 Internal control and audit systems, on the other hand, have just started to be 
developed and will require a long time until their proper functioning can be expected. 
Lastly, and perhaps most importantly, mechanisms of external audit are still missing, six 
years after the democratic changes. For this reason, annual consolidated financial 
statements have not been audited and presented to the Parliament since 2002. 12 Therefore, 
there is currently no official record of Government expenditure for 2002, 2003, 2004 and 
2005 and no external oversight of Government accounts. As a result, the Parliamentary, 
democratic scrutiny of the public money spending has been ineffective and disappointing. 
This all gives a rather bleak general picture of the current system of financial 
accountability in Serbia. 
The key question which this thesis asks is how to build an efficient and effective financial 
accountability system in Serbia. The EU Treaty does not specify any predetermined 
model of financial accountability and control to be applied by the Member States. The 
European Commission could in no way impose a specific model of public expenditure 
II Cf The World Bank, Republic of Serbia - Public Expenditure and Institutional Review, Volume Two, 
February 2003., available at http://www.worldbank.org.yu 
12 Consolidated accounts for 2001 were audited by a private firm, in the absence of a supreme audit 
institution. 
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control on any Member/Candidate State. J3 In fact, there are a number of different systems 
of financial accountability, varying from one Member State to another. All of them have 
their own specificities and are strongly embedded in their overall institutional context. 
Although the acquis communautaire prescribe certain obligations for the aspiring 
Member States in the area of internal control, these requirements represent just basic 
elements of a complex system. Therefore, although Serbia is urged to build an effective 
financial accountability system and has been given the suggestions in that respect, it is 
still left to find its own way towards this aim. 
The objective of this thesis is to provide possible solutions for creating an efficient and 
effective system of financial accountability that would best serve the Serbian case. It is 
not in dispute that each country needs to find its own financial accountability system, best 
suited to the local institutional environment and culture. However, in order to achieve this 
aim, insights into financial accountability systems of other countries can be a powerful 
source of inspiration. 
This thesis analyses financial accountability systems of two EU Member States: UK and 
France and a supranational EU system, which are then compared with the Serbian 
system. Notwithstanding the difficulties to assign various European countries models of 
financial accountability into separate categories, due to refined distinctions that 
characterise each of them, we have chosen the UK and French system of financial 
accountability as representatives of two models of financial accountability, which can 
broadly be defined as the Anglo-Saxon and the continental (Roman) system. The Anglo-
Saxon model is characterised by an existence of an audit office without a judicial 
function, headed by a sole head, usually an Auditor General. 14 Instruments of internal 
13 R. Koning, "Public Internal Financial Control (PIFC) in the context of European Union enlargement", 
Public Management Forum, vol. Y, No.6, 1999, ppA-5. 
14 The model of an audit office headed by an Auditor General exists in the United Kingdom, Ireland and 
Denmark and in the USA. There are four main types of supreme audit institutions within the European 
Union, namely the 'court' with ajudicial function; the 'collegiate' body without a judicial function; the 
independent audit office headed by an Auditor General; and the audit office headed by an Auditor General 
within the structure of the Government. (In addition Austrian Rechnungshofis a distinct model headed by a 
6 
financial control, on the other hand, are devolved from the Ministries of Finance to heads 
of line ministries or officials in the budget and finance departments of these public 
bodies, where the role of the Ministry of Finance is one of coordinator. The Roman 
model, in tum, is characterized by the existence of an external auditor with judicial 
functions 15 and more centralized internal financial control exercised by the Ministry of 
Finance itself. It may be argued that the devolved Anglo-Saxon approach is more focused 
on ensuring that priorities and objectives of an agency are achieved, while the centralized 
continental approach emphasizes respect for legality and regularity of expenditure. 
However, in the last two decades, financial accountability systems of both groups of 
countries have experienced gradual harmonization, mainly towards greater devolution of 
internal control functions to agency's management and insistence on achieving value for 
money in the use of the public funds. The EU system of financial accountability 
represents a unique mixture of these two basic models of financial accountability, which 
faces additional challenges in the context of shared financial management between the 
EU institutions and the Member States. 
The analysis of UK, French and EU system is taken as a source of information and 
knowledge which can be used for building the Serbian accountability system. 
Possibilities of incorporating strengths of particular systems into other systems of 
financial accountability are thus carefully considered and weighed and recommendations 
for further development of the Serbian financial accountability system are given. 
President and auditing at central, regional and local level}. Cf UK National Audit Office, State Audit in the 
European Union, December 2005, available at http://www.nao.org.uklpublications/stateaudit/state.htm 
15 Supreme audit institutions in six EU countries (in France, Belgium, Portugal, Spain, Italy and Greece) 
can loosely be grouped together as 'courts', which exercise judicial functions. The similarities in structure 
and functions stem from the spread of French administrative practice across Europe after the French 
revolution and in the nineteenth century. In Greece and Portugal, for example, the SAl is the part of the 
judiciary and is constitutionally equal with other courts. The Netherlands, Germany and Luxembourg, in 
tum, have 'collegiate' structure, but no judicial functions, which brings them closer to the Anglo-Saxon 
system. It is interesting to note that Sweden and Finland's external audit institutions are part of the 
Government structure, and therefore represent a specific model of external audit. Cf UK National Audit 
Office, Ibid. 
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Methodology 
In our research, we have combined several methods: normative method, socio-Iegal 
method, comparative legal method and historical method . 
...... 
Normative method is used to examine normative framework of financial accountability 
and its mechanisms in different countries and in the EU. Analysis of normative legal texts 
has provided us with a good basis for understanding of what are the standards that one 
financial accountability system aims to attain. However, as institutions and norms 
represent just a part of the broader social background, they cannot be analyzed isolated 
from their social context. 16 Therefore, in order to provide a better understanding of the 
adopted financial accountability mechanisms, we have devoted considerable attention to 
analysis of respective social environments through the employment of socio-Iegal 
method. 
The use of the socio-Iegal method has brought about a special dimension to our legal 
research, providing a greater understanding of researched phenomena through analysis of 
their empirical settings. 17 The object of the socio-Iegal analysis is to provide knowledge 
about administrative bodies and processes: their structure and organization, how they 
work in practice, the effect on legal rules and doctrines on them, and the nature and 
effectiveness of methods of regulation, control and recourse. IS The sociological 
interpretation has also provided a ground for critical assessment of the adopted financial 
accountability mechanisms and has helped opening up debate for challenging the existing 
frameworks. 
16 Cf O. Kokkini-Iatridou "Some Methodological Aspects of Comparative Law", Netherlands International 
Law Review, 1986, pp. 166-167. 
17 Cf R. Cotterrell, "Why Must Legal Ideas Be Interpreted Sociologically?", Journal of Law and Society, 
Volume 25, Number 2,1998, pp. 185-187. 
18 OJ. Galligan (ed.), "Introduction: Socio-Legal Readings in Administrative Law", A Reader on 
Administrative Law, (Oxford University Press), 1996, pp. 1-8. 
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Although the use of socio-Iegal research is invaluable for understanding the legal 
phenomena and their critical analysis, it is doubtful whether it can provide solutions for 
the posed problems. 19 This limitation of the sociological method, in our opinion, can be 
overcome by mutual application of comparative research methodology. 
The comparative analysis of different systems of financial accountability provides 
information on variety of ways, institutions, mechanisms and processes that are used to 
support the establishment of a sound system of financial accountability in different social 
settings. The comparative method is thus of critical importance for our research, which 
aims at providing different options for development of the Serbian system. 
Furthermore, the employment of comparative law methodology also plays an important 
role in the process of harmonization of Serbian law with the EU law. The application of 
the comparative law methodology should facilitate the process of alignment of Serbia's 
financial accountability mechanisms with the acquis communautaire. In that sense, the 
comparative law methodology also serves a function of legal unijication.20 
The employment of normative, socio-Iegal and comparative method has been coupled 
with the use of historical method, which has helped us to understand the development of 
different financial accountability systems throughout time, and explain why they have 
evolved in different directions. In that sense, it is interesting to see and compare how the 
different cultural-political and legal-tradition backgrounds have influenced the 
establishment and changes in the financial accountability legal framework (the social-
historical change in this case is taken as an independent variable and legal change as 
19 Cf D. Nelken, "Blinding Insights? The Limits of a Reflexive Sociology of Law", Journal of Law and 
Society, Volume 25, No.3, 1998, pp. 422-423. 
20 For more about functions of comparative law methodology see: R. Dehousse, "Comparing National and 
EC Law: The Problem of the Level of Analysis", [1994] 42, American Journal of Comparative Law, pp. 
762-764; J.H. Merryman, "Comparative Law and Scientific Explanation" in Law in the USA in Social and 
Technological Revolution, pp. 85-86; E. Orucu, Comparative Law and Methodology, University of 
Glasgow handout, 2000. 
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dependent variable).21 Thus, we have tried to explain why certain financial accountability 
mechanisms have been established in the UK and not in France and vice versa and which 
factors have influenced the development of the EU financial accountability system. This 
explanation coupled with an in depth analysis of the current social institutional context in 
Serbia provided us with a sound basis to predict22 which of the analysed financial 
accountability mechanisms may be most suitable for Serbia. 
Finally, for the purposes of our research, we have conducted a number of interviews, 
primarily with the members of staff of the French Cour des Comptes, Serbian officials 
working on financial accountability issues and other practitioners in this field. The 
interviews with French colleagues served to elucidate important points about the 
operation of the French financial accountability system, while the interviews with Serbian 
officials have helped us to understand peculiarities of the Serbian transitional model and 
very much contributed to formulation of conclusions presented in the final chapter. The 
list of persons interviewed is attached in Annex 2. 
Structure of the dissertation 
In conducting our research on financial accountability, we have undertaken several 
distinctive steps. 
Firstly, our focus is on conceptualization of the notion of financial accountability. This 
has provided us with a basis for carrying out a comparative research, as a comparative 
legal analysis cannot be undertaken unless we have a clear picture of what is going to be 
compared. In that sense, we have born in mind the important principle of comparative 
methodology - the principle ofjunctionality, which assumes that only things which fulfil 
the same function in a society can be compared.23 Therefore, the task of our preliminary 
comparative inventory is the identification of various mechanisms which have a role of 
21 Cf J.H. Merryman, op. cit., pp. 100-101. 
22 Cf D. Kokkini-Iatridou, op. cit., pp. 187-188. 
23 Cf K. Zweugert, H. Kotz, Introduction to Comparative Law, (Clarendon Press, Oxford), 1987, p. 3l. 
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securing financial accountability in different European states. In this way we have 
determined the tertium comparationis, as a precondition for any comparative research 
undertaking.24 The identification of the object of our comparative research has led us to 
several financial control mechanisms, which are used to secure financial accountability in 
modem states. These are: the mechanisms of securing democratic accountability of use of 
public funds, discerned through budgetary control of Parliaments; the mechanisms of 
internal financial control within the administrative structures of the Government and the 
mechanisms of external financial control, provided by specialized independent audit 
insti tu ti ons. 
In order to provide Serbia with ideas on how to build a reliable system of financial 
accountability, the second chapter is devoted to an analysis of the UK system of financial 
accountability. Diverse mechanisms of financial accountability are analysed, with special 
emphasis on the internal Treasury mechanisms, the Public Accounts Committee and the 
National Audit Office in holding the executive to account for spending of public money. 
The third chapter exammes the financial accountability system of France, as the 
representative of a continental legal tradition. Special emphasis is laid on the specificities 
of internal financial control in France, the role of the Cour des Comptes and an emerging 
focus on Parliamentary accountability to secure effective spending of public funds. 
The fourth part of our research is devoted to an analysis of the financial accountability 
system of the EU. We have first focused on the examination of an interplay of various 
EU financial accountability mechanisms and their overhaul over the last couple of years. 
This is followed by an analysis of the concept of financial accountability in the EU supra-
national context. After that, we have focused on the specific requirements for internal 
financial control, internal and external audit stipulated by the acquis communautaire and 
presented in negotiations Chapter 32 on financial control. We have tried to reveal the 
logic behind these requirements, provide their legal justification and explain their 
importance for the process of accession. 
24 Cf D. Kokkini-Iatridou, ibid, pp. 158-161. 
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The fifth chapter shall focuses on the current problems experienced by the Serbian 
Government in securing financial accountability. This chapter also analyses in more 
depth the historical development of financial accountability mechanisms in Serbia, in 
order to provide insights into traditional approaches to the financial accountability 
problems. 
The final part of the dissertation focuses on identification of differences and similarities 
between the described financial accountability systems, conditioned by their different 
historical developments. We have pointed out what changes Serbia will need to make in 
its legal frameworks as well as within institutional structures, for adhering to the EU 
financial accountability standards. We have further explored the possibilities of adoption 
of some of the UK, France and EU's financial accountability mechanisms in the Serbian 
environment. Bearing in mind that legal rules, principles and institutions cannot simply 
be transplanted from one legal system to another,25 the ways in which modem Western 
standards of financial accountability could be applied within the still fragile Serbian 
transitional context are carefully analysed. 
Lastly, we would like to note that the enlargement is a costly and lengthy undertaking 
that requires sacrifices on both candidate countries and the EU.26 Lots of investment that 
will only later be paid off is needed in order to secure peace and stability in Europe on a 
long-term basis. This dissertation is a small contribution aimed at achieving this goal. 
25 Cf 1. Bell, "Mechanisms for Cross-fertilisation of Administrative Law in Europe", in 1.Beatson, T. 
Tridimas New Directions in European Public Law, (Hart Publishing, Oxford), 1998, p. 147; S. Cassese, 
"Toward a European Model of Public Administration", in D. Clark ed., Comparative and Private 
International Law, (Duncker & Humblot), Berlin, 1990, pp. 361-362. 
26 E. Brok, "The EU after Enlargement: Managing Coexistence of Newcomers and Veterans in a United 
Europe", Public Management Forum, Vol. VI, No 1,2000. 
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Chapter I 
Financial Accountability - Concept and Securing Mechanisms 
Concept of Accountability 
Accountability is one of the most often found tenns in current administrative law and 
public policy theory and practice. It is therefore quite surprising to note that just a few 
decades ago this word was used in a very restrictive sense and still has, interestingly 
enough, no equivalent in any European language other than English.27 The concept of 
accountability has gradually evolved and encompassed a number of different meanings, 
which often call for further clarification of its genuine sense.28 
Linguistic analysis of the words 'accountability', 'accountable', 'account' and 
'accounting' demonstrates the common roots of all these tenns. They go back through 
Old English and Old French to Latin - computare, which is also the root of the verb "to 
compute".29 Computare is the compound of com, which means together, and putare, 
which means to count, reckon, consider, as well as to settle (an account).30 Therefore, the 
tenn accountability undoubtedly draws its origin from financial accounting, which is 
focused on checking the way the books are kept and how the money is spent. It is quite 
interesting that during the time the concept of accountability has been spread to other 
disciplines and gained a much broader meaning. In order to understand the full 
complexity of the contemporary meaning of the concept of accountability, we shall 
27 Cf M. Dubnick, "Clarifying accountability: an ethical theory framework", in C. Sampford and N. 
Preston (eds.) Public Sector Ethics (London, Routhledge), 1998, pp. 68-81. 
28 Cf R Mulgan, "Accountability: an Ever-expanding Concept?", Public Administration, No 3/2000, 
pp.555-573. 
29 Cf R. Behn, Rethinking Democratic Accountability, Brooking Institution Press, 2001. 
30 Ibid., Oxford English Dictionary. 
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explore its usage through current academic literature. Only then will we be able to fully 
define the concept of financial accountability, which will provide a basis for our overall 
research. 
The traditional dictionaries define the concept of accountability in different ways, mainly 
through a notion of the attribute "accountable". Oxford dictionary defines "accountable" 
as one required or expected to justify actions or decisions; explicable or understandable. 
Other sources interpret "accountable" as subject to giving an account - "answerable" and 
capable of being accounted for - "explainable".31 
On the basis of the provided definitions and at the most general level of understanding, 
accountability could be defined as answerability or justification for one's actions and 
behaviour. Therefore, accountability presupposes the existence of at least two key actors 
- an accountee, who is obliged to provide answers and/or justify hislher behaviour, and 
an accountor, who has the right to ask questions, require explanations, justifications etc. 
Although this seems to be a straightforward relationship, the question which naturally 
arises is why an acountee has to provide answers or justify his/her behaviour/actions to an 
accountor? What is the underlying logic behind this concept? 
It may be argued that delegation of duties and responsibilities lies at the heart of any 
accountability relationship. An accountor delegates his/her authorities to an accountee, 
who is being entrusted with certain tasks and activities and is obliged to report back on 
hislher actions, so that his/her ultimate principals/accountors can be sure the job has been 
done in the way it was intended. Thus, for example, Romzek and Dubnick define 
accountability as "a relationship in which an individual or agency is held to answer for 
performance that involves some delegation of authority to act".32 In a similar vain, Lord 
Sharman states that "Accountability is needed wherever there are hierarchical 
31 Cf J.M Shafritz, The Dorsey Dictionary of American Government and Politics (Dorsey Press, 1988). 
32 Cf B. Romzek, M. Dubnick, "Accountability" in J. M. Shafritz, The International Encyclopedia of 
Public Policy and Administration, (West-view Press, 1998), p. 6. 
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relationships, or where delegation of duties or responsibilities takes place." The 
establishment of any accountability relationship hence presupposes a delegation of tasks 
and duties between an accounter and accountee or the existence of an already established 
hierarchical framework, which is also based on prior entrustment of certain tasks and 
authorities. 
The content of the accountability relationship compnses two mam mutually related 
elements - the obligation of an accountee to provide information about the discharge of 
hislher duties (that have been delegated by the accountor) and the right of an accountor to 
require such information. However, it should be noted that the first element entails not 
only the obligation of an acountee to provide information for carrying out certain conduct 
or duty to the accountor,33 but also a duty to explain why tasks and responsibilities have 
been exercised in a certain way, to justify the way the things have been done so far as 
well as to reveal further plans and assure the accountor that activities are being performed 
in the way he/she wishes?4 The content of the second element of the notion of 
accountability is the accountor's right to request information and answers from an 
accountee. However, most authors agree that accountability cannot be solely identified 
with answerability.35 Accountability seems to be a "stronger" concept, which 
encompasses not only the right to get answers, but also the possibility to sanction or 
reward taken actions or behaviour, depending on the performance.36 If the accountor is 
happy with the accountee's performance, he/she may want to reward the accountee. 
However, if this is not the case, the accountor has the right to criticize the acountee, 
33 Cf F. White, K. Hollingsworth, Audit, Accountability and Government, (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1999), 
p.6. 
34 Cf L. Normanton, "Public Accountability and Audit: A Reconnaissance", in B.L.R. Smith and D.C. 
Hague (ed.), The Dilemma of Accountability in Modern Government - Independence versus Control, 
(Macmillan, 1971), p. 31 1. 
35 Cf M. Geoffrey, Constitutional Conventions. The Rules and Roles of Political Accountability, 1986, 
(Oxford, Clarendon); R. Pyper, "The Parameters of Accountability", in Robert Pyper (eds.), Aspects of 
Accountability in the British System of Government, 1996, (Tudor Business Publishing Ltd.). 
36 R. Behn, Rethinking Democratic Accountability, Brooking Institution Press, 2001. 
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direct the accountee's act in a particular way, require faults be remedied orland impose 
sanctions. It should be noted that the meaning of "sanction" is taken here in its broadest 
sense, encompassing in some situations only the right to criticize, while in others it 
involves more severe measures, such as the right to dismiss the accountee, impose 
. fi d I' 37 vanous mes an pena tles. 
The concept of accountability is mainly understood as an ex-post category, meaning that 
the relationship between accountor and accountee is established only after the 
performance by the accountee has taken place. This feature of accountability has 
provoked many critics, who argue that ex-post control alone is not sufficient to ensure the 
proper performance of delegated tasks. If the accountor has no means of influence over 
the accountee before and during the performance, it is likely that errors and omissions 
will eventually be made.38 Thus, all the ex-post observations and criticisms will come too 
late, which makes the accountability relationship ineffective. 
The mam answer to these critics IS that accountability, although almost always 
established ex post, has an immense ex ante impact. The awareness that the action will 
come under scrutiny may be a very strong deterrent of an accountee's ex ante action and 
therefore strongly prevent carelessness, negligence or any kind of abuse of power. 39 
The question, however, remains whether expectance of scrutiny is enough to ensure the 
accountee's compliance especially when accountability is exercised in a highly complex 
environment, such as that of the contemporary state. It could be furthermore argued that 
strong emphasis on the ex post nature of accountability has quite a negative effect on the 
accountee's creativity and willingness to take any kind ofrisk.4o A number of authors are 
37 Cf F. White, K. Hollingsworth, ibid. 
38 Cf E.L. Normarton, The Accountability and Audit of Governments - A Comparative Study, (Manchester 
University Press, 1964), p. 83. 
39 Ibid. 
40 A. Lovell, "Notions of Accountability and State Audit: A UK Perspective", Financial Accountability & 
Management, 12(4), 1996, pp. 267-268. 
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therefore of the opinion that accountability should not be comprehended only as ex post, 
but also as ex ante category, where accountability processes operate before or at least 
during the performance of an accountee.41 Besides its preventive function, accountability 
thus defined enables the performance of an accountee to be continuously scrutinized and, 
if necessary, his/her actions appropriately directed in a certain way. Another argument in 
favour of using broader understanding of accountability is that it is undoubtedly more 
suitable for comprehending the complexity of a contemporary state, which is based on 
numerous both ex post and ex ante accountabilities. Having all these arguments in mind, 
we shall base our research on the concept of accountability perceived in both the ex ante 
and ex post sense. 
Every accountability relationship implies the existence of a certain social framework, as a 
basic setting for the defining the accountability relations. Accountability may be 
established between two or more individuals as well as different organizational structures 
of various degrees of complexity. In any case, it is essential that accountor and accountee, 
whether they are individuals or institutions, accept their obligations and duties/rights 
stemming from the accountability relationship, as well as share the expectations about the 
respective activity and the sense of justifiable reasons for the need for an explanation of 
conduct.42 If participants have different expectations and do not share the same reasoning 
in terms of justifications, it is difficult to talk about accountability, but rather of different 
kinds of relationships, based on unclearly defined settings.43 
41 Cf F. White, K. Hollingsworth, op. cit. p. 6; M. Power, The Audit Explosion, (Demos, 1994); M. 
Harmon, Responsibility as Paradox: A Critique of Rational Discourse on Government (Sage Publications), 
1995. 
42 Cf P. Day, R. Klein, Accountabilities - Five Public Services, (Tavistock Publications, London and New 
York), 1987, p. 5. 
43 Ibid. 
17 
The distinction between accountability and other similar concepts 
The concept of accountability should be differentiated from other closely related 
concepts, such as responsibility and liability. Although these concepts are fairly similar, it 
is possible to delineate between them, by placing an emphasis on key features of these 
distinct notions. To be responsible is usually described as to have the authority to act, 
power to control, freedom to decide (so-called responsibility as "capacity,,)44, but 
foremost "to behave rationally and reliably and with consistency and trustworthiness in 
exercising internal judgment".45 Therefore the concept of responsibility (sometimes 
called moral, professional accountability)46 refers primarily to the professional capacity 
and internal personal values of officials related to discharge of professional duties, in 
contrast to accountability whose focus is placed on external pressure to provide answers 
and justifications for one's actions. It could further be argued that responsibility is an 
utterly personal concept, always related to an individual, while accountability is 
principally an institutional concept, which denotes relations between different institutions 
and between institutions and the general public and only to a lesser degree also a personal 
concept. 
The concept of liability, on the other hand, assumes the duty of making good, but even 
more so "to restore, to compensate, to recompense for wrongdoing or poor judgment". It 
generally implies the existence of a malpractice or misconduct, which needs to be 
remedied. Although the concept of accountability shares some of the features of liability, 
it does not presuppose the existence of the wrongdoing and compensation, but merely 
44 Cf A. B. Cendon, "Accountability and Public Administration: Concepts, Dimensions, Developments", in 
Openness and Transparency in Governance: Challenges and Opportunities, (NISPAcee and IEPA), 1999, 
pp.24-25. 
45 Cf a.p. Dwivedi, J.G. Jabbra, "Public Service Responsibility and Accountability" in a.p. Dwivedi, J.G. 
Jabbra (eds.) Public Service Accountability - A Comparative Perspective, (Kumarian Press, Inc., 1989), pp. 
24-25. 
46 Cf A. Sinclair (1995), "The Chameleon of Accountability: Forms and Discourses", Accounting, 
Organization and Society, 20. 219-237; a.p. Dwivedi, J.G. Jabbra, op. cit., pp. 5-7. 
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points out the duty to provide answers, justifications and provide assurance of an 
appropriate running of the entrusted affairs. 
The complexities of a precise definition of the concept of accountability is even more 
apparent in the comparative context, mainly due to an absence of a concept of 
accountability in other countries and, hence, the lack of adequate translation of the 
concept of accountability in other languages. For example, in French language, only one 
term "responsilibite" is used to denote the meaning of 3 different English concepts of 
accountability, responsibility and liability.47 A similar situation can be found in the 
Serbian language, which also contains only one word "odgovornost" for all three 
mentioned terms. The meaning of "responsabilite" and "odgovornost" is narrower than 
one of accountability and is quite close to English term of "responsibility", which, as we 
could see, is much more a personal, individual concept than institutional. 
"Responsabilite" and "odgovornost" definitely refer to one's capacity to act and decide 
(above mentioned responsibility as 'capacity'), but also include the notion of liability.48 
Therefore, these terms may also have a rather negative connotation, as they generally 
contain an inherent element of a wrongdoing and subsequent punishment.49 As 
accountability concept does not exist, it is not represented in the academic writing and 
practice. Instead, researchers prefer to use similar, but well-established concepts, in 
particular the concept of "control". 
Attempts to differentiate the concept of accountability and control are again complicated 
by different meanings these concepts have in various national settings and languages. In 
the English language, the meaning of control tends to be rather broad, starting from 
influencing and guiding to restraining and inspecting.5o In the French and Serbian 
languages, on the other hand, the meaning of control (controle) is much more restrictive 
47 Cf P. Avril, "Responsabilite et accountability", in O. Beaud, I.M. B1anquer (eds.), La Responsabilite des 
Gouvernants, (Descartes & Cie, SODEM), Paris, 1999. 
48 Ibid. 
49 Cf A. B. Cendon, op. cit., pp. 24-25. 
50 Cf D. Coombes et aI, The Power of the Purse, (London George Allen & Unwin ltd), 1976, pp. 16-17. 
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and precise than in English and refers to inspection, verification, examination, checking 
against fixed standards, 51 which is close to the English meaning of accountability. At first 
sight, it may seem that control is a looser concept than accountability, since 
accountability refers only to one type/means of control where persons are actually called 
to account and have to provide answers for their actions and accept possible sanctions. 
However, the main distinction between the concepts of accountability and control is an 
existence of delegation of functions, as the key element of accountability. Whereas 
accountability assumes delegation of functions between an accountor and accountee, 
control does not imply any entrustment of tasks. Control is primarily a tool for ensuring 
that things are done in the way it was required and that expected standards have been 
met. Thus, control could be defined as a process "designed to provide reasonable 
assurance regarding the effectiveness and efficiency of operations, reliability of reporting 
and compliance with applicable laws and regulations.,,52 Therefore, control may very 
well be used as a mechanism for ensuring accountability and a basis for calling someone 
to account, as will be explained in more detail later. 
Dimensions of accountability 
In order to comprehend the notion of accountability further, it will be useful to 
distinguish between its several dimensions. These are: 
1. who is accountable; 
2. to whom; 
3. for what; 
51 Cf Cassell's French Dictionary, (MacMillan Publishing Company, 1981); Concise Oxford Hachette 
French Dictionary, (Oxford University Press), 1998. Z. Tomic, Upravna kontrola uprave, (Draganic) 
Belgrade, 1995. The word controle, is a compound of the words "contre" and "role". "Role" is a official 
registry which contains certain important facts, while "controle" is another parallel registry which is being 
run for the purpose of checking the data of the first registry. 
52 OECD Policy Brief, "Public Sector Modernising Accountability and Control", (OECD Observer), 2005. 
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4. how it is secured and measured. 53 
The who-dimension provides the answer to the question of who is/are the accountee/s of 
the accountability relationship. Is it an individual who is performing a task, or is it a 
group of people? Is it a sub-unit of an organization or the whole organization, from those 
with rather simple organizational structures to very complex ones, such as that of the 
state? 
The to-whom-dimension refers to the accountor/s (principal/s) of accountability in the 
accountability relationship. The accountor is the locus of accountability who determines 
the mandates and the resources of the agent. 
The simplest categorization of the to-whom dimension of accountability is one which 
distinguishes between the internal and external loci of accountability. Internal 
accountability is established between persons and/or units which operate within the same 
organization. External accountors/principals, on the other hand, are those outside of the 
agent organization, such as a customer or a group of customers, tax payers in general (as 
an electorate), one's political party, union, governmental auditors etc. 54 It should be noted 
that external and internal accountability are closely related, since organizations can fulfil 
their external accountability responsibilities only if they are performing efficiently and 
effectivel y their internal duties. 55 
Similarly to this conception, public administration theory distinguishes between 
traditional "upward" - political or parliamentary accountability and the more recently 
developed image of "outward" or direct public accountability to clients and the public. 56 
53 Cf T. Virtanen, Financial Autonomy and Accountability of Public Managers, European Group of Public 
Administration Leuven, Belgium, September 1997. 
54 Cf D. Fuller, B. Roffey (1993), "Improving Public Sector Accountability and Strategic Decision-
Making", Australian Journal of Public Administration, 52, 149-163. 
55 Ibid. 
56 Cf A. Sinclair, op. cit., pp. 219-237. 
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In most cases, the accountor/principal in the accountability relationship has the ability to 
directly scrutinise the behaviour of the accountee. However, there are some instances in 
which the accountor/principal, for various reasons, cannot supervise the accountee, and 
therefore needs help of some third actor. In that sense, it is possible to imagine many 
various combinations, of which two shall be of our closer interest: 
1) The structure where the accountor/principal cannot exercise direct power over the 
accountee and therefore delegates his/her authorities to the third actor, who will 
carry out the supervision on his/her behalf; 
2) The structure where the accountor/principal exerCIses direct power over the 
accountee, but does not have enough knowledge to successfully scrutinize the 
accountee's work, and therefore hires a third person or a body, who/which helps 
him/her make the right assessment of the accountee's work. 57 
The for-what-dimension has to do with the object of accountability: particular tasks or 
organizational action including both its aims and consequences. There have been quite a 
few classifications of accountability notions according to this dimension. 
Smith (1971), thus, distinguishes between fiscal, programme and process accountability. 
While fiscal/regularity accountability is concerned whether the money has been spent as 
agreed, according to appropriate rules, programme/effectiveness accountability addresses 
the question whether the defined results have been achieved. Process/efficiency 
accountability, furthermore refers to employment of general processes and operations, so 
that value for money is achieved in the use of resources. 58 
57 Cf F. White, K. Hollingsworth, op. cit. pp. 6-7. 
58 Cf B. Smith "Accountability and Independence in the Contract State", in B.Smith and D.C. Hauge (eds.), 
The Dilemma of Accountability in Modern Government, (Macmillan, 1971), p. 29. 
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Day and Klein's (1987) framework for analysis of accountability rests on the distinction 
between political and managerial accountability. While political accountability is about 
those with delegated authority being answerable to the people, managerial accountability 
is mainly a neutral technical process aimed to make those with delegated authority 
answerable for carrying out agreed tasks according to politically agreed criteria of 
performance. On the basis of that definition, Day and Klein tried to build a hierarchical 
model of accountability, with political accountability, which sets the policy objectives 
and generates the criteria used in the technical process of managerial accountability, on 
the top of the accountability chain. However, the authors are aware of the number of 
arguable assumptions on which this model is built (for example, the model presupposes 
that there are effective institutional and organizational links between political and 
managerial systems of accountability, which may be indeed questionable in the 
conditions of the 21 st century service delivery state; that political process does generate 
precise, clear-cut objectives etc.).59 Day and Klein also distinguish a category of financial 
accountability, as a merely neutral, technical activity of keeping true and accurate 
accounts, which does not have any direct links with democratic government. Financial 
accountability, in their opinion, thus exists both in despotic and democratic regimes, with 
the distinction that in the despotic regime the principal of accountability is the ruler, 
while in democratic regime it is the citizen.6o 
Dwivedi and labbra (1989) separate out the following accountability categories: 
administrative/organizational, legal, political, professional and moral accountability.61 
59 Cf P. Day, R. Klein, op. cit., pp.6-7. 
60 Ibid. 
61 Cf a.p. Dwivedi, 1.G. Jabbra, op. cit., pp. 5-7. While organizational accountability is linked to strict 
hierarchical relationships within the organization and relies on internal means of control, legal 
accountability "relates actions in the public domain to the established legislative and judicial process". The 
main task of political accountability, on the other hand, is to assure the legitimacy of a public programme. 
Professional accountability, furthermore, is about balancing the professional interests with the wider public 
interests, which, in their opinion, need to have precedence over the former. Lastly, the aim of moral 
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In similar vein, Sinclair (1995) distinguishes between five types of accountabilities-
political, public, managerial/administrative, professional and personal. 62 Similar 
classification of accountability could also be found with Cendon (1999), who 
differentiates political, administrative, professional and democratic accountability.63 
Behn (2001) provides a slightly different classification, which recogmzes four 
accountability types: accountability for finances, for fairness, for the use (or abuse) of 
power and performance.64 For Behn, the substance of financial accountability is rather 
straightforward and is provided in the answer to a question "whether the organization and 
its officials have been wise stewards of the resources with which they were entrusted". 
Accountability for fairness, on the other hand, deals with the issue of respect of ethical 
standards. Accountability for the use (or abuse) of power encompasses the earlier defined 
accountabilities for finances and fairness, while the accountability for performance 
provides information on the effectiveness of Government's programmes.65 
accountability is to combat political and bureaucratic corruption and bring about the highest standards of 
personal integrity, honesty and fairness within the state structure. 
62 Cf A. Sinclair (1995), op. cit. pp. 219-237. Sinclair defines political accountability as a direct line of 
accountability where a public servant is accountable for the exercise of its public authorities to the 
Permanent Head, who is in tum accountable to the minister, to the executive of cabinet, to Parliament and 
hence to the electors. Public accountability is more informal, but direct accountability of the state to the 
public, interested community groups and individuals, is expressed through the requirement that 
Government, through various channels (debates, hearings), gives responses to public concerns about 
administrative activity. The managerial model of accountability requires that those with delegated authority 
are answerable for producing outputs or the use of resources to achieve certain ends. Very similar to 
managerial accountability is administrative accountability, where the emphasis is not on monitoring 
outputs, but the processes by which inputs are transformed. Professional accountability, furthermore, 
invokes the sense of duty that one has as a member of a professional or expert group. Finally, personal 
accountability is seen as faithfulness to personal conscience in basic human and moral values. 
63 Cf A. B. Cendon, op. cit., pp. 24-25. 
64 Cf R. D. Behn, op. cit., pp. 6-10. 
65 Ibid. 
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These classifications of accountability are useful SInce they highlight vanous 
accountability relationships established within the democratic state. Day and Klein's 
framework of accountability seems to be particularly helpful, since it attempts to provide 
a coherent structural design of different accountability relationships within the state-
society sphere. However, their model may be criticized for its problematic underlying 
assumptions as well its emphasis on strictly hierarchical relations between different 
dimensions of accountability. The other classifications, Dwivedi, Jabbra's and Sinclair's 
can be further criticized for their foundation on over-expanded concept of accountability, 
which is at times based exclusively on internal values (i.e. in the case of moral and 
personal accountability), instead of external scrutiny, mixing it with a concept of 
responsibility. However, in spite of inherent deficiencies of possible for-what 
classifications of accountability, their value should not be underestimated. Mapping of 
different public sphere accountability relationships can greatly enhance our 
understanding of the complexity of the contemporary state and provide a basis for 
building more specific concepts of accountability, such as that of financial accountability. 
The final dimension of accountability refers to ways it can be assessed and ensured. It 
provides answers to the question of possible channels and securing mechanisms of 
accountability. 66 
This dimension of accountability may be the most controversial, as it widens the concept 
of accountability and relates it to other concepts, such as rules, procedures, control, 
institutions etc. The basic assumption is that in order to hold someone to account for 
something, there is first a need to determine our expectations and values that we want 
individuals and organizations to uphold.67 Furthermore, there is a need for specification 
of those expectations through rules, procedures and standards. Given the complexity of 
the modem state, it is necessary to create controlling and reporting mechanisms to 
demonstrate that determined rules, procedures and standards have been followed. Only 
66 Cf R. Pyper, op. cit., pp. 7-8. 
67 Cf R. D. Behn, op. cit., pp. 5-6. 
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creation of such a reliable structure of accountability mechanisms would enable an 
accounter to assess whether the entrusted tasks are being carried out in accordance with 
his/her wishes and would provide the basis for holding someone to account. In this sense, 
all the rules, regulations, institutions in support of specific accountability relationship are 
understood as accountability mechanisms/devices. 
Some authors are of the OpInIOn that an introduction of diverse accountability 
mechanisms as elements of accountability brings about over-extension of the 
accountability concept.68 Namely, encompassment of all rules, institutions and methods 
of constraining public organizations other than through calling them to account 
significantly broadens the concept of accountability, bringing about more confusion in 
academic writing and practice than clarification.69 In order to avoid this, accountability 
should be associated only with the process of being called to account to some authority 
for one's actions, as the original or core sense of "accountability" and not be related to 
other broader concepts of control and regulation in genera1.70 
Although we do understand the wornes of the over-extension of the accountability 
concept, we are of the opinion that accountability could not be well understood and 
exercised without the existence of numerous accountability supporting structures, i.e. 
mechanisms and devices, which do not have to be accountability relationships 
themselves. There is certainly a possibility that all the rules aimed at constraining 
individual and organizational functioning would get an attribute of accountability device 
and this risk should undoubtedly be taken into account. Nevertheless, it should be 
stressed that (democratic) accountability, watched through the prism of the contemporary 
state, is a fairly complex concept, which assumes the existence of a number of different 
securing mechanisms, embodied in numerous rules, regulations, procedures. Only after a 
68 Cf R. Mulgan, op.cit., pp. 555-573. 
69 Ibid. 
70 Ibid. 
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careful identification and analysis of all these elements of accountability would we be 
able to understand the full meaning of this elusive notion. 
In the context of the democratic state, two broad categories of accountability mechanisms 
can be discerned, based on different to-whom dimensions of accountability. The first 
category relates to internal accountability mechanisms, such as administrative/managerial 
accountability. Administrative/managerial accountability assumes numerous channels 
focused on the need to secure the accountability of officials to their 
administrative/managerial superiors. This primarily refers to rules of defining the goals of 
officials, budgeting resources, the qualitative and quantitative measurement of goal 
achievement, and formal and informal interaction between the superiors and officials in 
the process of assessment. 71 The second category provides external accountability 
mechanisms, i.e. means of holding the Government to account to Parliament and other 
institutions outside of the administration, such as the Ombudsman and external audit. The 
main mechanisms of this category are scrutiny by legislative and investigatory 
committees, various public debates and, in the last resort, parliamentary elections. 
The Concept of Financial Accountability 
In the most simple terms, financial accountability is about responsible stewardship for the 
use of public money. Financial accountability is a means of ensuring that public money 
has been used in a responsible and productive way. It is about verification of legality and 
regularity of financial accounts, but also about making sure that value for money has 
been achieved in the use of resources. 72 
These definitions of financial accountability provide the answer to one of the crucial 
dimensions of accountability - for what. They define the object of financial 
71 cf T. Virtanen, op. cit. p. 7. 
72 Cf Lord Sharman of Redlynch, "Holding to Account, The Review of Audit and Accountability for 
Central Government", February 2001, www.hm-treasury.gov.uk. pp. 9-25. 
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accountability: organizational actions undertaken with the aIm of stewardship and 
productive use of public money. 
The outlined definitions of financial accountability further trigger a number of questions. 
What is public money? What is stewardship of public money? What is meant by its 
proper and productive use? 
Although the concept of public money seems to be clear, there are a number of ways of 
defining it, depending on the interest from which it is approached.73 One of the possible 
definitions of public money is that it is all the money raised by the Government in the 
form of taxes, fees and charges, or under other Government statutory powers, or 
borrowed by the Government and used for the purposes of funding governmental 
activities. Once public money is allocated to be spent, it is possible to talk about another 
complex and mainly economic concept of "public expenditure". Public expenditure could 
be defined as simply everything that is currently spent in the government's name, as well 
as its future obligations and liabilities.74 
Things are, of course, not as simple as that. However, it is very difficult to provide an 
accurate and extensive definition of public money and public expenditure, especially 
since there is still no universally accepted definition of what is the scope of the public 
sector, especially in a comparative context. The definitions of public expenditure have 
been changing and developing over time75 and are often found to be biased, to suit the 
objectives of the research being undertaken. Therefore, we shall not attempt to give a 
comprehensive definition of either the concept of public money or public expenditure, 
73 Ibid. 
74 Cf S. Watson, "What should count as Public Expenditure", in D. Corry (eds.), Public Expenditure, 
Effective Management and Control, 1997, (Harcourt Brace & Company Limited), 41-62. 
75 Ibid.; A. Likierman, Public Expenditure, 1988, (Penguin books); D. Heald, Public Expenditure, 1983, 
(Martin Robertson, Oxford); P. Else, "The Scope and Content of Govemment Expenditure", in D. Coombes 
et al (eds.), op. cit. 22-35. 
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but will operate with them as defined earlier, restricting their scope to central 
Government level funding. 
In a democratic state, the standards of public money stewardship are normally expected 
to be higher than in the private sector. The main reason for this lies in the fact that there is 
often an element of coercion involved in raising public money, which should oblige the 
Government to take a very good care on how to use it.76 What is more, the fact that most 
public services are not subject to competition should bring even more pressure to bear on 
the Government to apply high standards of public money stewardship.77 
Although there is no generally accepted definition of stewardship of public money, it is 
possible to discern several elements of this concept, which are represented in most 
Western democracies. 
The lowest common denominator of public money stewardship is the requirement that 
public money is spent in accordance with existing laws, regulations and principles. 
Depending on the country in question, we can talk about legality, regularity and propriety 
of expenditure. The requirements of legality and regularity generally mean that public 
money could only be used for the purposes intended by authorising legislation (including 
delegated legislation, i.e. secondary legislation) and other Parliamentary authority.78 In 
some countries (e.g. UK) requirement of probity, on the other hand, refers to compliance 
76 Cf L. Sharman of Redlynch, op. cit, p. 15. 
77 Ibid. 
78 Such as for example Appropriation Act in the UK and budget law in France (loi definances) and Serbia. 
It should further be noted that parliamentary authorisation of expenditure provides a basis for two elements 
of control. The first is that expenditure must conform with the ambit of the relevant Parliamentary Vote for 
appropriations (Appropriation Act in UK, Budget Law in France and Serbia), which represents a qualitative 
allocation of money between Government's priorities. The second is that public money has to be spent in 
accordance with its, perhaps even more important, qualitative framework, provided in the permanent 
legislation. Permanent legislation lays down the purposes to which government can spend requested money 
and provides the basis for quantitative allocation of public money, provided in appropriations. 
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with other rules, procedures, principles and standards of behaviour, which are not 
governed by statutory authority, as will be explained in more detail in the chapter II. 
A more advanced feature of the public money stewardship concept is achievement of 
"value for money" for the use of resources. Value for money could be defined in different 
ways, but generally denotes the obligation of public bodies to make the best use of the 
resources at their disposal and obtain three Es - economy, efficiency and effectiveness. In 
this sense, "economy" is concerned with minimising costs, "efficiency" with achieving 
the maximum output from a given input, while "effectiveness" is concerned with the 
extent to which policy objectives have been achieved. 
On the basis of the outlined standards, we may conclude that the key objective of 
financial accountability is to attain stewardship of public money through securing the 
principles of legality, regularity, propriety and value for money for the use of public 
funds. 
The next question to be raised is the definition of the first dimension of accountability-
who is the accountee in the financial accountability relationship? Who is the one who 
undertakes the action and spends the public money? Who is the one to be held to account, 
to provide information, explanation and be the subject of possible sanction? 
It may be argued that the state/Government as an entity is the accountee of financial 
accountability. At a lower level of generalization, it is the executive who is authorized to 
spend public money and which is, therefore, called to give an account of its actions. 
Lastly, financial accountability accountees are the officials who deal with public funds, 
and who, therefore, can individually be held accountable for dealing with public funds. 
The question which naturally follows IS what do we understand by the 
'state' /Government/executive? Not attempting to get into details of the theory of the 
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state, we shall just point out the key elements of these concepts, necessary for carrying 
out our comparative research. 
In the continental law tradition the concept of the state is a key notion of legal and 
political theory. The state is perceived as an autonomous actor supreme to its citizens. 79 
The state is thus defined as an "abstract identity bearing inherent responsibility for the 
performance of public functions". 80 
In contrast, in the Anglo-Saxon legal tradition the clear state conception is missing and 
reference is usually made to the term 'Government' .81 The term state is generally used 
only at the level of international relations or in the terms of welfare state. This is 
explained by the lack of the ideological barrier between the state and its citizens, 
developed during centuries of authoritative rule on the continent. 82 It should further be 
noted that the Government can have a narrow meaning in the sense of only elected 
politicians holding office, that is, ministers; or it can have a broad sense and include not 
only ministers but also the whole range of public organizations, such as departments, 
agencies, along with the civil servants and other officials. 
For the purposes of our research, we shall use the Anglo-Saxon term Government in its 
broader sense (unless being more strictly specified), encompassing the variety of entities 
or units that in addition to fulfilling their political responsibilities and their role in 
economic and social regulation "deliver public services for individual or collective 
consumption and redistribute income and wealth.,,83 Furthermore, we shall at times 
79 Cf B. Connaughton, "Teaching Ideas and Principle of Public Administration: Public Education in 
Europe", paper presented at EPAN conference in Granada, 2002. 
80 Cf C. Knill, The Europeanisation of National Administrations, (Cambridge University Press, 2001), p. 
73. 
81 Cf R.J. Stillman, Preface to Public Administration, (New York: St. Marint's), 1991. 
82 Cf C. Knill, op.cit, p. 73. 
83 Cf R. Allen, D. Tommasi (eds.), Managing Public Expenditure, A Reference Bookfor Transitional 
Countries, SIGMA, OECD, 2001, p. 44. 
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interchangeably use the terms "state" and Government, as concepts with the same 
meaning of encompassing the variety of organisations of a country's public sector. 
Nevertheless, we shall attempt to be consistent throughout our research and base it on the 
concept of the Government as explained above, in order to avoid possible confusion. 
There exist several possible levels of Government operations: general, central, regional, 
local and supranational. 'General Government' is a term used to describe all government 
entities at whatever level, central, regional or local. 'Central Government' is used to 
denote entities responsible for those functions that affect the country as a whole: for 
example, national defense, conduct of relations which other countries and international 
organizations, establishment of legislative, executive and judicial functions that cover the 
entire country, and delivery of public services such as healthcare and education.84 'Local 
Government', in tum, is a collection of public bodies with authority over a subdivision of 
a significant area of country's territory. 'Regional Government' has independent 
authority for certain functions in a significant area of country's territory.85 Supranational 
level of Government operates beyond all above mentioned national Government 
institutions and represents a particular international layer of administration, such as, for 
example, the European Union. 
Due to the great complexity of the contemporary state and its possible operation at 
several different levels, we shall restrict our research to financial accountability 
arrangements established at the central Government level. This means that local and 
regional levels of governance shall be excluded from our area of interest, since they raise 
specific financial accountability issues and require separate treatment. Financial 
accountability established at the supranational level of Government will be a subject of 
our special interest and will be analysed in more depth in the chapter IV. 
84 Ibid. 
85 Ibid. 
32 
The following crucial dimension of accountability, which needs to be addressed is the 
one which defines the principal of the financial accountability relationship. In order to 
provide the answer to this question, it is necessary to draw a conditional distinction 
between two main types of political regimes - despotic and democratic. It may be argued 
that financial accountability relationships exist in both kinds of regimes. Officials in both 
despotic and democratic regimes are held accountable for dealing with public funds by 
their superiors.86 However, while in despotic regimes the highest superior, and therefore 
the main principal of financial accountability is the ruler, in democratic regimes the 
ultimate principals/accountors of the financial accountability relationship are citizens.87 
As our financial accountability research is focused on the analysis of the democratic state, 
we may conclude that the ultimate accountor's power in the financial accountability 
relationship belongs to citizens. 
It should be stressed that the financial accountability relationship established between the 
Government and the citizens is in many ways problematic. The main reason for this is the 
practical impossibility of close and detailed scrutiny of the Government's actions by the 
citizens. Such a situation has brought about a need for the introduction of the mentioned 
third actor/s in the accountability relationship - representative or professional body/ies, 
which would, on the citizens' behalf, provide "indirect" supervision of the executive.88 
Therefore, it is possible to talk about several 'levels' of financial accountability. 
Financial accountability in its core sense is a "democratic" accountability, as a 
relationship established between the Government and its citizens, where citizens, through 
direct (elections) or more often indirect means and institutions (representative institutions 
and other bodies), are holding the Government to account for stewardship of public 
money. The core financial accountability relationship assumes that citizens need to be 
assured that possible public wrongdoing is minimized within government at all levels in 
86 Cf P. Day, R. Klein, op. cit. pp. 8-9. 
87 Ibid. 
88 Cf F. White, K. Hollingsworth, op. cit. pp. 7-8. 
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the chain of command. This implies the reassurance that sufficient internal and external 
checks exist so that reliable outside judgment can be made on Government operations.89 
It is obvious that the core financial accountability relationship relies on a number of more 
specific financial accountability relationships and controlling devices as its securing 
mechanisms. These supporting accountabilities/ accountability mechanisms are 
established between key state institutions and can be initially classified as external or 
internal to the executive. It may be argued that the main loci of financial accountability is 
external, since key accountability mechanisms are established outside the executive's 
structure (with parliament, external audit institution, judiciary etc.). However, since the 
executive can fulfil its external accountability responsibilities only if it is efficiently and 
effectively performing its internal duties, the financial accountability relationship is also 
established within its internal structure, between public officials dealing with public 
funds and their administrative/managerial superiors, through establishment of a number 
of controlling mechanisms. Therefore, we can see that financial accountability 
encompasses features of various previously mentioned types of accountabilities -
external political and public accountability on the one hand and internal 
managerial/administrative on the other hand, which are all connected by one common 
denominator - the aim of securing and safeguarding of public money. 
Before making the final specification of the concept of financial accountability and its 
securing mechanisms, we should further examine the historical origin and nature of the 
financial accountability relationship, which will help us draw the final conclusion on the 
concept of financial accountability in the remainder of this chapter. 
Origins of financial accountability 
Accountability for the use of public money has always been at the centre of attention of 
politicians, philosophers, lawyers, economists as well as ordinary people. In the old ages, 
89 Cf a.p. Dwivedi, lG. Jabbra, op. cit., pp. 5-7. 
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the Greek philosophers devoted considerable attention to handling of public money. 
Aristotle, thus, wrote: 
"Some officials handle large sums of public money; it is therefore necessary to have other officials to 
receive and examine the accounts. These inspectors must administer no funds themselves. Different cities 
call them examiners, auditors, scrutineers and public advocates ".90 
During history, the notion of financial accountability was developing and gammg 
different meanings, depending on the nature of the Government itself. 
During medieval history, the key pattern of accountability was expressed in 
accountability of a servant to a ruler.91 This pattern of accountability was complicated by 
the growth of the state, when the servant was no longer able to render account to the 
ruler, but had to deal with the royal auditors. 92 The nature of financial accountability, 
however, was not changed in this way, as the ruler remained the main accountor. The 
same remained true under the absolute monarchies of the Renaissance and the Baroque 
Age.93 The other main feature of such accountability was its secrecy of operation, far 
from the eyes of citizens. The ruler had to learn what his servants had been doing, so that 
he would be able to promote or punish them. Private persons, on the other hand, did not 
need to know about the functioning of administration and in most of such regimes were 
not allowed to do so. 
The broadest trend of the state development from the seventeenth until the twentieth 
centuries was to break the hierarchy of the medieval history down and distribute power 
more widely. A very important part of this movement was to distinguish a law-making 
function from an executive or administrative function and to entrust them to different 
90 Cf Aristotle, The Politics and Constitution of Athens, S. Everson (eds.), (Cambridge University Press, 
1996). 
91 Cf E.L. Normarton, op. cit. p. 3. 
92 Ibid, pp. 3-5. 
93 Ibid. 
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elements of the state. This was the idea of the separation of powers, expressed by 
Montesquieu.94 In that sense, the legislative power was dissociated from the executive 
and judicial power. Legislative power rested with a democratically elected parliament, 
which obtained one of the most important functions - voting the money to the executive 
power.95 
The first elements of a democratic financial accountability were developed in medieval 
England, in a struggle between the Parliament and monarch over finances. 96 In fact, the 
English Parliament owed its origin and existence almost entirely to the English age-old 
determination not to be taxed without consent (see Annex 1).97 Interestingly enough, it 
was through the achievement of this end that British representative institutions secured 
political freedoms for British citizens much earlier and much more effectively than the 
Parliaments which had originated through fight for political freedoms. 98 
The earliest financial demand was for legislative control of taxation; the control of 
expenditure gradually followed, with the requirement of proper accounts.99 These had to 
be public documents, so that the spirit of secrecy in financial administration had to be 
broken. The idea of finance as a private dynastic secret was incompatible with the 
constitutional state. Therefore, ideas of democratic financial accountability were 
spreading to most newly established constitutional states. 
94 Cf Montesquieu, The Spirit of Laws, (University of California Press, London), 1977. 
95 Cf D. Coombes (ed.), op. cit., pp. 13-21. 
96 S. Walkland, "Parliamentary control of public expenditure in Britain", in D. Coombes, The Power of the 
Purse, (London George Allen & Unwin Ltd.), p. 179-198. 
97 P. Einzig, The Control of the Purse - Progress and Decline of Parliament's Financial Control, (London, 
Secker & Warburg), 1959, p. 17. 
98 Ibid. 
99 E.L. Normarton, op. cit. p. 5.; lE.D. Binney, British Public Finance and Administration 1774-92, 
(Oxford Clarendon Press), 1958, pp. 4-5.; I.E. O'Brien, The Scottish Parliament in the 15th and 16th 
Centuries, Ph.D. Thesis (Glasgow, 1980), 180. 
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Thus, the United States Constitution states that: 
"No Money shall be drawn from the Treasury but in Consequence of Appropriations made by Law; and a 
regular Statement and Account of Receipts and Expenditures of all public Money shall be published from 
time to time. ,,]00 
The French Revolution went much further and proclaimed a doctrine of popular 
sovereignty over finance: 
"All citizens have the right to ascertain, either in person or through their representatives, the necessity for 
public taxation, to consent freely thereto, to observe its expenditure and to determine its apportionment, its 
assessment, its collection and its duration. ,,]0] 
Establishment of the constitutional state has changed the pattern of accountability. Now 
accountability started being exercised between the executive and citizens, which, in 
. h l' 102 practlce, meant, to t e par lament. 
In order to be fully implemented in practice, financial accountability demanded the 
development of an appropriate securing mechanism, starting from the structure of 
financial planning, accounting and banking to the establishment of auditing institutions. 
In that respect, the introduction of financial law, by which the legislature reinforced its 
control over finance, was of immense importance. The role of the budget for 
accountability was that it provided quite precise standards by which annual accounts were 
judged. Accountability thus became a comparison of the accounts submitted at the end of 
the cycle with the authorization of expenditure laws made at the beginning. 103 
100 Article I, Section 9 of the USA Constitution. 
101 Article 14, Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen, 1791. 
102 Cf E.L. Normarton, op. cit. pp. 7-8. 
103 Ibid, pp. 10-11. 
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Although the executives retained strong powers of leadership within most legislatures, by 
the end of the XIX century, the legislature had an absolutely prime interest in effective 
accountability.104 This was not simply a matter of preventing financial scandals, but 
mainly the question of power itself. Firm restrictions on the executive to the financial 
limits set by law was the key element of legislative influence over policy, as well as over 
the cost of everyday administration. 105 
Since the First World War, however, the state itself has tremendously changed. Public 
spending has vastly increased in most European countries, including those of Central and 
Eastern Europe. l06 The state has taken over a number of the activities reserved in the 
previous period only for the private sector. The number of state employees has 
continually grown from one year to another. The imposition of vast operations, which 
Government has taken over from the private sector, upon the relatively small and fragile 
state machinery has had two clear results. There has been a crisis of planning and a crisis 
of accountability. 107 This amounted to a crisis of the whole system of financial control, 
experienced in all advanced countries. 108 
The subordination of administrative bodies to the traditional political powers became 
more and more difficult to achieve as the number of civil servants grew, together with the 
problems with which they had to handle in everyday life. The commonest reaction to "big 
government" has been merely to expand old public bodies. But the expansion has often 
104 P. Einzing, The Control of the Purse, (London, Seeker & Warburg, 1959); B. Chubb, The Control of the 
Public Expenditure, (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1952) pp. 42-71. 
105 Cf E.L. Nonnarton, op. eit. p 8. 
106 P. Else, "The Seope and Content of Govemment Expenditure", in D.Coombes, The Power of the Purse, 
(London George Allen & Unwin Ltd.), pp.22-45; P. Enzing, The Control of the Purse, (London, Seeker & 
Warburg), pp. 223-232. 
107 E. L. Nonnarton, ibid. 
108 Ibid. 
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upset the arrangements for the democratic financial accountability, bringing about new 
challenges for keeping its proclaimed democratic nature. 109 
Nature of the financial accountability relationship 
The question which arises from the above discussion is whether the "democratic" notion 
of financial accountability as we described above, the accountability established between 
the state and the citizens, does accurately describe reality, or whether the elements of 
financial accountability relations in despotic states still remain visible in a modem state. 
Putting it the other way around, is spending of public money by the state still in many 
ways based on power and coercion, or does it represent a sole reflection of the unwritten 
social contract, where both parties have given their consent to enter the financial 
accountability relationship, maintained through regular elections? 
This question leads us to another key issue which needs to be addressed when talking 
about financial accountability. It is the question of the nature of the basis of financial 
accountability. 
Any serious search for providing the answer to this question necessarily leads to the 
writings of constitutional philosophers. Although the concept of financial accountability 
is rarely, if ever, mentioned in their writings, the nature of the financial accountability 
relationship cannot be comprehended without understanding broader concepts, primarily 
the concept of political and public accountability. As we could see, the concept of 
financial accountability has many common features with the notions of political and 
public accountability. This should not be surprising, bearing in mind that the 
development of a constitutional theory of political accountability went hand in hand with 
the development of the public financial accountability and substantial efforts of 
parliaments to overtake control of finance from the monarchs. 110 
109 Ibid. 
110 Cf P. Day, R. Klein, op. cit., pp.l2-l3; 
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The key theorists providing the theoretical basis for the development of the public 
accountability concept are certainly Thomas Hobbes, John Locke and Jean-Jacques 
Rousseau. The main idea presented in writings of all the three philosophers is that of a 
social contract. Government is established by the "social contract" between those who 
exercise public power and those who are expected to obey public power. The former hold 
authority and exact obedience only in so far as they pursue the interests of the latter. 
Should officials substitute their own interests or misinterpret common interests, the 
public is no longer bound by the social contract and could withdraw its support and find 
other officials who would respect its wishes. In short, public officials are responsible and 
accountable to the people on whose behalf they exercise public power. lll 
The theory of social contract can easily be applied to the financial accountability 
relationship. In this sense, it may be argued that a basis of financial accountability 
relationship is a hypothetical agreement concluded between the state and the citizens, 
where the citizens have entrusted their monies to the Government, which has in tum 
taken the responsibility of using the respective funds in the pursuit of the public good. 
Looking from the level of statal institutions, it may further be argued that the Parliament 
has entrusted the money to the Executive, and is holding it to account for its spending. 
The basis of the financial accountability relationship can further be located in the theory 
of democracy, which plainly claims that: "power emanates from the people and is to be 
exercised in trust for the people". I 12 Putting this the other way around, we may well argue 
that money emanates from the people and therefore has to be exercised in trust for the 
III Cf 1. Locke, Second Treatise o/Government, (1.M. Dent & Sons Ltd, London, 1924); 1.1. Rousseau, The 
Social Contract, (Penguin books, London), 1968; D. Gauthier "Hobbes's Social Contract", in C.W. Morris 
(ed.), The Social Contract Theorists, (Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc), 1999. 
112 Cf B.L.R. Smith "Accountability and Independence in the Contract State", in B.L.R. Smith and D.C. 
Hague (ed.), The Dilemma 0/ Accountability in Modern Government - Independence versus Control, 
(Macmillan, 1971), p. 26. 
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people. The state is responsible for the proper handling of public money and has to 
continually give an account of its actions to the public. 
Turning to the question of the nature of the financial accountability relationship, we are 
of the opinion that the social contract theory is quite a valuable means in explaining the 
essence of the financial accountability relationship. Furthermore, the social contract 
theory definitely provides a good theoretical basis for understanding the nature of 
financial accountability. The problem which may, however, arise while relying on the 
social contract theory is its obvious falsity. The contract between the state and the 
citizens in general has never actually existed. Are we not then relying for our theoretical 
understanding on something for which we are sure has nothing to do with the reality? 
The answer to this question is that social contract theory should not, at any point, be 
interpreted literally, but metaphorically.ll3 In that sense, it may be argued that the main 
idea of social contract theory is that societal institutions and arrangements are the 
creation of people and cannot be sustained without their support for a long period of time, 
even in the case of the most severe despotic regimes. Henceforth, we would argue that 
the basis of financial accountability needs primarily to be searched for in the willingness 
of people to transfer part of their private funds to the state, expecting the proper handling 
of those funds in return. 
Quite a separate issue worth discussing is whether the concept of financial accountability 
as described and explained above accurately depicts the contemporary reality, reflected in 
often found feelings of the citizens that the state is taking more than it is actually giving? 
Furthermore, citizens may experience immense difficulties in trying to hold the 
Government to account for the spending of public money and there is almost no doubt 
that any individual effort in that respect will be in vain. Citizens may also feel that 
entering the financial accountability relationship with the state is the corollary of state 
coercion rather than their own will. 
113 Cf C.W. Morris (ed.), The Social Contract Theorists, (Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc), 1999. 
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All these criticisms of the concept of financial accountability outlined above certainly 
have their relevance. However, they still cannot override the general framework of the 
financial accountability relationship, which is, in our opinion, primarily based on the 
special kind of contractual relationship existing between the citizens and the state. 
Specification of the Concept of Financial Accountability and its Securing 
Mechanisms 
After attempting to define the nature of financial accountability and trace its historical 
origins, it is necessary to define more precisely the scope of financial accountability 
concept that will be used in our research. 
It could be argued that the financial accountability relationship, in its widest sense, 
encompasses two broad processes: 1) adequate taxation, i.e. raising and collection of 
money from citizens in an appropriate manner and 2) adequate allocation and use of these 
resources. Although there is undoubtedly an integral relationship between these 
processes,114 financial accountability in our understanding refers only to the second 
process, where the emphasis is placed on the responsible and productive use of public 
money, i.e. public expenditure. The process of taxation and collection of public money, 
i.e., taxes, charges etc. represents a special area of research, which requires particular and 
extensive attention and exceeds the limits of our research. 
Furthermore, it is necessary to specify the concept of financial accountability in relation 
to the overall process of public expenditure management. In this sense, it is useful to 
distinguish between several key stages of public expenditure management: 
1) Expenditure planning by the executive 
2) Parliamentary debate and approval 
114 R. Allen, D. Tommasi, op. cit., p. 19. 
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3) Spending of the money voted 
4) A . c: h 115 ccountmg lor t e money spent. 
The public expenditure management process could thus be depicted as follows. The 
Executive first plans the expenditure and then asks Parliament for authorisation of 
expenditure of public funds. The necessity of Parliament's authorization of expenditure 
(as well as taxation), called in British constitutional tradition as the "power of the purse", 
is a focal point of Parliament's authority to hold the Government to account. If the 
authorisation is denied, the Government of the day is forced to resign. If, on the other 
hand, the approval is granted, it means that the Parliament has entrusted public money to 
the Government, who is responsible for ensuring that arrangements are in place to 
safeguard these funds and is held accountable for how it has used the money. 
The essence of the financial accountability relationship lies in the Parliament's 
authorisation of the public expenditure plans (as well as revenue) by legislation. 
Authorising expenditure legislation provides a framework of law, which is the basis for 
calling the Government to account for its actions. Statutory approval of expenditure thus 
provides a good foundation for exercising financial accountability, which in most basic 
form consists of a comparison of the submitted accounts to those initially approved. I 16 
115 Cf F. White, K. Hollingsworth, op. cit. p. I. It should be noted that in the UK and many other countries, 
draft laws on public expenditure proposals and tax changes are presented to parliament separately. The 
spending side of the budget is provided in supply estimates, which subsequently lead to the Appropriation 
Act. The tax side of the budget eventually leads to the Finance Act. From 1993-1996, the British 
Government started to present to Parliament its expenditure decisions along its tax proposals in a 'unified 
Budget', but afterwards got back to the earlier practice of separate presentation of revenue and expenditure 
side. In contrast, in most continental law tradition countries (including France and Serbia), revenues and 
expenditures are always presented jointly in the budget law. Therefore, continental law public finance 
theory generally distinguishes between 4 key stages of budget management: planning of the budget, 
approval of the budget, execution of the budget and budget control. Cf. G.Paovic-leknic, Kontrola budzeta 
~ jugoslovensko i italijansko pravo, Podgorica, 1999. B. lelicic, Nauka ° jinancijama ijinancijsko pravo, 
(Narodne novine, Zagreb), 1990. D. Aleksic, Finansije i jinansijsko pravo, (Informator, Zagreb), 1982. 
116 Cf L. Normanton, op. cit. pp. 6-7. 
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Henceforth, it may be concluded that only after the expenditure has been appropriately 
planned and authorized is the accountability relationship established between its 
numerous actors. Although it may be argued that the initial stage of expenditure planning 
subsumes some elements of ex-ante accountability, our financial accountability research 
will not encompass this preliminary phase. Instead, our analysis shall comprise the 
second phase of Parliamentary debate and approval of expenditure (as the key aspect of 
ex-ante financial accountability), but will primarily focus on the third and the fourth 
phase of public expenditure management, when the public money is being spent and after 
it is spent and is being accounted for (as ex-post financial accountability). 
Variety of Financial Accountability mechanisms 
The Government can be held accountable by the Parliament and, in the last resort, 
citizens, only if there are appropriate accountability mechanisms to ensure that money is 
spent in accordance with Parliamentary wishes. ll7 The Government thus has an 
obligation to the citizens for providing a credible legal/regulatory framework which will 
be able to support and secure the stewardship of public money. 118 Furthermore, numerous 
accountability mechanisms must exist outside of the Government structure to enable 
citizens to hold the Government to account for the stewardship of their money. 
The ultimate financial accountability mechanism is established directly between the 
Government and citizens. Taxpayers hold the state to account for management of monies 
which they have entrusted to it. The state has to give an account for its spending to 
citizens assuring the taxpayers that their money has been spent not only in a proper but 
also in a productive way. Otherwise, the legitimacy of the Government of the day will be 
put in question. If the citizens are not satisfied with the way their money has been 
handled the sanction they may impose is the change of Government at the next elections. 
117 Cf F. White, K. Hollingsworth, op. cit. p. 3. 
118 The World Bank, Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Country Financial Accountability Assessment, 2002. 
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Therefore, it may be argued that elections represent the ultimate and direct financial 
accountability securing mechanism within a system of representative democracy. 
Transferred to the terrain of statal institutions, the basic framework for accountability has 
in most parliamentary democracies been provided by the concept of ministerial 
responsibility to Parliament. The minister is obliged to give account for the exercise of 
power within his/her department and provide explanations and justifications for the 
undertaken course of action.119 Although having undisputable constitutional value, 
ministerial responsibility to Parliament represents just one and perhaps not the most 
important mechanism for securing financial accountability of the Government. Financial 
accountability is primarily safeguarded by a number of different forms: Parliament's 
activity, work of parliamentary investigatory committees, internal controls and reporting 
mechanisms within departments and external audit. 120 
It should further be noted that traditional emphasis placed on Parliament's key role in 
securing financial accountability (especially in the UK, but also on the continent) has for 
quite some time been questioned. 121 The general opinion has been that parliamentary 
control over public expenditure is rapidly declining and that traditional concepts which 
place Parliament at the centre of the financial accountability mechanisms may bring more 
confusion than clarification. 122 It has further been argued that many procedures 
established for the purposes of parliamentary control over public funds remain under 
heavy influence of the Government 123. Bearing in mind the importance of parliamentary 
119 Cf F. White, K. Hollingsworth, op. cit. p. 4; Z. Loncar, Ministarska odgovornost [Ministerial 
Responsibility], PhD Dissertation, Novi Sad, 1999. 
120 Cf Lord Sharman of Redlynch, op. cit. pp. 9-25. 
121 Cf G. Reid, The Politics of Financial Control, (Hunchinson & CO), 1966, p.62; Heclo H., Wildavsky 
A., The Private Government of Public Money (2nd edn, Macmillan, 1981), 1. Harden, "Money and the 
Constitution: Financial Control, reporting and audit", [1993], Legal Studies, 16. 
122 Cf D. Coombes et aI., The Power of the Purse, (London George Allen & Unwin ltd), 1976. 
123 Cf 1. McEldowney, "The Control of Public Expenditure" in J.Jowell, D.Oliver ed., The Changing 
Constitution, (Oxford University Press), 2000. 
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control over public expenditure, as a democratic means of holding the Government 
financially accountable to the public, many voices have been raised for the establishment 
of more effective procedures helping the Parliament to hold the Government to account 
for the use of public money.124 Due to obvious crises in the current post-modem political 
systems, many authors are calling for the introduction of more effective extra-
parliamentary pressures in both constitutional systems as a whole and area of public 
d· 1125 expen Iture contro . 
In most parliamentary democracies, external audit provides a key mechanism which on 
behalf of the taxpayer scrutinizes how Government uses the money voted to it and holds 
Government to account. Throughout the world, national audit bodies have been 
established with the task of examining the regularity and efficiency of use of public funds 
and reporting their findings. 126 Although the organizational arrangements and practices 
widely differ from country to country, reflecting various administrative cultures and 
traditions, their work is based on the same general principles: organizational and financial 
independence of the audit office, ability to decide its own work programme as well as the 
right to freely report the findings of their work. 127 
Although the external audit over public finances provides the substantive basis for 
effective financial control, its limitations as a sole instrument of financial control and 
accountability remain obvious. One of the main criticisms of audit processes is that they 
make public officials risk averse, constraining development of innovative ideas and new 
124 Ibid; 1. Garrett, "Developing State Audit in Britain", Public Administration Vol. 64, 1986. 
125 Cf P. Barberis, "The New Public Management and a New Accountability", Public Administration Vol. 
76, 1998.451- 469; Smith, "Post-modem Politics and the Case for Constitutional Renewal", Political 
Quarterly 65,1994, pp. 128-37. 
126 In most Central and Eastern European countries, external audit institutions have been established after 
the fall of the Berlin Wall and are slowly building their capacities for auditing of public funds. 
127 Cf Lima Declaration of Guidelines on Auditing Precepts, available on the INTOSAI web site, 
www.intosai.org . 
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approaches to service delivery.128 Audit procedures have also been criticized for their 
opacity and lack of transparency. 129 However, the key complaint against audit is that its 
observations and remarks are too late, that the errors and waste of money has already 
occurred at the time the audit is taking place and that nothing has been done in order to 
prevent it. Although, it may be argued that audit has certainly a preventive function in a 
sense that plain knowledge that the accounts will come under scrutiny at some point of 
time will discourage negligent behaviour,130 it is obvious that external control can not 
bring about great results if it is not underpinned by active, internal financial controls, 
exercised by the Government itself. 
The widely held opinion is that sound financial accountability depends on a combination 
of both strong internal, managerial accountability and independent external audit. 131 It is 
not disputed that internal, mostly preventive, control of public spending is a necessity of a 
modem, financially accountable state, as much as external, ex-post control by 
independent auditors. Responsibility for safeguarding of public funds rests undoubtedly 
with the management of the Government bodies receiving the money, who are 
responsible for establishing effective arrangements for control. Such arrangements 
include the measures taken to verify the legality and regularity of expenditure before it is 
made (ex ante accountability) and those which occur after the expenditure is made (ex 
post accountability). 
Internal accountability systems in Europe vary from country to country, depending on 
different traditions and socio-Iegal backgrounds. Broadly speaking, two main approaches 
to internal financial accountability can be discerned. The first one can be found in 
countries of continental Europe (France, Portugal, Spain) where the controls are 
exercised by a third party organization, often an agency of a ministry of finance. A 
128 Cf A. Lovell "Notions of Accountability and State Audit: A UK Perspective", Financial Accountability 
& Management, 12(4), November 1996. 
129 Cf M. Power, The Audit Explosion, (Demos, 1994), pp. 48-49. 
130 Cf E.L. Normanton, op. cit. p. 83. 
131 Cf Lord Sharman of Redlynch, op. cit. 9-25. 
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second approach, which can be found in the UK, Netherlands and the Scandinavian 
countries, is based on decentralization of financial control from the Ministries of finance 
to heads of line ministries or officials in the budget and finance departments of these 
public bodies, where the role of the Ministry of finance is one of the coordinator, who 
remains responsible for the overall effectiveness and consistency of the systems. 132 It 
may be argued that the centralized continental approach emphasizes respect for legality 
and regularity of expenditure, while the devolved system is more focused on ensuring 
that priorities and objectives of an agency are achieved. 133 
In the past two decades, internal control systems of both groups of countries have 
experienced gradual harmonization, mainly towards greater devolution of internal control 
functions to agency's management, which is taking overall responsibility for the 
management of funds, and abolition of controls exercised by a third party organisation. 
With increasing devolution of managerial discretion and financial responsibility, 
ministries, departments and agencies face increasing pressures to show that their 
managers have used their money and other resources in a way that accomplishes their 
functions efficiently. The question that remains, however, is which type of system of 
internal control would be most suitable for transitional countries, who are facing 
numerous challenges in building new systems of financial accountability. 
There are number of types of internal control, whose aim is to improve performance and 
reinforce financial accountability in the public agencies and bodies. Those are: financial 
accounting and reporting, accounting controls, procurement controls, physical controls, 
performance measurement, internal audit. 134 
I32 Cf R. Allen, D. Tommasi (eds.), op. cit. pp. 260-261. 
133 OECD Policy Brief, Public Sector Modernisation: Modernising Accountability and Control, (OECD 
Observer), 2005. 
134 Ibid. 
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Establishment of appropriate accounting systems has an increasingly important role in 
securing financial accountability. Once the authorized money has been spent, it has to be 
firstly accounted for and then audited subsequently. There are two key accounting 
techniques relevant for current public sector: cash and accrual accounting. 135 Under cash 
based accounting, transactions and events are recognized when cash is received or paid. 
Furthermore, there is no accounting for assets and liabilities. Accrual-based systems, in 
tum, recognize transactions or events at the time economic value is created, transformed, 
exchanged, transferred or extinguished and when all, not only cash flows, are recorded. 136 
This means while the cash accounting measures only flow of cash resources, accrual 
accounting includes all the revenues and expenses (including depreciation) 137, assets 
(financial and physical, current and capital), liabilities and other economic flows. 138 It 
may therefore be argued that accruals accounting presents a truer picture of the financial 
costs of an organization. Furthermore, accrual accounting basis are believed to encourage 
good stewardship of public money.139 However, cash accounting also has its advantages 
over accrual. It is simpler, cheaper (since it requires less work and expertise), less 
subjective and comparable to monetary data. 140 It should be noted that accounting bases 
in many countries are not based solely on cash or accrual accounting, but most of the 
time represent a mixture of the two systems, with different variants. 
Internal audit is another valuable tool in securing financial accountability. Internal audit 
could be defined as "independent, objective assurance and consulting activity designed to 
135 Cf F. White, K. Hollingsworth, op. cit. pp. 15-25. 
136 R. Allen, D. Tommasi, op. cit., p. 437. 
137 Depreciation techniques are those which spread the costs of assets over their lifetime. Expenses in 
accrual accounting, therefore, reflect the amount of goods and services consumed during the year, whether 
or not they are paid for in that period. 
138 R. Allen, D. Tommasi, op. cit, pp. 291-292. 
139 Cf F. White, K. Hollingsworth, ibid. 
140 Ibid, R. Allen, D. Tommasi, ibid. 
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add value and improve an organization's operations.,,141 Historically, internal auditing 
has solely focused on financial systems and financial controls within an organization. 
However, the role of internal audit has been changing and widening over time. Thus, in 
the past few decades, the internal audit function extended to examination of various kinds 
of risks to the organization and reviewing the adequacy of the underlying activities to 
manage those riskS. 142 Nevertheless, the role of the internal audit in financial matters has 
remained quite valuable and very important for building reliable new transitional systems 
of financial accountability. 
Conclusion 
The concept of financial accountability, as a relationship in which citizens hold the 
Government to account for the stewardship of public money is fairly complex and 
intricate. Establishing and securing an effective financial accountability relationship 
requires setting up of a network of internal and external financial accountability 
mechanisms, including adequate accounting, reporting and internal and external auditing. 
However, it needs to be emphasized that financial accountability is not only about 
establishing and maintaining accounting and auditing systems and checking the legality 
of public expenditure. Financial accountability goes further, requiring the Government to 
manage finances prudently and regularly inform the public what has been achieved with 
the use of public funds. 143 Therefore, in procedures of both internal and external financial 
accountability, the emphasis is gradually shifting from the classical concern of regularity 
and propriety of public expenditure, to "value for money" investigations, which examine 
141 The Institute ofInternal auditors, Internal Control Systems in Candidate Countries, Volume 2, SIGMA, 
OECD,2004. 
142 Ibid; Cf N. Hepworth, "Is the modem UK/US approach to internal audit appropriate in all 
circumstances and especially for countries with less developed systems and less well trained public 
officials", unpublished manuscript, 2004. 
143 Cf The World Bank, "Clean Government and Public Financial Accountability", OED Working Paper 
Series, No.17, Summer 2000. 
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whether economy, efficiency and effectiveness in the use of resources has been attained. 
Growing attention has furthermore been paid to the establishment of systems of 
performance measurement144 within Government departments, which should enable the 
Parliament and the public to assess how well public money is spent and what has been 
achieved with it. Finally, increasing attention has lately been paid to the regular reporting 
on the financial control findings to the public, which should attain greater transparency in 
the conduct of public finances and reinforce the level of trust between state and citizens 
when spending of public money is in question. 
Finally, it should be stressed that financial accountability mechanisms cannot be analysed 
as isolated phenomena, but as mutually interrelated elements, which are in the process of 
constant interaction, mutually supporting their structures and functions. Therefore, we 
can easily talk about financial accountability in terms of a system,145 which consists of 
different mutually related elements/mechanisms of financial accountability. It should be 
stressed that the effectiveness of financial accountability as a system depends mostly on 
the existence of a proper balance between its different supporting mechanisms, so that 
weaknesses in one form of financial accountability can be compensated for by controls 
through other mechanisms. 146 
There are a number of different systems of financial accountability, varying from one 
country to another. As pointed out in the introduction, our research shall be based on the 
analyses and comparison between three different national systems of financial 
accountability: British, French and Serbian and one supranational system of the European 
Union, aiming at providing possible recommendations for improving the Serbian system 
in order to achieve standards necessary for the EU membership. The first national 
financial accountability system to be analysed in the next chapter is the UK system. 
144 Perfonnance measurement can briefly be described as the use of measure and targets to assess 
objectively the perfonnance of a body. 
145 Cf L. Bertalanffy, General Systems Theory, (George Braziller Publishers), 1969. 
146 Cf T. Verheijen, M. Millar, "Refonning public policy processes and securing accountability: Ireland in 
a comparative perspective", International Review of Administrative Sciences, 1998, p. 98. 
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Chapter II 
Financial Accountability in the United Kingdom 
As we saw in the first chapter, financial accountability is a relationship established 
between the citizens, as accountors, and the state, as accountee, where citizens hold the 
state to account for the stewardship of entrusted public money. This rather abstract 
definition involves three main aspects of the accountability notion - who is accountable, 
to whom and for what. Understanding financial accountability in the United Kingdom 
necessitates operationalisation of this definition and clarification of its elements in the 
British context. As the to whom dimension of financial accountability seems to be rather 
clear and, in our opinion, does not require further elaboration, we shall devote our closer 
attention mainly to two/three other categories of financial accountability. Firstly, we shall 
discuss the meaning of the accountee/agent of the financial accountability, i.e. the British 
central Government. Secondly, we shall analyse in more detail the for what dimension of 
financial accountability, aiming at the provision of a framework for the understanding of 
the concept of "stewardship" of public money in the British Government context. The 
focus of our inquiry, furthermore, will be placed on the fourth financial accountability 
dimension - mechanisms through which the accountability relationship operates. As the 
effectiveness of a financial accountability depends mostly on the existence of a proper 
balance between the different mechanisms, so that weaknesses in one form of 
accountability can be compensated for by controls through other mechanisms, 147 we shall 
identify the key financial accountability mechanisms in the UK focusing on their role in 
the overall British system of financial accountability. 
147 T. Verheijen, M. Millar, "Reforming public policy processes and securing accountability: Ireland in a 
comparative perspective", International Review of Administrative Sciences, 1998, p. 98. 
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A Highly Complex Accountee - the British Central Government 
The British Governmentl48 operates within a political system of constitutional monarchy, 
without a written Constitution. Ministers of the Crown govern in the name of the 
Monarch, who is both the Head of the State and head of the Government. Sovereignty, 
however, is vested in the UK Parliament. In constitutional terms, the Westminster 
Parliament consists of the directly elected House of Commons, the House of Lords 
(traditionally unelected) and the monarch. 
It should be noted that in recent years, the British Constitutional arrangements have been 
subject to substantial changes aimed at making a clear separation between three powers: 
legislative, executive and judicial. These reforms, introduced by the Constitutional 
Reform Act 2005, involve the modification of the office of Lord Chancellor,149 detaching 
the UK highest court from the Upper House of Parliament and the creation of a UK 
Supreme Court l50 and an independent Judicial Appointments Commission,151 to allow 
greater level of independence of the judiciary from the executive. Such an ambitious 
reform agenda has prompted intense academic and professional discussionl52 and its 
outcomes are yet to be seen in the years to come. 
148 As we saw in the I chapter, the term Government can have a narrow meaning in the sense of only 
elected politicians holding office, that is, ministers; or it can have a broad sense and include not only 
ministers but also the whole range of public organizations, such as departments, agencies, along with the 
civil servants and other officials. We shall use it in the latter meeting throughout this chapter. 
149 In accordance with Part 2 of the Constitutional Reform Act 2005, the Lord Chancellor is no longer a 
judge nor exercises any judicial function. 
150 Part 2 of the Constitutional Reform Act 2005. 
151 Part 4 of the Constitutional Reform Act 2005. The Judicial Appointments Commission was created on 3 
April 2006. 
152 Cf. A. Le Sueur, "New Labour's next (surprisingly quick) steps in constitutional reform", Public Law, 
Autumn, 2003, pp. 368-377. R. Masterman, "A Supreme Court for the United Kingdom: Two Steps 
Forward, but One Step Back on Judicial Independence", Public Law, 2004, pp. 48-58; V. Lay, "A Small 
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The executive power in the UK is in the hands of the government departments, as policy-
making bodies and agencies, whose role is to implement government policy and advise 
ministers. Ministers are individually accountable and responsible for the work of their 
departments and agencies to Parliament and have a duty to report to Parliament on their 
policies, decisions and actions. IS3 Britain has a disciplined two party (perhaps now three 
party) system, in which Government has quite a strong power to implement its policies. 
Bearing in mind that our research is focused on the central Government level, we shall 
define the "who is accountable" dimension of accountability by defining the scope of the 
British central Government level. This is not an easy task, largely due to substantive 
changes which the British public sector experienced under the 18 years of Conservative 
Government (1979-1997), transforming it from a welfare to a contract model. 154 Aiming 
to reduce public expenditure, the Conservatives undertook excessive privatisation and 
increased private and voluntary provision of public services. In central Government, 
executive functions have been largely "hived off' from central departments to Next Step 
agencies. ISS At the same time, in order to attain their economic objectives, the 
Conservatives had to create a strong central Government which would be able to 
effectively carry out its policies. Therefore, a whole range of new, non-democratically 
elected public bodies (so called - quangos) was appointed. IS6 Since 1997 the structure of 
Sense Behind the UK Constitutional Reform", http://ezineartic1es.com; Lord Windelsham, The 
Constitutional Reform Act 2005: Ministers, Judges and Constitutional Change, Public Law, 2005, pp. 806-
822. 
153 It should be noted that the constitutional accountability of ministers is based on convention of 
ministerial responsibility, which should be distinguished from Ministers' managerial accountability. Cf D. 
Woodhouse: "The Reconstruction of Constitutional Accountability", Public Law, Spring, 2002. pp. 73-90. 
154 S. Horton, D. Farnham, "The Politics of Public Sector Change", in S. Horton, D. Farnham (eds), Public 
Management in Britain (MacMillan Press ltd.), p. 3. 
155 At the moment there are more than 100 such bodies, employing around 75 per cent of all civil servants. 
156 Cf. M. Flinders, M. Smith (eds.), Quangos, Accountability and Reform (Pal grave, MacMillan), 1999; D. 
Farnham, S. Horton, "Managing Public and Private Organisations", in S. Horton and D. Farnham (eds.), 
Public Management in Britain, (MacMillan Press ltd.), 1999. pp.26-29. However, it should also be noted 
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the British Government has undergone further profound changes, since legislative and 
administrative authorities have been devolved to regional institutions of Scotland, Wales 
and Northern Ireland. The processes of devolution and closer European integration, have 
further added to the complexity of the British Government organisation. 157 All these 
developments have undoubtedly added to the complexity of the ways in which public 
services are provided and funded and therefore have strong implications for audit and 
financial accountability. 
The term which has often been used to embrace the great diversity of British public 
sector is "public bodies". However, it seems that even this notion is not broad enough to 
encompass all the expanding variety of organisations. The vast and complex range of new 
organisations which government has invented to carry out public functions together with 
the great number of private or voluntary bodies which provide public services are not 
recognised as public bodies. 158 The picture gets even more confused when taking into 
account the mergers of bodies and the change of organisational status of a number of 
bodies within the public sector as well as outside of it. 159 Furthermore, criteria for 
classifying public bodies are not straightforward and clear-cut, albeit the Cabinet Office 
has made an effort to assist departments to identify the likely classification of new and 
existing bodies that fall within their remit, by instructions given in its Guidance on 
classification of public bodies. 16o 
that the use of ann's length bodies to deliver public services has a long history, for some ofthem dating 
back to XIX century. 
157 N. Burrows, Devolution, (Sweet and Maxwell), 2000; 1. Greenwood et aI., New Public Administration in 
Britain, (Routledge, 2002), p. 19. 
158 S. Weir, W. Hall (eds.), Democratic Audit - Extra-governmental Organisations in the United Kindgdom 
and their accountability, (the Charter 88 Trust, 1994), pp. 6-7. 
159 Ibid. 
160 Cabinet Office Guidance for Departments, Classification of Public Bodies, August 2005. 
htlp://www.civilservice.gov.uk/other/agencies/pubhcations/pdf/classification guidance aug05.pdf 
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Although there is a number of provisional classifications of British public sector 
organisations,161 the officially accepted one is of the Office of National Statistics which is 
done with the reference to ESA95. 162 A body is classified into a public or private body 
depending on who controls the general corporate policy of the body concerned. Once the 
Office of National Statistics has classified a body as public sector it is then classified to a 
. I b b d . h .. 163 partlcu ar su -sector ase on Its c aractenstlcs. 
According to the Office of National Statistics, the UK public sector is comprised of the 
following sub-sectors: 
Central Government (CG): includes Government Departments and their Agencies; 
the devolved administrations in Scotland, Wales and (when reinstated) Northern 
Ireland, Non-Departmental Public Bodies and any other non-market bodies 
controlled and mainly financed by them; 
Local Government (LG): those types of public administration that only cover a 
specific locality and any non-market bodies controlled and mainly financed by 
them; 
Public Corporations (PC): market bodies controlled by either Central Government 
or Local Government. These can include government-owned companies and 
trading funds. 164 
Relying on this definition of the British public sector, we shall restrict our research to the 
first element of the public sector, which is perceived to constitute a central Government 
level: government departments, government agencies and non-departmental public bodies 
(quangos) and any other non-market bodies controlled and mainly financed by them. 
161 S. Horton, D. Farhnam, op. cit., pp.3-4; L. Sharman of Redlynch, "The Review of Audit and 
Accountability for Central Government", February 2001, www.hm-treasury.gov.uk; Times Books, 1995, 
Times Guide to the British State, London: Times Books. 
162 European System of Accounts 1995, 
http://forum.europa.eu.int/irc/dsis/nfaccountlinfor/datalesa95en.htm 
163 Cabinet Office Guidance for Departments, Classification of Public Bodies, ibid. 
164 Ibid. 
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However, the devolved administrations in Scotland and Wales, shall, due to 
distinctiveness of the financial accountability mechanisms operating in this sphere of 
governance, be excluded from our research. Local Government institutions shall also be 
left out from our sphere of interest, due to the separate financial accountability regimes 
under which they operate. Public Corporations, on the other hand, shall be the subject of 
our research, provided that they are controlled by the Central Government level. 
Concept of "stewardship" of public money in UK 
There are two main conceptual categories which could be subsumed under the notion of 
"stewardship" of public money in the British context. Stewardship firstly encompasses 
basic financial requirements of regularity, propriety and probity of the public 
expenditure. Secondly, stewardship involves requirements related to issues of value for 
money in the use of resources and compliance with principles of economy, efficiency and 
effectiveness. Although these two categories of public money "stewardship" are usually 
perceived as quite separate matters, one dealing mainly with questions of conformity with 
relevant rules and legislation and another examining productivity of the use of public 
funds, there have been some tendencies which have brought these two categories 
together, not only in everyday practice of auditors and accountants, but also in the terrain 
of administrative law. Before examining this issue further, we shall look closer at each of 
the elements of the concept of "stewardship" of public money in the British Government. 
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According to the Treasury's Government Accounting Guide,165 regularity is seen as a 
"requirement for all items of expenditure and receipts to be dealt with in accordance with 
legislation authorising them, including any applicable delegated authority and the rules of 
the Government Accounting.,,166 This means that all expenditure and receipts have to be 
authorised by Parliament in the first place and then also comply with Treasury rules, set 
out in the Government Accounting Guide. When talking about parliamentary 
authorisation of expenditure, it may be argued that there are two elements of control. 
Firstly, expenditure must conform with the ambit of the relevant Parliamentary Vote of 
the Appropriation Act, which is legally binding. The expenditure, however, does not rest 
solely on the authority of the Appropriation Act. While the Appropriation Act represents 
a quantitative allocation of money between Government's priorities, it may be argued 
that permanent legislation provides a qualitative framework for the purposes to which 
government can spend requested money.167 If, however, there is a conflict between the 
Appropriation Act and permanent legislation, two possible options exist. The first one is 
that the terms of the Appropriation Act will prevail and spending under the Appropriation 
Act will be regular (although not necessarily proper), notwithstanding that restrictions of 
165 The Treasury's Government Accounting: A guide on accounting andfinancial procedures/or the use 0/ 
government departments, is a large guide on wide variety of issues relating to the proper handing and 
reporting on public money, which is regularly updated with amendments (London: HMSO, 1989 and 
several amendments 1989-05). While in formal terms the Government Accounting guide represents 
Treasury's own rules (rules made by administration), it also derives support and legitimacy from other 
sources, such as Parliament and especially the Public Accounts Committee. The Government Accounting is 
thus quite wide in scope and encompasses variety oflegislative requirements (much of the guidance 
concerning the use of the Contingencies funds, trading funds, the role of the National Audit Office and the 
Comptroller and Auditor General) and practices of parliamentary procedure that Parliament has adopted 
over the years for handing public money as well as specific agreements reached between the Treasury and 
Parliament (e.g. advice on the 1932 Concordat between the PAC and the Treasury). It further contains rules 
and practices that have been laid down only by the Treasury, which are mainly designed to secure good 
financial control, promote high standards of propriety, improve value for money throughout the 
administration. Cf http://www.government-accounting.gov.uklcurrentlframes.htm 
166 Government Accounting, supra, n. 3, 6.2.14. 
167 F. White, K. Hollingsworth, Audit. Accountability and Government, (Clarendon Press. Oxford, 1999), 
pp.65-66. 
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permanent legislation are not respected. 168 This understanding, however, has been 
challenged by the Courts, which held that voted funds in the Appropriation Act cannot 
cure the invalidity of the permanent legislation authorising the expenditure. 169 Therefore, 
it may be inferred that expenditure must conform both to the ambit of the relevant Vote 
and permanent legislation in order to be regular. 
Finally, regularity requires expenditure be authorised by the Treasury. The principle is 
that no expenditure or commitment can be undertaken without Treasury approval, even 
after being voted by Parliament and included in an Appropriation Act. This requirement 
has been put on a statutory footing by the Government Resources and Accounts Act 
2000. 170 In practice, the Treasury delegates to departments the authority to spend within 
defined limits, as will be discussed in more depth later. 
The next requirements of public money stewardship are propriety and probity. Propriety 
is defined by Government Accounting as a "further requirement that expenditure and 
receipts should be dealt in accordance with Parliament's intentions and the principles of 
Parliamentary control, including the conventions agreed with Parliament".17l It could be 
noticed that this definition is very similar to one of regularity. However, propriety is 
wider than regularity and is concerned more with the standards of conduct, behaviour, 
fairness and integrity (avoidance of personal profit from public business, even-
handedness in the appointment of staff, open competition in the letting of contracts 
etc.)172 Questions of propriety, as previously mentioned, could be raised when the terms 
168 Cf Public Accounts Committee Concordat, 1932, Government Accounting 8/94, Amendment No.6; T. 
Daintith, "The Legal Effects of the Appropriation Act", Public Law [1998], pp. 552-557. 
169 Cf. Fire Brigades Union case (R v Secretary of State for the Home Department. ex parte Fire Brigades 
Union and others, 2 AC 5l3, [1995] 2 All ER 244, [1995] 2 WLR 464). 
www.cicap.gov.uklcase_law/documentslProcedure/r_v _ secretary _ of_state _ ex ~arte _ fbu.pdf 
170 Subsection 2(b), section 3 of the Government Resources and Accounts Act 2000. 
171 Government Accounting, supra, n. 3, 6.2.14. 
172 Auditing Practice Board's Practice Note 10, Audit of Central Government Financial Statements in the 
United Kingdom. 
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of the Appropriation Act are in conflict with permanent legislation. In that case, spending 
will be proper only if Parliament has been expressly notified of the intention and effect of 
the vote by an appropriate note in the estimate and if the strict temporal restrictions on the 
use of this device are respected. 173 Lastly, the requirement of "probity" appears to go 
beyond regularity and to overlap with notions of propriety to include a standard of 
honesty and integrity. 
It is quite interesting, especially for a lawyer, to note that the concept of stewardship of 
public money in the UK does not recognise the principle of 'legality'. This raises 
important concerns. There is no doubt that the requirement that spending be authorised by 
legislation is a legal requirement. 174 Therefore, it does not seem to be plausible that a 
requirement for "all items of expenditure and receipts to be dealt with in accordance with 
legislation authorising them" defined in Government Accounting as "regularity" is not 
covered by and generally used as a principle of "legality". Confusion between the two 
principles can be misleading both to the executive and the public, who may believe that 
shortcomings in safeguarding public funds are of far lesser importance (irregular instead 
of illegal expenditure). Therefore, it would be important to distinguish and clearly stress 
the legality elements in the control of public expenditure. 
Nevertheless, it is hard to believe that the public money stewardship requirement of 
legality will soon get the place it deserves. This is due to nature of the control of public 
expenditure, which is mainly in the hands of accountants (from the National Audit 
Office) and only to a minimal extent exercised by the Courts (as will be pointed out 
later). Therefore, it should not be surprising that the concept of legality has not been fully 
developed and that the accountancy term 'regularity' very much prevails over the 
lawyers' usual obsession with the 'rule of law' issues. Or as some would argue: "It is a 
173 T. Daintith, op. cit, pp. 552-557. 
1741. Harden, F. White, K. Hollingsworth, "Value for Money and Administrative Law", Public Law, 1996, 
pp.677-678. 
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language of the auditor's certificate, not of the judge's opinion".175 Only if Courts start 
playing more important role of control of public expenditure (as is the case with the UK 
local level) could it to be expected that the principle of legality will obtain a much more 
prominent place within the concept of stewardship of public money. 
The second broad category of requirements of public money stewardship is one dealing 
with issues of value for money: economy, efficiency and effectiveness. Whereas the 
National Audit Act make explicit reference to these requirements, it is silent as to the 
exact meaning of these terms and to date no court has given a legal definition of it. 
However, academic discussions and audit practices have provided some deeper insight 
into the meaning of these concepts which could be depicted as follows: 
1) economy - minimising the cost of resources used or acquired - spending less. A lack 
of economy could occur, for example, when there is overstaffing or when 
overqualified staff or overpriced facilities are used; 
2) efficiency - the relationship between the output from goods or servIces and the 
resources used to produce them - spending well. Efficiency seeks to ensure that the 
maximum output is obtained from the resources devoted to a department (or 
programme), or alternatively, that only the minimum level of resources are devoted to 
a given level of output. 176 
3) effectiveness - the relationship between the intended and actual results of public 
spending - spending wisely.177 Studies which focus on effectiveness look at the 
difference between the intended and actual results of public spending and the quality 
of service delivered. 178 Effectiveness indicates whether results have been achieved, 
irrespective of the resources used to achieve those results. 
175 T. Daintith, A. Page, The Executive in the Constitution: Structure, Autonomy and Internal Control, 
(Oxford University Press), 1999, p. 172. 
176 1. Glynn, Value for Money Auditing in the Public Sector, (Institute of Chartered Accountants in England 
and Wales), 1985. 
l77 NAO annual report 1999 - Helping the Nation to Spend Wisely. www.nao.gov.uk 
178 NAO annual report 2000. www.nao.gov.uk. 
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The question which we would like to raise at this point is the relation between the 
requirements of value for money and the rule of law. As we have discussed earlier, most 
of the elements of the basic financial requirement of regularity can be subsumed under 
the principle of legality while requirements of propriety and probity seem to have broader 
meaning and cannot be identified with strictly legal issues. Should, furthermore, value for 
money principles be perceived as indicators of legality of public expenditure? Should 
public expenditure be deemed illegal if economy, efficiency and effectiveness in the use 
of public funds have not been attained? 
This question has rarely been raised either in practice or in academic writing, due to 
traditional non-interference of the common law courts in the process of control of public 
expenditure. However, the challenge of public money spending before the court occurred 
in the case R. v. Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, ex parte World Development 
Movement Ltd, the Pergau Dam Case,179 when the World Development Movement 
(WDM) sought judicial review of the Foreign Secretary's decision to spend money from 
the overseas development budget on the Pergau Dam project in Malaysia. 180 This has 
opened a number of controversies when different elements of public money stewardship 
are at issue. 
179 [1995] 1 WLR 886, [1995],1 All ER 611. 
180 The agreement between Foreign Secretary and Malaysian government was made in July 1991. In 1994, 
the Secretary refused to abandon the scheme, despite the negative advice given by the Overseas 
Development Administration. The applicant was challenging both the initial 1991 agreement and 1994 
Secretary's decision. Cf I. Hare, "Judicial Review and the Pergau Dam", The Cambridge Law Journal, 
Volume 54, part 2, 1995, pp. 227-230. Cf. White, I. Harden, K. Donnelly, "Audit, accounting officers and 
accountability: the Pergau Dam affair", 1994, Public Law, 526; P. Cane, "Standing up for the Public", 
Public Law, 1995,276 - 287; Overseas Development Institute, Changing Policies o/the Major Donors: 
UK case study, October 2003. 
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The Pergau Dam project was funded under the Overseas Development and Co-operation 
Act 1980, which provides that: 
"The Secretary of State shall have power, for the purposes of promoting the development or maintaining 
the economy of the country ... or the welfare of its people, to furnish any person or body with assistance, 
whether financial, technical or of any other nature. " 
The judicial review was based on the argument of the applicant that the Act assumed 
sound development purposes, although the word "sound" was not used in the legislation. 
The Court accepted the reasoning, holding that the project was so economically unsound 
that there was no argument in favour of it. Hence, it declared the decision unlawful. 
There have been two possible interpretations of the judgement. The first, supported by 
the Government and external auditors, is that the decision in the Pergau Dam project was 
dependent on the particular statutory context of the Overseas Development and 
Cooperation Act 1980 and that there are no more general implications of the judgement. 
The second is that the Pergau Dam case represents the application of a general principle 
of public law that public spending should represent value for money.181 This view finds 
its support in the provisions of the National Audit Act 1983 and numerous waves of "new 
public management reforms", which emphasise the importance of the achievement of the 
3 Es throughout the public sector. Proponents of this view argue that testing whether 
value for money for use of public funds has been attained could be done by using familiar 
categories of judicial review of administrative action, i.e. application of Wednesbury test: 
proposed expenditure is unlawful if, in relation to the object for which the money has 
been provided by Parliament, no reasonable minister could think that it represented value 
for money.182 
1811. Harden, F. White, K. Hollingsworth, op. cit., pp. 661-679. 
182 Ibid. 
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In our opinion, there is no doubt that the Court has based its judgement on a broader 
interpretation of the Overseas Development and Co-operation Act 1980. However, the 
fact that the court has interpreted legislation in such a sense, implies quite a strong case 
for the general application of the value for money principle by the courts in the future. 
The question, again, remains to which extent the courts will interfere in the control of 
public expenditure and if they would, whether they are equipped to make the complex 
economic judgements required to decide whether a particular decision represents value 
for money. 183 
All in all, the Pergau Dam decision has confirmed the importance of value for money 
issues when stewardship of public money is in question and proved that traditionally 
clear lines between the issues of regularity and propriety of public expenditure on the one 
hand and value for money on the other hand are being unequivocally blurred. Attainment 
of value for money in the use of public funds is no longer of secondary importance, but 
constitutes an equally significant part of the public money stewardship requirements. And 
this is something which all the involved actors of the British system of financial 
accountability should bear in mind constantly. 
Mechanisms of Financial Accountability 
The British system of financial accountability is based on parliamentary accountability. 
For several centuries, the British Parliament, assisted with its Committees and, later on, 
greatly supported by professional bodies, such as the National Audit Office (NAO) has 
been holding the executive to account for the stewardship of public money. The National 
Audit Office, as the supreme audit institution of the UK, is headed by the Comptroller 
and Auditor General (C&AG), who is the officer of the House of Commons and thus 
naturally reports to the Parliament. The key accountability link between the Parliament 
183 Ibid. 
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and the Executive is established through the work of Parliamentary Public Accounts 
Committee (PAC), which, supported by the work of the NAO, detects irregular and 
improper expenditure and investigates achievement of value for money, by calling 
government officials to account for the use of public money. 
In spite of its strong focus on parliamentary accountability, the UK financial 
accountability system very much relies on strong interlinks between the internal and 
external financial accountability mechanisms. The key executive financial department, 
the Treasury, holds the departments to account through numerous internal, managerial 
accountability mechanisms. Notwithstanding its powers of internal expenditure control, 
the Treasury, however, does not have any audit capability and therefore is dependent on 
the C&AG and NAO, to provide assurance on the reliability of departmental accounts. 
The second basic link between external and internal accountability mechanisms is 
provided in the role of an accounting officer, who is simultaneously involved in several 
accountability relationships. While his/her civil service position requires himlher to be 
loyal to the minister, hislher role of accounting officer makes him/her accountable 
directly to both the Treasury and the Parliament. 184 The whole system of financial 
accountability is based on trust and consensus of all the involved institutions and actors, 
which equally share the interest of securing public funds and where additional, external 
means of control are superfluous. 185 
It is still interesting to note that the Courts have only rarely interfered with this long-
lasting "self-contained" system of financial accountability. A direct challenge of public 
expenditure issues at the central Government level remains an exception to the rule. 
184 It is further interesting to note that accounting officers are not any longer personally liable for misuse of 
public funds. The last recorded instance of accounting officials personal liability appeared to have 
happened in 1920, when an accounting officer was called to repay the amount of misused public money. 
185 I. Harden, F. White, K. Hollingsworth, op. cit, pp. 670-671. 
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There have been only a few cases of direct challenge of public expenditure decisions186 
and a few which only indirectly affect public spending. 187 Whereas the scope for judicial 
intervention in public expenditure decisions at the local level has been quite wide, the 
role of the courts in controlling the public expenditure in Britain has up to now been 
minimal. 188 Major issues of public finance appearing before the courts have been only 
those of taxationl89 while the public spending have stayed aside of the court's agenda. 
This is partly a corollary of a long absence of a distinct system of administrative law and 
administrative courts in Britain 190 and partly the consequence of constitutional 
understanding of authorisation of expenditure. 191 While the constitutional requirement of 
legislative authorisation of taxation is based on individual private rights that are 
enforceable through the courts, there is no such correlate when legislative authorisation 
of government expenditure is in question. This has also contributed to the establishment 
of self-monitoring system of financial control in British central government, relying on 
trust between involved actors. 192 
Finally, it should be noted that the UK financial accountability legal framework has 
recently experienced notable changes through the adoption of the Government Resources 
and Accounts Act 2000,193 which the Treasury considers as the "biggest reform and 
modernisation programme in the management of the country's public finances since the 
186 Already mentioned Pergau Dam case and case Auckland Harbour Board v. The King [1924] (A C 318 at 
pp. 326-327) where it was found that payments made out of the Consolidated Fund without parliamentary 
approval were illegal. Cf l. McEldowney, Public Law, (Sweet and Maxwell), 3rd ed., 2003, pp. 371. 
187 For example Metzger and others v. Department of Health and Social Security. [1978] 1 W.L.R. 1046; 
[1977] 3 All E.R. 444 at 451. 
188 M. Elliott, "The Control of Public Expenditure", in l. lowell, D. Oliver (eds.), The Changing 
Constitution, (Oxford University Press, 2000), pp.20 1- 203. 
189 Woolwich Building Society v. Inland Revenue Commissioner (No.2) [1992] 3 All ER 737; Pepper v. 
Hart [1993] 1 All ER 86. 
190 Cf C. Harlow and R. Rawlings, Law and Administration, (Butterworths), London, 1997. 
191 Cf I. Harden, F. White, K. Hollingsworth, op. cit, pp. 670-671. 
192 Ibid. 
193 Government Resources and Accounts Act 2000, available at http://www.hmso.gov.ukiacts/2000/00020--
b.htm 
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Gladstone era". 194 The importance of this Act is that it has put on a legislative basis the 
governments' proposals for introduction of resource (accrual) accounting and resource 
budgeting into central Government. 195 The key objective of the introduction of resource 
accounting and budgeting is to improve the planning and control of Government 
spending as well as to improve departments' accountability to Parliament through more 
comprehensive financial information it will provide. 196 However, it is important to note 
that the passage of the Government Resources and Accounts Act has not in any way 
disturbed the operation of traditional financial accountability actors in the UK, as it 
occurred in some other systems in the last couple of years by adoption of the new 
legislation (notably in France, by the adoption of the LOLF in 2001; in the EU, by the 
adoption of new Financial Regulation in 2002 and in Serbia, by the Budget System Law 
in 2002, as will be discussed in the following chapters). The expected effect of this Act is 
rather only to enhance the efficiency and effectiveness of already existing balance 
between internal and external financial accountability mechanisms. 
Internal Financial Accountability Mechanisms 
It may be argued that during the previous century Britain has developed a regular and 
coherent system of financial accountability, primarily based on strengthening the control 
of the Treasury over spending departments. Thus, some authors claim that, instead of the 
194 H.M. Treasury News Release 195/99. Cf F. White, K. Hollingsworth, "Public finance refonn: The 
Government Resource and Accounts Act 2000", Public Law, 2000, pp. 56-61. 
195 Whereas the nationalised industries and local governments in UK have been using the accruals 
accounting for more than 20 years now, the central Government departments have expressed much more 
resistance to such a change in accounting approach. Cf. J. Perrin, "From Cash to Accruals in 25 Years", 
Public Money & Management, April-June 1998, pp. 7-10. 
1961. Chan, "Government Accounting: An Assessment of Theory, Purposes and Standards", Public Money 
& Management, January 2003, pp. 13-20. D. Heald, "The Implementation of Resource Accounting in UK 
Central Government", Financial Accountability & Management, 21 (2),2005, pp. 163-189. 
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other way around, Parliament became the Treasury's ally in a system of financial control, 
in which Executive largely polices itself. 197 
The Treasury regulates the work of departments primarily through its own rules and 
regulations, 198 in particular through the already mentioned guide, Government 
Accounting, which is regularly amended and contains a number of financial control 
. . d 199 conventIOns, practIces an statutory arrangements. 
The Treasury holds government departments to account primarily through a fairly 
flexible ex ante controls of public expenditure. The first ex ante role of the Treasury 
relates to the process of issuance of public funds to Departments. This process 
commences by the requisition of the Treasury to the C & AG to allow monies to be 
released from the Consolidated Fund and the National Loans Fund.2oo The Treasury then 
has the role to distribute the requested money to Departments.201 At this stage, it is the 
responsibility of both the C & AG and the Treasury to make sure that the issued amounts 
conform to the respective legislative authority.202 The system of ex ante control is further 
197 I. Harden, "Money and the Constitution: Financial Control, Reporting and Audit", Legal Studies 16, 
[1993], pp. 18-19. 
198 These are so-called Rules made by the Administration, Cf. P.P. Graig, Administrative Law, (Sweet and 
Maxwell), 1994, pp. 270-277. 
199 The latest Government Accounting amendments were made in 2005 (No. 4/05). 
http://www.government-accounting.gov.uklcurrentlframes.htrn 
200 The Consolidated Fund, established in 1787, is the government's account at the Bank of England into 
which all public revenues (taxes, duties, etc.) flow and from which all funds for the supply of public 
services are taken. The National Loans Funds, established in 1968, is the Government's principal 
borrowing account. Both Funds are operated by the Bank of England and the Treasury. Cf. F. White, K. 
Hollingsworth, op. cit. p.57; NAO, General Report of the Comptroller and Auditor General 2004-2005, 
www.nao.gov.uk 
201 Cf. Section 13 (for services charged directly to the Consolidated funds), and sections 14 and 15 (for 
issuance of funds for services which are subject of appropriation) of 1866 the Exchequer and Audit 
Departments Act. 
202 T. Daintith, A. Page, op. cit. pp. 117-118. 
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secured through the earlier mentioned regularity/legality requirement that no expenditure 
or commitments can be incurred without the approval of the Treasury.203 However, in 
practice the Treasury delegates to departments authority to enter into commitments and to 
spend within defined limits204, as it would be impossible for it to control every detail of 
expenditure.2os In order to secure some degree of control over departmental spending, the 
Treasury has concentrated on defining the sensitive expenditures which could be subject 
to irregularity and impropriety, such as: exceeding sub-heads within the votes, increase of 
establishment, salary or cost of services and additional works or new services.206 One of 
the main mechanisms of internal accountability in this respect is the virement process, in 
which the Departments are required to get Treasury's approval for transfers within the 
sub-heads of the votes. 
The last decade, however, has witnessed further reduction of Treasury ex-ante control 
and increase of the responsibilities of departments coupled by firmer Treasury monitoring 
over expenditure aggregates and management systems. One of the steps in this direction 
has been the simplification of estimates by reduction of the number of votes and sub-
heads within the votes which occurred in 1996.207 This resulted in the simplification of 
the virement process and relaxation of the Treasury's powers, as Treasury approval is 
now needed only for transfers between expenditure lines and not between numerous sub-
heads as required before the changes.208 Given that there are around 550 expenditure lines 
in comparison to earlier existing 2000 sub-heads, it is obvious that the control of the 
203 Subsection 2(b), section 3 of the Government Resources and Accounts Act 2000. 
204 Cf. paragraphs 2.4.3, 2.4.5 to 2.4.11, Amendment No.6, Government Accounting. 
205 Treasury's general view on its authority to control ordinary expenditure has been set out early on in a 
Treasury Minute of April 1868 (Roseaveare 1973: 172-3; Epitome I: 20-1). It's position was that control of 
ordinary expenditure was beyond its functions and that only in exceptional cases it should sanction 
departments. Cf T. Daintith, A. Page, op. cit. pp. 177-183 
206 Ibid. 
207 T. Daintith, A. Page, op. cit, pp. 159-164. 
208 Cf. Treasury and Civil Service Committee Fourth Report, Simplified Estimates and Resource 
Accounting, HC 212,1994-1995. 
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Treasury towards departments has been technically and substantially reduced?09 
Although relaxation of ex-ante Treasury approval has raised concerns within the 
Parliament on the loss of accountability, the Treasury has strongly argued that the 
accountability to Parliament will only improve, as Departments will take over full 
responsibility for spending of public money and will not be able to place the blame on 
Treasury for making their expenditure decisions.2lo The potential 'loss of accountability' 
the Treasury has compensated by introducing requirements on the methodology of 
expenditure decision-making, such as: checks on the quality of decisions, techniques for 
investment appraisal, project evaluation, electronic information management and the 
overall system of control of public expenditure through the running costs control.211 
As mentioned earlier, a key element of accountability for public money is the role of the 
Accounting Officer. The Treasury appoints the most senior official in a department as the 
Accounting Officer to be responsible for departmental expenditure. A departmental 
accounting officer is also normally the permanent secretary of the department. The 
responsibilities of an accounting officer are defined and promulgated in a document of 
constitutional importance - the Accounting Officer Memorandum.212 An accounting 
officer is responsible for the performance of a number of functions: signing the accounts 
(authorising payments and making commitments), ensuring propriety and regularity of 
the public finances; keeping proper accounts; for prudent and economical administration; 
the avoidance of waste and extravagance; and for the efficient and effective use of all 
available resources.213 It is also possible that in some departments other senior managers 
responsible for particular activities to be appointed as additional Accounting officers?14 
209 F. White, K. Hollingsworth, Audit, Accountability and Government, (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1999), 
pp.50-51. 
210 T. Daintith, A. Page, op. cit. pp. 178-179. 
211 Ibid. 
212 Government Accounting, Amendment No.4, 411992, HMSO, 1989. 
213 Government Accounting, 6.7, Amendment No 7, 3/97, HMSO, 1989. 
214 Ibid, 6.3. 
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An accounting officer is under a general duty to ensure that Ministers receive appropriate 
advice on all matters of financial propriety and regularity as well as regarding economical 
administration, efficiency and effectiveness.215 Until recently, two distinct regimes were 
applied when provision of advice to Ministers was in question, depending on whether the 
addressed matters were those of propriety and regularity or economy, efficiency and 
effectiveness of use of public money. Thus, where a Minister plans a course of action 
which the accounting officer considers would infringe the requirements of propriety or 
regularity, the accounting officer is obliged to forward his/her objections to the Minister 
in writing. In the case his advice is overruled, the accounting officer has a duty to inform 
the C&AG. If, furthermore, a minister decides to proceed with the expenditure despite 
communicated objections, the accounting officer has to seek written instruction from the 
minister before making the payment. At the same time, he/she has to inform the Treasury 
and C&AG on the developments without undue delay.216 If, on the other hand, the issue 
in question is one of economy, efficiency and effectiveness, the accounting officer is 
under a duty to draw the relevant factors to the attention of the Minister. However, if his 
advice is overruled, there is no duty that his findings be communicated with the Treasury 
or the C&AG?17 
It is interesting to note that the Pergau Dam case, which we analysed in more detail 
earlier, has brought about significant changes when provision of advice to ministers on 
value for money issues is in question. The accounting officer involved in the Pergau Dam 
project did object to the minister's decision to undertake the investment, but treated the 
issue as one of efficiency and effectiveness and not of regularity and propriety. 
Therefore, there was no requirement for the matter to be addressed to the Treasury and 
the C&AG and hence the case was not subject to wider financial scrutiny. In the wake of 
the Pergau Dam case, this stance has been changed and the Accounting Officer 
Memorandum has been amended requiring an accounting officer to inform the Treasury 
215 F. White, I. Harden, K. Donnelly, op. cit., pp. 526-534. 
216 Government Accounting, Amendment No.4, 4/1992, HMSO, 1989. 
217 F. White, I. Harden, K. Donnelly, op. cit. pp. 528-529. 
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and to communicate to the C&AG without undue delay the papers relating to all cases 
where ministers issue instructions on matters involving prudent administration and 
economical administration, efficiency and effectiveness.218 In this way, the constitutional 
responsibilities of the key actor of managerial financial accountability, the accounting 
officer, has been increased and the importance of prudent and productive use of public 
money in the British central Government context strongly underlined. 
The question which, however, may be posed is whether a single person at the top of an 
organisation can be really held accountable for every financial activity in a public body? 
Isn't this just a replication of the doctrine of ministerial responsibility, which has been 
criticised on a number of occasions?219 Although there is no doubt that accounting 
officers bear an extensive burden of the financial accountability role, Lord Sharmans' 
report on audit and accountability of Government conducted in 2001 strongly supports 
the view that the role of accounting officers is of continuing salience.22o In the 
discussions the Sharman team lead with the accounting officers, the accounting officers 
themselves found their role as a source of strength both in their relationships with 
ministers and ability to manage their departments and understood it as a "personal 
responsibility to safeguard the interests of the taxpayer".221 Such a personal nature of 
accountability, or better to say, responsibility for public money stewardship on the part of 
an accounting officer is regarded as essential to produce necessary incentives to ensure 
value for money of the use of public funds is achieved?22 The accounting officer's 
responsibility for stewardship of public funds has also been perceived as vital from the 
parliamentary perspective, as it establishes a clear line of accountability between the 
executive and the parliament. It may be argued that avoidance of political waters of 
Ministerial responsibility and the emphasis on comprehensive 'administrative' aspects of 
218 Government Accounting 6.1.5, December 1994. 
219 Cf D. Woodhouse, op. cit, pp. 73-90. 
220 L. Sharman of Redlynch, The Review of Audit and Accountability for Central Government, February 
2001, www.hm-treasury.gov.uk. p. 20. 
221 Ibid. 
222 Ibid. 
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accountability for stewardship of public funds entrusted to experienced civil servants, 
instead of politicians, generate much lesser potential for politicisation of issues of public 
spending and bring about much better results in safeguarding the tax-payers money. 
Nevertheless, it is understandable that the accounting officer cannot carry out his/her 
financial tasks well without support of other actors, such as the internal audit services.223 
Internal audit services do not constitute part of the Treasury, but are parts of departments, 
although their operation is regulated by the Treasury's Audit Policy and Advice unit 
through different guides, such as Government Internal Audit Standards and Internal 
Audit Training and Development Handbook. 224 The main role of the internal audit units is 
to provide advice and assurance to the accounting officer on the adequacy and 
effectiveness of the internal control systems, not only in financial matters, but also on 
other operational aspects of work. Over the last decade, internal audit is increasingly 
shifting its focus to financial issues and development of 'risk management' approach 
aimed at examination of various kinds of risks to the organization and reviewing the 
adequacy of the underlying activities to manage those risks?25 In order to provide 
adequate conditions for the work of audit units, it is very important to secure their 
independence of operation. Although their independent status has not been legally 
guaranteed, this does not seem to pose serious problems in their operation.226 One of the 
ways to strengthen their independence would certainly be establishment of a closer 
relationship with external auditors and continuous exchange of information between the 
two. In recent years, public bodies have started incorporating audit committees within 
their arrangements, whose role is to communicate directly to internal audit units and 
223 It should also, however, be noted that some departments also contract out their internal audit functions, 
Cf. F. White, K. Hollingsworth, op. cit. pp.52-53. 
224http://www.hm_ 
treasury.gov .ukl documentslfi nanci ai_management! governance_government! gg_ i ndex.cfm 
225 L. Sharman of Redlynch, op. cit. p. 23; NAO, General Report of the Comptroller and Auditor General 
2004-2005; 2003-2004, www.nao.org.uk 
226 F. White, K. Hollingsworth, ibid. 
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Accounting Officers, advising and reporting on audit and internal control issues.227 This 
has further strengthened the overall system of managerial financial accountability. 
This analysis of internal financial accountability mechanisms has underlined the links 
between the internal and external accountability mechanisms in UK. In order to obtain 
the overall picture of the UK system of financial accountability, we shall attempt to 
reveal the 'heart' of financial accountability relationship in UK, by turning our attention 
to external financial accountability mechanisms which encompass the complex web of 
accountabilities established between the executive and the Parliament. 
External financial accountability mechanisms 
Parliamentary accountability 
Parliament's "power of the purse" is a basic principle of the British constitution and had 
an important role to play in establishment of the British Parliamentary system (see Annex 
1 ).228 It traditionally consists of three elements: the right to give prior approval to the 
raising of finance through taxation, the right to approve the total and allocations of 
expenditure of public funds and the right to control the execution of the expenditure?29 
Since Government must have money in order to function, this principle theoretically 
provides a powerful way for the House of Commons to control government spending.23o 
For a mainland European lawyer, the first interesting feature of the British 'power of the 
purse' is a separation of procedures of Parliament's approval of the taxation and 
expenditure. Whereas the revenue side of the Government plans is presented separately 
227 L. Sharman of Redlynch, op. cit. p. 22. 
228 A.v. Dicey, Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution (19 th edn, Macmillan, 1960), p. 447. 
229 D. Coombes et aI., The Power of the Purse, (London George Allen & Unwin Ltd), 1976, p. 386. 
230 I. Harden, "Money and the Constitution: Financial Control, reporting and audit", Legal Studies 16, 
[1993],pp.16-17. 
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though the Budget document, expenditure side is presented in a separate document, as 
will be explained in more detail later. 231 This is in contrast to the mainland Europe where 
the 'unity' of presentation of revenue and expenditure (unity of budget) represents one of 
the key features of the budgetary process. This, however, does not pose a problem to our 
research, which is, as defined in the first chapter, solely focused on the expenditure side 
of the financial cycle. 
UK Parliament authorises most public money to be spent through the supply process.232 
Each year the Government's request for resources is presented in the form of 'supply 
estimates'. These set out for each broad area of planned activity, the public funds the 
Government needs to pursue its policies. The estimates are approved by the Commons, 
but its formal acceptance is given by the whole of Parliament through the annual 
Consolidated Fund (Appropriation) Act (usually called Appropriation Act).233 
It is easy to note that the Parliament's expenditure element of the "power of the purse" 
does not involve its right to actually make spending decisions. On the contrary, the policy 
objectives on which the money is spent are almost solely determined by the Government 
of the day. Parliament is thus unable to initiate its own expenditure on its own behalf, but 
only to reduce it, which again happens very seldom.234 
231 It is interesting to note that from 1993 to 1996 the Government presented a 'unified Budget' comprising 
both planned revenues and expenditures, but the new Labour Government moved back to the old system 
from 1997. 
232 In addition to supply services, there are Consolidated Fund Standing Services, as payments for services, 
which Parliament has decided by statute, once and for all, to be met direct from the Consolidated Fund and 
they are therefore made independently from annual authorisation of expenditure. These are for example: 
issues to the Contingencies fund, payments to European Committees, civil list salaries, salaries and 
pensions of judges, office of Comptroller and Auditor General etc. Cf. Government Accounting, op. cit. 
Sections 1.1.7.,3.2.8. 
233 T. Daintith, A. Page, op. cit. pp. 156-157. 
2341. McEldowney, "The Control of Public Expenditure", in 1. lowell, D. Oliver, The Changing 
Constitution, (Oxford University Press, 2000), pp. 197-198. 
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In reality little substantial scrutiny is involved in a supply procedure, one of the reasons 
being that exhaustiveness of the issue makes complete and detailed discussion of the state 
expenditure impossible. Almost a century ago, the government and the Commons have 
observed a tacit agreement permitting the Opposition to decide which chapter of the 
estimates will be submitted to parliament to debate; the other chapters are adopted 
without debate or are voted together.235 Some authors are therefore of the opinion that the 
chapters designated by the Opposition are used only as an excuse for holding some 
general plenary debates on general policy, since, at the end, state expenditure is approved 
almost automatically.236 The House of Commons has also for many years tried to achieve 
some control over public spending through its Estimates Committees.237 However, the 
work of the Estimates Committees has generally proven to be unsatisfactory and detailed 
estimates control left to the full executive's command. Furthermore, since 1982 the time 
available for discussion on estimates has been restricted to 3 days between the 
presentation of the estimates and the summer recess, which has further lessened the 
opportunity of the Commons to get into serious discussion on the Government 
expenditure plans.238 During the XX century the Commons have never rejected the 
Government estimate. Indeed, the statement that "as far as the control of the estimates is 
concerned, the government of Britain is a constitutional dictatorship,,239 unfortunately 
still appears to be true. 
235 S. Walkland, "Parliamentary Control of Public Expenditure in Britain", in D. Coombes et aI, The Power 
of the Purse, (London George Allen & Unwin Ltd), 1976, pp. 179-197. 
236 J. Molinier, "Parliament's financial powers: a comparison between France and Britain", in D. Coombes 
et aI, The Power of the Purse, (London George Allen & Unwin Ltd), 1976, p. 170. 
237 Cf B. Chubb, The Control of Public Expenditure - Financial Committees of the House of Commons, 
(Oxford at the Clarendon Press) 1952; A. Robinson, Parliament and Public Spending, (Heinemann, 
London), 1978; V. Flegmann, Public Expenditure and the Select Committees of the Commons (Gower) 
1986. 
238 T. Daintith, A. Page, op. cit. pp. 156-157. 
239 P. Einzig, The Control of the Purse - Progress and Decline of Parliament's Financial Control, 
(London, Seeker & Warburg, 1959), p. 13. 
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The most often cited reason for a minimal role of the Parliament in the supply procedure 
is a strong party control over the members of the House of Commons.240 The general 
influence of Ministers where the government has a majority in the House of Commons 
substantially reduces the House of Commons' powers of control in practice. Although 
this argument certainly has some weight, the question which still remains is why the 
debate on the detail of taxation, in spite of the mentioned party-political limitations, 
continues to be lengthy and effective while the debate on the Government spending plans 
attracts so little attention of the MPs and the general public. The answer to this question 
perhaps lies in the higher degree of political controversy of taxation issues, which have a 
direct bearing on the citizens, where the spending decisions on the already collected 
money are further removed from the interest of the public and from their representatives 
in the Parliament. 
Further concerns over the role of the Parliament in the financial control of the executive 
have been raised in relation to important exceptions to the constitutional rule of 
obligatory authorization of expenditure. An example of a gap in Commons control over 
expenditure is the Contingencies Fund, which Government, without prior Parliamentary 
approval, may use to finance urgent expenditure,z41 The total expenditure of the 
Contingency fund, as a reserve fund intended to meet unforeseen items of expenditure, is 
considerable. However, the control of the fund is placed strictly on the system of internal 
Treasury control and audit.242 No Parliamentary committee directly monitors the use of 
the Fund and there are no satisfactory means to inquire into the policy behind the 
government's use of the Fund prior to the Fund being used.243 
240 A. Lovell, "Notions of Accountability and State Audit: A UK Perspective", Financial Accountability & 
Management, 1996, pp. 263-265. 
241 J. McEldowney, "The Control of Public Expenditure", op. cit. pp. 200-201. 
242 Government Accounting: A Guide on accounting and financial procedures for the use of Government 
Departments, Her Majesty's Stationery Office, London, 1989. 
243 As we have previously seen, the use of money from the Contingencies Fund has up to now created 
substantive difficulties. In 1994, the fund was used to fund the Pergau Dam project following the decision 
of the divisional court declaring the aid to be ultra vires. It should be noted that the doubts about the 
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The above discussion undoubtedly raises the question of possible ways of enhancement 
of key democratic institution in holding the Government to account for public spending. 
In that sense, it could be argued that the traditional rules on parliamentary financial 
control (the right to give prior approval to the budget, the right to approve allocations of 
expenditure, and the right to control the execution of the budget) are clearly not enough 
on their own to give parliament effective or meaningful influence over the scope, content 
and administration of modem public finance. 244 In order to address these longstanding 
issues, several positive changes have been introduced, such as: providing the House of 
Commons with better access to information about the assumptions on which budgetary 
decisions are based, in particular by the move towards accrual (resource) accounting and 
supporting its powers of scrutiny by the work of parliamentary committees.245 
Nevertheless, despite many advances in the procedures of financial control through 
improved transparency it remains uncertain to what extent the Parliament has and could 
enhance its role regarding financial accountability. A decrease of general Parliamentary 
power against the executive in the previous decades is usually explained by the generally 
dismissive and occasionally contemptuous attitude adopted by the Thatcher as well as, at 
legality of the fund were raised by MPs and members of the Treasury and Civil Service Select Committee 
in 1983, but have been seemingly resolved and the Fund therefore assumed to be legal. Since then, 
Parliament has never raised this issue again. 
244 D. Coombes et aI, op. cit, p. 386; H. Heclo, A. Widlavsky, The Private Government of Public Money, 
(1973); Hague et a!., Comparative Government and Politics (The MacMillan Press Ltd.), 1992. 
245 Over the years the presentation of the Estimates has become more attractive and readable and today they 
contain economic information and there are cross-references to the Departmental Report. In March 1998 
the Treasury published The Code for Fiscal Stability, (received statutory authority through the Finance Act 
1998), which provides key information on Government introduction of new monetary policies, with the aim 
to bring "openness, transparency and accountability" over monetary policy and improve MP's knowledge 
on economic and fiscal assumptions. On the other hand, the role of the Parliamentary Committees in 
controlling public spending, especially one of the Committee of Public Accounts, has in the last two-three 
decades substantially improved. Cf. 1. McEldowney, "The Control of Public Expenditure", op. cit. pp. 226-
228. 
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times, Blair governments towards Parliament.246 This was undoubtedly facilitated by the 
massive Commons majorities in both cases, which surely had an adverse effect on the 
Parliament's possibilities of effective executive control. However, previous years have 
witnessed lessening of the Labour party unity, which could enhance more effective 
Parliamentary control of the executive. In order for Parliament to make executive more 
accountable, it should try to utilize the full range of different means at its disposal in a 
coordinated fashion and in this way regularly demonstrate its independence from the 
., f h 247 restnctlOns 0 t e party managers. 
A key weapon of the parliament in securing financial accountability is the work of its 
most senior and most fonnidable committee, the Public Accounts Committee. Its role is 
to examine whether public money voted by Parliament has been spent in accordance with 
Parliament's intentions, and with due regard to issues of regularity, propriety and value 
for money. Work of the Public Accounts Committee is substantively supported by the 
external audit institution, the National Audit Office, without whose professional 
assistance the Committee's control would be almost impossible. On the basis of the NAO 
reports, the Public Accounts Committee calls officials to account for misuse of public 
money and reports its findings to the House of Commons. The Committee's reports and 
the government's responses to them are debated in an annual debate in the Commons and 
may be raised by MP's at other times. 
It should be noted, however, that the debates on the Public Accounts Committee's reports 
are not very popular parliamentary occasions, with attendance usually limited to 
frontbench spokesmen, members of the committee and members with a constituency 
interest in its reports.248 Some authors are of the opinion that this does not undennine the 
importance of parliamentary based scrutiny of public money spending. An annual debate 
2461. Greenwood et a!., op. cit., pp. 182-183. 
247 Ibid. 
248 1. Bates, "The Scrutiny of Administration", in M. Ryle, P. Richards, The Commons under Scrutiny, 
Routledge, 1988. 
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of this sort is considered to be a privilege not granted to other select committees and a 
reflection of the importance which is accorded to the work of the PAC.249 
It may, therefore, be concluded that the key financial accountability relationship is 
established not so much between the Parliament itself and the executive, but has been 
delegated by Parliament to PAC, which, on Parliament's behalf, keeps the Executive 
accountable for the stewardship of public money. Since the Public Accounts Committee 
and National Audit Office are the main institutions of the British system of financial 
accountability, we shall examine their roles and operations in more detail in the following 
discussion. 
Committee of Public Accounts (PAC) 
The PAC is the senior select committee of the House of Commons, with almost a century 
and half long tradition (see Annex 1). It was established in 1861 by Standing Order 122 
(now standing order 148). PAC consists of fifteen Members of Parliament, selected 
proportionally to the composition of the House. The work of the Committee is to be non-
partisan. Impartiality and independence of the Committee is partly secured by the 
constitutional convention that the President of the Committee is always a member of the 
opposition. The Committee's remit covers all central Government departments, executive 
agencies and NDPBs, the National Health Service and a wide range of other public 
bodies?50 The Committee carries out its investigations based on the accounts, reports and 
memoranda presented to Parliament by the C&AG. After examination of senior public 
officials responsible for the expenditure or income under examination, PAC produces its 
own reports, in which it sets out its recommendations to the public body in question.251 
249 F. White, K. Hollingsworth, op. cit., pp. 123-125; V. Flegmann, "The Public Accounts Committee: A 
Successful Select Committee?", Parliamentary Affairs, Vol 23, No.1, 1980, pp. 166-172. 
250 L. Shannan of Redlynch, op. cit. pp.39-41. 
251 Ibid. 
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The majority of PAC's hearings and reports are based on value for money (vfm) 
examinations.2s2 The PAC does not nowadays spend much time on matters of financial 
irregularity or constitutional impropriety. There are not many of them, and most which do 
occur are not of sufficient seriousness to warrant intervention by the Committee.2s3 Most 
of the PAC's work is based on the C&AG vfm reports on financial management, which 
are conducted in the areas of trade, industry, agriculture, overseas services, transport and 
health as well as various other public services. The choice of the study depends on the 
nature of the Government's actual programmes, likely interest of the subject to the 
Committee and the prospect of useful recommendations for improvement arising from 
their inquiries. 
The PAC hearings are usually based on an NAO report, either on the accounts of a 
department or public body or, more often on a vfm study?S4 The PAC usually decides on 
which case it will choose for further investigation on the basis of the briefing by the NAO 
and any independent research that a particular member may undertake. The members of 
the Committee are not individually in charge for any specific portfolio according to their 
particular interest or expertise, but are responsible for every NAO report. However, 
personal interest and expertise of members can have important impact on the choice of 
the case examined?SS 
The accounting officer of the respective public body in question is the main witness at the 
hearing. In addition to an accounting officer, the PAC can call anyone else to appear 
252 V. Flegmann, op. cit., pp. 166-172. 
253 D. Henley, A. Likierman, 1. Perrin, M. Evans, I. Lapsley and J. Whiteoak, Public Sector Accounting and 
Financial Control, (Chapman & Hall) 1992. 
254 F. White, K. Hollingsworth, op. cit, p. 49. 
255 The latest PAC reports are: Channel Tunnel Rail Link (4 May 2006), The refinancing of the Norfolk and 
Norwich PFI Hospital (3 May 2006), Tackling the complexity of the benefits system (27 April 2006), Inland 
Revenue Standard Report: New Tax Credits (25 April 2006) etc. All of them can be obtained at the PAC 
website: www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cmicmpubacc.htm 
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before it, except ministers.256 The PAC also invites the C&AG and Treasury Officer of 
Accounts, or their deputies, to attend every hearing. 
It may be argued that the proceedings conducted by the PAC are of a quasi-judicial 
nature, since witnesses are put in the position of defendants and are called to account for 
their actions.257 However, although the Committee can invoke personal responsibility of 
the accounting officer, it has lost a formal power to impose sanctions on him/her.258 
Sanctions available to the PAC are mainly of an informal nature, which, interestingly 
enough, does not undermine its effectiveness. 
The important question which arises in this respect is what sanctions may be imposed on 
a public official in relation to a PAC hearing? Firstly, if PAC comes across some serious 
irregularities, the official can become the subject of criminal investigation (fraud, 
corruption etc.). Secondly, irregularities in dealing with public funds may have impact on 
the approval of the following year's budget of the public body in question. Furthermore, 
there is a possibility of requiring compensation from the public official for the improper 
handling of public money. However, the sanction of compensation does not have 
sufficient weight, since the required amounts are usually fairly symbolic?59 Lastly, it 
seems that the main PAC's sanction from the public official's point of view is the mere 
fact of being summoned before the Committee. It has always been a matter of great 
importance to spending Departments to avoid giving an account to PAC on any question 
of regularity or propriety in its stewardship of public money, since it is perceived as an 
indication of misconduct, implying strong criticism on the departmental administration. 
256 F. White, K. Hollingsworth, op. cit., pp. 122-125. 
257 J. Molinier, "Parliament's Financial Powers: A Comparison between France and Britain", in D. 
Coombes, The Power a/the Purse, (London George Allen&Unwin Ltd.), 1976. 
258 The last recorded case when the sanction of personal liability was imposed on an accounting officer was 
in 1920. 
259 In 1984, NAO investigated the case of fraud in the procurement of the defence case. The accounting 
officer in charge was obliged to contribute a symbolic 10 pounds. 
82 
Moreover, appearance before the Committee requires lots of extra work and, if, repeated, 
may have far- reaching consequences for the career of the person involved. 
Unanimity in the work of the PAC is seen as very important for its effective work. The 
standard practice is that there must be unanimous support within the PAC for a report 
before it can be published.26o This is due to the fact that a unanimous report very much 
adds strength to the Committee's influence. In the past, some reports have been held back 
until unanimity was obtained. This means that the timing of the publication of the final 
report after the hearing can vary. The PAC report will encompass the recommendations 
of the Committee, based on the hearing. 
It should be noted that there is no automatic route for the implementation of the PAC's 
conclusions and recommendations.261 The Government responds to the PAC's report in 
the form of a Treasury Minute issued as a White Paper, which explains how it intends to 
follow up the committee's suggestions.262 This is published usually 2-3 months after the 
PAC report and it outlines which of the PAC's recommendations the government accepts 
and will act on, and those which it simply notes (that is, which will not be acted on). 
Departmental replies to the Committee's reports and recommendations thus provide quite 
a good evaluation of the impact which PAC has on the government administration?63 If 
the department or body in question does not accept any PAC recommendations, the 
Committee can return to the issue at some later point. If the PAC is not satisfied with the 
Government's response, it may make further investigations and hence produce another 
report, which happens in practice only rarely. 
260 F. White, K. Hollingsworth, op. cit, p. 50. 
261 S. Roberts, C. Pollitt, "Audit or Evaluation? A National Audit Office VFM Study", Public 
Administration, Vol. 72, 1994. 
262 Cf F. White, K. Hollingsworth, op. cit. pp. 132-132. 
263 Forty-five percent of departmental replies between 1966 and 1978 contained statements of the public 
bodies in question that certain actions are taken as a result of the PAC's recommendations. Cf 
V.Flegmann, op. cit., p. 169. 
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Although the PAC has the reputation of being one of the most formidable and successful 
parliamentary committees, its role in the control of public expenditure is undoubtedly 
limited and its achievements are not often spectacular. 264 One criticism of the PAC is that 
ex post facto review may be too late to be effective. The money is spent, the waste has 
occurred and inevitably it is difficult to trace and recover money. Related to that is the 
problem that PAC reports are published long after the event in question, when those 
responsible are no longer in the department and, thus, cannot be called to account.265 
Furthermore, PAC is at times criticised for lack of willingness to get into the true 
substance of the presented case, trying instead to "grab the headlines" and attract the 
audience of the MP'S.266 Its reports are therefore at times assessed as "eccentric, over-
enthusiastic and possibly subversive.,,267 Some officials consider PAC too critical of any 
failures, however small, even in cases when projects were generally successful. 
Furthermore, it has been suggested that the fear from PAC's censure discourage officials 
from considering more innovative projects.268 
Although all the mentioned shortcomings in the work of PAC certainly have some 
weight, they should not be overestimated. Whereas the ex post nature of PAC's work may 
be criticised for its ineffectiveness, ex post accountability, as we have seen in a previous 
chapter, always has an important preventive function. Although in general the Committee 
attracts little attention in Parliament and its modem role is not as influential as its 
nineteenth century role of setting good public-sector accountancy practice, its reports do 
get quite wide publicity and certainly have a strong impact on public bodies' financial 
decision-making and accountability.269 Delays in reporting could also not be taken as 
264 B. Landers, "Encounters with the Public Accounts Committee: a Personal Memoir", Public 
Administration, 2000, pp. 195-213. 
265 F. White, K. Hollingsworth, op. cit., p. 132. 
266 B. Landers, ibid. 
267 1. Garrett, "Developing State Audit in Britain", Public Administration, Vol. 64,1986,425. 
268 L. Sharman of Redlynch, op. cit. p. 40. 
2691. Bates, "The Scrutiny of Administration", in M. Ryle and P. Richards (eds.), The Commons under 
Scrutiny, (Routledge), 1988. 
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serious shortcoming, especially that the PAC, accustomed to work within the framework 
of an annual timetable, completes its inquiries and presents its reports more speedily than 
a number of other parliamentary committees and is regarded by many as the hardest 
working Committee of the Commons.270 The criticism related to expertise and neutrality 
of PAC members, however, should not be too easily dismissed. It may well be the case 
that the PAC reports are made with the attempt to attract attention of the Parliament as 
well as wider public as their key audiences, and therefore tend to overemphasise certain 
shortcomings, while not addressing less visible and more delicate administrative 
weaknesses. 
Finally, the key limitation of the PAC is that its 15 members, who hold two hearings per 
week when Parliament is in session, cannot handle the abundance of auditors work in 
modem times. The NAO already produces more reports than the PAC can examine. 
Possible ways forward in this respect could be subdivision of the PAC to subcommittees 
or delegation of PAC's work to departmentally related select committees.271 Another 
solution is that PAC focuses its attention on broader issues and outputs and not be 
concerned with minor matters and processes. In order to reduce its workload, PAC could 
still get involved with examination of issues of lesser importance, but would not need to 
hold oral hearings on them. This would also help dismiss the arguments that PAC focuses 
too much attention on smaller failures and thus discourages innovation. In relation to this, 
it has been recommended that PAC use its position of a cross-cutting committee to 
consider issues which go beyond the limits of individual departments, taking an overall, 
strategic view of the stewardship of public money (such as for example, risk 
management, corporate governance, performance measurement, fraud).272 It is expected 
that production of such kind of comprehensive high-level reports will bring about an 
270 V. Flegmann, op. cit., p. 169; A. Adonis, Parliament Today, (Manchester University Press), 1993, 
pp.184-185. 
27J Cf. F. White, K. Hollingsworth, op. cit. pp. 131-137. 
272 L. Sharman of Redlynch, op. cit. pp. 39-41. 
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increase in overall financial management standards throughout the various British public 
sector organisations. 
There is no doubt that the PAC has a major advantage over any other select committee 
because it relies on the work of the NAO. The good continuous cooperation with the 
Comptroller and Auditor General as auditor of public expenditure has thus been regarded 
as essential for the success of the PAC's work.273 
The Comptroller and Auditor General and the National Audit Office 
Status and structure 
The Comptroller and Auditor General (C&AG) and the National Audit Office have a 
long history of development, which is analysed in Annex 1. Their current status and 
functions are governed by three fairly different Acts: the 1866 Exchequer and Audit 
Departments Act,274 the 1921 Exchequer and Audit Departments Act275 (which repealed 
and amended most of the provisions of the 1866 Act) and the National Audit Act of 
1983276 (which also repealed and amended a number of provisions of the previous two 
Acts). 
The role of the C&AG and the NAO is to provide independent assurance and advice to 
Parliament on the proper accounting for, and regularity and propriety of central 
Government expenditure, revenue and assets. It is also to provide independent reports to 
Parliament on the economy, efficiency and effectiveness with which Government 
departments and other bodies use their resources. These reports form the basis for PAC 
hearings. The C&AG is responsible for the audit of a total of some £800 billion revenue 
273 A. Harrison, The Control of Public Expenditure 1979-1989, (Policy Journals), 1989. 
274 The Exchequer and Audit Departments Act 1866, 29&30, Vict.3.39 of 28 June 1866. 
275 The Exchequer and Audit Departments Act 1921, 11 and 12 Geo.5, c52 of 19 August 1921. 
276 The National Audit Act 1983, c.44 of 13 May 1983. 
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and expenditure each year, along with assets of much greater value and audits the 
accounts of some 600 bodies and prepares around 60 value for money reports a year. 277 
The 1983 Act is quite rigorous with regard to the independence of the C&AG against the 
Government. Thus, subsection 1 (2) first establishes the status of the C&AG as an officer 
of the House of Commons. Subsection 1(1) requires the agreement of the Chairman of 
the Committee of Public Accounts to the appointment of the C&AG, which additionally 
secures independence of the C&AG since the Chairman of the PAC is always a member 
of the opposition. Functional independence of the C&AG was provided by subsection 
1(3) of the NAO 1983 Act, which gives the C&AG complete discretion in the discharge 
of his/her functions concerning value for money studies. Financial independence was 
furthermore secured by the establishment of a Public Account Commission, which has a 
responsibility for approving the estimates of the NAO and also appointing an accounting 
officer for preparing the accounts of the NAO together with an independent auditor to 
audit the accounts of the NAO.278 
The NAO does not have the status of a government department and its staff are placed 
formally outside the civil service. The C&AG is given a wide discretion regarding the 
staffing of the NAO. Subsections 3(2) and (3) of the 1983 Act give the C&AG the 
authority to appoint such staff as he considers necessary for assisting him/her in the 
discharge of his/her functions, on such remuneration and other terms as he/she may 
determine. Although the placement of the NAO staff outside the civil service 
undoubtedly underlies the independence of the NAO staff towards the executive, it may 
be argued that C&AG' s authority over its staff is too wide and could lead to 
administrative instability. It therefore may be argued that more stability and possibly 
higher quality of work would be attained by giving the NAO staff the privilege of civil 
service tenure. 
277 NAO Annual Report 2005, Helping the Nation Spend Wisely, www.nao.gov.uk 
278 Sections 2 and 4 of the NAO 1983 Act. 
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The Office's audit staff are recruited as university graduates. At least an upper second 
class honours degree is required for entering the service. Graduates are trained as 
professional accountants. The Office employs around 800 staff, most of which, around 
600, are professionally qualified accountants, technicians or trainees. Each year NAO 
recruits around 70 graduates and trains them as professional accountants. 279 NAO also 
employs other specialists, such as economists, statisticians, corporate financiers, 
operational research specialists and sectoral specialists, which are often employed on 
short-term contracts, particularly for value for money studies.28o 
NAO is divided into six units. A central unit offers administrative support to the other 
five audit units. Remaining units are responsible for both the financial and value for 
money audit within particular areas: Unit B, for example, covers environment, home 
affairs, agriculture, inland revenue, customs and excise, transport and finance. 281 Each 
unit is headed by an Assistant Auditor General appointed by the C&AG. 
Functions a/the C&AG 
The C&AG has two mam functions: that of Comptroller General and Auditor. As 
Comptroller General, the C&AG authorises the issue of public monies from the 
Consolidated Fund and the National Loan funds to Treasury, which then distributes it to 
government departments and other public sector bodies, as explained earlier.282 The 
Comptroller function is essentially an ex ante checking, or financial control function. It is 
quite interesting that the C&AG has retained this ex ante checking role, which is one of 
the main features of some other supreme audit institutions in Europe.283 However, it 
279 NAO Annual Report 2005, pp. 34-35. 
280 Cf. F. White, K. Hollingsworth, op. cit. p. 48. 
281 Ibid. 
282 Cf. Government Accounting. 
283 This is, for example, the case with the Italian Corte di Compti, which performs ex-ante audit of all 
public funds issues. G. Paovic-leknic, Budzetska kontrola - jugoslovensko i italijansko pravo [Control of 
the Budget - Yugoslavian and Italian Law], University of Montenegro, Podgorica, 2000. 
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should be noted that this C&AG's function, in comparison to other European Supreme 
Audit Institutions, is quite restrictive and relates largely to checking of whether the 
requested amounts conform to the ambit of respective votes. 
In order to understand the function of the Comptroller General better, more should be 
said about the process of issuance of public funds, which could be depicted as follows. 
Treasury requests granting of the monies of the public funds from the C &AG. The 
amount sought is checked by the Comptroller section of the NAO to ensure that it comes 
within the total voted or, in case of standing services, such as judicial pensions or EU 
funds, to ensure its conformity with the legislation,z84 Provided the above criteria are met, 
credits are rarely refused. The only occasions when the C &AG refuses granting a credit 
are in cases when the Treasury requisitions accidentally exceed the monies voted by 
Parliament, or ifthere is an error in quoting the authorising legislation,z85 In the course of 
2004-2005, a new payment system has been introduced, requiring on-line authorisation 
for payments from the public Funds from the C&AG. The Treasury and the C&AG 
managed to complete the transition to the new process successfully.286 
The second and mam function of the C&AG is of auditor general of the central 
Government accounts. As an auditor general, C&AG is responsible for checking the 
legality, regularity, propriety and value for money of the spending ex post. There are, 
thus, two basic strands of C&AG' s work: financial audit and value for money audit. As 
we could see earlier, there is a close connection between these two types of audit, 
especially from the administrative law point of view. Looking from a more practical 
perspective, an overlap between these two functions can also be found, since findings in 
financial audit can provide a basis for value for money audit and vice versa.287 However, 
financial audit and value for money audit are generally perceived as distinct disciplines, 
284 F. White, K. Hollingsworth, op. cit. pp. 47-48. 
285 Ibid. pp. 58-59. 
286 NAO, General Report of the Comptroller and Auditor General 2004-05, www.nao.goY.uk 
287 F. White, K. Hollingsworth, op. cit, pp. 60-61. 
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and are performed by NAO as strictly separate exerCIses. Therefore, we shall devote 
closer attention to each of them separately. 
Financial audit 
The basis for the financial audit of the C&AG are provided in the Exchequer and Audit 
Departments Act 1921, subsection 1(1): 
"Every appropriation account shall be examined by the Comptroller and Auditor General on behalf of the 
House of Commons and in examination of such accounts the Comptroller and Auditor General shall satisfy 
himself that the money expended has been applied to the purpose or purposes for which the grants made by 
Parliament were intended to provide and that the expenditure conforms to the authority which governs it. " 
Financial audit, traditionally called certification audit, thus involves two basic kinds of 
examination: 
whether the figures in the account are properly stated (requirement of accuracy of 
the accounts) and 
whether the payments and receipts accord with Parliament's intentions and 
relevant legislation and other regulations (requirement of regularity/legality and 
probity of the accounts). 
In addition to these examinations, the C&AG investigates whether accounts comply with 
the requirements of propriety and probity, which we have discussed earlier. If the account 
contains material misstatements and does not satisfy the above requirements, the auditor 
shall qualify its opinion on it. 288 Qualified opinion is always followed by a report, which 
288 In 2004-2005 fiscal year, the NAO has qualified its opinion on only two sets of departmental resource 
accounts compared to four qualifications in the prior year. It has further qualified its opinion on eleven sets 
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provides the background and the reasons for the qualification?89 If, however it does not 
find any irregularities, NAO shall produce a clear opinion or a clear opinion and a report 
(in the case that it wants to bring some matter which has arisen in the course of the audit 
to the attention of Parliament and into the public domain). After the process of audit is 
finalised, the C&AG issues a certificate of audit, where he/she confirms that audit has 
been undertaken and expresses his/her opinion on the accuracy, legality, regularity, 
propriety and probity of the accounts. When the audit is completed and the account has 
been examined, certified and reported upon, the C&AG signs-off the account, which 
cannot be reopened afterwards. 290 
At least theoretically, the C&AG is statutorily responsible for forming an opinion on all 
the accounts. Practically, of course, the work necessary to form that opinion is delegated 
to a team of auditors, usually comprising of a director, an audit manager, and a principal 
auditor who may be assisted by other junior staff.291 The size of the team, naturally, 
depends on the accounts of a particular audited body. 
Nowadays, NAO practices two basic audit approaches: system based audit and 'risk-
based' approach. System based audit focuses on testing samples of individual 
transactions, on the basis of which the conclusions on reliability of the internal controls 
or systems established within the public body are made?92 The risk-based approach 
involves a more comprehensive understanding of an audited body's business, the risk it 
faces and the controls in place to manage those risks.293 It consists of provision of advice 
to the audited body on accounting issues and financial controls, commenting where 
of accounts of other public bodies. See: General Report of the Comptroller and Auditor General, 2004-
2005. www.nao.gov.uk, pp. 10-13. 
289 F. White, K. Hollingsworth, op. cit, pp. 73-74. 
290 Ibid., pp. 63-64. 
291 Ibid., pp. 58-59. 
292 Ibid., p. 28. 
293 General Report of the Comptroller and Auditor General, 2004-2005. www.nao.gov.uk, pp. 25-27; NAO 
Annual Report, 2001, Focusing on Success. 
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appropriate on possible improvements in accounting and financial control systems which 
have been identified during the audit. Where the C&AG considers that a significant 
breakdown in financial control has occurred, he/she will report this matter to Parliament 
by means of a qualified audit opinion and a report, while other weaknesses identified 
during the C&AG's examination are brought to the attention of management of the body. 
In many instances this is done through day-to-day contact with audited public bodies, but 
more important issues are usually addressed formally in letters to management.294 It is 
interesting to note that reporting of its findings in the form of management letters puts 
NAO in the interesting position of more a Government management consultant than 
external auditor, since a direct connection between the NAO and auditee is established, 
without elements of democratic, parliamentary accountabiIity.295 
Lastly, when talking about financial audit, we shall address the issue of C&AG 
institutional jurisdiction. C&AG's financial audit jurisdiction is determined by the 1866 
and 1921 Act. Besides, C&AG 's jurisdiction over public bodies can be established by a 
specific statute or an agreement. Thus, the core financial audit work of C&AG is directed 
at three main groups of accounts: 
1) central government departmental appropriation accounts audited under the terms of 
the 1866 Act; 
2) agency resource accounts audited under the 1921 Act or the Government Trading 
Funds Act 1973; and 
3) the accounts of other bodies audited under the terms of a specific statute or by 
agreement. 
294 See for example: NAO Annual report, Helping the Nation to Spend Wisely, 1999. Management letters 
can have quite an important effect on central government bodies. In 1999 NAO have sent 514 management 
letters, prompting the bodies it audits to make over 1.300 changes to their systems in response. NAO has 
estimated that in total, 94 per cent of the recommendation it made in management letters were accepted and 
implemented by audited bodies. 
295 F. White, K. Hollingsworth, op. cit. pp. 128-129. 
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Such institutional jurisdiction was not satisfactory, as it was not brought up to date to 
reflect the changes in the delivery of central government services. Namely, when the 
1866 and 1921 Acts was passed, the central Government consisted mainly of 
Government departments, which gave the C&AG the right of access to all public money. 
As the organisation of central Government has drastically changed in the last century, the 
statutory provisions of the 1866 Act were obviously obsolete, as they did not include a 
number of different public bodies created at the central Government level in the previous 
decades. For example, due to strong resistance from their lobbies, nationalised industries 
and statutory public corporations have never been subject to C&AG's jurisdiction. A 
large number of diverse executive non-departmental public bodies (NDPB's) were 
excluded from the C&AG's jurisdiction.296 Moreover, C&AG was not allowed to audit 
companies established by central government bodies, basically due to legal problems 
imposed by the Companies Act 1989, which envisages that only a registered auditor can 
audit a body established as a limited company.297 Lastly, the ability of the NAO to follow 
public monies into private contractors' hands and local public spending bodies was also 
significantly constrained. 298 
These concerns were expressed in one of the reports of the Committee of Public 
Accounts,299 which stressed that a number of publicly funded bodies were audited by 
auditors appointed by, and reporting to, Ministers, rather than Parliament's own officer -
C&AG. In February 2000, the Chief Secretary to the Treasury announced a review of 
audit and accountability arrangements in central government in response to Committee's 
concerns. The Review was led by Lord Sharman of Redlynch and its findings endorsed 
296 Labour Government has provided that all executive NDPB's created since May 1997 have had the 
C&AG appointed as their statutory auditor. Previous to this, where an executive NDBP was newly 
established and the C&AG was not the appointed auditor under relevant legislation, this was a matter 
largely within the remit of the parent department. 
297 L. Sharman of Redlynch, ibid. 
298 F. White, K. Hollingsworth, op. cit. pp. 86-87. 
299 PAC, Report on Government Resources and Accounts Bill, 9th Report 1999-2000 HC 159. 
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by the Committee of Public Accounts quickly.300 The key recommendations of the report 
were the following: 
as a matter of principle, the C&AG should be the auditor, on behalf of Parliament, 
of all non-departmental public bodies, 
the C&AG's access rights should be formalised where they are currently based on 
negotiated agreement or conventions; 
the C&AG should be able to audit companies owned by a department, or which 
are subsidiaries of a non-departmental public body. 
The Government has swiftly positively responded to the Review's recommendations on 
institutional jurisdiction of the C&AG.301 Thus, the Treasury has made seven orders 
under the Government Resources and Accounts Act 2000 (GRAA) extending the C&AG 
statutory rights of access to all NDPBs. These orders came into force on 23 May 2003, 
extending the C&AG jurisdiction to most NDPBs and is working on coverage of all 
NDPB's within the C&AG remit.302 As for the audit of companies, the progress on Lord 
Sharman's review has been slower, due to the need to change the existing legislation on 
companies. At the moment, the Government is preparing the Company Law Reform Bill, 
which should enable the C&AG to audit government owned companies. The NAO has 
already started working on the preparation for the implementation of such measures, in 
continuous consultation with the Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and 
Wales and the Department of Trade and Industry and the Treasury.303 
300 6th Report, Session 2000-01, He 260. 
301 Audit and Accountability in Central Government, The Government's response to Lord Sharman's report 
"Holding to Account", March 2002, http://www.hm-treasury/gov.uk 
302 NAG, Financial Auditing and Reporting, General Report of the Comptroller and Auditor General 2004-
2005, www.nao.gov.uk, p.22. 
303 Ibid. p.6. 
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Value/or Money Audit 
It is often argued that the C&AG concern for issues of economy, efficiency and 
effectiveness has for quite some time constituted a part of public sector auditor's 
responsibilities.304 However, the existing practice of value for money studies was 
formally recognised only recently, by Part II of the 1983 Act. Thus, Section 6 provides 
that the C&AG may "carry out examinations into the economy, efficiency and 
effectiveness with which any department, authority or other body to which this section 
applies, has used its resources in discharging its functions". Section 6(3) specifies the 
C&AG jurisdiction in conducting value for money studies to: 
any department required to prepare an appropriation account under the 1866 Act; 
any body required to keep accounts under section 98 of the National Health 
Service Act 1977 or section 86 of the National Health Service (Scotland) Act 
1978; 
any authority or body whose accounts are required to be examined and certified 
by, or are open to the inspection of the C&AG by virtue of any enactment 
including an enactment passed after this Act; and 
any authority or body whose accounts are required to be examined and certified or 
are open to the inspection of the C&AG by virtue of any agreement made, 
whether before or after the passing of this Act, between the authority or body and 
a Minister of the Crown. 
Furthermore, section 7 (1) prescribes that if the C&AG has reasonable cause to believe 
that any authority or body has in any of its financial years received more than half of its 
income from public funds, he may carry out an examination into the economy, efficiency 
and effectiveness with which it has in that year used its resources in discharging its 
functions. However, section (4) specifies that this refers only to bodies which are 
appointed by the Crown and explicitly excludes remaining nationalised industries and 
304 D. Dewar, "Value for Money Audit: The first 800 years", Public Finance and Accountability, 1985. 
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some statutory public corporations from C&AG's institutional remit. Section 8, 
furthermore, provides the C&AG a right of access at all reasonable times to all 
documents in the custody or under the control of the department, authority or other body 
being audited, as he may reasonably require to conduct a value for money examination. 
Finally, section 9 stipulates that the C&AG may report to the House of Commons the 
results of any value for money investigation. 
Since 1983, the NAO has produced about 40-60 value for money reports each year, 
covering a wide range of government activities. Value for money studies usually focus on 
a specific topic, such as introduction of new government policies, implementation of a 
new programme or the management of a service or a crisis. 
Although each study is umque, several stages in the production of value for money 
reports can be discerned. The first stage involves a research and study selection. Topics 
are identified by audit staff from close monitoring and analysis of the risks to value for 
money across various public services. 305 A study can also originate from other sources, 
including members of the Parliament, departments themselves, or the public.306 The PAC 
has a particular statutory role in relation to study selection. Section 1 (3) of the 1983 Act 
provides that in determining whether or not to carry out a value for money study, the 
C&AG must take into account any proposals made by the PAC. After the initial 
identification of the study and approval by the C&AG, full investigation can be 
undertaken. The report is usually conducted by the audit team, comprising one director, 
one audit manager and one or two principal or senior managers. The following stage is a 
production of a draft report by the audit team and its presentation to the auditee, who is 
given about four weeks to respond. This process of sending the draft report to the auditee 
is known as clearance. Its objective is to reach an agreement between the NAO and 
auditee on the facts of the case, making sure that both sides agree that all materials and 
305 NAO Annual Report, 1999. 
306 Cf F. White, K. Hollingsworth, op. cit., pp. 74-76. 
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relevant facts have been included in the report and that their presentation was fair. 307 
Where a common ground does not exist, both views can be reflected in the report. The 
last phase is publication of the vim report, which will generally include recommendations 
to the auditee. 308 
It should be noted that as NAO has moved further away from the account-based approach 
and has found its higher profile role examining value for money of Government 
programmes, it has experienced some problems in relationships with the executive. After 
some initial misunderstanding of what was expected, efforts have been made to work out 
acceptable forms of words going beyond the purely factual element in a report. However, 
as seen from the executive, the NAO has been pushing at the frontiers of its remit and 
encroaching on policy issues, which needs to be strongly discouraged. This has provoked 
substantial problems when conduct of value for money studies is in question. 
It has been argued that among three Es, effectiveness, concerned with the extent to which 
outputs of goods or services achieve policy objectives, although undoubtedly most 
controversial, has the greatest potential for bringing about change and saving public 
funds, while maintaining the quality of service provision.309 However, most authors and 
NAO auditors agree that up to now relatively few genuine audits of effectiveness have 
been carried out. 3 \0 Audit offices are criticised for concentrating too much on ensuring 
307 This convention was formalized following a Committee of Public Accounts hearing in 1986 when NAO 
and auditee, Department of Education and Science, disagreed on the facts ofthe vfm report. PAC refused to 
arbitrate between the NAO and departments and asked for process to be reviewed and agreement on facts to 
be made. Cf J. Keen, "On the Nature of Audit Judgements: The Case of Value for Money Studies", Public 
Administration 1999, 77, 509-525. 
308 Cf F. White, K. Hollingsworth, op. cit. p. 77. 
309 H. Gordon, "Effectiveness Audit in the Audit Offices", Public Money & Management, 1998, pp. 5-6; 1. 
Glynn, Valuefor Money Auditing in the Public Sector, (Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and 
Wales),1985. 
310 Ibid; M. Pendelbury, O. Shreim, "UK Auditors' Attitudes to Effectiveness Auditing", Financial 
Accountability & Management, 6(3), 1990. 
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that the existing rules, regulations and systems are appropriately applied, without giving 
sufficient consideration whether they are the best available option to achieve policy aims. 
There are several reasons why effectiveness audit is rarely carried out in NAO practice. 
One is that it is very difficult to determine the effectiveness of public services. Objectives 
of government policies are often vague and ambiguous, and even more so is the 
measurement of their achievement.311 Furthermore, effectiveness is a particularly 
sensitive matter because it has the potential to question the merits of policy objectives.312 
Since policy decisions-making is in exclusive competence of the executive, any 
interference of the auditor in policy matters is deemed unacceptable and is forbidden by 
the 1983 Act. Thus, subsection (2) prohibits the C&AG from questioning the merits of 
the policy objectives of any department, authority or body in respect of which an 
examination is carried out. 
Although it is not disputed that an auditor should not judge the policy objectives, he/she 
has to be allowed access to policy information, in order to establish the policy aim and 
hence assess whether it has been achieved. Only after establishing what policy objectives 
are, can an auditor examine the means by which the policy is put into effect and consider 
alternative strategies which could achieve the same results at lesser costs. 313 Therefore, if 
effectiveness audit is to be carried out, the first step is to enable auditors to get familiar 
with policy issues, having access to information and papers so that the auditor can gain 
in-depth knowledge of the main components of the relevant policies.314 
It seems however that fear of interfering with policy objectives prevents auditors from 
carrying out effectiveness examinations at all. It often happens in practice that financial 
aspects of the policy are identified with the policy itself. Thus, Departments usually 
311 Ibid. 
312 Cf F. White, K. Hollingsworth, op. cit, pp. 74-76. 
313 H. Gordon, op. cit. 
314 D. Dewar, 'The Auditor General and the Examination of Policy", International Journal o/Government 
Auditing, 1986, pp. 10-12. 
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defend their positions by claiming that auditors are interfering with issues of policy, in 
the cases when auditors attempt to examine only its financial implementation aspect. 315 
This discussion raises several criticisms when conduct of value for money studies by 
NAO is in question. Although NAO has a guaranteed constitutional independence, it 
looks as if it is too reluctant to undertake more radical measures when examining whether 
public bodies have achieved value for money for the use of allocated resources. One of 
the problems is that the NAO reports are usually extensively cleared with the audited 
bodies concerned. This procedure can take quite a long time, involve lots of compromise 
and result in a more biased than truly independent study. As a corollary, NAO reports 
often yield fairly general and polite recommendations, simply pointing out that particular 
management aspects of the body in question require "continuing attention,,316 or 
"review",317 instead of providing more detailed measures which the audited body should 
take in order to improve unsatisfactory segments of its work. 318 The problem is that the 
more controversial and open to argument the NAO' s recommendations, the less 
authoritative they will be, especially if the findings are to be unfair, and the more likely is 
that they will not be accepted.319 Furthermore, as previously mentioned, auditors are 
rather hesitant to undertake serious efficiency studies, not wanting to interfere with 
questions of policy in any way. 
The explanation of such a position of NAO when conducting value for money 
investigations may be sought for in the ultimate dependence of the NAO on the Public 
Accounts Committee and Parliament. Although NAO's independence towards both 
Parliament and PAC is constitutionally supported, NAO's position of "Parliamentary 
assistant" requires him to pay attention to the needs of its main audiences, members of 
315 H. Gordon, op. cit., pp. 5-6. 
316 See for example NAO vfm report: "The BBC: Collecting the Television Licence FEE", 2001-02. 
317 See for example NAO vfm report, "Government on the Web II", 2001-02. 
318 S. Roberts, C. Pollitt, "Audit or Evaluation? A National Audit Office VFM Study", Public 
Administration, Vol. 72, pp. 527-549. 
319 A. Harrison, The Control of Public Expenditure J 979-J 989, (Policy Journals), 1989. 
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the PAC and Parliament. In this sense, NAO has to make sure that its reports will, firstly, 
raise interest of the members of the PAC, otherwise their usefulness could be put in 
question. NAO is thus criticised for conducting "headline hunting" studies, which would 
undoubtedly attract PAC's attention, instead of producing more demanding reports, based 
on complex societal issues. Secondly, and more importantly, NAO's work is constrained 
by its need to balance opposing views on more sensitive political issues, taking care not 
to provoke partisanship among its "political" audience.32o Therefore, it may be expected 
that if NAO would tackle some of the more sensitive Government policies, this could 
divide PAC on political lines and question the authority and legitimacy of both PAC and 
NAO. In this way, the basis of the British system of financial accountability would be 
substantively disturbed. 
It may be argued that the above critics overemphasise some of the inherent weaknesses of 
the British financial accountability system. It should be stressed that the 1980s have 
undoubtedly brought about a substantial improvement in the arrangements made for the 
external audit of the public sector, strengthening the independent position of the NAO 
towards the PAC and the Parliament. Since its institutional independence was established 
in 1983, the C&AG has not hesitated to investigate areas which the Government of the 
day might consider sensitive, as, for example, was the case with introduction of the 
financial management initiative into central government Departments, Ministry of 
Defense's purchasing policies and number of other cases which reflected badly on the 
Government's management of Departmental resources.32 ! NAO also became the first 
national audit institution to examine the variety and complexity of privatization sales.322 
More recent NAO studies have focused on some of the key British societal issues, such 
as, for example, the national health service system, which has for quite a while been the 
320 S. Roberts, C. Pollitt, op. cit., pp. 546-547. 
321 A. Harrison, ibid. 
322 National Audit Office, He 645, Session 1995-6; The Work of the Directors of Telecommunications. Gas 
Supply. Water Service and Electricity Supply. 
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subject of a great number of NAO's critical reports.323 NAO has also quickly responded 
to crises which occurred at various public service areas.324 Lastly, in recent years NAO, 
together with PAC, has started producing high-level overview reports on thematic 
subjects.325 The objective of these reports is to draw out lessons from a number of more 
detailed reports on similar subjects and disseminate good practice throughout central 
Government. In this way, NAO has started developing a new function as Government 
advisor. 
The final question which remains to be answered is how can the implementation of the 
recommendations of the NAO be secured and strengthened? The present situation is that 
the Government formally responds to each PAC report, which means at least that each 
recommendation is looked at. One step forward in that respect is to require explicit 
acknowledgement of the relevance of the auditor's main findings and a statement of the 
action taken in response to them. A further step would be to give NAO and PAC reports 
even wider publicity in the media and thus increase the pressure of the public on the 
Government. Although this influence has up to now been considerable, it is essential that 
the public is informed of NAO findings timeously and extensively. Therefore, one of the 
conclusions may be that in a long run, the effectiveness of the NAO will depend not only 
on the expertise and quality of the NAO' s work, but also and even more on the general 
323 See recent NAO reports on NHS: The NHS Cancer Plan -A Progress Report, HC 343, 2004-2005; 
Tackling Cancer: Improving the Patient Journey, He 288, 2004-2005; Darent Valley Hospital: The PFI 
Contract in Action, HC 209, 2004-2005; Patient Choice at the Point ofGP Referral, www.nao.org.uk 
324 Cf. NAO reports: Reducing Crime: The Home Office working with Crime and Disorder Reduction 
Partnership, HC 16,2004-2005; London Underground: Are the Public Private Partnerships likely to work 
successfully? He 644, 2003-2004; Regeneration of the Millennium Dome and Associated Land, He 178, 
2004-2005; Shadow Strategic Rail Authority: Action to improve passenger rail services (1999-00). 
www.nao.goY.uk 
325 Cf NAO reports: Good Practice in Performance Reporting in Executive Agencies and Non-
Departmental Public Bodies; Examining the Value for Money of Deals under the Private Finance 
Initiative; Supporting Innovation: Managing Risk in Government Departments. 
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climate within which they work, i.e. the general level of public interest in the questions 
h . 326 t eyexamme. 
The Government Accounting System 
Public accounts in the United Kingdom have traditionally been prepared on a cash basis, 
but in recent years there has been a substantial shift towards accruals accounts. This has 
been provided by the Government Resources and Accounts Act of 2000. The key 
objective of the introduction of resource accounting and budgeting, as we could see, is to 
improve the planning and control of Government spending as well as to improve 
departments' accountability to Parliament through more comprehensive financial 
information it will provide. We shall analyse in more detail sections of the Act which are, 
in our opinion, most relevant for audit and accountability. 
Section 5 of the Resources and Accounts Act 2000 reinforces the 1866 and 1921 
Exchequer and Audit Departments Acts' provisions that the Treasury prescribes the form 
in which the accounts are laid. However, it also requires the Treasury to, in determining 
the content of accounts, have regard to any relevant guidance issued by the Accounting 
Standards Board327 and include in the accounts contents: statement of financial 
performance, statement of financial position and a cash flow statement. 328 Section 5 (6) 
puts on a statutory basis the appointment of accounting officers, who shall be responsible 
for the preparation of the department's resource accounts and their transmission to the 
Comptroller and Auditor Genera1.329 Sections 6 and 8 furthermore deal with authorities of 
the C & AG in examination of accounts. Subsection 6 (1) prescribes that in examining 
326 A. Harrison, ibid. 
327 The body responsible for setting accounting standards under the companies legislation. Its independence 
is strengthened by the Act by requiring the Treasury to consult the C&AG in the process of selection of its 
members. 
328 s. 5(4)a and b. 
329 s. 5(7). 
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any resource accounts, the C & AG must satisfy him/herself that: a) the accounts present 
a true and fair view, b) that money provided by Parliament has been expended for the 
purposes intended by Parliament, c) that resources authorised by Parliament to be used 
have been used for the purposes in relation to which the use was authorised, d) that the 
department's financial transactions are in accordance with any relevant authority. While 
the first paragraph (a) reflects the change from cash to accrual accounting requiring 
provision of the opinion usually given by auditors on company accounts, the remaining 
items may be subsumed under the regularity requirements of cash accounts and legality 
requirements when looked from the legal point of view. 
The Resources and Accounts Act 2000 has also provided for the preparation and audit of 
consolidated accounts for the whole of the public sector (Whole of Government 
Accounts- WGA). The Treasury has been introducing the WGA gradually, by making 
preliminary central government sub-consolidations for the financial years 2001-2002 and 
2002-2003 and more complete central government consolidation account for the financial 
year 2003-2004, which has been subject to the NAO audit. At the moment the Treasury is 
working on inclusion of the local authorities, health trusts and public corporations within 
the WGA, which will add a great number of public bodies to the consolidation process 
and will require harmonisation of accounting policies.33o It is expected that the whole of 
government account will provide Parliament with an overall picture of the financial state 
of the public sector, allowing in this way more effective scrutiny of the government's 
economic policies. 331 
The introduction of the resource accounting and budgeting as well as the whole of 
government account has undoubtedly brought about improvements in accountability 
arrangements of the central Government, providing Parliament and other interested actors 
330 NAO, Financial Auditing and Reporting, General Report o/the Comptroller and Auditor General 2004-
2005, pp. 20-2l. 
331 F. White, K. Hollingsworth, "Public finance reform: The Government Resource and Accounts Act 
2000", op. cit., pp. 56-61. 
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with more sophisticated financial information on the basis of which accountability 
standards are measured. Encouraging results of reforms are to be thanked first to the 
Treasury, which has designed a very good strategy of gradual introduction of resource 
accounting in the central Government.332 However, full success and effectiveness of these 
reforms will greatly depend on the ability of its users to understand and efficiently use the 
information provided.333 In this sense, it is essential that the Parliament's support to the 
resource accounting project is strengthened and that the members of the PAC are 
provided further education and training on how the new financial informational base can 
be used for enhancing accountability of the executive for the public money stewardship 
to Parliament and the public. 
Summary and Conclusion 
Despite some inherent weaknesses, the British system of financial accountability can be 
depicted as well-tried and effective. It is based on external, parliamentary accountability, 
where Parliament, through the work of its Public Accounts Committee, based on the 
expertise of NAO, holds the executive to account for the legal and productive use of 
public money. The other key chain of accountability is managerial, established between 
the Treasury and accounting officers of public bodies, where ex ante financial control 
tasks have been delegated from the former to the latter. Accounting officers represent the 
key link between these two lines of accountability, since both the Parliament and the 
Treasury can call them to account for stewardship of public money. 
The developments in the accountability system have had an important impact on the basic 
systematic premises, such as one of the concept of public money stewardship. In that 
sense, it should be noted that traditionally clear lines between the issues of legality and 
regularity of public expenditure on the one hand and value for money on the other hand 
332 This is contrast to Australia and New Zealand which undertook a rapid approach to resource accounting 
implementation. Cf. D. Heald, "The Implementation of Resource Accounting in UK Central Government", 
op. cit., pp. 11-12. 
333 F. White, K. Hollingsworth, ibid. 
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have been unequivocally blurred. Hence, attainment of value for money in the use of 
public funds in Britain is no longer of secondary importance, but constitutes an equally 
important standard against which financial accountability is measured. 
The UK system of accountability has further been significantly enhanced by extending 
the jurisdiction of the C&AG to other public bodies, especially NDPBs, and a gradual 
introduction of resource accounting and budgeting and. It is expected that the new way of 
financial reporting, contained in the application of resource accounting and budgeting 
introduced through The Resources and Accounts Act 2000 will substantially improve 
both internal and external financial accountability. New accounting practices are 
perceived to enhance departmental management as well as bring about better value for 
money in the use of resources. More importantly, new financial reporting should provide 
Parliament with high quality information on the basis of which it could, on behalf of the 
citizens, more efficiently exercise both its ex ante and ex post democratic accountability 
title. 
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Chapter III 
Financial Accountability in France 
The objective of this chapter is to analyse the financial accountability system of France. 
Following the structure of the previous chapter, we shall examine the way that financial 
accountability, as a relationship established between the citizens, as accountors, and the 
state, as accountee, where citizens are holding the state to account for the stewardship of 
entrusted public money, is operationalised in the French state context. In this sense, we 
shall first analyse the 'who is accountable' dimension of accountability, attempting to 
provide an overview of the structure of the French state. This will be followed by an 
examination of the 'for what' financial accountability dimension, which should reveal the 
complexity of the concept of "stewardship" of public money in France. However, the 
focus of our inquiry, again, will be placed on the fourth financial accountability 
dimension - mechanisms through which the accountability relationship operates. 
Throughout our research we shall especially focus on the impact that the Law Regulating 
the Public Finance in France, so called - LOLF334 has had on the financial accountability 
framework in France in the last couple of years. 
Another Highly Complex Accountee - the French Central Government 
Constitutional background 
Unlike Britain, France has possessed a strong administrative state tradition since at least 
Napoleonic times.335 After many hundreds of years of monarchy, a variety of political 
334 La Loi Organique Relative aux Lois de Finances (LOLF), Constitutional bylaw No. 2001-692 of I 
August 2001 on budget acts, 'French Official Journal' No. 177 of2 August 2001, p. 12480. 
335 The differences between the Anglo-Saxon and continental traditional perception of the state are certainly 
corollary of different historic paths of the British Isles and the continent from XVII onwards. The 
supremacy of Parliament in Britain has been already established after the revolution in 1688 and 
sovereignty had been vested in Parliament instead of the monarch. At the same time, the continent 
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systems followed: First Republic (1792-1804), First Empire (1804-1815), Restored 
Monarchy (1815- 1830), Liberal Monarchy (1830-1848), Second Republic (1848-1852), 
Second Empire (1852-1870), Third Republic (1870-1940), Fourth Republic (1946- 1958). 
The current Fifth Republic was proclaimed in 1958. 
France's republican status is enshrined in the Constitution. The Fifth Republic has 
increased the power of the executive in order to promote strong and stable government. 
The constitutional and political reinforcement of the executive led to a corresponding 
reduction in the powers of the parliament. Thus, many of the important laws passed in 
Parliament are so-called lois d'orientation, laws which present only the general outlines 
and guidelines of legislation.336 The Constitution, in tum, vests in the executive strong 
powers to regulate by decree (decrets).337 
The French Parliament is comprised of the National Assembly and the Senate. 
Deputies of the National Assembly are elected by direct elections, and represent the 
people of territorial units of the Republic. The Senate members, in tum, are elected by 
indirect election and represent French nationals settled outside France. 338 
Revision of the Constitution in 1962 provided for a powerful President and the creation 
of a so-called 'semi-Presidential' political system. The President is elected by direct 
popular vote for a five-year term.339 The President appoints the Prime Minister, appoints 
experienced at least another century of absolutist state development, which brought about alienation 
between the state and the citizens. Cf C. Knill, The Europeanisation of National Administrations, 
(Cambridge University Press, 2001), p. 74. 
336 V. Wright, The Government and Politics of France, London, Routhedge, 1994, pp. 100-101. 
337 L. N. Brown, J. Bell, French Administrative Law, (Clarendon Press, Oxford), 1993, pp. 8-9. 
338 Article 24 of the French Constitution. 
339 From 1962 to 2002, the President was chosen for the seven year term. However, referendum of 2000 has 
changed President's mandate to 5 years, since it was out of step with the five-year lifetime of parliament, 
and three times in the past 14 years that has produced paralysing "cohabitations" between presidents and 
prime ministers of different political persuasions that have effectively stymied major institutional change. 
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senior civil servants and military commanders and oversees observance of the 
constitution.34o He promulgates laws passed by Parliament and has the power, although 
seldom used, to refer laws back to the Parliament.341 . As in every parliamentary 
democracy, Government is responsible to the National Assembly (the lower house of 
Parliament) and must resign if it loses a vote of confidence. The resignation has not 
always been accepted by the President, who may maintain the Prime Minister in office 
and call for new general elections after dissolution of the National Assembly.342 
In order to secure balance between the judicial and legislative power, draftsmen of the 
1958 Constitution have established a new institution, the Constitutional Council (Conseil 
Constitutionnel).343 The basic function of the Constitutional Council is adjudication upon 
the validity of presidential, parliamentary elections and referenda344 and checking the 
constitutionality of laws approved by the Parliament.345 
The French political system cannot be classified fully either as "majoritarian" or 
consensual. Cabinets are usually one-party or a minimal coalition, but these majoritarian 
characteristics are counterbalanced by the existence of a multi-party system and a strong 
President.346 During the period since 1980 there has been a fairly frequent alternation of 
the parties in office. In the majority of cases the President and the Government came 
from the same political party, but there were periods when this was not the case (the 
periods of cohabitation - Jospin government under President Chirac, 1997-2002, for 
example). 
340 Article 7 of the French Constitution. 
341 Article 10 of the French Constitution. 
342 V. Wright, The Government and Politics of France, (London, Routhedge) 1994. 
343 Articles 56 - 63 of the French Constitution. 
344 Articles 58, 59 and 60 of the French Constitution. 
345 Cf. L. N. Brown, 1. Bell, op. cit., pp. 14-15. 
346 C. Pollitt, G. Bouckaert, Public Management Reform - A Comparative Analysis, (Oxford University 
Press 1999), p. 227. 
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France can furthermore be depicted as a "legal model" state (rechtsstaat).347 The state 
activity is overtly regulated by legal rules and the state administration conceived as an 
autonomous domain apart from civil society. France has a well-developed system of 
administrative law (droit administratij), largely created by precedents of the Conseil 
d'Etat, which had an immense influence on evolution of administrative law concepts.348 
And while in the United Kingdom conflicts between public authorities and the ordinary 
citizens are solved by the 'ordinary' courts, France has a number of specially constituted 
administrative courts, which exclusively exercise control over Government bodies.349 In 
this way, the French legal founders wanted to achieve a full separation between 
legislative, administrative and judicial power. 
It is interesting to note that the French administrative system also recognises a strict legal 
division of the civil service into a large number of corps, each with its own educational 
entry requirements and its own set of hierarchically arranged posts, defined by a general 
civil service law.35o The state power is mainly situated at the grands corps of the state, 
comprised of: the Inspection des finances (financial inspectorate), the Conseil d'Etat 
(Supreme Administrative Court) and the Cour des Comptes (The Court of Accounts, 
hereinafter the Cour). All these bodies recruit their members from the prestigious Ecole 
Nationale d 'Administration. 
Despite its 'rigid' traditional structure, the French state has undergone significant reforms 
during the last several decades. There have been a series of reform initiatives by different 
governments, focusing on decentralisation/deconcentration and privatisation. Thus, in 
1982, under the socialist Mitterrand's Government, a significant transfer of power from 
347 L. N. Brown, J. Bell, op. cit., p. 7. 
348 G. Braibant, Administrativno pravo Francuske [French Administrative Law}, (Sluzbeni list SRJ, em 
Podgorica) 2002, pp. 403-426, translation of G. Braibant, Le Droit Administratif Francais (Presse de la 
fondation nationale des sciences politiques & Dalloz), 1992. 
349 Ibid. 
350 This feature of the French administrative system has been interpreted as one of the sources of 
considerable rigidity and resistance to public management reforms. C. Pollitt, G. Bouckaert, op. cit., p. 231. 
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central to regional and local government occurred.351 Furthermore, during the period of 
the socialist government (1981-86) extensive nationalizations were undertaken (exactly 
the opposite of the trend which was beginning to develop in the UK). Shortly afterwards, 
however, the neo-liberal government of Chirac (1986-88) has started excessive 
privatisation, which resumed in a more moderate way in 1993, after the right regained 
power. This trend continued by the following socialist Government resulting in 
privatisation of a great majority of state corporations. Therefore, in the last 25 years the 
central Government in France witnessed significant reduction of its scope. 
Variety a/public bodies 
The French central Government comprises a number of fairly different bodies, which, 
similar to the UK, seem to be continuously diversifying over the time. One of the 
possible general classifications of great variety of public bodies would encompass: 
central government departments; public bodies called etablissements publics (EPs); 
(semi) independent public bodies - Autorite Administrative Independante (AAI) and state 
owned corporations. Regional and local government bodies shall be excluded from our 
research interest, since they fall under a distinct financial accountability regime. 
Core central Government compnses ministries, as policy making bodies, and 
etablissement public (EP), as policy implementation bodies.352 There are no pre-existing 
criteria to determine whether a given activity is to be performed by a Government 
351 France (without overseas departments and territories) is divided into 22 administrative regions. 
352 The EPs were actually created by case administrative law precedents rather than enacted into statutes or 
issued as regulations. The concept of the EP's was defined by the Conseil d'Etat already in mid 19th 
century (1856) and is based on the following criteria: an agency has to be a separate legal and public law 
entity, need to have a specific object of activity, have administrative and financial autonomy and be under 
the supervision of the national/regional/local Government. The concept ofEPs developed by case law over 
the decades along with the very notion of public service (understood as the services of national economic 
and social interest). Cf. L. Digi, Preobrazaj javnog prava [Transformation of Public Law], (Geca Kon, 
Belgrade), 1929. Cf. S. Touchon, D. Tommasi, "Country Report France", in Financial Management and 
Control of Public Agencies, SIGMA Paper No.32, OECD, Paris, 2002.op. cit. pp. 43-44. 
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Department or an EP, although there is a political consensus that those tasks which are a 
"royal" prerogative (defense, police, justice and foreign affairs) must be handled directly 
by the central government Ministry.353 
EP's are by far the most frequent form of public bodies (autonomous organizations) 
within the French state due to their fairly flexible structure and can be divided into three 
broad categories: administrative, industrial and commercial. Administrative EPs (around 
1000 of them) are the most common form of organization which are used for provision of 
government services (e.g. national employment agency, universities, museums etc). The 
number of industrial and commercial EPs is smaller (around 80) and has often been 
established as a corollary of gradual transfer of functions from the core executive to more 
flexible forms of organizations.354 Whereas the administrative EPs are subject to public 
law rules and budgeting and accounting regulations similar to those of Government 
departments, the industrial and commercial EPs, which enjoy somewhat greater 
autonomy and were designed to operate as commercial companies, are subject to private 
law rules, but are required to use public law accounting regulations.355 
It should be noted that social security funds also fall under the category of EPs. Although 
they have a particular management structure composed of representatives of both 
employers and employees, the Government and the Cour have in the last decades started 
exerting much tighter control of the use of their funds. 356 
353 Cf. S. Touchon, D. Tommasi, op. cit., pp. 43-73. 
354 Industrial and commercial EPs are for example big public enterprises (electricity, railways companies), 
the Paris opera, the French Foreign Trade Centre etc. 
355 It is interesting to not that most of the industrial and commercial EPs apply government accounting 
regulations, but are not the subject of the a priori financial control of the Government. Cf. S. Touchon, D. 
Tommasi, ibid. 
356 The Constitutional amendments of 1996 have thus enabled the Cour to audit social security funding 
institutions, Article 147(1) ofthe French Constitution. 
111 
Questions are also being raised about the need to tighten the financial control over all 
EPS.357 Although the Ministry of Finance itself has created a number of EPs, it has 
developed a generally negative attitude towards the increase of number of the EPs, since 
their operation generate additional public spending, partly due to difficulties in imposing 
proper financial supervision. In order to avoid difficulties related to supervision of EPs, 
over the last decade the Government started creating a new type of public body called 
"bodies with nation-wide jurisdiction" (Services a caractere national - SeN), which are 
not separate legal entities and could provide an alternative solution to the continued 
creation of EPs. 358 
Semi-independent public bodies - Autorite Administrative Independante (AAI) constitute 
another important category of public bodies, having a nature of a regulatory agency. 
AAIs thus regulate "sensitive" Government sectors of their area of competence, such as, 
for example, broadcasting, freedom of information, protection of consumers and other 
citizens' rights etc.359 AAIs are usually created by statute voted by Parliament and are not 
subject to any supervisory authority. Therefore, it is argued that their members are 
independent from both the executive and the Parliament. 360 However, unlike EPs, AAIs 
do not have a status of legal person separate from the State, which again questions their 
complete independence from the executive. Being a part of the state administrative 
structure, AAIs are subject to control of administrative courts. Most AAI are not subject 
to the a priori financial control of the Ministry of Finance discussed below, but are still 
subject to government accounting regulations and audit by the Cour. 
All this variety of public bodies coupled with the privates ones receiving considerable 
public funds constitute a rather complex and comprehensive financial accountability 
357 Cf. S. Touchon, D. Tommasi, op. cit., p. 49. 
358 The first SCN was created in 1997, Ibid. 
359 Examples of AAIs created by statute are: Broadcasting High Council, responsible for appointing the 
Presidents of the television and radio state-owned companies; National Commission for Information and 
Freedoms (Commission Nationale de l'Informatique et des Libertes). 
360 S. Touchon, D. Tommasi, op. cit. 47-49. 
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accountee, which is constantly evolving. In order to follow up this evolving nature of the 
accountee, proper financial accountability mechanisms need to be defined and adjusted to 
the new circumstances, so that the central Government administration can be effectively 
held to account, or as the French people would rather say - so that state would be 
adequately controlled in the use of the public funds. 
Systemic reforms of the financial accountability framework through LOLF 
The overvIew of the gradual reduction of scope of the French central Government 
presented at the outset of this chapter demonstrates that the French public sector reforms, 
in comparison to its Anglo-Saxon counterparts, have been implemented in a fairly 
piecemeal way in the last two decades of the 20th century. Although the pace of the 
reforms has been slower, the structure of administration did experience substantial 
overhaul, which resulted in the transfer of a number of central Government functions 
either to the local level or to the private sector. Interestingly enough, these structural 
changes have for several decades not been accompanied by reforms in the financial 
accountability framework, which has remained almost intact for more than 40 years. 
The budget and financial accountability was governed for more than 40 years by a 
Constitutional Bylaw of 1959, the so-called French "Financial Constitution".361 The 
budget framework under the 1959 Financial Constitution is characterised by a strong role 
of the executive in determining the overall scope and allocation of expenditure, fairly 
centralised control by the Ministry of Finance and quite weak powers of the Parliament 
both in the process of budget approval and in the later phase of accountability. In spite of 
numerous attempts at changing a fairly outdated budget framework (around 38 initiatives 
altogether), the executive has constantly refused to reform the budget process. This 
resistance to change is usually explained by strongly entrenched values of a strong 
361 L 'ordonnance N 59-2 du 2 janvier 1959, which ceased to be in effect from 1 January 2005. 
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administrative state and structure of strong Grands Corps that appear to have stayed in 
control of most of the reforms, with their central roles not been seriously undermined.362 
However, the very beginning of the 21 sl century has witnessed a substantial reform of the 
budgeting, accounting and financial accountability framework enabled through the 
adoption of the new "Financial Constitution", so-called LOLF (fa loi organique relative 
aux lois de finances) in 2001.363 The LOLF attempts to attain several objectives: increase 
accountability of managers, create a more active role for Parliament and improve the 
transparency of expenditure allocation and Government's performance. The law was 
adopted in the wake of the discovery of a tax fraud affair in 2000, which brought to bear 
significant pressure from the Parliament on the Government to overhaul the budgetary 
process.364 Furthermore, it may be argued that the requirements of the EU economic and 
monetary union have also had an impact on the need to improve public management and 
reduce fiscal deficit and provided an additional impetus for reforming the budgeting and 
financial accountability framework. 365 Finally, it is interesting to note that the LOLF was 
adopted in France only a year after the UK Parliament adopted the Government 
Resources and Accounts Act (2000), which, as we could see in the previous chapter, the 
UK Treasury considers as the "biggest reform and modernisation programme in the 
management of the country's public finances since the Gladstone era".366 However, 
although the importance of this Act for the enhancement of financial accountability in 
362 C. Pollitt, G. Bouckaert, op. cit., p. 230. 
363 Constitutional bylaw No. 2001-692 of 1 August 2001 on budget acts, 'French Official Journal' No. 177 
of2 August 2001, p. 12480. 
364 F. Waintrop, C. Chol, "France: The Challenge of a Systemic Reform", paper presented at the EGPA 
meeting of the Study Group on Productivity and Quality in the Public Sector, "Performance Measurement 
and Public Management Reform", in Ljubljana, Slovenia, September 2004. 
365 R. Hertzog, "Une grande premiere: la reforme du droit budgetaire de l'Etat par Ie Parlement", Revue 
Francaise de Finances Publiques, No. 73, January 2001, pp. 7-18; H. Enderlein, "Adjusting to EMU, The 
Impact of Supranational Monetary Policy on Domestic Fiscal and Wage-Setting Institutions", European 
Union Politics, Volume 7 (1), (Sage Publications), 2006, pp. 113-140. 
366 H.M. Treasury News Release 195/99. Cf F. White, K. Hollingsworth, "Public finance reform: The 
Government Resource and Accounts Act 2000", Public Law, 2000, pp. 56-61. 
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UK cannot be disputed, the reforms undertaken by the LOLF have much more 
substantially changed the French financial accountability framework than it occurred 
under the Government Resources and Accounts Act 2000 in UK, as pointed out in the 
previous chapter. 
The LOLF provides the basis for the introduction of programme budgeting in the French 
central Government, which has started to be fully implemented in the current 2006 
budget. Unlike in the previous system, where each body was assigned the budget based 
on different types of expenditure (operational, capital etc.), in the new system the 
expenditure is based on missions which correspond to the Government's key public 
policies (security, education, research, etc). Each Mission consists of a number of 
progammes, which are further divided into sub-programmes (actions) as operational 
means to implement the Programme.367 This introduces much more transparency and 
flexibility in the system. Namely, in the new system appropriations may be freely re-
allocated within the programmes and their breakdown according to sub-programmes is 
now purely indicative, which allows for much more flexibility for the organisation's 
management.368 Such developments go hand in hand with the British reforms of 
enlarging the sub-heads within the votes, as pointed out in the previous chapter. In 
exchange for the high degree of autonomy they now have, programme managers in public 
bodies have to be fully committed to their goals and held accountable for their 
. I' d' d I 369 management acts VIa resu ts In Icators an target va ues. 
The reform introduced by the LOLF, as a second French Financial Constitution have 
unsurprisingly affected all elements of the French financial accountability framework, 
starting from the concept of the stewardship of public money and extending to internal 
and even more external accountability framework, with an increasingly important role 
367 Article 7, paragraph 1 of the LOLF. Cf Ministere de l'Economie des Finances et de L'Industrie, Budget 
Reform and State Modernisation in France, available at www.minefi.gouv.fr or www.1olf.minefi.gouv.fr 
368 Personnel expenditure is the only exception to the globalisation principle: it cannot be topped up with 
other appropriations and payroIls have to be capped, cf. Article 7, paragraph III of the LOLF. 
369 Article 48 item 4 of the LOLF Chapter V, Information and Audit of Public Finances. 
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given to democratic accountability forms of the French Parliament, as will be explained 
in the course of the ensuing analysis. 
Stewardship of Public Money - from compliance to performance? 
The concept of stewardship of public money is not explicitly defined in the French legal 
system. Instead of providing a detailed definition of what may be subsumed by the 
concept of stewardship of public money, the French legislator has regulated this area in a 
fairly vague manner, providing the external accountability actor, the Cour des Comptes 
(hereinafter the Cour) substantial freedom of interpretation of this concept. Nevertheless, 
the Cour's basic framework of control is explicitly regulated by the Code des 
jurisdictions financiers, which authorises the Cour to conduct three major areas of 
financial accountability investigations: 
1) accuracy of the accounts (controle de la regula rite comptable), 370 where the Cour 
has to be assured that figures in the accounts are properly stated; 
2) regularity of financial operations (controle de la regula rite de la gestion),371 
where the Cour checks whether receipts and payments accord with relevant 
budgetary legislation and, in the case of public bodies, relevant administrative 
legislation; in the case of public enterprises - relevant commercial law; or in the 
case of subsidised organisations - relevant civillaw.372 
3) quality of management, assurance of "good use of public funds" (bon emploi des 
fonds )373 and "verification of the accounts and management of public enterprises" 
370 Article L III - 1 of the Code des jurisdictions financiers. 
371 Article L III - 3 of the Code des jurisdictions financiers. 
372 Within the control of financial operations, an auditor also checks whether rules of fiscal and criminal 
law are respected, although this does not represent hislher major preoccupation. Cf C. Deescheemaeker, La 
Cour des Comptes, (La Documentation Francaise, Paris), 1998, pp. 61-62. 
373 Article L III - 3 of the Code des jurisdictions financiers. 
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(fa verification des comptes et de fa gestion des enterprises pub/iquesi74 which 
would generally correspond to British value for money requirements - attainment 
of economy, efficiency and effectiveness in the use of public funds. 
There is certainly a similarity between the definition of a concept of stewardship of 
public money in the British and French central Government. Although the French system 
does not regulate different public money stewardship requirements in greater detail, as is 
the case with British regulations, both systems explicitly stress the importance of 
regularity of financial operations, in addition to the requirement of account's accuracy. 
Furthermore, it is interesting to note that both systems use the term "regularity" instead of 
"legality" which, in our opinion, would be more appropriate and legally "correct" term in 
this case. Lastly, there is surely some similarity in which the third financial accountability 
requirement, the requirement of achieving "value-for-money" in the UK, and the French 
imperative of bon empfoi des fonds are defined. The reforms undertaken through the 
LOLF will bring about even greater proximity between these two national concepts. 
In this respect, in it interesting to note that an absence of the clear meaning of the bon 
empfoi des fonds in France has never been perceived as a problem for the French 
financial accountability system. Lack of a precise definition of this notion has enabled the 
Cour to develop its own concept of what this principle means in practice. This does not, 
in any case, mean that the Cour has not taken this role seriously or that the freedom of 
interpretation has undermined the assessment of the good use of the public funds. Thus, 
relatively recent research conducted on the performance audit conducted by the Cour has 
demonstrated that there is a wide range of criteria which the Cour's auditors apply in 
their performance management inspections. These are: economy, efficiency, 
effectiveness, goal attainment, good management practice and good governance, 
depending on the context and purpose of the particular audit. 375 However, it is also not in 
374 Article L III - 4 of the Code des jurisdictions financiers. 
375 C. Pollitt at ai, Performance or Compliance? Performance Audit and Public Management in Five 
Countries, (Oxford University Press), 1999, p. 84. 
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dispute that a lack of a clearly set objectives and targets of financial performance in the 
French administration has generated significant difficulties in the Cour's attempts to 
assess efficiency and effectiveness of financial operations. Due to these limitations, many 
auditors have kept their activities within a more narrowly defined framework of 
controlling the regularity and consistency of the audited body's decisions, stability of its 
operations and investigating any specific problems that came to the auditor's attention.376 
It is expected that the introduction of programmatic budgeting, with clear setting of 
objectives and indicators, will even more enhance the importance of values of efficiency 
and effectiveness in the use of the public funds in France. As the programme budgeting 
has been introduced only this year (2006) it is still not possible to judge its results and 
impact on the concept of the stewardship of public money. However, the first pilot 
ministries which have undergone this process, have experienced difficulties when 
attempting to reorient budgets to the performance budgeting framework. 377 This is partly 
due to difficulties in defining clear targets and objectives of the programmes for the first 
time, and partly due to strong rechstaat legal tradition of the French administration, in 
which most Government activities are already closely regulated by detailed framework of 
law and do not leave much space for managerial freedoms. It will, therefore, be very 
interesting to see how and to what extent the French legal culture based on Weber's 
classical bureaucratic values of regularity and compliance will be able to embrace strong 
New Public Management values of performance orientation and management flexibility. 
This issue will surely be tested through the ongoing introduction of a more flexible 
internal control management framework. 
376 Ibid. 
377 F. Waintrop, C. Chol, op. cit. p. 11. 
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Internal financial accountability mechanisms 
Financial control posts and General Inspectorate of Finance 
There are three key posts in the French government internal control system. These are the 
ordonnateur (authorising officer), the controleur financier (financial controller) and the 
comptable (or public accountant). 
Ordonnateur holds the power over the budget of a public body, by being authorised to 
enter into commitments (engage), issue contracts and orders, verify deliveries and 
invoices (liquide) and authorize payments (ordonne).378 The authorising officer in the 
Ministry is the line Minister (or for EPs the head of the EP), who usually delegates this 
responsibility to other members of staff, such as General Directors (heads of Sectors). 
Comptables make the payments authorised by the ordonnateur (and later approved by the 
controleur financier). They are accountants by profession, but of a very special kind, 
which makes them a sort of a 'national phenomenon' that has no real counterpart 
elsewhere in the world.379 Thus, comptables are personally responsible for the decisions 
taken and liable for the sums involved should a payment be made without appropriate 
authorisation or without legal authority in the budget. 380 Such an emphasis on personal 
liability of comptables can be traced back to the beginning of the XIX century, when they 
obtained a key position in the process of judicial financial accountability. As Napoleon 
wanted to create a strong state with an efficient executive, he simply exempted Ministers 
(ordonnateurs) from judicial audit of the Cour, placing the burden of financial 
accountability solely on comptables.381 This 'imbalance' in accountability lines was 
addressed in 1948, by creation of the Court of Budgetary and Financial Discipline (La 
378 S. Touchon, D. Tommasi, op. cit. p. 59. 
379 Cf. Normarton, The Accountability and Audit of Governments, (Manchester University Press, 1964), pp. 
18-19. 
380 Cf. 1. Magnet, Les comptables publics, (L.G.D.J, Paris), 1995, pp. 105-137. 
381 Cf. Normarton, ibid. 
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Cour de discipline budgetaire et financiere), which has the authority to decide on the 
cases of irregular action of commitments officers or other persons involved in financial 
matters other than comptables.382 
Comptables are responsible for verifying the regularity of payment orders, to issue the 
payment through the Treasury Single Account (or the EP's account at the Treasury) and 
keep the accounting books. There are around 55,000 comptables in the French 
administration, operating in central, regional and local government. 383 They are internally 
supervised by the General Directorate of Public Accounting (as part of the Ministry of 
Finance), and externally account for their actions to the Cour, which carries out detailed 
audits of their accounts. 
Controleur financier is an official of the Ministry of Finance placed in each 
Ministry/other body, who supervises financial operations within that body and ensures 
that spending does not exceed prescribed limits. Controleur financiers perform ex-ante 
control of financial operations and are obliged to attach a visa (indicating approval) at 
two different stages in the expenditure procedure: at the stage of commitment and at the 
stage of payment. They must verify that there is an appropriation available and the 
commitment fits the purpose of the appropriation, performing in this wayan ex-ante 
control of regularity of financial operations.384 
For an outside observer, the function of controleur financier appears to be redundant, as a 
great degree of ex-ante control of payments is already performed by comptables. The 
main logic behind the introduction of controleur financier, however, seems to be the wish 
of the Ministry of Finance to more strongly and directly control line ministries and 
agencies by placing their officials all throughout the administration. It should also be 
382 Cf. 1. Magnet, La Cour des Comptes les institutions associees et les chambers regionales des comptes, 
4th edition (Berger-Levrault, Paris), 1996, pp. 313-329. 
383 National Audit Office, State Audit in the European Union, 2005, pp. 89-90, available at 
www.nao.gov.uk 
384 E. Devaux, Finances Publiques, (Breal Editions, 2002), pp. 266-268. 
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noted that in addition to their role of controlling the regularity of operations, controleur 
financiers also carry out an advisory function. They thus report regularly to the Minister 
of Finance and give opinions upon all the financial projects of the ministry, including the 
preparation of the budget. 385 
The function of the controleur financier was introduced as early as in 1890 and gradually 
developed to modem times.386 The Minister of Finance has the authority to appoint the 
controleur financier in each public body and to have direct supervisory power upon them. 
In order to strengthen their independent position, the Law of the 21 of March 1947 
provided that contra leur financier could not be recruited from the Ministry they are 
situated at, but need to be brought from another public body or outside of the 
administration. 387 Usually, controleurs financiers are experienced civil servants, without 
express political affinity, at the end of their career. 388 Therefore controleur financiers are 
often perceived as alien elements imposed by the Ministry of Finance in order to 
strengthen the already existing framework of internal financial accountability established 
between ordonnateur and comptable. 
The French internal financial accountability system firmly establishes the principle of 
incompatibility/segregation of functions between the ordonnateur and comptable.389 This 
principle ensures that the same person cannot at the same time make orders, verify 
deliveries and make payment. The principle of incompatibility therefore provides that the 
comptable does not report to the ordonnateur. He/she is empowered to reject any 
irregular payment orders issued by the ordonnateur. This principle is applied for both 
expenditure and revenue (since revenue assessment is separated from revenue collection). 
Subsequently, the comptable is responsible for communicating all transactions through 
the Treasury's accounts. In exceptional circumstances, however, the ordonnateur can 
385 Cf. Normarton, op. cit. 92-93. 
386 E. Devaux, op. cit., pp. 266-268. 
387 Ibid. 
388 The final status of controlleur financers has been regulated by a Decree of January 23, 1956. 
389 Cf. J. Magnet, Les comptables publics, op. cit, p. 10. 
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impose a "requisition order" onto the "public accountant", to authorise a payment order 
that the accountant had previously rejected. When this occurs, the requisition order is 
reported to the Cour by the Ministry of Finance and accountability shifts from the 
comptable to the ordonnateur.39o Although the principle of segregation of duties is a 
fundamental principle of French financial accountability, which has been further spread 
to other systems (such as the EU one, as will be discussed in the next chapter), it has 
recently been criticized for slowing down the introduction of costing procedures, 
separation of management from accounting and weakening managers' awareness of 
overall budgetary performance.391 
When a relationship between the comptable and controleur financier is looked at more 
closely, it seems that the role of both actors correspond to the role which the UK 
Treasury performs in the UK. As pointed out in the previous chapter, one of the key 
principles of internal control in the UK is that no expenditure or commitments can be 
incurred without the approval of the Treasury. However, as we could see, in the UK 
model the Treasury is not able and does not want to control every detail of expenditure. 
Instead, it delegates the financial responsibilities to departments, while it concentrates 
only on potentially sensitive financial issues (increase of establishments, salary cost etc.). 
In contrast, the traditional French internal control model is highly centralised, 
emphasising a strong controlling role of the Ministry of Finance, exercised through 
controleurs financiers and comptables. 
Another internal accountability mechanism in France is provided by operation of the 
General Inspectorate of Finance, based in the Ministry of Finance (L 'inspection Generale 
des Finances). The Inspectorate was set up in 1816 and, as pointed out earlier, together 
with the Cour and the Conseil d'Etat, represents one of the three senior bodies of French 
administration, so called 'Grands Corps de l'Etat,.392 It has a staff of some 350 inspectors 
390 S. Touchon, D. Tommasi, op. cit., 59-60. 
391 Ibid, p. 60. 
392 Its staff is normally recruited from the prestigious ENA. 
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who are authorised to make on the spot checks and access documents in ministries and 
any institution or enterprise that spends or receives public funds. 393 The nature of their 
control is mainly preventive, as there are no real direct sanctions that the Inspectorate can 
impose. The report on performed control is, however, sent to the Finance Minister for 
information, and he alone can decide on eventual sanctions, as, for example, on the 
personal liability of the accountant or his/her suspension.394 It should also be pointed out 
that the General Inspectorate has gradually developed a role of a consultative body 
producing reports and audits of public bodies and public policies. Its reports can be made 
public and its recommendations about procedures or the performance of individuals are 
usually well received and accepted. 
Gradual reform of the internal control framework 
In spite of a satisfactory level of operation of the internal control structures in the French 
administration, the system of internal accountability can be criticised on several grounds. 
The first obvious criticism may be directed towards numerous levels of financial control 
within the executive, which undoubtedly have an adverse effect on administrative 
flexibility in the use of the public funds. The existence of numerous levels of control and 
detailed regulation of available items of expenditure prescribed by budget expenditure 
items, do not leave enough flexibility for managers to use public money in the most 
efficient and effective way, but force them to move within a fairly restrictive legally 
defined framework. In such a system, values of compliance indeed dominate over the 
values of performance. 
The second strand of criticism may be directed towards ambiguous accountability lines 
established between different control post actors. Although ordonnateurs are generally 
responsible for financial management of a public body, this responsibility is to quite an 
393 E. Devaux, op. cit. 271-273; NAO, State Audit in the European Union op. cit, p. 90. 
394 E. Devaux, ibid. 
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extent devolved to the financial controlleurs and comptables. Both actors, especially 
financial controlleurs, who actively control the ordonnateurs in their every day work, in 
this way assume considerable level of responsibility for financial management, which 
brings about a blurring of accountability lines within the organisation. 
Third, it may be argued that within the concept of separation between the ordonnateur 
and the comptable, too much emphasis is placed on the role of comptables, who are 
personally liable for the proper execution of authorised payments and held to account for 
their operation before the Cour. Although the role of comptables is certainly important, it 
is also true that their overall involvement in the financial process is fairly technical and 
implementory, as they represent basically cashiers of an organisation they operate within. 
This is in contrast to the level of responsibility of the management of an organisation. 
And whereas comptables face continuous high level of scrutiny by the Cour, management 
of an organisation faces lesser amount of pressure, imposed primarily by the Court of 
Budgetary Discipline, which has not achieved great results in its work so far and does not 
enjoy the prestige of the Cour in the French administration. It is also true that 
ordonnateurs may also face criticisms presented in the annual or special reports of the 
Cour, but difficulties in following up the Cour's recommendations undermine the effects 
of such a scrutiny. 
The LOLF has tried to address the weaknesses of the existing model primarily through 
providing more strength and flexibility to ordonnateurs in the use of the public money. 
The enlargement of budget appropriations through the introduction of programmes will 
allow for much more flexible management, as managers in charge of individual 
programmes will be able to freely reallocate appropriations between sub-programmes or 
types of expenditure. This will not only strengthen the role of ordonnateurs, but also 
substantively lessen the importance of the role of controlleurs financiers, whose ex-ante 
controls of expenditure will become redundant, due to significant enlargement of votes. 
Although the LOLF does not explicitly address this issue, the French Government is 
making plans for a gradual change of a function of controlleur financier from ex ante 
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control to ex-post internal audit,395 which is in line with the existing models of internal 
accountability in the Anglo-Saxon world. In this way, the French model of internal 
control is, at least to some extent, moving towards the UK accounting officers model. 
It is, however, interesting to note that the role of comptables has remained almost intact 
in the new legal framework, in spite of systemic changes in the public expenditure 
management. It does not seem very likely that this traditional role of comptables will 
change in the near or distant future. It even may be argued that the LOLF has 
strengthened the position of comptables, by pointing out that comptables responsible for 
keeping and drawing up their accounts need to ensure faithful accounting and compliance 
with procedures, especially in the view of the introduction of accrual accounting.396 This 
demonstrates that, in spite of the strong influence of New Public Management ideas 
based on performance logic and the doctrine of enhanced managerial freedoms, the 
French financial accountability system will not easily let go its traditional values based 
on primary respect for legal rules and compliance with established procedures. 
Finally, in the light of strengthening the role of ordonnateurs, the question which 
naturally arises is how to ensure accountability for increased level of their 
responsibilities? As regards assurance of internal accountability, managers at different 
levels of public bodies will have to establish results (performance) indicators and target 
values, which will provide benchmarks for assessing their performance. Strengthening of 
external accountability mechanisms, on the other hand, can be achieved by two possible 
options. The first would be to enhance the effectiveness of the Court of Budgetary and 
Financial Discipline397 or to possibly allow the Cour des Comptes additional powers 
when dealing with senior officials. The second course of action would go towards 
substantial increase the role of the French Parliament in the scrutiny of the use of public 
395 NAO, op. cit., p. 90. 
396 Article 31 of the LOLF. 
397 S. Thebault, "L'imperiuse refonne de la Cour de discipline budgetary et financiere", Revue Francaise de 
Finances Publiques, No. 75, Septembre 2001, pp. 171-185. 
125 
money. The French MPs have given quite a clear answer to this question, opting strongly 
for the latter option. 
Enhancement of Parliamentary Accountability 
Historical background 
The right of Parliament to scrutinise public finances in France was established only at the 
beginning of the XIX century, following the development of a parliamentary system in 
France. The foundations of the Parliamentary control over finances were set up almost a 
century and half later than in Britain, during the period of Restoration (1814-30), often in 
an attempt to imitate well established practices that existed in the British Isles at that time 
(see Annex 1).398 Thus, the Restoration law of 15 May 1818, for the first time stipulated 
the right of Parliament to pass two kinds of financial laws: loi de finances, which contains 
both envisaged revenues and expenditure of the Government for the next year, and loi de 
reglement, which comprises the consolidated government accounts (financial statements), 
prepared on the basis of the actual execution of the loi de finances, as an ex post control 
of government financial operations. At this time, this was of great political importance, 
since it enabled the Parliament to control the actions of the executive.399 
During the III and IV Republics the means of control of Parliament over the executive 
were oscillating from rather strong position of the Parliament over the executive under 
the III republic and gradual lessening of its powers under the IV republic. Under the III 
Republic (1875-1940), Parliament was endowed with very real powers enabling it to 
influence the contents of the budget and thus control the Government. The debate on the 
398 P. Lalumiere, "Parliamentary Control of the Budget in France", in D. Coombes et aI., The Power of the 
Purse, (London George Allen & Unwin ltd), 1976, pp. 126-127. 
399 L. Saidj, "La loi de reglement et Ie deceloppement du controle parlementaire de la Restauration a nos 
jours", Revue Francaise de Finances Publiques, n 51, 1995, pp. 172-173. 
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proposed loi de finances allowed the Parliament to obtain extensive infonnation about the 
policies of the government and to influence its activities in a desired direction.4oo 
However, during the IV Republic Parliament was gradually losing its powers over 
finance, which resulted in further fonnal restrictions imposed after the establishment of 
the V Republic.401 
As pointed out earlier, the Constitution of the V Republic deliberately reduced the power 
of the Parliament, as a reaction to its omnipotence of previous times, which resulted in 
great instability of successive French Government cabinets. This has had a direct effect 
on the reduction of the Parliament's financial powers. Although the decline in 
Parliament's role arises from the provisions of the 1958 constitution, Parliament's 'power 
of the purse' was even more undennined by the 'organic' Constitutional Bylaw of 1959, 
earlier mention as the French "Financial Constitution,,.402 The main problem with the 
1959 'Financial Constitution' lay in its requirements that Parliament must either accept or 
reject the loi de finances as a whole without ever getting into details of its provision. The 
budgetary debate was actually limited only to the "new measures" to be introduced in 
individual ministries, which amounted to around 10% of the overall budget.403 This has 
deprived the Parliament of real powers of political control. Similar situation was to be 
found for the discussion on the consolidated government accounts, presented in the loi de 
reglement, which was not perceived as a genuine instrument for scrutinising the 
executive or bringing any additional power to the Parliament and therefore provoked an 
even lesser degree of interest of the French MPs. 
Enhancing Parliamentary Scrutiny through UK recipe - creation of MEC 
In the 1990s, due to growing international dialogue with other countries and within the 
EU, French parliamentarians have started to become increasingly aware of the need to 
400 P. Lalumiere, ibid. 
401 Ibid. 
402 L'ordonnance N 59-2 du 2 janvier 1959, which ceased to be in effect from 1 January 2005. 
403 F. Waintrop, C. Chol, op. cit., p. 3. 
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introduce substantive changes in their system of parliamentary financial accountability. 
The first natural reaction of the French parliamentarians was to look up at the UK model 
of accountability to try to find solutions that would fit the existing restrictive legislative 
framework. Thus, in 1998, a parliamentary report on reforming scrutiny of financial 
legislation was produced, devoted considerable attention to a study of the House of 
Commons Public Account Committee (PAC). 404 This led a year later to the establishment 
of a "Mission d'Evalution et de Controle", MEC, as a sub-committee of the Parliament's 
Finance Committee, modelled on the UK PAC.405 
The main objective of the MEC is to examine the cost effectiveness of public policies and 
to give the government the incentive needed to shift from efforts to accumulate resources 
to a culture based on spending results.406 In order to perform its tasks effectively, the 
French have introduced basic rules of operation of the UK PAC with some slight 
modifications. 
The MEC is comprised of the members of both ruling party(ies) and opposition and relies 
in its work on the expertise of the Cour. Unlike the UK PAC, the composition of the 
MEC does not rest on the proportional representation of the political parties in the 
parliament. Instead, in order to minimise possibilities of partisanship, political parties 
have equal representation on the committee.407 Furthermore, the MEC is co-presided by 
404 Assemblee Nationale, Groupe de travail sur I'efficacite de la depense publique et Ie controle 
parlementaire, Rapport, 1998. Cf H.B. Street, "MPs Attitudes towards Scrutiny in Britain and France", 
draft prepared for the ECPR workshop on the renewal of Parliaments, March 2002, Turin (permission to 
quote obtained from the author), p. 3. 
405 Assemblee Nationale, Rapport de la Commission des Finances, de I'Economie Generale et du Plan en 
conclusion des travaux d'une mission d'evalution et de controle constituee Ie 3 fevrier 1999, Repport, No. 
1781, July 1999. 
406 D. Migaud, "Des progres incontestables en droit et dans la pratique du contro1e parlementarie sous la XI 
legislature. La Mission d'evalution et de controle: un exemple parmi d'autres", Revue Francaise de 
Finances Publiques, No 77, 2002, pp. 47-54. 
407 SIGMA papers 33: Relations between Supreme Audit Institutions and Parliamentary Committees, 
OECD/SIGMA, Paris, 2002, pp. 36-37. 
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the President of the Finance Committee or his/her representative, who comes from the 
majority party and one representative of the opposition parties. According to the initial 
agreement, the Cour pays close attention to work of the MEC and its representatives are 
continuously present at the MEC's meetings. Work of the Cour is thus perceived as one 
of the key elements for successful functioning of the Committee.408 
The statute establishing the MEC stipulates that MEC members conduct their 
investigations not only on the basis of written evidence, which has been the case with the 
Finance Committee, but also can hold hearings of responsible administrators.409 This kind 
of examination requires again the assistance of the Cour in preparation of its hearings. 
MEC also cooperates in its work and communicates its findings to other parliamentary 
committees (especially the Financial Committee), so that all the institutionalised 
parliamentary bodies can be involved in the process of financial scrutiny. 
The MEC examination methods have demonstrated the ambition of MEC to examine use 
of public funds on a regular basis, assessing not only the regularity of expenditure, but 
also efficiency and effectiveness of public spending. This has been proved by the 
majority of MEC's reports, in which questions of efficiency and effectiveness 
investigations occupy the most prominent place.410 The MEC members have also ensured 
that their work is open towards media and the public and its reports regularly published 
and represented in the broadcasting media, which should facilitate effective follow up on 
its findings and recommendations. 
408 J.D. Charpantier, "L 'asistance de la Cour des Comptes au Parlement", (Institut d'Etudes Politiques de 
Grenoble Universite Pierre Mendes France), 2000, pp. 173-175. 
409 Ibid. 
410 For example cf. Assemblee Nationale, Rapport d'Information par la Commission des Finances, de 
L 'Economie Generale et du Plan en conclusions des travaux de la Mission d'evalution et de controle 
(MEC) sur la gouvernance des Universites dans Ie contexte de la LOLF, Rapport No. 3160, Juin 2006, all 
MEC reports are available at the website of the French National Assembly: http://assemblee-nationale.fr 
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Although the first years of MEC's operation have shown satisfactory results, senous 
challenges still remain to be faced. This is primarily due to overall attitude of the French 
Parliament which perceives itself mainly as a legislator and much less as a scrutiniser of 
Government activity, which does not provide a good environment for the MEC's work. 
The MEC has, naturally, still not achieved the prestige of the UK PAC and will need time 
to impose itself as an important guardian of public money. Furthermore, the cooperation 
between the MEC and the Cour has not been satisfactory, as will be pointed out in more 
detail later. Although there is no need that the Cour establish too close a relationship with 
the Parliament, modelled on the NAO/House of Commons, a high degree of cooperation 
will be necessary in order for MEC to function properly. Furthermore, it is very important 
for MEC to enhance collegial work within its membership in order to reduce possible 
political partisanship and be able to more effectively convey its findings both to the 
Parliament and citizens.411 
Substantive reforms of parliamentary accountability through LOLF 
The passage of the LOLF in 2001 (which made the earlier 1959 bylaw largely defunct) 
has substantively increased the role of the Parliament holding the executive accountable 
for the use of the public money. Under the new legal framework, MPs are given the right 
to make amendments to the budget framework, as they will now be able to reallocate 
appropriations between the various programmes which constitute a particular mission, in 
accordance with the Article 43 of the LOLF. Parliament will thus be paying a much more 
substantial role in outlining public finance expenditure strategy and setting priorities of 
policy objectives. In order to strengthen the link between budget execution and 
parliamentary authorisation, Parliament will also have the right to supervise the 
411 Assemblee Nationale. Rapport de la Commission des Finances, de I 'Economie Generale et du Plan en 
conclusion des travaux d'une mission d'evaluation et de controle constituee Ie 20 decembre 2000, Rapport 
No. 3664, 2002. 
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movements of appropriations, such as credit transfers, carry-overs to the next budget 
d 11 . . 1 d" 412 year, a vances or cance atlOns or partIcu ar expen Iture Items. 
The enhancement of Parliament's role in financial matters should also be improved by 
providing MPs with much better information on the overall economic, social and 
financial situation in the country at the time the loi de finances is discussed. Thus, the 
LOLF requires that the Government, in addition to the list of missions, programmes and 
performance indicators for the following year's loi de finance, provide Parliament with 
several reports: an analysis of economic, social, financial situation and outlook; a 
description of its economic and fiscal policy guidelines with regard to France's European 
commitment and medium term evaluation of the State's resources and charges broken 
down by main functions. 413 All this should enhance Parliament's understanding of the 
complex and comprehensive issues of Government finances. 
It is important to note that the scrutinising role of the Parliament has also been very 
strongly emphasised in the LOLF. In accordance with Article 57, the Finance 
Committees of both Assemblies of the Parliament will have greater investigative and 
hearing powers. They will have the right to conduct on-the-spot investigations on 
particular matters and refer them to the Cour and other bodies as part of their control and 
assessment remit. Article 57 also explicitly requires public officials to attend the 
Committee's hearings, if requested by the Committee's chairman, in order to account for 
the results achieved with the resources allocated to them.414 In this way, the current 
position of the MEC in making its own investigations and hearings will certainly be 
reinforced. 
412 Ministere de l'Economie des Finances et de L'Industrie, Budget Reform and State Modernisation in 
France, available at www.minefi.gouv.fr 
413 Article 48 and Article 50 of the LOLF. 
414 Minister of the Economy, Finance and Industry et aI, The Performance-Based Approach: Strategy, 
Objectives, Indicators ~ A methodological guide for applying the Constitutional bylaw of August 151 2001 
on budget acts, available at http://www.minefi.gouv.fr/lolf. 
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The first effects of the LOLF have been experienced through the adoption of the loi de 
finances for 2006, the first French budget based on the introduction of programme 
budgeting and with substantively reformed powers of the Parliament. As expected, the 
Parliamentary debate on the basis of the LOLF was much more substantial than in the 
previous years and have prompted a significant reaction of the French MPs, who have 
submitted around 1100 amendments to the loi de finances proposal, 400 being related to 
the revenue issues and around 700 regarding issues of expenditure.415 The debate on the 
loi de finances was held over around 30 sessions of the Parliament (14 of them related 
only to issues of expenditure),416 which provided room for detailed analysis of particular 
missions and definitely revived the Parliament's 'power of the purse' in France. 
Whereas the first signs of the LOLF implementation have been encouraging (as regards 
the Parliamentary power to approve expenditure and revenue), it still remains to be seen 
whether the Parliament will have enough strength and capacity to effectively keep the 
executive to account for the effective implementation of the modernised expenditure 
framework. Attainment of true Parliamentary accountability will, of course, require much 
more than changing the legislation. It will definitely necessitate the change of culture in 
the French parliament from the legislative role towards strengthening its scrutinising role, 
which has been widely suppressed throughout decades in the fear of reestablishment of 
the fragile III French Republic. 
Against such a background, it will be essential to further strengthen the role of the MEC 
in the overall accountability framework. It needs to be ensured that the MEC members 
are adequately trained to perform their investigative duties and to impose their work to 
members of Parliament as well as the wider public. In this sense, it would be helpful if 
the MEC would obtain the status of the standing Committee of the French Parliament, 
415 Assemblee Nationale, Loi De Finances Pour 2006 (No 2540) Deuxieme parties, Amendments, Available 
at http://assemblee-nationale.frI12/pdf/amendments/adts PLF2.pdf 
416 Assemblee Nationale , Calendrier de la discussion en seance publique de la second partie du project de 
loi de finances pour 2006. http://www.assemblee-nationale.frI12/dossiers/loi finances 2006-calend2.asp 
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instead of its current status of the Financial Committee sub-committee, which has to 
some extent kept the operations of the MEC in the shadow of its Finance Committee big 
brother. Furthermore, it is essential to establish good working relations between the MEC 
and the Cour, which highly professional staff would be able to continuously provide the 
MEC with reliable information on the Government's financial performance. This, 
however, will not be such an easy task, as it may look at the first sight, the reasons of 
which will be examined in the next section. 
La Cour des Comptes (The Cour) - a traditional guardian of the 
'public' purse 
Historical background 
Similar to Britain, France has a long history of institutionalised scrutiny of public money. 
The oldest audit body established for the purpose of overseeing the royal receipts and 
payments dates back to 1190.417 At the beginning of the XIV century the Royal 
Chambers of Accounts (Chambres des comptes) were established in most provinces. At 
that time the separation between financial control posts (ordonnateurs and comptables) 
also occurred.418 The eighteenth-century crises of accountability resulting in the famous 
Revolution brought about abolition of the Royal Chambers. Following the principles of 
the 1789 Declaration of the rights man and the citizen,419 two clear opposing tendencies 
appeared: one, which favoured the examination of the accounts by the National Assembly 
417 C. Deescheemaeker, La Cour des Comptes, (La Documentation Francaise, Paris), 1998, p.8-1 O. 
418 1. Magnet, La Cour des Comptes les institutions associees et les chambers regionales des comptes. op. 
cit, p. 29. 
419 As mentioned earlier, Article 14 of the Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen, 1791 proclaimed 
that "All citizens have the right to ascertain, either in person or through their representatives, the necessity 
for public taxation, to consent freely thereto, to observe its expenditure and to determine its apportionment, 
its assessment, its collection and its duration." 
Article 15 "Society has the right to require of every public agent an account of his administration". 
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itself and another, which proposed the establishment of a body independent both from the 
legislative and executive power.420 The latter option undoubtedly prevailed. 
It was not until the beginning of the 19th century that the auditing of public accounts was 
formalised by Napoleon I, who established the Cour des Comptes (the Cour) in 1807. 
After the Bourbon Restoration and consequently Orleanist monarchy the Cour started 
cooperating more closely with the Parliament, underpinning the legislative control of the 
budget. However, the Cour has never become a close ally of the representative body as is 
the case in Britain. Its essential characteristic is strong judicial independence, dedicated 
to a task of financial control, as the servant of neither the executive nor legislature, but 
only of "the nation".421 
Article 47 of the French Constitution of 1958 proclaims that "The Cour assists Parliament 
and the Government in the control of the execution of loi de finances." Constitutional 
establishment of the Cour demonstrates its high status and prestige in the French 
constitutional and institutional framework. Article 47 was amended in 1996 (Article 47-
1), giving a basis for the Cour's annual report on the yearly Social Security Finance Acts. 
The structure and staffing of the Cour 
According to the Law of 16th September 1807, the Cour was composed from "a Premier 
President, three Presidents, 28 maitres des comptes, rejerendaires, which number is 
established by the Government, one procureur general and one greffier en cheJ'.422 
Although the composition of the Cour has naturally been changing over the last two 
centuries, its main structure has remained the same to modem times. Thus, according to 
Article L. 112-1 of the Financial Courts Code (Code des juridictions financieres) the 
420 C. Deescheemaeker, ibid. 
421 E.L. Normanton, The Accountability and Audit o/Governments, op. cit, p. 19. 
4221. Magnet, La Cour des Comptes les institutions associees et les chambers regionales des comptes, op. 
cit. 73. 
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Cour is composed of "a Premier President, Presidents of chambers, conseillers maitres, 
conseillers rf?ferendaires and auditors." The Cour is headed by a Premier President, who 
is appointed by the President of the Republic, and has significant management 
responsibilities as will be analysed further in the text. However, it should be noted that in 
spite of a relatively strong position of the President, the Cour in its essence is a body of a 
collegiate nature, as pointed out in the above legal provisions. 
The Cour has quite a good system of career development of its staff. Auditors of the Cour 
are chosen from the best graduates of the prestigious Ecole National d 'Administration 
and appointed by the President of the Republic. After several years of working 
experience and positively assessed work abilities, an auditor can be promoted to the post 
of conseiller referendaire and consequently to the post of conseiller maitre. Their roles 
shall be examined in more detail later in the text. At this point, it is interesting to note that 
around two thirds of conseillers maitres have taken their positions after occupying one of 
the lower levels posts of the Court's hierarchy while one third comes from outside of the 
court (other civil service positions). Similarly, three quarters of the conseillers 
referendaires were previously auditors of the Cour while the remainder are generally 
selected from the wider civil service, particularly the Ministry of Finance. As the scope of 
performance is increasing, the Cour has shown interest in recruiting people with 
experience in social, scientific and industrial walks oflife.423 
It may be argued that the accumulating experience of the Cour's staff obtained outside of 
the Cour's work increases the Cour's appreciation of the practical management problems 
in the bodies they audit and increases their credibility with those subject to their 
examination.424 In addition, many magistrates have worked in the internal control 
environment of ministries, sometimes even as comptables, which surely enhances their 
expertise. Once appointed to a chambre, staff tend to stay within one area and build up 
considerable competence. Furthermore, magistrates are also encouraged to assume 
423 C. Pollitt at aI, op. cit., p. 61. 
424 Ibid. 
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responsibilities in the wider public sector. It is thus, not an unusual practice for the 
magistrates of the Cour to leave the Cour and start a political career, or go to and work in 
the civil service and come back to the Cour at some later stage of their career.425 
Therefore, it is often argued that the staff of the Cour and the civil service (especially the 
Ministry of Finance) represent a joint elite, sharing the same objective of stewardship of 
bl · 426 pu IC money. 
Like all other French courts, the Cour is assisted by the Parquet, headed by Procureur 
General (Chief Prosecutor), appointed by the Government. The key functions of the 
Procureur General are internal coordination of the activities of the individual Chambers 
and external coordination between the Cour and other state bodies.427 One of his/her key 
roles in this sense is to ensure rendering of the accounts by the comptables and to follow 
up on the implementation of the findings and recommendations of the Cour, as will be 
discussed in more detail later. 
The Cour is divided into seven chambers each headed by a President de Chambre, who is 
chosen by Government from among a list of conseillers maitres prepared by the Premier 
President. Each chamber employs approximately thirty magistrates and examiners, 
together with specialised support of senior civil servants and engineers on secondment.428 
Chambers of the Cour are quite independent in their work. After consultation with the 
Presidents of Chambers and a Procureur General, the Premier President makes a formal 
decision on the work of each chamber. 429 Presidents of Chambers further allocate tasks to 
425 It is interesting to note that the President Chirac has started its career in the Cour. 
426 I. Harden, F. White, K. Donnelly, "The Court of Auditors and Financial Control and Accountability in 
the European Community", European Public Law, Volume 1, issue 4, pp. 559-662. 
427 Cf website of the Cour des Comptes: http//:www.ccomptes.fr 
428 Ibid. 
429 Since 12 September 1997, the work-load of the Cour has been distributed between the seven Chambers 
as follows: First chamber: Ministries and public bodies in charge of Finance and the Budget; Second 
chamber: Ministries and public bodies in charge of defence, industry, energy, foreign and domestic trade; 
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Chamber teams headed by a conseiller maitre. It is important to note that each Chamber 
has total independence in establishing its findings on the accounts of the government 
departments and the associated governmental bodies within their sphere of operation. 
Each chamber proposes to the First President, on an entirely independent basis, an annual 
work programme and a medium term programme. On the basis of these proposals from 
the chambers, the Premier President decides on the annual programme of the Cour as a 
whole. 
The Cour is very proud of its independence in deciding on its own programme and 
regarding its operation in general. As pointed out earlier, the Cour is not closely linked 
either with the Parliament or with the Government, but represents a prestigious judicial 
institution in its own right, being accountable directly to citizens. 
This independent feature of the Cour, has, however, been seriously challenged by the 
adoption of the LOLF. Namely, in their desire to improve the role of the Parliament in the 
scrutiny of public money, MPs have introduced a provision in the LOLF (Article 58, 
paragraph 1) which requires the Cour to submit its annual working programme to the 
Parliament's Financial Committees (one of the National Assembly and one of the Senate) 
for their opinion.43o This provision has provoked serious protests from the Cour, which 
claimed that its independent status accorded by the Constitution was grotesquely violated. 
The story has got its epilogue in the decision of the Counseil Constitutionel, which 
proclaimed the disputed provision unconstitutional, in violation of the Article 47 of the 
Third chamber: Ministries and public bodies responsible for education, culture and research; the public 
broadcasting; Fourth chamber: Ministries and public bodies in charge of justice, interior, foreign affairs as 
well as appeals against rulings of the Chambres Regionales des Comptes; Fifth chamber: Ministries and 
other public bodies in charge of employment, Labour, professional training, housing and social affairs; 
charitable organisations; Sixth chamber: Ministries and other public bodies in charge of health and social 
security; social security bodies; Seventh chamber: Ministries and other public bodies in charge of 
infrastructure, transport and urban planning, agriculture and fishery, the environment and tourism. 
430 B. Cieutat, "La Cour des comptes et la reforme", Revue Francaise de Finances Publiques, No. 76, 
Novembre 2001, pp. 107-122. 
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Constitution.431 In this way, the Cour has won an important battle in securing its 
independence from the Parliament. However, it looks as if the war has not been yet won, 
as the Parliament is continuing to put increasing pressure on the Cour to respond to its 
requests and needs, as will be analysed in more depth later. 
Institutional jurisdiction of the Cour 
The Cour institutional jurisdiction is quite wide. Most of the Cour's institutional remit 
was established in a law passed in 1967, which provides for the audit of all ministries and 
public bodies. The audit of public enterprises and nationalised industries was added in 
1976 when the bodies previously responsible for their audit were merged with the 
Cour.432 
Institutional jurisdiction of the Cour can be mandatory or optional. 433 Mandatory 
examinations are those where the Cour is the only body authorized by primary 
legislation 434 to audit the accounts of the bodies concerned. Code des Juridictions 
Financieres (Code on Financial Jurisdiction) establishes general mandatory jurisdiction 
of the Cour over all central Government bodies: central government departments, 
ministries and agencies; etablissements publics nationaux, semi-independent public 
431 Le Counsil constitutionnel decision no 2001-448 DC du 25 Juillet 2001. 
432 Thus, the Cour took on duties that had previously been allocated to the Commission de verification des 
comptes des entreprises publiques (The Nationalised Industries Accounts Commission). The Commission 
was set up in 1948 to examine the accounts of public corporations and nationalised industries and audit 
their accounts, and was affiliated to the Court of Accounts. Cf J. Bertucci, "Le droit de controle des 
juridictions financiers", Revue Francaise de Finances Publiques, No. 75 2001, 95-101. 
433 Cf the website ofthe Cour des Comptes, http://www.ccomptes.fr 
434 Primarily by the Code on Financial Jurisdiction (Code des juridictions financieres) in which the laws 
and regulations about the Cour des Comptes and the 'chambres regionales des comptes' (regional chambers 
of audit) have been merged in. Courts mandatory jurisdiction is provided in the Articles L. 111-1, 111-3, 
131-1,133-1,133-2. 
138 
bodies (Autorite Administrative Independante -AAI); since 1950, social security bodies; 
and, since 1976, public corporations and nationalised industries.435 
The Cour has only optional jurisdiction over private bodies, as their accounts are audited 
regularly by other organisations and the examination of the Cour is only discretionary. 
However, involvement of the Cour in audit of these bodies is important, due to significant 
amounts of public money which may be invested in the work of these bodies. The 
organisations under which the Cour exercises only optional jurisdiction are: 
-private sector companies where a majority of the voting rights or capital is held 
by one of the public sector bodies listed above, who are subject to the mandatory 
jurisdiction of the Cour des Comptes, or where such a public sector body has a 
decisive influence over decision-making and management within the company; 
-private sector organisations (including the voluntary sector, charities and other 
non-profit organisations) which receive support from the public sector; 
-charitable organisations funded by contributions from the general public (since 
1991); 
-organisations which receive funds from the European Union (Art. 45 of Act No. 
96-314 of 12 April 1996).436 
It is obvious that institutional jurisdiction of the Cour is rather wide. Such a broad remit 
of the Cour brings about comprehensiveness in the audit of public monies, defined in 
their broadest sense. 
Functional jurisdiction of the Cour 
The Cour is, at least in form, a court of law, whose primary task is to make judgement on 
accuracy and regularity of public accounts. Nowadays, however, the role of the Cour has 
435 Article L. Ill-I. of the Code des jurisdictions financiers. 
436 Cf the website of the Cour des Comptes, http://www.ccomptes.fr 
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evolved towards an audit body which perfonns a much wider scope of activities than 
judging the accounts. In fact, the Cour's judicial powers have gradually been weakened 
and delegated to other institutions,437 and its 'accessory' role as an auditor of financial 
management of public funds has been significantly strengthened. 
Evolution of the Cour can easily be followed through legislation which regulates its 
material jurisdiction. Material jurisdiction of the Cour has for a long time been defined by 
the Law of 16 September 1807, which laid down two distinct roles for the Court: 
principal and accessory. The principal role of the Cour was stipulated by Article 11, 
which provided for the Cour the right and duty to judge the enumerated public accounts. 
The second, accessory, or extra-judicial role of the Cour was stipulated by Article 16 
which provided for the Cour the role of examining financial irregularities that it has 
discovered during the control of the accounts and consequently presenting them in an 
annual report containing general observations from the examination of the accounts 
(Article 22).438 
It should be noted that although judicial and extra-judicial functions of the Court seem to 
be distinct, they are not necessarily separate. Thus, while exercising its judicial function, 
the Court naturally examines the regularity of the procedures which the administration 
employs in its everyday work and subsequently reports on its findings. Unlike in the 
British system where controls of financial audit and value for money audit are separated 
both substantially and organisationally, in the French system all kinds of control are 
exercised simultaneously. Reporters are thus obliged to devote equal attention to all the 
aspects of financial control and management. 439 
437 Thus, as a result of decentralization refonns in 1983 some of the Cour's competences were transferred to 
regional audit bodies (chambres regionales des comptes).437 On the other hand, the highest administrative 
court, the Conseil d'Etat has overtaken its role of imposing fines on accountants and has become a Court of 
Cassation for the decisions of the Cour. 
438 J. Magnet, La Cour des Comptes les institutions associees et les chambers regionales des comptes, op. 
cit., pp. 73-74. 
439 C. Descheemaeker, op. cit., pp. 61-62. 
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Depending on the nature of the audited bodies in question (whether they fall under the 
Cour's mandatory or optional jurisdiction), the Cour performs its control in a slightly 
different manner: 
1) for bodies under the public accounting rules regime (falling under the mandatory 
audit), the Cour exercises both judicial and extra-judicial functions; 
2) for bodies under the private accountancy regime (optional audit of the Cour) the 
Cour does not have authority to exercise its judicial functions and therefore 
exercises only extra-judicial powers, communicating its findings to the audited 
bodies and provides different kind ofreports.44o 
Although the Cour does not distinguish operationally and organisationally between 
regularity and financial management audit, we shall examine Cour's distinct roles in 
more detail separately, hoping to provide more clarity in the Cour's complex audit remit. 
In addition to the role of the Cour as a judge of accounts and as an auditor of financial 
management, we shall also separately examine the new role the Cour obtained under the 
LOLF, which could be described as assistance to Parliament. 
The COUf as a judge 
The judicial function of the Cour is usually expressed in the following definition: "La 
Cour juge les comptes et non les comptables [The Cour judges the accounts and not the 
accountants]." This definition was originally designed to express limitations of the 
competence of the judge of the accounts, but has been abusively extended to the 
440 Ibid. 
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definition of its jurisdiction, as there have been many misunderstandings concerning this 
" 441 Issue. 
On the one hand, the phrase that the Cour is judging the accounts means that it judges the 
regularity of financial operations. However, as the Cour cannot annul irregular operations 
or correct the accounts that have been rendered, this statement does not accurately depict 
reality. On the other hand, the statement that the Cour cannot judge the comptable is not 
completely true, it is contrary to the law of 1807 (Article 13), which provides that the 
Cour definitely establishes with its judgment on whether comptables have done their 
work accurately/regularly, or have surplus or are in arrears. In the first two cases the Cour 
will discharge the comptables, and in the third one, it will sentence the comptables to 
settle their arrears.442 Thus, by necessity, when the Cour is making a judgment on 
accounts, it also makes a judgment on comptables as well, especially in the case when the 
Cour sanctions the comptables. Such a judgment is not simply a declaratory statement, 
but represents a legally enforceable act against a comptable.443 This is in contrast with the 
UK system of financial audit where the NAO just provides a clear or a qualified opinion 
on the accounts. The NAO's opinion on the accounts is a simple declaratory statement 
that does not imply any personal liability of the person who prepared these accounts. 
In this sense, it is important to point out that the Cour does not base its judgment solely 
on the material elements of the case, but takes into account any personal circumstances 
that could justify ones behaviour, such as, for example existence of vis maior, which may 
justify the action of the accountant and thus discharge him/her of his/her responsibility. 
The best interpretation of this issue has been given by the Cour itself. It thus states: 
441 1. Magnet, "Que juge Ie juge des comptes?" Revue Francaise de Finances Publiques, 1989, no. 28, pp. 
115-124. 
442 1. Magnet, La Cour des Comptes les institutions associees et les chambers regionales des comptes, op. 
cit., pp. 147-148. 
443 Ibid. 
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"The task/mission of the judge charged with checking the regularity of the accounts is to understand the 
responsibility of the comptable and his position, in the view of the whole situation of the accounts. ,,444 
Therefore, if the judge finds that a comptable is in arrears and that there is no good 
justification for his/her behaviour (such as e.g. vis maior), the judge will establish 
personal financial liability of the accountant (law of 23 February 1963, Article 60-VI) in 
its judgment, which will be enforced against the comptable.445 All judgments emanating 
from auditing the accounts are also communicated to the Minister, in order to avoid 
repetition of errors. In 2004, the Cour made 333 judgments on the accounts of the 
comptables.446 
It should be noted that the Cour does not only judge accounts kept by 'official' 
comptables, but also examines the accounts of any person who has improperly become 
involved in handling public monies, In this case, the Cour can declare the existence of 
gestion de fait (de facto management). If the person is found to be a de facto public 
accountant, it consequently becomes subject to the same obligations and formal legal 
'b'l' , bl 447 responsl 1 Itles as a compta e, 
The Cour as an auditor of financial management 
Since its very establishment, the Cour has been authorized to exercise its powers only 
towards comptables, who were held personally and financially responsible for use of 
public money, while the ministers and higher officials qualified to order payments 
(ordonnateurs) were exempted from any form of accountability, Napoleon's 1807 law 
was quite explicit in this respect. Thus, Article 18 of the 1807 Act prescribed that: "The 
444 Cour des Comptes, 10 August 1880, commune de Frasne (Doubs), p. 8. 
445 1. Magnet, La Cour des Comptes les institutions associees et les chambers regionales des comptes, op, 
cit, 191-194. 
446 NAO report, op, cit. p. 94. 
447 Cf 1. Magnet, "La regularisation de la gestion de fait", Revue Francaise de Finances Publiques, No. 66, 
1999; R. Hertzog, "La necessaire refonne de la procedure de gestion de fait", Revue Francaise de Finances 
Publiques, No. 66, 1999. C. Descheemaeker, La Cour des comptes, op, cit. 119-133. 
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Cour may not, in any case whatever, claim any jurisdiction over ordonnateurs".448 This 
prohibition can be interpreted as a clear wish of the executive to protect its absolutist 
executive power. It may be argued that it is due to this legal situation that the indirect 
control, through the public accountants, was evolved and encouraged by the Cour.449 
It is interesting to note that the Cour is still not authorized to judge elected officials or 
civil servants entitled to order payments and receipt of public moneys. As mentioned 
earlier, enforcement of personal responsibility for ordonnateurs was instead given to a 
new body, the Court of Budgetary Discipline, founded in 1948.450 However, since it is far 
more difficult to impose personal responsibilities upon administrators than upon cashiers, 
additional ways of imposing accountability towards ordonnateurs were sought. One of 
the ways of putting pressure on ordonnateurs was to give the Cour the right to examine 
their performance, i.e. efficiency and efficacy of the use of public funds. Thus, the Law 
of 22 June 1967 introduced a new role for the Cour, which is defined in the current 
Article L 111-3 of the Code on Financial Jurisdiction which provides that the Cour is to 
"ascertain the good use of public funds" ('bon emploi des fonds'), and that it shall verify 
the accounts and management of public enterprises (Article III-4). These provisions have 
provided a basis for examination of value-for-money aspects of financial management, as 
pointed out earlier in the course of discussion on the concept of stewardship of public 
money. In this way, the Cour has indirectly started reviewing the work of elected officials 
and civil servants entitled to authorize payments. The Cour performs this role either 
during its examination of the accounts of government departments and other State bodies 
produced by the public accountant, or by directly reviewing the work of ordonnateur. 
It is difficult to estimate the share of performance audit in overall work of the Cour, since 
the Cour's investigations generally combine judiciary work and financial management 
448 C. Descheemaeker, op. cit. 119-133. 
449 Ibid. 
4501. Magnet, La Cour des Comptes les institutions associees et les chambers regionales des comptes, op. 
cit., 313-329. 
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audit. However, according to some estimates, two-thirds of the resources of the Cour are 
nowadays devoted to the audit of financial management or performance.451 
Within the Cour, performance audit is carried out by each chamber. Thus, each chamber 
selects topics for performance audit, on the basis of the annual plan and in accordance 
with level of public interest, possible risks involved and experience of the concerned 
area.
452 After the subjects of the audit have been determined by the chamber, the process 
of planning of the work commences, in accordance with the detailed rules of the 
decision-making process of the Cour. 
The rules of the decision-making process 
The decision-making process of the Cour in both judicial proceedings and financial 
management audit (as they are performed together) can briefly be described as follows. 
The audit is performed by an auditor, who carries out his audit alone and remains free to 
express his/her own opinion on the accounts, even if he is part of a team.453 After 
finalisation of the initial version of report, an auditor submits his/her work to a conseiller 
maitre (contrerapporteur). The role of the conseiller maitre is to study the report together 
with all supporting documents and to submit his/her assessment of the report to the 
committee of other conseillers maitres of the chamber. The reporter's report and the 
conseiller maitres remarks are given to the members of the chamber, which can require 
that more details on the report are provided. This review considers all the aspects of the 
report: its scope, methodology, findings and conc1usions.454 After thorough examination, 
the members of the chamber collegiaUy decide if they will accept the report. All the 
members of the chamber vote for the report, except for the reporters, who are usually not 
allowed to vote. In order to avoid influence of the older magistrates, younger magistrates 
451 NAO report, op. cit, p. 94. 
452 Ibid. 
453 Article 22 of the Decree 11 February 1985. 
454 Cf. website ofthe COuT, http://www.ccomptes.fr 
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vote first, while the president of the chamber votes last. In the case of a balance of votes, 
·d' . d .. 455 a pres I ent s vote IS eClslve. 
The following phase of the procedure is based on the right of reply. In the case of judicial 
proceedings the results of the collegial hearing are forwarded as an interim ruling to the 
comptable, who is then required to submit a formal response. In the case of audit of 
financial management, an audit report is sent to the audittee, who is required to comment 
on the report. Only after submission of an comptable/audittee's formal response is the 
Cour allowed to reach the verdict/adopt the final report. 456 In the case of financial 
management reports, the Cour generally attempts to obtain an agreement with the auditee 
on the substance of the report. However, if no agreement between them is reached, the 
Cour will annex the auditee's comments to the Report and publish it all together.457 
The decision-making process of the Cour undoubtedly has many advantages, which are 
primarily based on the right of reply and collegiality of decision-making. The right of 
reply protects the democratic value of providing an audittee the opportunity to express 
his/her view on the alleged irregularities. Collegiality of the decision-making, on the 
other hand, undoubtedly contributes to the high quality of decision-making. Two key 
control mechanisms - cross-examination by the conseiller maitre, in the first instance and 
collective examination of the chamber in the second, certainly add to the high level 
standards of the Cour's reports. In this way the experience of other experts in the field is 
widely used and quality of the final decisions secured. 
After the completion of judicial decision-making process, a comptable does not have the 
right to appeal against the decisions of the Cour. Nevertheless, there are two 
455 J. Magnet, op. cit. p. 110. 
456 In the case of a production of a report, a Chamber also needs to approve that revisions to the report are 
made following the organisation's comments. Cf. website of the Cour des comptes, http://www.ccomptes.fr 
457 For example, in the case of the Cour's report on museums and collections (1997), the commentaries 
were almost half as long as the text produced by the Cour itself (Cour des Comptes ,1997). 
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extraordinary remedies which can be used to challenge the judgments of the Cour: 
revision and cassation.458 
Revision is based on allegations of errors of fact, in which case the Cour is the competent 
body to decide on it. The basis for revision are thus the facts which could not have been 
known to the judge when he made the judgment (e.g. new circumstances, facts -
additional facts). The revision proceedings can be initiated on the request of the 
accountant, or the Procureur General, the Minister of Finance, other relevant Ministry or 
legal representative of other public bodies.459 
The case for cassation, on the other hand, can be based only on breach of the rules of the 
first instance procedure. Reasons for cassation could thus be lack of competence and/or 
misuse of power. A request for cassation is submitted to the Conseil d'Etat, which is the 
Court of cassation for the decisions of the Cour. However, it should be noted that 
cassations are very rare and those who succeed are even rarer. From 1807 to 1995, 67 
requests were introduced, and only 19 were accepted.46o 
Follow up on the audit process 
After the completion of an overall audit process, the Cour has to communicate its general 
financial audit or performance audit findings to the public bodies that have undergone the 
audit process. There are several different types of communication between the Cour and 
audited bodies, depending on the seriousness of financial management issue and the rank 
of addressee. Less significant problem issues are communicated through letters of 
presidents of the chambers to directors of the audited bodies (Article 35 of the Decree 20 
September 1968). Furthermore, usual correspondence between the Cour and audited 
bodies goes through the Procureur General (Article 4 of the Decree 11 February 1985). 
458 1. Magnet, La Cour des Comptes les institutions associees et les chambers regionales des comptes, op. 
cit. pp. 273-280. 
459 Ibid. 
460 Ibid. 
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The Procureur General issues notes, in which he lists irregularities and suggests ways to 
improve them. The addressees are obliged to provide an answer to the note, but are not 
generally obliged to apply the proposed recommendations.461 More serious, especially 
recurrent financial management irregularities, are in charge of the Premier President of 
the Cour (Article L 135_1).462 Following the general procedure, the Premier President 
sends the refere containing the overview of the findings together with recommendations 
for improvement to a minister. The Minister is obliged to give his/her reply in the period 
of six month. If the Cour does not receive a satisfactory answer within that time, it sends 
the referes to Parliament. 463 
It is interesting to note that most of the Cour's audit work is not published nor distributed 
to the broader audience.464 Although this may raise concerns for the transparency of the 
operation of the Cour and the executive, it seems to be in line with the modem trends that 
external audit institutions should move away from the pecuniary, sanctioning function 
they exercised during past centuries and instead work on development of their advisory 
and partnership function with the Government. This also corresponds to the emerging 
advisory function of the NAO, which, as we could see in the previous chapter, 
communicates its numerous findings through management letters directed solely to the 
executive, without any interference on the side of the PAC. However, it is very important 
to find a balance in this advisory exercise, as the democratic nature of modem external 
audit institutions requires that findings of the audit, especially those addressing serious 
systematic flaws, be disseminated to the Parliament and the general public. 
461 J. Magnet, La Cour des Comptes les institutions associees et les chambers regionales des comptes, op. 
cit.p.137. 
462 On average seven hundred reports are produced every year, all of which involve correspondence with 
the audited body's parent organisation and its senior managers. Around two hundred letters from the 
Procureur General are sent to departmental heads and directors, while around three hundred letters are 
signed by the Presidents of the seven Chambers. Cf. website of the Cour, http://www.ccomptesJr 
463 Thus, Article 135-5 of the Code provides the possibility for the Cour to communicate its findings to 
Finance Commission of the Parliament. 
464 C. Pollitt et ai, op. cit. 181. 
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Public Annual Reports of the Cour represent an important means of direct 
communication between the Cour and the public. The significance of the Public Annual 
Reports is established by Article L. 136 of the Code, which provides that: "The Cour 
informs the President of the Republic and Parliament of its audit findings in an annual 
report". It is the responsibility of the Premier President to ensure that its drafting and 
presentation are satisfactory. Although Public Reports generally contain extracts from 
other unpublished audit reports, they often address complex financial management issues, 
which, in Cour's opinion, require substantive reforms, underpinned by changes of 
legislation and regulations.465 Implementation of such reforms undoubtedly necessitates 
strong public support and Parliamentary support in order to be properly followed up. 
Recommendations of financial management audits can also be presented in special 
studies, concerned with specific, mainly performance issues (rapports publics 
particuliers).466 These reports basically correspond to the NAO's value for money 
studies. Since 1991 the Cour has published two or three reports a year on specific 
performance matters.467 The reports are addressed to the Ministers concerned, to the head 
of the audited body, or to the appropriate legal authorities. Copies of the report are also 
sent to the President of the Republic and Parliament. The rapports publics particuliers 
are also sent to newspapers and receive considerable attention in the media. 
However, it seems difficult to assess the Cour's influence on the audited bodies. This is 
primarily the corollary of the Cour's huge confidential correspondence with auditees and 
the fact that it publishes only a small section of its overall work. Unlike the majority of its 
counterparts in other countries, the Cour does not systematically survey the 
implementation of recommendations arising from its work which makes any impact 
465 Ibid. 
466 The Cour has been authorized by the Council of Ministers decision of 1991 to conduct specific public 
reports. Cf. C. Pollitt at ai, op. cit., p. 154. 
467 The Cour's reports could be found on the Cour's website, http://www.ccomptes.fr 
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evaluation difficult. In recent years, however, the Cour has included in its Annual Public 
Report details of the follow-up of previous evaluations, which are occasionally publicly 
cited.468 However, this is far from the practice of regular accounting and publication of 
overall impact indicators, exercised on the regular basis by most of other Supreme Audit 
Institutions in Europe.469 
The need for more effective follow-up of the Cour's recommendations has, in recent 
years, attempted to be addressed through the establishment of a closer working 
relationship between the Cour and the Parliament. As pointed out in the prevIous 
sections, the LOLF has provided the Parliament with much stronger means of holding the 
executive to account, through various instruments it accorded to the Parliamentary 
Finance Committees (MEC), modelled on the UK example of NAO/P AC. It is expected 
that such cooperation will be able to address the existing weaknesses in the follow up of 
the Cour's recommendation and provide a synergy of action directed towards holding the 
managers of public bodies strongly to account for their organisation's financial 
performance. In this sense, it could be argued that the Cour is moving away from its 
strictly independent position from the Government and Parliament and is becoming more 
and more an assistant of the Parliament. This contention certainly deserves to be 
addressed in the final section of this chapter. 
The emerging role of the Cour - an assistant to the Parliament? 
Although it may look as if the LOLF has not been able to introduce any changes in the 
traditional operation of the Cour, this has not been the case. Not surprisingly, the MPs 
have addressed the need for a changing the role of the Cour, pointing out two major 
aspects of reform. The first is a requirement that the Cour more actively respond to the 
468 For example, in 1997, Premier President introduced the annual report to the members of Parliament 
pointing out different cases ofCour's impact on the audited bodies. Cf. C. Pollitte, op. cit. p. 181. 
469 C. Pollitt, H. Summa, "Reflective Watchdogs? How Supreme Audit Institutions Account for 
themselves", Public Administration, Vol. 75, summer 1997, pp. 313-336. 
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requests of the Parliament in carrying out its audits. The second is an obligation of the 
Cour to provide MPs with additional sources of information on execution of the new 
budgetary framework, especially on the state of the Government accounts. 
The LOLF has defined the need for a more proactive assistance of the Cour to the 
Parliament in scrutinising the implementation of the loi de finances through the following 
requirements: 
1) the obligation of the Cour to respond to assistance requests from the chairman and 
the general rapporteur of each assembly's finance committee for the audit and 
evaluation mission (MEC);470 
2) the obligation of the Cour to carry out any investigation requested by the National 
Assembly and Senate financial committees on the managements of agencies or 
bodies it supervises. The conclusions of these investigations must be 
communicated within eight months of the formulation of the request to the 
committee issuing the request, which rules on their publication.471 
In spite of a clearly defined legal framework, the cooperation between the Parliament and 
the Cour is not functioning well. This should perhaps not been surprising as these 
provisions of the LOLF do infringe the Cour's independence in defining its own work, 
which has been the traditional feature of this prestigious institution. In order to 'defend' 
its independence, the Cour has consistently refused to respond to Parliamentary request 
for carrying out specific investigations. This has provoked strong reaction from the MP's 
and especially the President of a Finance Committee (who is at the same time the 
President of MEC) who have characterised the Cour's refusals for cooperation as 
'shocking' .472 It is further argued that although the Cour should certainly have 
470 Article 58, paragraph 1 of the LOLF. 
471 Article 58, paragraph 2 of the LOLF. 
472 Cf. Assemble Nationale, "Rapport d'!nformation par la Commission des Finances, de l'Economie 
General et du plan sur Ie suivi de preconisations de la Cour des comptes et de la Mission e'evaluation et de 
controle," Report No. 2298, of May 2005., available at http://assemblee-nationale.fr, p. 61. 
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independence in carrying out its duties, this independence must have its limits, especially 
in relation to an institution of democratic audit, such as the Parliament. In the President's 
own words: 'The democracy requests the controllers also to be sometimes controlled".473 
The adversarial relation between the Parliament and the Cour is certainly not a good sign 
for the future development of the French financial accountability system. Clearly, 
contrary to the presupposed intention of the LOLF to develop strong working relations 
between the Cour and the Parliament, the opposite is happening at the moment, which 
may have an adverse effect on both functioning of the Parliament as a scrutiniser of the 
executive's behaviour and the Cour's ability to follow up on its recommendations. 
Therefore, we again reiterate the need for establishment of a more cordial relationship 
between the Cour and the Parliament in their day-to-day work. 
As regards the second sets of obligations of the Cour towards the Parliament, the LOLF 
further requires the Cour to provide the Parliament with three annual reports: the 
preliminary report on developments in the national economy and public finance trends,474 
(which is to assist the Government to prepare for the Parliamentary discussion on the loi 
de finances for the next year)475; the report regarding the consolidated financial 
statements of the Government, which in particular, analyses the utilisation of 
appropriations by mission and by programme; and report on certification that the State's 
accounts are lawful, faithful and present a true and fair view.476 This certification will be 
annexed to the loi de reglement (law on consolidated Government accounts) and will be 
accompanied by the report on the audits conducted.477 
Whereas the request for presenting the first two kinds of annual reports is obviously in 
line with the desire to enhance the role of the Parliament in holding the executive to 
473 Ibid. 
474 Article 58 paragraph 4 of the LOLF. 
475 Article 48 of the LOLF. 
476 Article 58, paragraph 6 of the LOLF. 
477 Article 58, paragraph 5 of the LOLF. 
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account for better financial performance, one may wonder what is the logic behind 
requesting the Cour to provide the certification/assurance that the Government accounts 
present a fair view. This requirement may seem a bit surprising, as the Cour has lately not 
experienced any significant problems with respect to accuracy of the public accounts. It is 
interesting to note that the concept of provision of certification/assurance of the accuracy 
and fairness of accounts has for some time been present in the framework of the EU 
financial management, as will be analysed in more detail in the next chapter. The 
European Court of Auditors has for the last 11 years been request to provide statement of 
assurance (declaration d'assurance-DAS) on reliability of the EU accounts and its 
underlying transactions. This is one of example of how EU concepts and instruments 
affect areas of traditional national competence. However, whereas the reasons for the 
introduction of the DAS in the EU system stem from complexities and weaknesses of the 
EU financial accountability framework, the logic behind the introduction of certification 
in the French system is certainly different. 
Reasons for requiring the Cour to produce certification of the accounts become quite 
apparent when one takes into account the LOLF's intention to introduce resource 
accounting in the French Government. Introduction of resource accounting, as a part of 
overall changes introduced by the LOLF, represents a big challenge to the French 
Government, as faithful representation of transactions and events under the resource 
accounting requirements will be much more complex and demanding. Although the 
budget of 2006 has elements of resource accounting, the transition towards the 
introduction of a true accrual accounting is a long-term project and will take at least 
another 5 years to be fully successfully implemented.478 This will require lots of efforts 
on the side of comptables, but also on their management. 
Furthermore, it may be argued that the imposed request to the Cour to carry out 
certification of the accounts may have a much deeper meaning than it may look at first 
478 International Federation of Accountants, "The Modernisation of Government Accounting in France: the 
current situation, the issues, the outlook, January 2003", available at http://www.ifac.org 
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sight. Although the concept of the certification itself is not fully clear, it does imply a sort 
of technical examination of the accounts, rather than deciding on a personal responsibility 
of accounts.479 And although elements of personal responsibility of accountants are still 
very much present in the French system and not denied in the LOLF, requesting the Cour 
certify the accounts will certainly enhance the Cour's already existing advisory role. In 
this way, the Cour should be further moving away from its sanctioning role and become 
an important Government (and hopefully Parliament's) advisor. 
Conclusion 
This chapter provides a very clear example on how a national financial accountability 
system can be reformed in a relatively short period of time under increasing inside and 
outside pressure. The introduction of LOLF in 2001 has made quite a revolution in the 
financial operations of the French Government, putting in place a completely new 
legislative framework for the operation of financial accountability in France. 
The strengthening of the role of the Parliament, through enhancement of its powers to 
decide on the allocation of expenditure as well as to scrutinise its implementation through 
specialised Parliamentary Committees (MEC), demonstrates the recognition of all French 
authorities of the importance of democratic financial accountability mechanisms. 
However, the relations between the key guardian institutions of financial accountability, 
the Parliament and the Cour are still not functioning well, which may have an adverse 
affect on the effectiveness of the overall financial accountability system. Therefore, it 
will be important to work on establishing better working relations between different 
financial accountability actors. 
This analysis of reform of financial accountability system in France also demonstrates 
that, in spite of strong influence of New Public Management ideas based on performance 
479 P. J-R. Alventosa, "La nouveau role de la Cour des comptes," ENA mensuel, June 2002, No. 322, pp. 9-
II. 
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logic and the doctrine of enhanced managerial freedoms, the French financial 
accountability system will not let go easily its traditional values based on primary respect 
for legal rules and compliance with established procedures. But it could, perhaps, provide 
an affirmative example on how traditional values of compliance could be well coupled 
with modem ideas of performance. 
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Chapter IV 
Financial Accountability in the EU 
This chapter shall examine financial accountability at the supranational level of the EU. 
Following the structure of the previous chapters, we shall first analyse the key 
supranational accountor of the EU level - EU institutions. We shall then examine the 
concept of stewardship of public money in the EU. Significant attention shall again be 
placed on both internal and external financial accountability mechanisms that operate at 
the EU level. 
Furthermore, in this chapter we shall attempt to comprehend the nature of financial 
accountability at the supra-national level of the European Union. There is no doubt that 
the establishment of a democratic financial accountability, in the most general sense of a 
relationship between the EU citizens and EU institutions, is even more complex than at 
the national level. This is primarily because the EU expenditure is managed largely by 
the Member States and only in small part by the Commission and other EU institutions. 
In order to be able to comprehend the financial accountability relationship in the EU 
context we will have to comprehend the nature of the EU itself. Therefore we shall 
discuss the main theories attempting to explain the nature of the EU integration and its 
basic features. This will provide us with a basis for drawing general conclusions on the 
nature of the financial accountability relationship. 
Finally, the focus of our attention shall be laid on the requirements for the acceding 
countries in the area of financial accountability. We shall especially focus on the EU 
basic standards in the area of internal financial control and standards related to external 
audit and the protection of the EU financial interests. 
156 
Unique Supranational Financial Accountability Accountor - EU institutions 
The EU has an exceptional governmental structure, which at first sight resembles that of 
a national system. The EU has a Council, a Commission, a Parliament, and a Court of 
Justice, institutions which, on the surface, correspond to a national government's 
executive, legislature and judiciary. Although there are certain elements of similarity, 
they may be quite misleading. Thus, the Council consists of Member States' government 
ministers and instead of executive function, mainly performs the legislative one. This 
legislative function is shared with the directly elected Parliament, whose functions are 
therefore much more limited then in the national contexts. It may be argued that only the 
European Court of Justice, consisting of judges appointed by the Member States, 
. " 1 480 approXImates to Its natlOna counterpart. 
The Council of the European Union - formerly known as the Council of Ministers -is the 
main legislative and decision-making body in the EU. It brings together the 
representatives of the Member State governments, which are elected at national level. It 
is the forum in which the representatives of national governments can assert their 
interests and reach compromises. They meet regularly at the level of working groups, 
ambassadors and ministers. The European Council which decides major policy 
guidelines is composed of Heads of State or Government.481 
The European Parliament is intended to represent the peoples of the Community. The 
members of the European Parliament were for a long time selected by the national 
legislatures and it was only in 1976 that agreement was reached on direct elections. The 
European Parliament (EP) is now directly elected every five years and attempts to 
provide the democratic voice of the peoples of Europe. 
The Council and the European Parliament set the rules for all the activities of the 
European Community (EC), which forms the first "pillar" of the EU. It covers the single 
480 D. Dinan, Ever Closer Union, An Introduction to European Integration, Macmillan, 1999, pp. 205-229. 
481 www.europa.eu.int 
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market and most of the EU's common policies, and guarantees freedom of movement for 
goods, persons, services and capital. They also share competence in EU budget issues. In 
addition, the Council is the main institution responsible for the second and third "pillars", 
i.e. intergovernmental cooperation on common foreign and security policy and on justice 
and home affairs.482 
The key executive organ of the Community is the European Commission, which has no 
analogue in national governmental systems. Although the Commission members are 
appointed by national governments, they must be approved by the Parliament and are 
pledged to act in the EU's interests. The Commission has exclusive right to initiate 
legislation in the first pillar, makes sure that EU decisions are properly implemented and 
supervises the way EU funds are spent. It also makes sure that everyone abides by the 
European treaties and European law.483 Assisted by around 24000 multinational civil 
servants, the Commission lies at the hart of the EU supranational system.484 
The Commission consists of a number of Directorates General (DGs), which resemble 
the structure and functions of national ministries. Although no formal hierarchy exists 
within the Commission's services, it may be argued that the DGs which are directly 
involved in policy development enjoy more prestige than those which are primarily 
concerned with policy implementation or with horizontal activities such as financial 
coordination.485 Each Directorate General is headed by a Director General, who is 
responsible to the relevant Commissioner. There are also a number of specialized 
services, such as the Legal service, which gives legal advice to all Directorates General 
and represents the Commission in legal proceedings.486 
482 www.europa.eu.int 
483 T.e. Hartley, The Foundations of European Community Law, Clarendon Press Oxford, 1999, pp. 12-17. 
484 D. Dinan, ibid. 
485 N. Nugent, "At the Heart of the Union", in N. Nugent, At the Heart of the Union, (London: Macmillan) 
1997, pp. 1-26. 
486 Ibid. 
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In addition to the above institutions, the EU has a number of other institutions and 
supporting bodies, such as: the European Court of Justice, the European Economic and 
Social Committee, Committee of the Regions, European Central Bank, European 
Investment Bank and European Ombudsman. The EU also has a Court of Auditors 
(hereinafter ECA), which has a special importance for our financial accountability 
research and will be examined in greater detail later. 
It should be pointed out that the EU institutions operate in a fairly diverse and dynamic 
multicultural and multinational environment. Such an environment is much more 
unstable than the national one, given the frequency of Treaty changes in the Union since 
the mid 1980s. The Union structure is further characterized by peculiar institutional 
rivalry, as most EU institutions consistently follow the objective of enlarging the scope of 
their competence. Institution building in the EU is therefore usually quite pragmatic and 
incremental, as each institution seeks to enhance its formal legal competence and obtain a 
more important place in the Union's institutional structure.487 This has brought about a 
significant alteration in the balance between institutions over time, which generally 
resulted in a gradual enhancement of the Parliament's power at the expense of the power 
the EU Commission.488 This movement was also reflected in the area of financial 
accountability, which experienced different stands of reforms in the last couple of years. 
Background of reform of EU financial accountability framework 
Just like national governments, the EU supranational government is, through different 
mechanisms, financed by the EU citizens and therefore requires the existence of effective 
financial accountability mechanisms by which the EU citizens would hold it to account 
487 Cf B. Laffan, "Becoming a 'Living Institution': the Evolution of the European Court of Auditors", 
Journal of Common Market Studies (1999), Vol. 37, No.2, pp. 251-268. 
488 Cf J.P. Jacque, "The Principle of Institutional Balance", Common Market Law Review 41,2004, Kluwer 
Law International, pp. 383-391; A. Dashwood, A. Johnston, "The Institutions of the Enlarged EU under the 
Regime of the Constitutional Treaty," Common Market Law Review 41, 2004. pp. 1481-1518, Kluwer Law 
International. 
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for the stewardship of their money. Many efforts have been made in order to strengthen 
the financial accountability at the EU level, primarily by establishing an effective 
accountability relationship between the European Parliament and the Commission and by 
enhancing the role of key external accountability mechanism of the ECA. 
In spite of these efforts, handling of public money in the EU kept attracting significant 
attention of EU citizens and Member States, especially during the last decade. There has 
been a quite high incidence of financial irregularities, waste and fraud in the management 
of EU financial resources, which has provided Euro sceptics with additional arguments 
against the EU and further integration processes. 
The occurrence of a series of cases of mismanagement in handling of EU resources led to 
the resignation of the Santer Commission in 1999, as the first case when the entire 
Commission resigned in the history of the EU.489 The resignation was preceded by the 
Report of the Committee of Independent Experts, which examined the allegations of 
fraud, mismanagement and nepotism in the Commission. The Committee of Independent 
Experts further published its second report analyzing the then current financial 
management practices and laying proposals for tackling mismanagement, irregularities 
and fraud in the EU .490 
The reports of the Committee of Independent Experts and the subsequent Commission 
White paper on reforming the Commission (2000t91 have led to substantive changes in 
the regulation of the EU public expenditure management. The Community budget and 
financial procedures are traditionally governed by secondary legislation, embodied in the 
489 A. Tomkins, "Responsibility and Resignation in the European Commission", (1999), 62 MLR 744. 
490 Committee of Independent Experts, Second Report on Reform on the Commission, Analysis of current 
practice and proposals for tackling mismanagement, irregularities and fraud, Volume II, September 1999. 
491 Commission's White Paper: "Reforming the Commission", COM (2000)200, Brussels, 5.4.2000. 
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Council Financial Regulation, adopted in 1977.492 In June 2002, the Council has 
substantially amended the 1977 version of the Financial Regulation, adopting the new 
Regulation on the Financial Regulation applicable to the general budget of the European 
Communities493 (hereinafter Financial Regulation), followed by the Commission 
Regulation of 23 December 2002, which laid down more detailed rules for the 
implementation of the Financial Regulation. Both Regulations came into force in January 
2003. These Regulations have had a significant impact on the various financial 
accountability mechanisms in the EU context and will be explored in more details in the 
course of the ensuing analysis. 
Concept of Stewardship of Public Money 
The concept of stewardship of public money in the EU resembles the concepts found in 
the Member States and consists of two main components - requirements of reliability of 
accounts, legality and regularity of financial transaction on the one hand and 'value for 
money' principles on the other hand. The only reference to the stewardship of public 
money provided in the Treaty relates to the mandate of the Court of Auditors, which 
stipulates that the Court should examine "whether all revenue has been received and all 
expenditure incurred in a lawful and regular manner and whether the financial 
management has been sound.,,494 The concepts of reliability, legality and regularity of 
492 Council Financial Regulation of21 December 1997 applicable to the general budget of the European 
Communities, OJ No L 356, 21.12.1997, p.l; Regulation as last amended by Regulation (EC, ECSC, 
Euratom) No 76212001 (OJ L 111,2004.2001, p.I). 
493 Council Regulation (EC, Euratom) No 1605/2002 of25 June 2002 on the Financial Regulation 
applicable to the general budget of the European Communities, OJ L 248/1, 16.9.2002; Commission 
Regulation (EC, Euratom) No 234212002 of23 December 2002 laying down detailed rules for the 
implementation of Council Regulation (EC, Euratom) No 160512002 on the Financial Regulation 
applicable to the general budget of the European Communities, OJ L 357/1, 31.12.2002. 
494 Article 248 (ex Article 188c) Ee. 
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accounts have been developed by the Court of Auditors itself and could be defined as 
follows: 
Reliability of accounts assumes that all revenue, expenditure, assets and liabilities 
have been properly recorded and that the annual accounts faithfully reflect the 
Community's financial position at the end of the year;495 
Legality and regularity require that all transactions must conform to applicable 
laws and regulations, and that they are covered by sufficient budgetary 
.. 496 
appropnatlOns. 
Whereas the concept of reliability of accounts is quite straightforward, the conceptual 
distinction between the requirements of legality and regularity of expenditure is not very 
clear. There seems to be no clear reference to meaning and using of one of these 
principles separately. Instead, they are always used together, e.g. that "expenditure is 
incurred in a lawful and regular manner" and "transactions are legal and regular" etc.497 
This, however, should not be surprising, as the distinction between principles of legality 
and regularity of expenditure, as pointed out in the previous chapters, is not clear in the 
national contexts either. It seems that the concept of regularity of financial transactions 
holds sway over the principle of legality in international practice, although it has the 
same meaning as the principle oflegality (conformity with laws and regulations). In order 
to avoid confusion and point out the importance of the principle, we have, in the previous 
chapters, suggested that principle of legality is used instead of regularity. However, until 
this issue is resolved at the international level, usage of both concepts of legality and 
regularity of financial transactions at the Union level seems to be acceptable. 
Similarly to Member States contexts, the notion of legality and regularity in the EU 
encompasses two elements - an element of quantitative allocation of money expressed 
through the EU budget and an element of qualitative allocation of money expressed 
495 Brochure of the ECA, Improving the financial management of the European Union, 2004, 
www.eca.eu.int . 
496 Ibid. 
497 ECA's annual Report concerning the financial year 2004. 
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through vanous procedural or substantive regulations which govern spending of the 
public money in the EU. In this sense, Advocate General Mancini in Case 204/86 stated 
that the European Court of Auditors (ECA) has the power and duty to verify not only that 
transactions comply with the provisions relating to the budget which are contained in the 
Treaties or in Financial Regulation, but also with any provision belonging to the 
Community legal order in so far as it has an effect on expenditure.498 Thus, in practice, 
any legal provision affecting revenue or expenditure provides a point of reference for 
examination of legality and regularity.499 
The second component of the concept of stewardship of public money, a principle of 
sound financial management (or value for money requirement), has provoked many 
controversies both in EU and the Member States. 
New Financial Regulation of 2002 clearly defines the principle of sound financial 
management, which encompasses the well-known principles of economy, efficiency and 
effectiveness. Special attention is given to the principle of economy, which is defined by 
the Regulation as the requirement that "the resources used by the institution for the 
pursuit of its activities shall be made available in due time, in appropriate quantity and 
quality and at the best price".500 The principle of efficiency is defined in a usual way, as 
"the best relationship between resources employed and results achieved." Effectiveness is 
498 Different view on the authorities of the ECA was presented in the case Les Verts v Parliament, 294/83 
of the Court of Justice, where the Court had to pronounce on an action for annulment filed against the EP 
by one of its political groups, and it remarked that the ECA only has power to examine the legality of 
expenditure with reference to the budget and the secondary provision on which the expenditure is based 
(commonly called 'the basic measure'). However, it is important to note that the issue in question here was 
not the concept of legality of expenditure itself, but potential overlap and conflict of competences between 
the Court of Justice and the ECA in this case. In this sense, the Court of Justice has argued that the ECA's 
powers of review under Article 206a do not preclude any review by the Court of Justice. 1. Inghelram, 
"The European court of Auditors: Current Legal Issues", Common Market Law Review 37: 129-146,2000, 
Kluwer Law International, pp. 133-134. 
499 Ibid. 
500 Article 27, paragraph 2 of the Financial Regulation No 160512002 . 
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naturally concerned with "attaining the specific objectives set and achieving the intended 
results." 
In order to enhance the principles of sound financial management and enable their easier 
implementation and control, the Regulation introduces elements of performance 
management and programme evaluation. It requires all sectors of the activity covered by 
the budget to set specific, measurable, achievable, relevant and timed objectives. 
Achievement of those objectives should be monitored by performance indicators for each 
activity and spending authorities should provide such information to the budgetary 
authority. 50 I Furthermore, the Regulation requires all the institutions to undertake both ex 
ante and ex post evaluations of their progammes and activities which entail significant 
spending. Evaluation procedures are regulated in more detail in Article 21 of the 
Commission Regulation, which further elaborates the requirements of the evaluation 
process.502 
Despite obvious improvements (discussed below) of the regulation of principle of sound 
financial management, the question remains as to what extent the changes in regulation 
are having an effect on the actual enhancement of financial management in the EU. A 
glance over the reports of the Court of Auditors shows that the EU expenditure 
management is still primarily concerned with compliance with the principles of 
reliability, legality and regularity and to a lesser extent with sound financial 
management.503 The question which therefore may be posed is why 'value for money' 
501 Article 27, paragraph 3. 
502 Commission Regulation (EC, Euratom) No 234212002 of December 2002 laying down detailed rules for 
the implementation of Council Regulation (EC, Euratom) No 1605/2002 on the Financial Regulation 
applicable to the general budget of the European Communities. 
503 Cf ECA, Annual Report concerning the financial year 2003 and Annual Report concerning the financial 
year 2004; Special Report No 812004 on the Commission's management and supervision of the measures to 
control foot and mouth disease and of the related expenditure; Special Report 312003 on the invalidity 
pension scheme of the European institutions, together with institutions' replies. www.eca.eu.int . 
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principles and examinations have not been sufficiently grasped by the EU institutions, 
even after the reform of its regulatory framework? 
It may be argued that one of problems with the application of a principle of sound 
financial management in the EU stems from the remaining vagueness of the objectives of 
some of the EU policies. As we could see earlier, achieving the principle of sound 
financial management presupposes the existence of clearly defined and coherent 
objectives and operational targets. 504 If the objectives of a policy are vague, self-
contradictory or unidentifiable, it is very difficult to obtain the value-for-money principle. 
This has especially been the case with the rolling, complex nature of the EU Common 
Agricultural Policy, which contains a set of policies, which are often at odds with each 
other. At the same time, the CAP is taking a substantive part of the EU budget and has 
proved very difficult to be reformed. 505 In such circumstances, it is very difficult to obtain 
and measure soundness of financial management, especially since policy makers are 
likely to accuse the auditors of interfering with political issues and can easily dismiss any 
criticism on their expenditure management. 506 
Furthermore, it may be argued that the lack of sufficient budget restraint in the EU 
undermines the achievement of sound financial management. 507 Without a firm budget 
constraint, there is little incentive for those responsible for spending to engage in a 
serious attempt to achieve value for money. Some others argue that instead of attempting 
to contain public spending, the EU institutions seem to regard expansion of the EU 
budget as per se a good thing, because it represents a growth of European competences. 
504 Cf 1. Harden, F. White, K. Donnelly, "The Court of Auditors and Financial Control and Accountability 
in the European Community," European Public Law, Volume 1, Issue 4 (Kluwer Law International), 1995. 
505 R. Levy, Implementing European Union Public Policy, (Edward Elgar), 2000, pp. 69-96. 
506 The Commission has thus tended to resist the ECA's increasing focus on value for money issues, 
claiming that these raise policy questions which are for the Commission and Council (The Court's Stuttgart 
Report, Report in Response to the conclusions of the European Council of 18 June 1983 OJ C2871l 1983). 
Cf. I. Harden, F. White, K. Donnelly, ibid. 
507 Ibid. 
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This has resulted in the overly ambitious budgeting, which, coupled with the inability of 
Member and beneficiary States to absorb EU funds have brought about budget surpluses 
in subsequent years.508 Furthermore, the difficulties experienced in recent discussions on 
the 2007-2013 EU budget show that the Coombes assertion that "the national Ministers 
of finance who meet to decide budgetary questions in the Council are concerned more 
with keeping their own country's contributions down, or at least with maximizing its 
return on the principle ofjuste retour, than with getting the best value for Community's 
expenditure as a whole" is still valid.509 This implies an overall tendency towards 
'spending culture' rather than setting of priorities and achieving sound financial 
management. 51 0 
Lastly, it should be borne in mind that around 80% of the EU budget is implemented not 
in the EU institutions, but in the EU Member States, which have quite different 
understanding of the concept of stewardship of public money. The decentralized nature of 
implementation of the EU budget is therefore very much dependent on the financial 
control and accountability systems of the Member States and their comprehension of the 
public money stewardship concept, which has, in most EU countries been largely based 
on principles of legality and regularity and has only relatively recently started embracing 
the value for money considerations.511 Moreover, the quite high incidence of breaches of 
concepts of legality and regularity in EU's financial management, especially in the 
implementation of resources managed by Member States, have necessitated that much 
508 For 2003 budget surplus totalled 5500 million euro. While still large in absolute terms, this represents a 
fall compared with 2002 and 2001 (7400 million euro and 15000 million euro respectively). European 
Court of Auditors, Annual Report Concerning the Financial Year 2003 and Annual Report Concerning the 
Financial Year 2002, www.eca.eu.int. 
509 D. Coombes, The Power of the Purse in the European Communities, (London, Chatham House: PEP), 
1972, p. 69. 
510 Cf I. Harden, F. White, K. Donnelly, op. cit. pp.615-616. 
511 Cf C. Pollitt at aI, Performance or Compliance? Performance Audit and Public Management in Five 
Countries, (Oxford University Press), 2002. 
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more attention is paid to respect for these basic principles, instead of giving more weight 
to achieving value for money in the use of the public money. 
Reform of internal financial accountability mechanisms 
Until the adoption of the Financial Regulation amendments in 2002, the EU system of 
internal financial accountability mechanisms in many respects resembled the French 
system of internal control. Since the use of English terms for the main internal control 
actors (financial controller and accounting officer) may be misleading, as their functions 
do not correspond to their English counterparts,512 we shall use the French terms to 
denote their functions. 513 The system was based on the distinction of three key posts: 
ordonnateur (authorizing officer), controleur financier (financial controller) and 
comptable (accounting officer). As in French system, the ordonnateur is in charge of 
authorizing expenditure, i.e. entering into financial commitments and issuing payment 
orders. The controleur financier monitors the commitment and authorization of all 
expenditure and gives visa for the operation requested by the ordonnateur. And finally, 
the comptable is responsible for the proper execution of payments and is liable for 
disciplinary action and payment of compensation in the cases of financial misconduct. As 
in France, the system was based on the separation between the three functions, meaning 
the ordonnateur, controleur financier and comptable had to be different individuals. 514 
512 This is especially the case for accounting officer, who (as was pointed out in II chapter) is normally a 
permanent secretary of the Department, while in the French law 'comptable' (as pointed out in chapter III) 
has strictly determined financial and accounting responsibilities. The word 'controller' could also be 
misleading, since, as pointed out in chapter I 'controle' in the French language denotes a check rather than 
a power to manage, as would be assumed by the English term "control". 
513 We should, however, point out that the EU 'comptable' does not naturally have exactly the same status 
as the French 'comptable'. For more details on French comptables see Chapter III. 
514 Article 29 of the "Financial Regulation on 21 December 1977 applicable to the general budget of the 
European Communities (OJ No L356 of21.12.1977, p.l). 
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The controleur financier was envisaged to be the key person in charge of securing 
financial accountability within the EU institutions. Each institution had to appoint a 
controleur financier, a completely independent person, to be responsible for ex ante 
checking of all commitments and expenditure incurred by granting visas for each 
operation. 515 Although an institution who appointed its controleur financier also had the 
right to dismiss him/her, the controleur financier's independence was nevertheless 
secured through a complex system of relations with other EU bodies (such as the Court of 
Auditors, the Court of Justice, the Commission, Council and Parliament).516 It should be 
noted that the controleur financier function for the Commission was centralised in DG 
Xx. This meant that DG XX performed ex-ante checking of all transactions of the 
Commission bodies (around 60,000 commitments and 300,000 payment approvals each 
year). 517 
Despite its seemingly well designed system, the internal EU financial accountability 
mechanism based on the traditional French model proved to be ineffective in practice.5lS 
In its analysis of the Commission's internal control system, the Committee of 
Independent Experts was of the opinion that the multiplicity of modem financial 
transactions do not allow that all the financial proposals are genuinely and thoroughly 
checked. Due to the impossibility of universal testing, there is a move towards a sampling 
system, where only few sample transactions are thoroughly checked, while the rest 
usually receive automatic approval, i.e. visa. 
Furthermore, the Committee found that the existence of centralized ex ante controls takes 
away the responsibility for financial management from the person who manages 
expenditure to the person who approves expenditure. Such a displacement of 
responsibility easily brings about a situation where no one seems to be ultimately 
515 Article 39 of the Financial Regulation. 
516 Articles 42-43 of the Financial Regulation. 
517 Cf I. Harden, F. White, K. Donnelly, op. cit. pp. 606-607. 
518 Committee of Independent Experts, ibid. 
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responsible for financial management. 519 Therefore, many European countries are 
moving away from rigid ex ante control systems, and adopting firmer ex post control, as 
is the case with France itself. It may further be argued that shifting the emphasis from the 
ex-ante control, concerned mainly with legality and regularity of transactions, to stronger 
ex post control, leads to the establishment of a more complex system of accountability, 
with higher degree of interest for attaining value for money principles. 520 
The new Financial Regulation gives legal force to these ideas, with an emphasis on 
decentralization and taking responsibility of department management for overall financial 
control framework. In this sense, the Regulation first proclaims the principle of 
segregation of duties between ordonnateur and comptable. Then it merges the function of 
ordonnateur and controleur financier, providing the ordonnateur with full responsibility 
for financial management, i.e. for entering into commitments and authorising payments. 
In this way, the ordonnateur has obtained a central role in the internal financial 
accountability.52! This has been confirmed by quite strict and lengthy provisions on the 
ordonnateur's liability for misconduct in the discharge of his/her duties.522 The role of 
the comptable, on the other hand, has not been substantially changed, as the comptable 
has remained responsible for actual making of payments and keeping the accounts and 
liable to disciplinary sanction and payment of compensation in the case of 
mismanagement of public funds. 523 
Each institution performs the duties of ordonnateur524 through the delegation of the 
ordonnateur's duties to staff of an appropriate level. The delegation is regulated by 
internal rules of an institution, which specify the scope of the powers delegated and the 
519 Ibid. 
520 OECD Policy Brief, Public Sector Modernisation: Modernising Accountability and Control, 2005., 
www.oecd.org/publications/pol_brief. 
521 Cf P. Craig, "A New Framework for EU Administration: the Financial Regulation 2002", 68 Law & 
Contemp. Probs. pp. 107-133, http://www.1aw.duke.eduijouma1s/Jcp/articles/Jcp68dwinter2004p107.htm. 
522 Chapter 4, Articles 64-66 of the Financial Regulation, 2002. 
523 Article 67 of the Financial Regulation, 2002. 
524 Article 59, paragraph 1, Financial Regulation, 2002. 
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possibility for sub-delegation.525 The person who is given the authority of ordonnateur 
(or so-called authorising officer by delegation) makes budget and legal commitments, 
validates expenditure, and authorizes payments.526 When adopting a budget commitment 
and authorizing payment, he/she must make sure that the appropriations are available, 
that the expenditure conforms to the relevant legal provisions and is also responsible for 
implementing expenditure in accordance with the principles of sound financial 
management. 527 Odonnateur's function is performed by Directors General (and 
exceptionally Directors)/Heads of Services, which have to report annually on the overall 
activity of the Directorate-General/Service and in particular on the management of its 
resources.
528 
Although the ordonnateur has full responsibility for managing expenditure, certain level 
of additional control is secured by providing the members of staff other than the person 
who initiated the operation the right to verify the operational and financial aspects of the 
transaction, before and after authorization of expenditure (so called ex ante and ex post 
verification).529 Furthermore, any member of staff involved in the financial management 
and control of transactions who considers that a decision he/she is required by hislher 
superiors to apply or to agree to is irregular or contrary to the principles of sound 
financial management of the professional rules, is required to inform the ordonnateur by 
delegation in writing, and, if the latter fails to take action, to other authorized 
institutions.53o More detailed regulation of rights and obligations of all financial actors 
has been provided in the Commission Regulation laying down detailed rules for the 
implementation of the Financial Regulation. 531 
525 Article 59, paragraph 2. 
526 Article 60, paragraph 3. 
527 Article 60, paragraph I. 
528 http://ec.europa.eu/reforml2002/selection/chapterlen.htm#1 3 
529 Article 60, paragraph, 4. 
530 Article 60, paragraph 6. 
531 Cf. Commission Regulation (EC, Euratom), No. 234212002 of23 December 2002 laying down detailed 
rules for the implementation of Council Regulation (EC, Euratom) No 1605/2002 on the Financial 
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The strengthening of internal audit capacity is also central to the refonn package. The 
idea was strongly advocated by the Committee of Independent Experts and endorsed by 
the Commission's White Paper. In accordance with these ideas, the new Financial 
Regulation provided for a creation of internal auditor services in all Directorates-
Generals, now called Internal Audit Capabilities (IACs). They provide assurance and 
consultancy services to director generals of the DGs on reliability of financial control 
framework. 532 Furthennore, the central Internal Audit Service (IAS) was created in 2001 
to strengthen the coordination of work of individual IACs. lAS auditors advise the 
institutions about proper budgetary procedures and the quality of their management and 
control systems.533 They are intended to help ordonnateurs by providing a check on the 
overall systems adopted. 534 
It is quite interesting to note that the refonners of the internal accountability mechanisms 
in the Commission have abandoned a variant of the traditional French model of 
centralized internal control, based on ex-ante control of financial operations by the 
officials of the Ministry of Finance (DG XX in the then EU system). Instead, they have 
moved towards establishing principles of the new French internal accountability 
framework, which is a variant of the UK model of decentralized managerial internal 
control, based on responsibility of a UK accounting officer. The authorities of the EU 
ordonnateur (to authorize payments, make commitments etc.) and his/her full 
Regulation applicable to the general budget of the European Communities, OJ L 35711,31.12.2002, In May 
2005, the Commission decided to amend this Regulation and has prepared the draft amendments, mainly of 
technical nature. Cf Draft Commission Regulation (EC, Euratom) amending Regulation (EC, Euratom) No 
234212002 laying down detailed rules for the implementation of Council Regulation (EC, Euratom) No 
160512002 on the Financial Regulation applicable to the general budget of the European Communities, 
Brussels 12.10.2005. SEC(2005) 1240 final. 
532 Cf. "A New Stage of Reform: The European Commission's recently appointed internal audit Chief says 
his organisation must continue to work toward modernisation and progress", Internal Auditor, 2004. 
http://www.theiia.org/?act=iia.internaIAuditor. 
533 Cf. http://europa.eu.intlcommldgs/internal_auditlgeninfo_en.htm. 
534 Financial Regulation, supra note 5, Art. 85-86 
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responsibility for financial management are almost identical to the new responsibilities 
the French ordonnateurs have obtained under the LOLF and very much correspond to 
responsibilities of a UK accounting officer. The similarity is even more striking when one 
takes a look at the actual delegation of responsibility of the ordonnateur in the 
Commission. In most cases it is performed by the Commission's Director-Generals or 
Heads of Services, which constitute a rough equivalent to the British Permanent 
Secretary post and General Directors (managers) posts in the French administration. The 
difference between these models, however, lies in a thoroughly regulated role of the 
comptable in the French system and to a lesser extent in the EU system as well, which is 
in contrast and the UK system, which does not recognise the role of a comptable as such. 
Furthermore, whereas the EU system has fully abolished the post of the controlleur 
financier, the French system has kept it, gradually changing its role towards the ex-post 
audit. Therefore, it may be concluded that the EU model of internal financial 
accountability still remains an interesting mixture of both UK and the French model. 
The change of the model of the system of internal accountability in the EU has 
undoubtedly brought about positive results, enhancing the legality and regularity of the 
transactions which are subject to direct management by the Commission.535 However, as 
noted by the European Court of Auditors in its 2004 report, progress is still required in 
terms of actual implementation, since the extent of implementation and effective 
operating are not yet satisfactory.536 Additional efforts are still needed to be made in 
strengthening of internal control systems in order to provide reasonable assurance as to 
the legality and regularity of the underlying transactions and to further support the shift 
from a compliance to an effectiveness approach. Furthermore, it is necessary to 
strengthen the coordination of work programmes and harmonise audit methodologies and 
reporting structures within the Commission. In this sense, the Commission has obliged 
535European Court of Auditors, Annual Report Concerning the Financial Year 2003,2004. www.eca.eu.int; 
National Audit Office, "Financial Management of the European Union", HC 289 Session 2004-2005, and 
HC Session 2005-2006, www.nao.org.uk. 
536 European Court of Auditors, Annual Report concerning the financial year 2003, 2004. www.eca.eu.int. 
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the IACs to systematically send their final reports to the IAS and in this way reinforce the 
relations between the lAS and IACs. 537 
Towards an Integrated Internal Control Framework 
Although the Commission management of expenditure has been enhanced as a result of 
the recent reforms, the European Court of Auditors has not been satisfied with the level 
of effectiveness of the overall Community financial management especially in areas in 
which the Community and Member States share the management of programmes. 538 Due 
to continuing excessive criticisms of the Community financial management, the Barroso 
Commission has therefore made a strategic objective to strive for a positive assessment of 
legality and regularity of the Community financial operations. 539 The key issue in 
question here is how to ensure a sound implementation of the EU budget at the central 
level when 80% of the budget is presently implemented by Member States? Decentralised 
nature of the budget implementation implies a relatively long control chain with a high 
number of actors involved and the corresponding difficulty to maintain common levels of 
application of rules. Therefore, it is essential that Member States take an active part in 
obtaining the Commission's objective. 
In order to address this complex issue, and following the initiative of the European Court 
of Auditors,540 the Commission adopted a communication on a roadmap to an integrated 
internal control framework on 15 June 2005.541 The purpose of this document was to 
537 European Court of Auditors, Annual Report concerning the financial year 2004. www.eca.eu.int. 
538 Ibid. 
539 Cf. Commission Communication Strategic Objectives 2005-2009, Europe 2010: A Partnership for 
European Renewal, Prosperity, Solidarity and Security - COM(2005) 12,26.1.2005. 
540 European Court of Auditors Opinion No 212004, OJ C107Il of 30.4.2004 ("Single Audit" opinion). 
541 Commission Staff Working Paper, A gap assessment between the internal control framework in the 
Commission Services and the control principles set out in the Court of Auditors 'proposal for a Community 
internal contralframework' opinion No 212004,07/07/05. 
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initiate a process which should lead to an agreement between the Commission, the 
Member States and acceding countries on how this framework could be improved in 
order to get reasonable assurance on the regularity and legality of financial transactions. 
After discussing the communication document with all relevant actors, the Commission 
has adopted an Action Plan towards an Integrated Internal Control Framework on 17 
January 2006.542 The Action Plan defines 16 specific actions to be implemented during 
2006 and 2007, such as: simplification of management of EC funds, adoption of common 
internal control principles, issuing management declarations and synthesis reports at the 
national level, sharing results and prioritising cost benefit etc. 543 The Plan requires all 
relevant actors, i.e. the European Parliament, the Court of Auditors, the Member States 
and the Commission to contribute to the implementation of these actions. 
A need for institutionalisation of an integrated control framework has been addressed 
through the preparations of amendments of the existing Community legislation, i.e. 
Financial Regulation. According to its Article 184, the Financial Regulation is subject to 
review every three years, or whenever it proves necessary to do so. In compliance with 
this obligation, on 3 May 2005 the Commission adopted a proposal for its revision. In 
line with the Commission's Action Plan, a new budgetary principle is to be added in 
Chapter 9 of the Title II - the principle of effective and efficient internal control. This 
new principle underlines the importance of improvement of the implementation of the 
budget, the effectiveness and efficiency of the operations, the reliability of financial 
reporting, the protection of the financial interests of the Communities and the 
management of the risks relating to the legality and regularity of the underlying 
transacti ons. 
542 Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament and the European Court 
of Auditors, Commission Action Plan towards an Integrated Internal Control Framework, {SEC(2005) 
49}, Brussels, 17.1.2006 COM(2006) 9 final. 
543 Ibid. 
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It is expected that the joint action of all relevant actors of financial accountability in the 
EU context, with a special emphasis on the Member States internal and external financial 
accountability mechanisms, will provide a much needed synergy in addressing the 
inherent weaknesses of complex multi-layered financial accountability system of the EU. 
Although it is not very likely that this initiative will yield positive and concrete results in 
the short term, or even in the mid term, it is very important that the Commission has 
started tackling the problems of shared/decentralised budget implementation. In order for 
this initiative to work in the long run, it is necessary that the EU institutions provide a 
continuing leadership throughout this process. In this sense, an important role in further 
enhancement of the overall financial accountability framework will certainly be accorded 
to the Commission, but equally so to the Commission's external observers, the European 
Parliament and the European Court of Auditors. 
External financial accountability mechanisms in the EU 
The establishment of first external financial accountability mechanisms of the EU dates 
back only to the early 1970s. It may be argued that the development of external financial 
accountability mechanisms was the consequence of the transition from the budget system 
of national contributions to the establishment of an autonomous EC budget based on 
'own resources544 in the 1970 Budget Treaty.545 Integration in the sphere of own revenue 
resources naturally created a pressure for further integration in the control and 
accountability for their use. Hence, a more supranational EU budget necessitated an 
independent EU audit body, such as the European Court of Auditors. 546 Moreover, there 
544 Community revenue is based on several sources: 'traditional own resources', such as: customs, 
agricultural duties and sugar levies and resources based on value-added tax (V AT) and gross national 
income (GNI). 
545 B. Laffan, "Becoming a 'Living Institution': The Evolution of the European Court of Auditors", op. cit., 
p.254. 
546 B. Laffan, "Financial Control: The Court of Auditors and OLAF", in 1. Peterson and M. Shackleton 
(eds.), The Institutions o/the European Union, (Oxford University Press), 2002, p. 235. 
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was a growing pressure for further advancement of democratic control of Community 
expenditure and calls for granting the European Parliament a right of a 'discharge' to the 
Commission on its execution of its previous year's budget.547 However, it was obvious 
that the Parliament would not be able to exercise this right without the assistance of an 
expert institution. These interrelated factors led the signing of the 1975 Treaty which both 
gave the Parliament power to discharge the budget and created the European Court of 
Auditors, and thus provided a basis for the establishment of key EU external financial 
accountability mechanisms. 
Parliamentary accountability - granting the discharge to the Commission 
Parliamentary financial accountability of the EU finances is peculiar in many ways. 
Unlike in nation states, budgetary authority in the Community does not rest solely with 
the Parliament, but is generally shared between the Council and Parliament. Whereas the 
Council has the key role in determining the scope of EU revenue, the Parliament has an 
important role in the control of the EU expenditure, which resembles the role Parliaments 
play in Member States. In order to understand the overall context of the external financial 
accountability and especially Parliamentary accountability in the EU, it is necessary to 
gain some insight into the EU budgetary process. 
The budgetary process in the EU could briefly be described as follows. The scope of 
Community revenue is decided by a unanimous decision of the Council. All Member 
States must agree with the revenue decision in conformity with their respective 
constitutional requirements.548 The Budget Directorate General of the Commission is 
responsible for preparing the Commission's budget proposal (the preliminary draft 
budget). Similar to the process of budget discussion between the Ministers of Finance and 
547 The wise chair of the Budget Committee published an influential report in 1973, entitled "The Case for a 
European Audit Office", in which he called for the establishment of a new institution, the Court of 
Auditors. 
548 Article 269 (ex Article 201) EC. 
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spending ministries in the nation state, such a draft is then discussed with other 
directorate generals and other EU institutions. The Commission's preliminary draft is 
subsequently sent to the Council which by a qualified majority determines the draft 
budget. The draft budget is then forwarded to the Parliament, which has the right to 
amend it. After Parliamentary discussion and approval, the draft budget is sent back to 
the Council. It should be noted that approximately half the budget is spent on 
'compulsory expenditure" (mostly agriculture). Whereas in the case of dispute over 
'compulsory expenditure' between the Council and Parliament, the view of the Council 
prevails, the Parliament will have the final say on the non-compulsory expenditure. 
Finally, the Parliament adopts the budget acting by a majority of its members and three 
fifths of the votes cast. After the budget has been approved, the EU Commission bears 
overall responsibility for its implementation.549 
In contrast to its rather accessory role in determining the EU budget, the EU Parliament 
has a more prominent role in holding the Commission to account for spending of EU 
citizens' money. Since 1977, the Parliament, acting on a recommendation from the 
Council, grants a discharge to the Commission for implementation of the budget. 550 The 
Parliament's discharge to the Commission is a formal act, which marks the final closure 
of the accounts. It could further be argued that the discharge also represents a political 
verdict on the overall performance of the Commission.551 
Although the discharge procedure seems to be clear, it has provoked certain 
controversies. The key question is what would happen if the Parliament would refuse the 
discharge to the Commission? Up to now, the Parliament has refused to give a budgetary 
discharge on three occasions and threatened to do so on others, and has withheld approval 
549 For more details on the budgetary procedure see: 
http://europa.eu.inticomm/budgetlbudgetJindex _en .htm. 
550 Article 276 (ex Article 206) EC. 
551 C. Kok, "The Court of Auditors ofthe European Communities - the other European Court in 
Luxemburg", Common Market Law Review 26: 345-367 (1989). 
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of the budget for 1984 before discharging the budget implementation for the 1982.552 At 
that time, the Commission was very close to the end of its term and Parliament did not 
take any steps to dismiss it. The discharge was later given to the newly appointed 
Commission. This case points to the fact that the key Parliamentary sanction in the case 
of refusal of discharge may just be a postponement of such an action, rather than calling 
the Commission to resign. 553 This could also be confirmed by the later and even more 
senous case of the 1996 budget, when the European Parliament delayed giving the 
Commission a discharge following one of the critical reports of the ECA. The 
Commission survived a motion of censure only because a special Committee of 
Independent Experts was appointed to investigate the charges of mismanagement and the 
ultimate result was the resignation of the entire Santer Commission. Nevertheless, it 
could also be argued that refusal of granting of discharge to the Commission could 
prompt a call for Commission's resignation in accordance with the Article 201 of EC 
Treaty. The problem, however, may arise if this right would be used too frequently, as it 
could bring about adverse political consequences on stability and efficiency of EU 
governance processes. 
In order to find a good compromise solution that would balance the need for strong 
Parliamentary powers in the process of discharge and the potential problems that may be 
faced in the case of a refusal of the discharge, some authors are of the opinion that instead 
of focusing on the discharge of the Commission as a collective body, the Parliament 
should bring pressure to bear on one or more specifically responsible members of the 
Commission, which would ultimately result in their resignation. 554 This further triggers a 
wider debate on whether the collegiality principle on which the Commission grounds its 
operation should be maintained. The strict application of the collegiality principle might 
have seemed necessary at the early stage of development of the EU in order to prevent 
confrontations that could arise due to a Commissioner's loyalties to their Member States. 
552 R. Levy, Implementing European Union Public Policy, op, cit., pp. 16-17. 
553 Cf I. Harden, F. White, K. Donnelly, op.cit. pp. 620-622. 
554 C. Kok, op. cit., p. 352. 
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However, with the development of a genuine supranational structure and an increasingly 
prominent role of individual commissioners, the principle of collegiality may strongly be 
disputed. The key issue here is that the collegial structure of accountability for 
individually assigned portfolios may lead to a conceptual "diffusion of 
responsibilities",555 which undoubtedly has an adverse effect on the principle of 
accountability, as exemplified by the recent need for reform of the Commission's internal 
accountability mechanisms. 
The question which should be raised, however, is whether the Commission should fully 
be held to account through the discharge procedure, since the process of EU budget 
implementation is performed largely by the Member States themselves. The 
Commission's accountability for the implementation of the budget in the system of 
divided budget implementation management makes sense only if all Member States have 
the administrative capacity for sound financial control and management and if the 
Commission would have sufficient levers to make them use it.556 For this reason, the 
Commission has a very strong interest that all Member States and potential Member 
States which are receiving the EU accession funds have good and reliable systems of 
financial accountability and has taken a number of measures in this respect, as pointed 
out earlier in the text. Only if the Member States and potential Member States would 
achieve adequate implementing capacity the Commission would be able to fully take on 
the burden of key accountee of financial accountability. 
As in nation state context, the EU Parliament would have serious problems in holding the 
Commission to account if it would not be supported by other bodies, primarily by its 
committees and by work of the EU supreme audit institution, the Court of Auditors. 
Therefore, we shall devote our further attention to the functions of the Parliament's 
555 V. Mehde, "Responsibility and Accountability in the European Commission", Common Market Law 
Review 40, 2003 Kluwer Law International, pp. 423-442. 
556 C. Kok, op. cit., p. 352 .. 
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committees and the Court of Auditors, which shall be analysed in the overall context of 
EU financial accountability. 
The Budgetary Control Committee - the EU PACIMEC? 
In 1973, the European Parliament approved the creation of a new Parliamentary sub-
Committee on the budget of the Communities, responsible for the budget 
implementation. The idea was to establish a body that would provide a link between the 
external auditor that was planned to be established and the Parliament. However, the 
work of this sub-committee was quite ineffective in the mid 1970s. Therefore, it was 
decided in 1979 that the sub-committee should be upgraded to a status of a separate 
Budgetary Control Committee557 (generally called "COCOBU" -according to its name in 
French: Commission du Contr6le Budgetaire). 
COCOBU has a key role in the discharge process, as it invites the Parliament to grant, 
postpone or refuse the discharge of the budget implementation. Similar to the British 
PAC and the more recently established French MEC, the COCOBU often bases its own 
work on reports made by the external auditor, the European Court of Auditors. However, 
the COCOBU also responds to proposals and reports from the Commission558 and 
produces its 'own' initiative reports, which provides it a rather broad basis for the final 
decision. It should be noted that the COCOBU adopted its last report in which it invites 
557 Cf 1. Harden, F. White, K. Donnelly, op. cit., pp. 622-625. 
558 Following the Commission's White Paper on reform, the number of reports and materials available from 
the Commission has substantively increased. One of the most important Commission reports is the 
Synthesis report and the individual Commission DG's activity reports, which aim at giving a global picture 
of the internal management issues raised in the DGs' reports and to draw conclusions on how to address the 
identified problems. 
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the Parliament to discharge the implementation of the EU budget for 2004 on 21 March 
2006.559 This report is expected to be adopted by the Parliament shortly. 
Like the British PAC, the COCOBU provides an added value in exercising parliamentary 
control by trying to ensure that problems identified in audits by the Court of Auditors and 
in investigations by the Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF) are given political prominence and 
addressed in a timely manner.560 However, it should be noted that the COCOBU has not 
enjoyed the status and the prestige of the British PAC. Attendance of its members has 
been quite low and most of them have not been substantially interested in following up 
the European Court of Auditor's reports. 561 Furthennore, the attendance of the plenary 
sessions of the Parliament when the European Court of Auditor's report and the 
COCOBU's draft discharge resolution are discussed has also been low, which has further 
undennined the effectiveness of the EU financial accountability system, based on the UK 
model. 
It should, however, be noted that the COCOBU's profile has begun to rise as a result of 
the prominence accorded to the 'fight against fraud' over the last couple of years. The 
COCOBU has spent significant amount of time on issues of legality and regularity, 
especially on fraud, payments under CAP and Commission virements between 
accounts. 562 Given the complexity of EU budgetary matters, individual members of the 
committee during the previous parliamentary tenn specialised in particular EU policy 
areas, preparing a Parliament's response to special reports by the Court of Auditors in 
their field, often in the fonn of working documents, which has had a positive effect on the 
559 Committee on Budgetary Control, Report on the Discharge for implementation of the European Union 
general budgetfor thejinancial year 2004,27.3.2006, 
http://www.europarl.eu.int/comparJ/cont/adopt/dischargeI2004/default_en.htm. 
560 Committee on Budgetary Control, Handbook 2004 for New Members, 
http://www.europarl.eu.int/comparl/cont/guide/default_en.htm. 
56l Cf I. Harden, F. White, K. Donnelly ibid. 
562 Cf R. Levy, Implementing European Union Public Policy, op. cit. 25-25. 
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efficiency of its work. 563 Nevertheless, the Committee is still experiencing difficulties 
especially as it has to protect its own field of competence against other committees which 
want to set up inquiries in areas that the COCOBU would normally cover, making use of 
the power which the TEU has provided to the Parliament to conduct ad hoc 
. .. 564 
mvestIgatIOns. 
This discussion points out the difficulties which may be faced when attempting to 
transplant financial accountability mechanisms from one system to another and may be 
quite useful when we start examining the possible introduction of different financial 
accountability mechanisms in Serbia. 
The European Court of Auditors CECA) 
Historical background 
The ECA is the key external accountability mechanism operating within the EU financial 
accountability system. The 1975 Budget Treaty provided the legal basis for the 
establishment of the ECA and it began to work in 1977, replacing the then existing Audit 
Board and the Auditor of the European Coal and Steel Community. 
The main incentives for the establishment of the ECA could be sought in two major 
developments. The first is the earlier mentioned change of the EU financing based on 
"own resources" in the 1970 Budget Treaty, which has greatly enhanced the limited 
budgetary powers of the European Parliament. 565 The second is the admission of new 
563 Committee on Budgetary Control, Handbook 2004 for New Members. 
http://www.europarl.eu.int/comparl!contiguide/defauIt_en.htm . 
564 Cf R. Levy, Implementing European Union Public Policy. ibid. 
565 The vice-chair of the Budget Committee published a report in 1973, entitled The Case for a European 
Audit Office, which had exerted significant pressure for the establishment of the ECA. B. Laffan, 
"Becoming a 'Living Institution': The Evolution of the European Court of Auditors", op. cit. p. 251. 
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Community Member States- Denmark, Ireland and UK in 1973.566 As all these countries 
have a strong tradition of independent public sector auditing, they from the outset 
imposed considerable pressure for the creation of the stronger Community accountability 
framework, which was able to satisfy their needs. 567 
The Treaty of Maastricht (1992) enhanced the ECA's formal status, moving it from the 
category of 'other bodies' to the status of a full institution. This was clear recognition of 
the need to enhance the authority of the Court and to elevate it to a status equivalent to 
those institutions over which it had auditing power. 568 Enhancement of the ECA's status 
has extended ECA's audit powers to the second (Common Foreign and Security Policy) 
and third (Cooperation in the fields of Justice and Home Affairs) pillars of the Union. 
The Treaty of Amsterdam (1997) and Treaty of Nice (2001) have further strengthened the 
status of the ECA. The Treaty of Amsterdam has emphasized the Court's role in respect 
of irregularities and measures to combat fraud. Furthermore, it confirmed the Court's 
right to bring actions before the Court of Justice to protect its prerogatives with regard to 
the other EU institutions. In the view of the EU enlargement, the Treaty of Nice provided 
that the Court of Auditors should be composed of one member from each Member State 
(instead of 15 members). It also emphasized the importance of the cooperation between 
the Court and the supreme audit institutions of the Member States.569 
Organisation and Structure of the ECA 
The structure and procedures of the Court have changed over time, aiming at enhancing 
the coherence and effectiveness of the Court's activities. As confirmed by the Treaty of 
Nice, and in accordance with the principle of national representation, the ECA consists of 
566 N. Price, "The Court of Auditors of the European Communities", in Yearbook of European Law, vol. 2, 
pp. 240, Oxford, 1982. 
567 Ibid. 
568 1. Inghelram, op. cit., pp. 129-146. 
569 Cf http://www . eca. eu.intl eca/treaty/ docs/ disp _ cdc_en. pdf. 
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one Member from each Member State. The Members are appointed by the Council, 
acting unanimously after consultation with the European Parliament, on the basis of 
nominations made by individual Member States. The Members' term in office is six years 
and is renewable. 57o The members are required to perform their duties in complete 
independence and in the general interest of the EU. 571 
Although it is naturally headed by the President, the ECA operates primarily as a 
collegiate body, with its members adopting audit reports and opinions by majority vote. 
The President is elected by the members with a three years renewable mandate.572 The 
President's role is that of primus inter partes. He/she chairs the ECA's meetings, ensures 
that its decisions are implemented and that overall activities are well managed. 
The ECA regulates its structure and procedure by its own Rules of Procedure, which are 
submitted for approval to the Council. Nowadays, the structure of the ECA consists of 
audit groups comprising a number of specialized divisions which cover the different areas 
of the budget. Each member of the ECA is assigned to a group. The groups are chaired by 
a "Dean", elected by the members of the group for a renewable two-year term. The Dean 
is responsible for overall operation of the group and its divisions. There are around 800 
staff in the ECA, who have a broad range of professional backgrounds and experience 
from both the public and private sector. The ECA employs nationals from all Member 
States in order to ensure a sufficient spread of linguistic and professional skills within its 
workforce. 573 
The organization of the ECA, however, has been the subject of heavy criticism. This 
especially relates to the large composition of the ECA's membership, appointed in line 
570 Article 247, paragraph 3, items 1,2 of the EC Treaty. 
571 Article 247, paragraph 4 of the EC Treaty. 
572 Article 247, paragraph 3, item 3 of the EC Treaty. Hubert Weber, from Austria, was elected President in 
January 2005. 
573 The European Court of Auditors, "Improving the Financial Management of the European Union", op.cit. 
p. 10. www.europa.eu.int 
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with the principle of national representation. Whereas there is nothing wrong with the 
principle of national representation itself, the fact is that with each enlargement the 
number of ECA's member significantly increases, which questions the effectiveness of 
collegiality.574 It furthermore appears that each enlargement reduces the workload of its 
members, questioning the necessity of their high position in the ECA's hierarchy.575 The 
second, and the key related question is how to ensure the comprehensiveness of the 
ECA's work given the variety of external audit traditions of its numerous members, 
which has negatively affected the uniformity of the ECA's work. Therefore, there have 
been calls for the reduction of the number of the ECA's members and possible 
abandoning of the collegiate structure and introduction of a single head organisation, 
modelled on the UK C&AG.576 Whereas the latter solution may be too extreme for an 
institution of a supranational governance, the former solution would most probably 
increase the efficiency and effectiveness of the ECA' s work and would prevent potential 
problems of inflation of its membership in the case of future enlargements. 
Mandate of the ECA 
Article 248 of the EC Treaty sets out the mandate of the ECA. According to Article 248, 
the ECA has the following competences: 
audits the accounts of all the revenue and expenditure of the EU and, unless 
otherwise specified, of all bodies established by the Union; 
examines whether all EU revenue and expenditure has been received or incurred 
in a lawful and regular manner and whether the financial management has been 
sound; 
574 This is particularly obvious in the case of the last enlargement, when the number of the ECA's members 
have increased for 10 new members. 
575 N. S. Groenendijk, "Assessing Member States' Management ofEU Finances: an empirical analysis of 
the annual reports of the European Court of Auditors, 1996-2001", Public Administration Vol. 82 No.3, 
2004, pp. 701-725. 
576 Ibid; I. Harden, F. White, K. Donnelly, op. cit., pp. 627-628. 
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produces an Annual Report containing its observations on the execution of the EU 
budget for each financial year, including a Statement of Assurance (DAS) on the 
reliability of the EU accounts for that year and the legality and regularity of the 
underlying transactions; 
may submit observations on specific topic of its choice at any time, particularly in 
the form of Special Reports; 
in cases of irregularity or suspected fraud detected in the course of its audit work 
provides formal opinions on proposals for EU legislation of a financial nature; 
is consulted on any proposal for measures in the fight against fraud; 
assists the discharge authority - the European Parliament - in exercising its 
powers of control over the implementation of the budget of the European Union 
through the publication of audit reports and opinions. 
The listed competences show that ECA has no legal powers of its own. Therefore the 
name of the Court is somewhat misleading, since the ECA's does not judge the accounts 
(as the French Cour des Comptes) but performs general audit functions (like the British 
NAO) without judicial competences. If auditors discover fraud or irregularities in their 
investigations they inform the European Anti-Fraud Office - OLAF. 
Similar to national supreme audit institutions, the ECA issues an annual report, published 
in the autumn of each year for the preceding year and a number of special reports on 
particular institutions, policy programmes or financial processes and Opinions when 
requested by the Councilor observations on the initiative of the ECA.577 
Very early on, the ECA decided not to limit its investigations to compliance of legality 
and regularity, but started examining whether financial management has been sound. The 
European Parliament has characterized the value for money controls as being "the most 
577 www.europa.eu.int 
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important work of the Court",578 as it has on numerous occasions pointed out to the waste 
of using of resources in various EU institutions. The majority of ECA's special reports 
consist of value for money audits of the Union's internal policies with a particular 
emphasis on the CAP and structural expenditure.579 However, in the last couple of years 
the ECA's special reports also have focused very much on the sound financial 
management in the pre-accession aid and measures to prepare the candidate countries to 
C . ~ d 580 manage ommumty lun s. 
When the ECA obtained the status of a full institution (by the Maastricht Treaty in 1992), 
it got a major new responsibility, known as a statement of assurance or DAS (from the 
French term declaration d'assurance). This task, the origin of which is a British proposal, 
means that in addition to the Annual Report and special reports, the Court must provide 
the Council and the Parliament with a statement of assurance as to "the reliability of the 
accounts and the legality and regularity of underlying transactions".581 This is quite a 
demanding exercise, as it requires the ECA to move from its traditional 'system based 
approach,582 to sample based detailed financial audit checks of all underlying transactions 
578 D. O'Keefe, "The Court of Auditors", in Institutional dynamics of European integration: essays in 
honour of Henry G. Schermers, vol. II (1994), p. 177-194 in the Liber Amicorum for Professor Henry G. 
Schermers, 1994, KluwerlMartinus Nijhoff, p.187. 
579 Cf. Special Report No 312004 of the Court of Auditors concerning the recovery of irregular payments 
under the Common Agricultural Policy, 10 June 2004 OJ C 269, 4.11.2004; Special Report No 712004 of 
the Court of Auditors concerning the common organisation of the market in raw tobacco 21 July 2004; 
Special Report No 1412003 of the Court of Auditors on the measurement offarm incomes by the 
Commission 4 December 2003 OJ C 45, 20.2.2004; Special Report No 8/2004 of the Court of Auditors on 
the Commission's management and supervision of the measures to control foot-and-mouth disease and of 
the related expenditure, 21 July 2004, being published. 
580 Cf. Special Report No 512004 concerning Phare support to prepare candidate countries for managing the 
Structural Funds, OJ C 15, 20.1.2005; Special Report No 212004 of the Court of Auditors concerning pre-
accession aid - Has SAPARD been well managed? OJ C 295, 30.11.2004. 
581 Article 248EC 
582 The system-based approach assumes examination of different areas of revenue and expenditure over a 
four-year cycle. Cf. Kok, op. cit. note 4. 
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down to the level of the final beneficiary. In the last couple of years statement of 
assurance is given on the specific parts of the Community revenue and expenditure (CAP, 
structural measures, internal policies, external actions, pre-accession aid, administrative 
expenditure and financial instruments and banking activities). 583 The Court gives an 
assurance that the accounts representing financial transactions were reliable and if it feels 
that they were not reliable, it states why this was not the case. 584 It should be noted that 
the ECA has not issued a positive DAS on the EU expenditure in each of the last eleventh 
years, although it has noted some general improvements in specific areas.585 
However, the ECA's has been criticised for the limited impact of its DAS findings and its 
work overall. The information resulting from the DAS is often too general and not overly 
useful for its audiences.586 Furthermore, the ECA's reports, naturally, do not have any 
legally binding effect. Therefore, a negative statement of assurance, does not oblige the 
European Parliament to refuse the discharge to the Commission, which further questions 
the usefulness of this instrument. 587 Nevertheless, it should be noted that the repeated 
negative DAS assessments have prompted the reaction of the Commission and other 
actors in creating a common framework for enhancing the framework of internal control 
(as discussed earlier in the chapter) which demonstrates the ECA's potential for 
providing constructive feedback arising from the DAS examinations. 
583 ECA, Annual Report concerning the financial year 2002, Annual Report concerning the financial year 
2003, Annual Report concerning the financial year 2004, www.eca.eu.int . 
584 Ibid. 
585 The ECA has found that the transactions underlying the accounts for 2004 were legal and regular with 
respect to revenue, commitments, administrative expenditure, expenditure on the pre-accession strategy (!) 
and areas of expenditure under the CAP covered by the Integrated Administration and Control Systems. 
However, it was not able to provide the positive assessment for the remaining four (out of six) main areas 
of expenditure. 
586 N. S. Groenendijk, op. cit. p. 702. 
5871. Inghelram, op. cit. pp. 132-133. 
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The EC Treaty gives the ECA a right of access to any information it requires to undertake 
its tasks. According to Article 248(3) EC, the audit shall be based on records and, if 
necessary, performed on the spot in the other institution. Article 248(3) further provides 
that the other institutions shall also forward to the ECA, at its request, any document or 
information necessary to carry out its tasks. However, the ECA has experienced problems 
with enforcement of its right to access information. Although the ECA had the possibility 
of filing an action for failure to act against another institution under the Article 232 EC 
since it became an institution under the Maastricht Treaty, this right was restricted as it 
was possible to file an action only if the defending institution has not defined its positions 
within two months of being called upon. 588 In response to ECA's request for 
strengthening the right of freedom of access to information, the Amsterdam Treaty 
provided the ECA an additional instrument to enforce its right to access information. In 
accordance with the Amsterdam Treaty, the ECA has the right to file an action for 
annulment of the decision by which an institution refuses to grant an access to 
information before the Court of Justice under Article 230(3) EC for the purpose of 
protecting its prerogatives.lf this Court of Justice finds that the refusal of the access is not 
justified, it will annul such a decision and provide the ECA access to necessary 
documents. 
Relationship between the ECA and other EU institutions and Member States 
In the beginning of its operation, the ECA had quite conflictual relations with the 
Commission, was largely ignored by the Council of Ministers and the European Council, 
but instantly established good relations with the European Parliament, which has 
accepted it as an important ally in its power struggle with the Council and the 
Commission. 589 Relations between the ECA and the Commission especially deteriorated 
during Jacques De1ors' tenure in Brussels. In contrast to the situation during De1ors' 
tenure in the Commission, Jacques Santer invested considerable efforts in improving 
588 Ibid, p. 137. 
589 D. Q'Keeffe, ibid. 
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relations with the ECA and acknowledged the many managerial weaknesses highlighted 
by the Court in its reports. 590 The tone of Commission-ECA relations changed from 
hostility to a shared approach towards sound financial management and a sense that the 
key issue in the longer term is to address the weaknesses not in the financial management 
of the Commission, but in the Member States. Internally in the Commission, it was felt 
that the ECA was strong enough to criticize the Commission but was still unwilling to 
take a tougher stance on the Member States. 591 
It seems that the ECA is now more sympathetic to the management difficulties of the 
Commission and is more willing to identify problems with the Member States. The 
Parliament and the ECA continue to share a joint concern about the management of EU 
monies, although the ECA is less subservient to the EP. As it grew in confidence, it has 
started pointing out to growing financial management difficulties in the Member States 
and not just in the Commission.592 
In the last couple of years, the ECA has especially pointed out various risks in the area of 
pre-accession strategy on implementation of all programmes carried out in the candidate 
countries, although the overall area of management of the EU pre-accession funds has 
been assessed as satisfactory. Thus, for example, in its 2003 and 2004 Annual Reports, 
the ECA has pointed out to numerous shortcomings in the supervisory systems and 
controls in the case of pre-accession aid, which had already been identified in the 
previous years and resulted in errors and greater risks affecting the legality and regularity 
of the transactions. The errors detected during the ECA's audits of transactions in 2003 
have revealed system weaknesses and the need to further improve the supervisory 
systems and controls in order to limit the risk of irregular payments.593 
590 Cf. B. Laffan, "Becoming a 'Living Institution': The Evolution of the European Court of Auditors", op. 
cit., pp. 256-263. 
591 Ibid. 
592 Ibid. 
593 ECA, Annual Report concerning the financial year 2003. 
190 
The ECA has been trying to establish co-operative relations with national audit offices so 
that it can also rely on their findings in its work. Following a British proposal, the 
Amsterdam Treaty specified that the ECA shall perform the audit on the spot in the 
Member States, including on the premises of any natural or legal person in receipt of 
payments from the budget. Such audit is carried out in liaison with the national audit 
bodies or competent departments. In the Treaty of Amsterdam (Article 248_3)594 it was 
agreed that "the Court of Auditors and the national audit bodies of the Member States 
shall cooperate in a spirit of trust while maintaining their independence." Proposed by the 
German delegation, this provision reiterates the general obligations of cooperation 
between the Community institutions and the Member States under Article 10 Ee. 595 
However, it is interesting to note that the ED Treaty has kept the last sentence of the 
Article 248(3) that national audit bodies or departments "shall inform the Court of 
Auditors whether they intend to take part in the audit." This indicates that they are free 
not to participate and has placed the onus on national audit authorities to make a decision 
concerning their involvement in the statement of assurance process. This sentence also 
confirms the autonomous nature of the ECA's audit rights in the Member States.596 
In order to balance the autonomous nature of the external audit institutions in the Member 
and candidate States and cooperation with the ECA, the Nice Treaty has included a 
Declaration on the Court of Auditors by which the ECA and the national audit institutions 
have been called to improve the framework and conditions for cooperation, while 
maintaining the autonomy of each. To that end, it has been advised that the President of 
the Court of Auditors should set up a contact committee with the chairmen of the national 
audit institutions.597 
594 Amended Art. 188c of the TEU, Treaty of Amsterdam. 
595 Cf. 1. Inghelram, op. cit. p. 140. 
596 Ibid, p. 139. 
597 http://www.eca.eu.intieca/treatY/docs/disp cdc en.pdf. 
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For several years now, the Contact Committee, comprising the heads of the external audit 
institution (which includes the President of the ECA), the Committee of Liaison Officers 
and working groups on specific audit topics has been operating rather successfully. The 
heads of the national external audit institutions and the ECA meet once a year and their 
meetings are prepared by the liaison officers who themselves meet usually twice a year. It 
should also be noted that the ECA, together with the Contact Committee has set up a 
parallel liaison structure with the external audit institutions of the candidate countries to 
help facilitate their integration into the EU after accession. Although the Member States 
are still under no obligation to carry out controls on behalf of the Court, the cooperation 
between the ECA and national external audit institutions has undoubtedly improved 
under this framework. 
Similarly to the Member States contexts, the key issue in ensuring an effective external 
audit in the EU is a provision for adequate follow-up procedures in the case of 
recommendations by the ECA. The critical importance of follow-up procedures has now 
been widely recognized by requiring the Commission to comment on the ECA's annual 
report and any relevant special reports and to state how the ECA' s recommendations are 
being met.598 However, the question is how the ECA's audit powers could be enforced 
not only in the Commission, but also in the Member States. Some authors are of the 
opinion that the ECA's powers towards the Member State could be enforced through an 
action for infringement of the Treaty via the Commission.599 However, this could be an 
unsatisfactory solution since the Commission (under Article 274 EC) and the Member 
States are jointly responsible for the implementation of the budget and it is not plausible 
that one would go directly against another in this process. The better solution could 
perhaps be giving the ECA the right to bring an action directly to ECl against the 
Member States, in order to protect the institutional balance between both the Community 
institutions and Community institutions and the Member States.600 
598 Annual Report concerning the financial year 2004, www.eca.eu.int . 
599 1. Inghelrarn, op. cit., p. 140. 
600 Ibid, pp. 140-141. 
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Fight against fraud and OLAF 
The establishment of OLAF in 1999 can be traced back to 1988 when the Delors 
Commission felt compelled to establish UCLAF in response, notably, to repeated 
requests from the European Parliament to the Commission to enhance its fight against 
fraud. In 1998, in anticipation of the coming into force of Article 280 of the Treaty of 
Amsterdam on protecting the EU's financial interests, the Commission proposed that an 
independent anti-fraud office should replace UCLAF. However, the real impetus for 
creating OLAF came from continuing criticisms of the Commission's financial 
management and a very critical report by the ECA and UCLAF itself. 
While emphasizing the importance of OLAF's investigative function, the Commission 
entrusted the Office with a wide range of activities related to the protection of the 
European Union's financial interests. These activities cover the following: 
-the assistance that the Commission gives to the Member States in the fight against fraud; 
-the development of a strategy for fighting fraud within the framework of its policy on 
the protection of financial interests (Article 280 of the Treaty); 
-the preparation of the Commission's legislative and regulatory anti-fraud initiatives; 
-technical assistance, especially in the field of training, to the other Community bodies 
and institutions and to the national authorities concerned with the protection of the 
Community's financial interests.601 
OLAF issued its first annual report in June 2000. When presenting its first report OLAF's 
director pointed out the continuing problems arising from the differences in national legal 
systems which prevent the emergence of EU wide anti-fraud rules and common penalties 
for offenders. 602 
601 Decision 1999/3521EC, ECSC, Euratom, Article 2(3) to (7). 
602 B. Laffan, "Financial Control: The Court of Auditors and OLAF", pp. 247-248. 
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OLAF is still a young institution, which is in the process of establishing its internal 
structures, procedures, processes. Like the ECA, it is part of the Union's accountability 
structure with a specific remit to combat fraud and crime. Its remit is based on the clear 
recognition that there is an important transnational dimension to budgetary fraud in the 
EU. Similar to the ECA, there is a clear recognition that OLAF has to work with and 
through national investigative channels. 
In 2005, the ECA produced a special report on the operation of OLAF, pointing out the 
difficulties it has faced in its first years of operation and giving recommendations for its 
future work.603 The report reveals that the preparation and follow-up of investigations 
have frequently been rudimentary. The investigators objectives are still vague as regards 
the evidence to be obtained and the resources to be used. Apart from the customs sector, 
cooperation with Member States still calls for serious effort in both areas that are 
managed directly and where management is shared with the Member States.604 
OLAF is independent in its investigations, but subject to the Commission as far as its 
other duties are concerned. This hybrid status has not affected its independence in its 
investigative functions. The fact that it is attached to the Commission has enabled it to 
benefit not only from extended administrative and logistical support, but also from the 
same regulatory anti-fraud provisions as Commission departments. Therefore there are no 
proposals to change the Office's status. 60S The key issue to be addressed instead is the 
need for OLAF to focus its investigative function, so that better use is made of its 
resources, notably with a view to opening investigations that target areas in which the 
risk of fraud is considered greatest, as suggested by the ECA's special report. 
603 The Court of Auditors, Special Report No 112005 concerning the management of the European Anti-
Fraud Office (OLAF) together with the Commission's replies. OJ C 20211 of 18/8/2005" 
604 Ibid. 
605 Ibid. 
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Nature of the EU and financial accountability at the EU level 
After analysing the key elements of financial accountability at the EU level, the question 
which arises is what is the nature of financial accountability at the EU level? Is the 
accountability relationship established between the EU institutions and EU citizens the 
same as in the nation state context? Is there a difference between two levels of 
accountability and if so, what are then the consequences of such a difference? 
In order to be able to comprehend the financial accountability relationship in the EU 
context we will have to comprehend the nature of the EU itself. Therefore we shall 
discuss the main theories attempting to explain the nature of the EU integration and its 
basic features. This will provide us a basis for drawing general conclusions on the nature 
of financial accountability relationship. 
Theoretical basis Jor EU integration 
There are several theories which attempt to explain the nature of the EU. The most 
prominent ones are: neo-functionalism, inter-governmentalism and multi-level 
governance. Although all these theories seem to provide quite different determinants and 
postulates of supranational integration, they in fact emphasise different aspects of the EU 
integration process and operation. We shall briefly analyse the main features of these 
theories, which should provide a basis for understanding of financial accountability at the 
EU level. 
N eo functionalists have for many years provided the framework for understanding EU 
integration. The key tenet of neo-functionalism is that different social groups (including 
bureaucratic actors at state level, societal interest groups and multi-national cooperations) 
within Member States have particular interests in the integration processes. These 
interests are mainly of economic nature and cross the borders of nation states due to 
strong interconnectedness of national economies. The promotion of economic interests 
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leads to certain degree of integration, which is then by 'spill-over' effect spread to other 
areas of integration. The main idea is thus that integration in one sphere creates pressure 
for integration in other areas. Economic integration naturally leads to certain degree of 
political integration, which is further spread by spillover effect to different sectoral areas. 
In order to attain their integration objectives interest groups concentrate their attention 
both on the national institutions and EU institutions, applying the pressure on those who 
have the regulatory power. 606 
Neofunctionalism has been facing numerous criticisms. The main problem of this theory 
seem to lie in its relative simplicity, which could well serve to explain gradual 
strengthening of integration processes but could not account for difficult periods in the 
EU context, featured by serious crises in the EU development in the 1970s as well as 
those experienced relatively recently, with rejection of the EU Constitution by some of 
the Member States and budget disputes. As Community integration had not proceeded in 
the manner predicted by neofunctionalists, the initial neofunctionalists theoretical 
framework was modified and become much more complex. Notwithstanding these 
modifications, the neofunctionalists were not able to explain the causal links of various 
shifts and changes in the EU integration process. Furthermore, the lack of more advanced 
ideas on Community democratic features and accountability represent the weak points of 
this theory, which seems to be well-suited to explain the early EU integration process, but 
fails to provide insight into its more advanced stage of development. 607 In spite of these 
critics, neofuctionalist theory certainly has its values and could be well used to provide at 
least partial explanation of the development of financial accountability mechanisms in the 
EU context. Neofunctionalism could thus be well used to explain the emergence of the 
European Court of Auditors, as has been pointed out earlier. 
606 Cf P. Craig, O. de Burca, The Evolution of EU Law, (Oxford University Press, 1998), pp. 3-7; J. 
Peterson, M. Shackleton, The Institutions of the European Union, (Oxford University Press), 2001, pp.5-6 
607 P. Craig, O. de Burca, op.cit., pA. 
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The next theory which attempts to explain the EU integration is intergovernmentalism. 
Intergovernmentalism represents a state-centric theoretical framework which tries to 
explain the nature of the EU on the basis of a rational choice theory, overtaken from 
economic liberalism. The key argument of intergovemmentalism is that increasing 
transborder flows of goods, services, factors or pollutants create "international policy 
externalities", which create costs and benefits for the groups outside national 
jurisdictions. In order to overcome possible disputes and individual interstate bargains 
and in this way reduce the costs of externalities, the states have created a supranational 
structure, which should provide a stable institutional setting for the resolution of possible 
disputes and bargains. In this sense, the states have either pooled their sovereignty, 
through qualified majority voting or delegated power to semi-autonomous institutions, 
which should be able to deal efficiently with all the issues arising from the integration 
process. 608 
The core of the intergovernmentalist argument is that, despite certain level of delegation 
of power to supranational institutions, the Member States remain key determinants in the 
integration process, unlike the Community institutions which have little, if any, 
independent impact on the integration process. Intergovernmentalists contend that the 
existence of democratic institutions and mechanisms in the EU is fully contingent upon 
the consent of the States, which are the driving forces behind integration. Supranational 
actors act mainly at their behest and exert almost no influence on the pace of integration. 
The significant powers of the Commission and the European Court of Justice 
intergovernmentalists explained by use of delegation and agency theory.609 
Intergovernmentalists have been heavily criticized for over-simplification of the driving 
forces for integration and their reduction to pure economic calculus. Furthermore, their 
contention that Community institutions have no genuine impact on the integration 
process is highly disputable. Nevertheless, insights of intergovernmentalism are certainly 
608 Ibid, pp. 9-15. 
609 Ibid. 
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useful for explaining some of the key features of the ED integration and will be used to 
some extent in our financial accountability research, as will be pointed out later. 
As a reaction to the intergovernmentalists' overstressing of the importance of Member 
States in the integration process, a new theory of multilevel governance has emerged, 
emphasising the importance of the ED institutions in the policy-making process. The 
theory of multi-level governance draws on the new institutionalist thinking, which 
stresses the importance of the design of political institutions on the society. Advocates of 
multi-level governance argue that although national governments are major players in the 
policy process, they do not have a monopoly of control. Supranational institutions, 
including the Commission, the European Parliament and European Court of Justice, have 
genuine, independent influence on policy making process that does not stem from and 
cannot be explained by individual national interests.610 
Multi-level governance theory sees the rationale for integration in the wish of the 
Government leaders to transfer decision-making power either because the political 
benefits may outweigh the costs of the loss of political control, or because of the 
advantages obtained by shifting the responsibility for unpopular decisions from the 
national to supranational level. Their main argument is that once competence over a 
certain subject matter has been transferred to the Community level individual states have 
only a limited degree of control of supranational decision making process. Ability of the 
Member States to control the ED institutions is limited by a range of factors, including 
the 'multiplicity of principals, the mistrust that exists among them, impediments to 
coherent principal action and by unintended consequences of institutional change. ,611 
Stone, Sweet and Sandholtz have made an interesting attempt at combining the 
intergovernmentalism with new institutionalism (i.e. multilevel governance). They argue 
610 Ibid, pp. 16-23. 
611 G. Marks, L. Hooghe, K. Blank, "European Integration form the 1980s: State-Centric v. Multiple-Level 
Governance', (1996) 34 JCMS pp. 341-342. 
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that these two theories could be placed at two opposite ends of the continuum. At the one 
end of the continuum, there is pure intergovernmental politics where the states are the 
central players who bargain in order to attain commonly acceptable policies. In such 
matters, the role of a Community is one of a passive observer, who can only try to 
enhance the efficiency of such interstate bargain. At the other end of the spectrum there is 
supranational politics which covers the areas of competence which, due to pressure of 
different societal actors, have been transferred to the Community decision making level. 
In these matters, the Community institutions take precedence, greatly limiting the 
influence of the Member States. Stone, Sweet and Sandholtz therefore believe that 
different areas of Community policy could definitely be located at different points along 
the spectrum. The location of a policy area at a particular point on the continuum is 
dependent on the levels of cross-border transactions and the consequential need of 
different societal actors for supranational coordination within that area.612 
In a similar vain Weiler argues that there are three modes of governance operating at the 
Community level: the international, the supranational and the infranational. International 
governance is concerned with macro-level matters, such as the fundamental rules of the 
system and issues of high political sensitivity. The key actors of the international mode of 
governance are the states and especially state executives. Supranational governance, on 
the other hand, deals with the passage of the primary legislative agenda of the 
Community, including the principal harmonization measures. In the supranational 
context, states are also important players, but so too are the Community institutions, such 
as the Commission and the EP. Weiler furthermore adds an important third dimension of 
the Community governance - infranational governance, which includes executive and 
implementing measures. At the infranational level of governance, the key actors are 
neither the states executives nor the Community institutions, but administrations, 
612 A. Stone Sweek and W. Sandholtz, "European Integration and Supranational Governance", 19974, 
JEPP, p. 297. 
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departments, private and public associations and certain interest groups of both Union 
and member state levels. 613 
Theoretical model of EU financial system and financial accountability 
We find the models of Stone, Sweet and Sandholtz and especially the Weiler model most 
useful to explain the dynamic and fairly complex policy-making process operating within 
the Community, and in particular its financing. These models provide quite a good 
framework for understanding of the complexity of the EU budget issues and financial 
accountability. 
If we apply the Stone Sweet and Sandholtz model to the EU financial system, we may 
argue that at the one end of the intergovernmental continuum (international governance in 
Weiler's model) there are politically sensitive issues of the EU budget, in which the 
Member States are the key players of the game. Relatively recent fierce disputes over the 
British rebate which triggered the question of the reform of the common agricultural 
policy have demonstrated the delicacy of budget issues for the individual Member States 
and underlined the existence of the right of the Member States to veto budget proposals 
which do not satisfy their national interests. 
Furthermore, it may be argued that the process of budget preparation and allocation falls 
somewhere in the middle of the two ends, between intergovernmental and supranational 
levels of governance. The Commission is responsible for budget preparation while the 
Council and Parliament are in charge of its approval. As we could see earlier, 
approximately half of the Union's budget is spent on 'compulsory expenditure' (mostly 
agriculture). In the event of disagreement between the Council and Parliament over the 
compulsory expenditure the Council's view prevails.614 This keeps the budget allocation 
pendulum towards the intergovernmentalist end. On the other hand, other half of 'non-
613 P. Craig, G. de Burca, The Evolution of EU Law, op. cit. pp. 29-30. 
614 I. Harden, F. White, K. Donnelly, op. cit. pp. 602-603. 
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compulsory' expenditure the final word rests with the Parliament.615 Therefore, the issue 
of expenditure allocation is slightly reversed towards the supranational end of the 
spectrum. It may in any case be argued that both cases generally fall within the Weiler's 
supranational governance model. 
The above discussion implies that our key concept of democratic financial accountability, 
defined in the Chapter 1, understood as a relationship between the Government and its 
citizens, where the citizens have entrusted their money to the Government and 
consequently are holding it to account for its stewardship, cannot be easily transferred to 
the supra-national context of the EU. The key problem is that the main democratic 
relationship between the EU citizens and the EU, established through the European 
Parliament, is still fragile. The European Council, as the main forum of Member States 
interest, still wields a preponderance of power in the decision-making process on public 
expenditure issues. This points to the intergovernmentalist nature of the game. 
Furthermore, for the purposes of the more in depth understanding of the general 
conception of financial accountability at the EU level, it is also important to look at the 
revenue side of the EU budget. Although the financing is of the budget is ensured by the 
EU rules which are binding for all Member States there is no direct link to citizens or tax-
payers. Instead, the financing of the budget relies on transfers from national treasuries.616 
Therefore the citizens of the EU do not feel that they have directly delegated their money 
to the EU. Instead it is the Member States who are in charge of providing the money to 
the EU budget and subsequently they are the key actors in the process of the budget 
allocation, approval and, as will be pointed out later, implementation. With the current 
overwhelming weight of the gross national income (GNI) resources in the EU budget, 
Member States themselves tend to judge EU policies and initiatives exclusively in terms 
615 Ibid. 
616 Commission of the European Communities, "Financing the European Union, Commission report on the 
operation of the own resources system", Brussels, 14.7.2004. COM(2004) 505 final. 
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of their national allocation and with little regard to the substance of policies.617 This all 
again implies a strong case for intergovernmentalist thinking, which clearly undermines 
financial accountability established directly between the EU citizens and EU institutions. 
In order to strengthen this relationship and provide more transparency in the EU 
budgeting process, the European Commission has recently started giving thought to 
changing the system of the EU financing, which should address the key weaknesses of 
the present system. 618 
If we, however, look at a more specific concept of financial accountability, understood as 
a phase in the public expenditure management process in which a government has to 
account for the money spent, we may see that the area of financial accountability is 
characterised by multiple levels of operation, which could perhaps best be placed towards 
the neofunctionalist end of the spectrum and Weiler's infranational governance model. 
On the side of the EU, there are a number of the EU institutional financial accountability 
mechanisms established for the purpose of securing the financial accountability at the EU 
level. However, the fact that the EU budget is not implemented solely by the EU 
institutions, but largely by the Member States, places the burden of financial 
accountability not only on the EU institutions but even more so on the financial 
accountability mechanisms of the Member States, which are the key safeguards of the EU 
money. The area of financial accountability would furthermore correspond quite well 
within Weiler's third infranational dimension of EU governance, concerned with 
execution and implementation measures taken at both international and national levels of 
governance. 
It may be therefore concluded that financial accountability in its more specific sense in 
the EU context is a relationship established not only between the EU citizens and EU 
617 Ibid. 
618 The Commission has been considering introduction of a new tax-based resource replacing the current 
statistical VAT-based resource and has proposed three main candidates as possible future fiscal own 
resources: a resource based on energy consumption, national V A T bases and corporate income. 
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institutions, but also between the EU citizens and their own nation states, where the 
citizens are holding both layers of governance to account for the stewardship of public 
money. Financial accountability is ensured through a number of different financial 
accountability mechanisms which exist both at the EU and the national level. 
Due to its complex, multi-level governance nature, the area of financial accountability is 
characterised by constant interaction between the EU and national financial 
accountability institutions and mechanisms. As we could see, the Member States have 
established the financial accountability mechanisms at the Union level (Court of Auditors 
etc.) to oversee their agent, the Commission, in its management of EU monies. In the 
process of establishment of the EU financial accountability mechanisms, the EU policy 
makers found their inspiration in their national contexts, which made an undisputed 
impact on the design of the EU institutions. However, over time the EU institutions, due 
to complexity and shared competence in the budget execution had to start scrutinizing the 
functioning of the financial accountability mechanisms of the Member States as well as 
the countries acceding to the EU. Therefore, the national financial management came 
under increasing scrutiny of the EU institutions. This has contributed to an enhancement 
of the norm of sound financial management in the EU and to creating a web of rules 
around the control of the EU expenditure, which started having a reverse affect on 
financial management of national institutions.619 All this points to the supranational 
nature of the financial accountability in the EU context and proves the new-
institutionalist argument that the form and shape of institutions have a powerful impact 
on the policy-making process in most of the EU spheres of competence, including the 
area of financial accountability. 
The remainder of this chapter shall examine the influence the EU system of financial 
accountability on countries which have expressed the wish to become members of the 
EU. 
619 B. Laffan, "Financial Control: the Court of Auditors and OLAF", op. cit, pp. 249-251. 
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Financial Accountability as a condition for the EU accession 
The EU key challenge - process of enlargement 
The expansion of the European Union of 151 of May 2004 which took in eight Central and 
East European countries (CEECs) and two Mediterranean countries to the EU has marked 
a new momentum in the European integration process. On the side of the EU, the 
enlargement is conceived as a "historic opportunity,,620 for bringing the European 
continent together. It should provide greater security and stability of the continent and 
economic prosperity for all the European nations.621 Although enlargement denotes 
investment of sufficient financial resources into the CEECs economies,622 it also creates 
bigger and more dynamic market for the benefit of all of its members. For the new 
members, on the other hand, the accession into the EU means becoming part of the long 
desired "West", with blooming economy, prosperity and world without frontiers. It 
signifies an era of greater freedom and respect for human rights, based on European 
democratic values. 
The EU's readiness to accept the CEECs as potential candidate states was explicitly 
expressed for the first time at the Copenhagen European Council (1993), which declared 
that: 
"the associated countries in central and eastern Europe that so desire shall become 
members of the European Union. Accession will take place as soon as an associated 
620 Cf European Commission, "Agenda 2000. For a stronger and wider Union", Bulletin a/the European 
Union, Supplement 5/97, 13, 1997. 
621 Cf Regular Reports from the Commission on Progress towards Accession by each of the candidate 
countries, November, 2000. 
622 The Commission has estimated that the enlargement will cost the Union up to 75 billion ECU. Cf D. 
Dinan, Ever Closer Union, (Lynne Reinner Publishers) 1999, p. 198. 
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country is able to assume the obligations of membership by satisfYing the economic and 
political conditions required". 623 
In June 2000, the Santa Maria de Feira European Council agreed that all the countries in 
the region are "potential candidates" for the accession to the EU. This perspective should 
help each country to accelerate the pace of reform and to begin to align its laws and 
structures with those in the EU.624 While Bulgaria and Romania hope to join the EU in 
2007, Croatia, Macedonia and Turkey have the status of candidate countries and Serbia 
and Montenegro, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Albania have the status of potential 
candidate country. The increased EU co-operation with the countries of Western Balkans 
and the anticipation of their accession to the Union are expected to bring about greater 
stability of the whole region. 
Conclusions of Thessaloniki European Council of June 2003, reiterate the determination 
of the EU to support the European perspective of the Western Balkan countries. The 
Council explicitly states that the Western Balkan countries are to become members of the 
EU "once they meet the established criteria".625 Although the prospects of further EU 
enlargement have been seriously questioned after the 2005 stalemate with the EU 
Constitution, the EU Commission has still not changed its rhetoric and intentions and 
seems to be determined to enable the comprehensive economic and political unification 
of the European continent in the years to come. 
Setting up the EU membership criteria 
In order to help the candidate states achieve the objectives of accession to the EU, the 
Commission outlined the strategy for preparing the Central and East European states for 
623 European Commission, "PH ARE 1994 Annual Report", COM(95) 366 final, 14. 
624 Cf Enlargement Strategy Paper, Regular Reports from the Commission on Progress towards Accession 
by each of the candidate countries, November 8, 2000. 
625 Presidency Conclusions of the Thessaloniki European Council, 19 and 20 June 2003. 
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membership, providing significant political and financial support. The pre-acceSSIOn 
strategy generally consists of several distinct parts: priority setting, discerned through 
Accession Partnerships, financial assistance, Association agreements, participation in 
Community Programmes and preparation of the negotiations through analytical 
examination of the candidate country's achievements. The Commission has also set up a 
number of conditions which need to be met in order to join the EU. Therefore, the 
accession to the EU should be perceived as a long-term process, rather then a simple 
agreement of contractual parties, which was a feature of most of the previous 
enlargement waves. 
The question which should be raised is why did the Commission adopt such an approach 
and imposed quite wide accession conditions upon the candidate countries, especially 
since similar conditions were not imposed during the previous EU enlargements? 
To answer this question, several important factors should be taken into account. The main 
one is that the accession of the countries of Central and Eastern Europe to the European 
Union is in many respects different from all the previous European Union enlargements. 
First, the number of countries applying for membership was much greater than was the 
case with the previous waves of enlargement. Second, CEECs democratic systems were 
rather fragile at the beginning of the accession process and the level of economic 
development is still substantially below the European average.626 Third, the European 
Union is in a much more advanced stage of integration than it was in the previous 
enlargement waves, which necessitates meeting of certain standards before entering in the 
European space. Early accession to the EU, without meeting certain standards, would be 
626 Average GDP per head in the ten new member countries is only 46% of the EUl5 average. Although 
one new member country, Slovenia, is richer than the poorest 'old' member, Greece, the poorest new 
country, Latvia, has a GDP per head of only 39% of the EU average. According some estimates, it will take 
Poland approximately 59 years to achieve the EU average of GDP per head. Cf. The Economist, May lSI 
2004, Volume 371, Number 8373. 
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likely to undermine the process of further European integration and smooth functioning 
of the Union. Therefore, there seem to be many arguments to support the necessity of 
meeting certain number of conditions in order to join the EU. 
The conditions for the EU membership set up by the European Council and developed by 
the European Commission's Opinions are mainly of a political and economic nature. The 
EU requires the prospective candidate States to attain certain level of democratic and 
economic development, so that they would be able to sustain the obligations of 
membership without major difficulties. In that sense, the EU also requires CEECs to 
adopt voluminous acquis communautaire. Changes in law are therefore conceived as a 
basic tool for the process of political and economic integration. 
However, the EU is quite aware that changes of law alone cannot bring about significant 
reforms in political and economic systems of the candidate states, especially when most 
of the acceding countries suffer from the discrepancy between the legal system and legal 
order. Quite often very good laws are enacted, but the degree of their implementation 
remains pretty low. Therefore the Commission insisted that candidate states work very 
hard on the strengthening of their administrative and judicial capacities. One of the 
important aspects of the administrative capacity of candidate states is financial 
accountability. 
Financial accountability - a valid EU membership criterion? 
The first time financial accountability was used as a criterion for accession in its own 
right were the Commission Opinions issued in July 1997. From 1997 and on, the 
European Commission started regularly checking the candidate states' administrative 
abilities and providing advice and solutions, in its opinions of the progress of the 
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candidate states towards accession.627 In these opinions references were not only made to 
administrative capacities to deal with the absorption of specific elements of acquis 
communautaire, but also to the need to develop adequate financial accountability system, 
based on effective internal and external financial control. 
The issue which may arise in this respect is whether the Commission, i.e. the ED, has the 
legal right to demand the candidate States to comply with certain financial accountability 
standards? This question appears to be problematic, especially having in mind that there 
are only few provisions in European Treaties and secondary European legal sources 
which contain provisions of general application to financially accountability of ED funds. 
Although the ED has started taking a more proactive stance in this regard in the last 
couple of years (as pointed out earlier), the area of financial accountability still falls 
within the principle of subsidiarity and the ED has no competence interfering with the 
organization and operation of the financial accountability institutions of its Member 
States. But what then gives it the legal right to impose public financial accountability 
standards on the countries which are still not its members? 
Although there is no direct legal basis which gIves the ED power to reqUIre certain 
institutional standards from the candidate countries, it could, however, be argued that 
there are some indirect sources which provide the ED with such a right. The most 
important is Article 10EC, which requires the Member States to take all the necessary 
measures to fulfill the obligations arising of the ED membership. This implies that 
Member States must have adequate capacity to be able to ensure the timely 
implementation of the ED policies and managing the ED funds. This is especially 
important in the view that the ED does not have its own administration outside Brussels 
and thus heavily depends on national, regional and local governments for the 
627 Cf Regular Reports from the Commission on Progress towards Accession by each of the candidate 
countries, 1997, 1998, 1999,2000,2001,2002; The EU Commission reports on Bulgaria, Romania and 
Turkey's progress towards accession, 2004; The EU Commission Comprehensive Monitoring reports on 
Bulgaria and Romania, October 2005, http://europa.eu.intJcommlenlargementJindex_en.htm. 
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implementation of its policies. As it has been pointed out a several times by now, 80% of 
the EU budget is implemented by the Member and potential Member States and only 
around 20% by the EU institutions themselves. Therefore, Member States have to ensure 
efficient and effective management of the EU funds provided under the numerous EU 
programmes, such as Common Agricultural Policy, the Regional Development fund, 
European Social Fund etc. 
The issue of the candidate States financial accountability has not been only the concern of 
the EU institutions, but also of the current Member States, especially those who 
significantly contribute to the EU's budget. If a new Member State lacks capacity to 
comply with the Community rules and does not have proper financial control 
mechanisms, other Member States may be put at risk. Although the financial 
accountability systems of the current Member States are not ideal and do suffer from 
various shortcomings and weaknesses (as pointed out in the ECA reports), acceptance of 
generally fragile systems of financial accountability of the candidate/acceding countries 
may generate additional burdens on the control institutions, the Commission and the 
ECA. 
On the other hand, the establishment of effective financial control mechanisms will be of 
great importance for the candidate countries own administrative developments. The 
establishment of effective systems of financial control should provide better value for 
money of public funds, as well as decrease the possibilities of fraud, corruption and 
financial irregularities, as one of the candidate countries greatest public administration 
problems. 
The above discussion leads us to conclude that the EU has the general right to require the 
candidate countries to have reliable and effective financial accountability systems. The 
way they organize their financial accountability systems is still left to themselves, but 
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they must assure that such a system will be able to properly manage and control the use 
ofEU funds. 628 
Defining the European standards of financial accountability 
The next question which should be raised is whether there are unique European standards 
of financial accountability to which the candidate countries should aim? And if these 
standards exist, what is the best way of achieving them? 
As we could see, the Treaty establishes only general obligations of the Member States in 
specific financial accountability areas, such as fight against fraud. It also provides the 
basis of its own financial accountability system, setting out the responsibilities of the 
Commission and for the ECA. Many other detailed requirements are set out in other 
regulations and directives, etc. on how the processes of management and control of EU 
funds and resources should be designed and function. However, what seems to be 
missing are the general standards of operation of financial accountability systems and 
guidance on how to achieve the standards and develop required financial accountability 
requirements for accession. 
In response to this need, the European Commission has developed a special negotiation 
Chapter 32 (before 2005 Chapter 28) which comprise acquis in the area of financial 
control and accountability. The acquis requirements for public financial control under 
Chapter 32, cover a limited number of Regulations related to the financial management 
and control of EU funds. 629 Instead of relying on detail legal regulation in specific areas 
628 J. Fournier, "Governance and European Integration - Reliable Public Administration", Preparing Public 
Administration for the European Administrative Space, SIGMA papers No 23, CCNM/SIGMA/PUMA 
(98)39. 
629 First, there are already discussed regulations on the general management of the EC budget: The Council 
Regulation (EC, Euratom) No 160512002 of25 June 2002 on the Financial Regulation applicable to the 
general budget of the European Communities, OJ L 248/1, 16.9.2002; Commission Regulation (EC, 
Euratom) No 234212002 of 23 December 2002 laying down detailed rules for the implementation of 
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of management of EU funds, the acquis in the area of financial accountability are based 
on general European and internationally agreed principles of sound financial 
management. 
In order to develop the requirements of this and other negotiation chapters in more depth, 
the European Commission SIGMA programme,630 provided a useful instrument in the 
assessment process by producing the "baseline" criteria. Baselines are designed in 
accordance with the EU legislation, but they also incorporate good or best European 
practices in six core functions that public management systems are expected to fulfill 
effectively.631 They were prepared in close co-operation with various Directorate 
Generals of the Commission and the European Court of Auditors. In many cases, 
candidate countries have also given contributions for the design of these baselines. 
SIGMA regularly revises the baselines in order to keep them up to date with the new EU 
legislation and developments. Since 1999, the European Commission has produced its 
Council Regulation (EC, Euratom) No 1605/2002 on the Financial Regulation applicable to the general 
budget of the European Communities, OJ L 357/1, 31.12.2002. Furthermore, key regulations on financial 
management, control and audit of EU pre-accession funds are: Council Regulation (EC) No. 126611 999 of 
21 June 1999 on coordinating aid to the applicant countries in the framework of the pre-accession strategy 
and amending regulation (EEC) No. 3906/89, OJ L 161168; Council Regulation (EC) No. 126711999 of21 
June 1999 Establishing an Instrument for Structural policies for Pre-accession (ISPA), OJ L 161/73, 
Council Regulation (EC) No. 1268/1999 of 21 June 1999 on Community Support for pre-accession 
measures for agriculture and rural development in the applicant countries of Central and Eastern Europe in 
the pre-accession period (SAPARD), OJ L 161 (with 2003 and 2004 amendments) . Key regulations on 
financial management, control and audit of EU structural and cohesion funds are: Council Regulation (EC) 
No 126011 999 of 21 June 1999, laying down general provisions on the Structural Funds, OJ L 161/1; 
Commission Regulation (EC) No 438/2001 of2 March 2001 laying down detailed rules for the 
implementation of Council Regulation (EC) No 126011999 as regards the management and control systems 
for assistance granted under the Structural Funds, OJ L 63/21. 
630 SIGMA programme is mainly funded by the EU PHARE programme and represents one of the main 
instruments of the European Commission in promoting capacity development in public administration in 
Central and Eastern Europe, as well as a technical assistance service to the candidate states .. 
631 On policy management, civil service, internal financial control, public expenditure management, 
external financial control and procurement 
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regular Progress Reports on the basis of the SIGMA baselines. In this way, the 
Commission has created a well-defined tool for administrative capacity assessment. 
However, it should be noted that although the key objective of the SIGMA's baselines is 
to assess administrative readiness for EU membership, they have been used widely 
beyond the direct EU accession context as a basic benchmarking system for establishing 
whether public administration and financial accountability systems meet minimum 
institutional and legal standards and have contributed to a broad discussion on what 
constitute 'European Values' of public administration and financial accountability.632 
There are four main elements of EU financial accountability requirements that have been 
envisaged by the EU negotiations instructions and further developed by the SIGMA 
baseline criteria: public internal financial control, external audit, EU pre-accession 
funding and future structural actions and the protection of the EU's financial interests.633 
The vast majority of these requirements are based on the existing EU regulations and 
practices. 
Public Internal Financial Control 
Public Internal Financial Control (PIFC) requirements refer to the entire public sector 
financial internal control systems in an accession country, disregarding their possible 
involvement in dealing with the EU funds. PIFC requirements consist of two key 
components: financial management and control (FMC) and internal audit. Under the 
632 Dimitrova, A. (2002), Enlargement, Institution-Building and the EU's Administrative Capacity Criteria. 
West European Politics, Vol. 25. No 4.171-190. 
633 Cf. European Commission Directorate-General Enlargement: Enlargement of the European Union, 
Guide to the Negotiations, Chapter by Chapter, December 2004, 
http://europa.eu.intlcomm/enlargementlnegotiations/chapters/index.htm 
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PIFC model, all public income and spending centres should be subject to PIFC and all 
control and audit systems should be integrated in the system.634 
The Commission assesses the progress of PIFC development through monitoring a series 
of steps to be taken by the central authority responsible for the development of PIFe. 
The first step is the drafting and adoption of a PIFC Policy or Strategy Paper in which a 
gap analysis is provided of the present control systems that leads to a number of 
recommendations for upgrading the systems taking into account internationally accepted 
control and audit standards. The second step is the drafting and adoption of framework 
and implementation laws relating to internal control and internal audit. The third step is 
the establishment of operational and well staffed organizations like decentralized internal 
audit units, adequate financial services in income and spending centres, and central 
harmonization units for both functions (FMC and internal audit). The fourth step is the 
establishment of sustainable training facilities for financial controllers and internal 
auditors.635 
These requirements have further been developed by the SIGMA Baselines on Public 
Internal Financial Control, in line with the existing EU system of internal control as 
defined by the Financial Regulation 2002 (discussed earlier in this chapter). The 
Baselines thus require the acceding countries to have an adequate management control 
systems and financial control procedures in place. This means that management of 
organization must have the responsibility for adequate financial management and control 
systems, including ex ante controls of commitments and payments and recovery of 
unduly paid amounts.636 
The next set of baselines requires the establishment of a functionally independent internal 
audit/inspectorate mechanism with relevant remit and scope. The Commission does not 
require any specific organization structure of such a body, but insists it should be 
634 Ibid. 
635 The World Bank draft Report, Serbia - Fiduciary Assessment Update, July 2005, p.31. 
636 Public Internal Financial Control Baselines, SIGMA baselines, October 1999. 
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functionally independent, have an adequate audit mandate (in terms of scope and types of 
audit) and use internationally recognised auditing standards.637 
The Commission also insists that there should be appropriate co-ordination and 
supervision of the applied audit standards and methodologies. This means that there 
should be an organization responsible for the coordination and harmonization of the 
implementation of PIFC throughout the entire public sector. Usually, there are two 
central harmonization units: one for managerial accountability and another for internal 
audit. 638 
External Audit 
The nature and functioning of external audit is not as such part of the acquis 
communautaire. However, following the criteria laid down by the Copenhagen Summit, 
the new Member States will need to adhere to the additional political and economic 
conditions which require, amongst others, that the candidate has achieved stability of 
institutions guaranteeing democracy and the rule of law. This includes the existence of an 
effective supreme audit institution (SAl). In a more practical manner, the EC Treaty is in 
fact implying the existence of such institutions and their capacity to co-operate with the 
European Court of Auditors (Articles 246-248). Moreover, general financial control 
standards for the management of EU-funds and own resources in the candidate countries 
as well as in the Member States require an effective external audit of all public sector 
resources and assets, and that this should be carried out in a continuous and harmonised 
manner. The external audit could also have a crucial role in the evaluation of and 
reporting on how the financial control systems are implemented and function. 
The SIGMA baseline requirements on external audit require the SAl to have a clear 
authority to satisfactorily audit all public and statutory funds and resources, bodies and 
637 Ibid. 
638 The World Bank draft Report, Serbia - Fiduciary Assessment Update, ibid. 
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entities, including EU resources. If the SAl is not the sole provider of public sector 
external audit, then any assessment should also refer, as applicable, to the alternative 
arrangements made and in particular to any gaps in audit coverage. 639 The SA Is are 
further required to carry out full range of regularity and performance audit in compliance 
with INTO SAl auditing standards. 640 
A special emphasis is laid on the necessity of having operational and functional 
independence. This should be ensured by providing the SAl the right to decide what work 
it will carry out and to make the results of its work directly available to the public and the 
Parliament. The Parliament, e.g. its designated committee should be also obliged to 
consider SAl's reports and the Government should be obliged to formally and publicly 
respond to the published reports. It is further important to ensure an effective follow-up 
on whether its and parliament's recommendations are implemented. The SAl should also 
adopt internationally and generally recognised aUditing standards compatible with EU 
requirements and must be appropriately aware of the requirements of the EU accession 
process.641 
The Commission is, however, aware that in addition to the criteria described above, the 
capacity of a country to bring public sector external audit into line with European 
standards and international best practice, and to maintain those standards, will depend on 
a number of factors including the capability and capacity to develop and make change, 
existence of a strategy for development and its effective implementation and commitment 
to the change and development process. The Commission therefore recommends that, 
SUbjective and objective indicators should be assessed to try sum up the impact and 
effectiveness of the SAL 
639 Public Sector External Audit Baselines, SIGMA baselines, October 1999. 
640 Cf. INTOSAI: Lima Declaration on Guidance on Auditing Precepts, 
http://www.intosai.org/Levelll1_defaue_new.html 
641 Public Sector External Audit Baselines, SIGMA baselines, October 1999. 
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EU Pre-accession funding and future Structural Action and Protection of the EU financial 
interests 
In addition to requirements of well functioning PIFC and external audit systems, the 
Commission naturally pays special attention to the correct use, control, monitoring and 
evaluation of EU funding, which constitute an important element in assessing the 
Candidate Countries ability to apply the acquis under the Chapter 32. The Commission 
requests the acceding countries to apply the PIFC procedures (ex-ante financial control as 
well as internal audit) in the same way to all the public funds irrespective of their source, 
as there should be no distinction made in terms of control for the national budget and for 
EU resources. With reference to the internal control procedures related to the EU pre-
accession funds, the Commission requests the acceding countries establish the 
appropriate ex ante control and functionally independent internal audit mechanisms, to 
make available experienced and qualified staff resources and to produce procedure 
manuals as well as audit trails for each pre-accession instrument. One of the important 
indicators is the existence of the procedure for the recovery of lost EU funds. 642 
Furthermore, protection of the EU financial interests assumes the ability to implement the 
relevant EC Regulations by the accession, namely Regulation on the protection of the EC 
financial interests and Regulation on the on-the-spot checks carried out by the 
Commission in order to protect the EU financial interests against fraud and other 
irregularities.643 The acceding countries are also requested to designate a single contact 
point for co-operation with OLAF and to ensure the development of the administrative 
capacity necessary to implement the acquis, including the capacity of the law 
642 Cf. European Commission Directorate-General Enlargement: Enlargement o/the European Union, 
Guide to the Negotiations, Chapter by Chapter, December 2004, 
643 Regulation (EC) No. 1073/1999 of the European Parliament and the Council of 
25 May 1999 concerning investigations conducted by the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF), Council 
regulation (EURATOM) No.1 074/1999 of 25 May 1999 concerning investigations conducted by the 
European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF). 
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enforcement bodies and judiciary to address cases where EU financial interests are at 
stake. 644 
Finally, in accordance with article 164 of the Financial Regulation, the Commission may 
decide to entrust project implementation management of its pre-accession funds to 
authorities of beneficiary countries, under the so-called decentralised management 
framework. This takes place after having established that the beneficiary third country or 
countries are in a position to apply in whole or part a number of predefined criteria for 
financial management and control, and in particular: (a) Effective segregation of the duties of 
authorizing officer and accounting officer; (b) existence of an effective system for the internal control of 
management operations; (c) for project support, procedures for the presentation of separate accounts 
showing the use made of Community funds; and for other forms of support, an officially certified annual 
statement for the area of expenditure concerned to be made available to the Community; (d) existence of a 
national institution for independent external auditing; (e) transparent, non-discriminatory procurement 
procedures ruling out all conflicts of interest. 
The European Commission closely monitors EU acceding countries' progress in 
preparing and implementing a new regulatory framework for public financial control. As 
the requirements under Chapter 32 are largely based on EU and internationally accepted 
standards, the practical interpretation and implementation of these standards can in some 
cases pose a significant challenge to acceding countries, especially since the financial 
accountability standards are not static values, but are themselves of evolving nature. That 
is why DO Budget and DO OLAF in co-operation with DO Enlargement attach high 
importance to the monitoring and cooperation process. 
Summary and Conclusions 
This chapter has pointed out the great complexities of financial accountability 
relationship established at the supra level of governance such as the EU. Numerous levels 
at which financial accountability operates in the EU context has resulted in weakening of 
644Cf. European Commission Directorate-General Enlargement: Enlargement of the European Union, 
Guide to the Negotiations, ibid. 
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the direct financial accountability relationship between the EU citizens and institutions 
which use the tax-payers money, creating a general feeling of distrust towards the EU 
governance system. 
Over the last couple of years, in response to senous criticisms on its financial 
management, the EU has made an important progress in improving the overall financial 
accountability framework. The reform of internal accountability mechanisms, coupled 
with strengthening of the powers of the ECA and creation of OLAF have undoubtedly 
had a positive effect on firming up the financial accountability relationship. However, 
further efforts are still needed in order to fully implement the well-designed reforms and 
keep the reform momentum. 
In the light of the ongoing reforms of the EU institutions, the EU accession process has 
initiated discussion on another important dimension of reform - definition of European 
standards and values in financial accountability to which acceding countries need to 
adhere in order to join the EU. This discussion has influenced not only acceding 
countries, but also the Member States, as the completion of the Internal Market and 
Monetary Union requires further harmonization of legislation and practices in various 
fields, including financial accountability matters. This is exemplified in the recent 
initiative for the creation of a common framework for internal financial control of the 
EU, focusing on the need for active participation and reform of internal control systems 
of the Member States themselves. 
The evolving nature of the EU standards in financial accountability and other acquis has 
made it more difficult for the acceding countries to get to know the EU standards in 
financial control and audit. In response to this need, the Commission's benchmarking 
systems elaborated in the chapter 32 of negotiations and SIGMA's baselines have 
established a much more clear sense of what kind of financial accountability system is 
needed and is likely to provide a continuing impetus for states to measure progress in 
establishing high standards of financial accountability. 
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The value of this chapter is therefore not only in the analysis of the EU accountability 
system as such and identification of its links with other Member States, but even more so 
in providing benchmarks against which we shall compare the development of the Serbian 
system of financial accountability and identify the steps which need to be made in order 
to reach the European standards of financial accountability. 
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Chapter V 
FINANCIAL ACCOUNTABILITY IN SERBIA 
The objective of this chapter is to analyse the Serbian financial accountability system. 
Analysis of the current Serbian financial accountability system should provide a basis for 
comparison with other systems of financial accountability, which should yield 
recommendations for the improvement of the institutional setting and functioning of the 
current Serbian system and its alignment with the EU standards, as will be discussed in 
the concluding chapter. 
In accordance with our earlier established theoretical framework, we shall firstly analyse 
the who is accountable dimension of accountability. We shall provide a short overview of 
the transformation of the Serbian 'state' during the last two centuries and analyse the 
current structure of the Serbian central Government. We shall also point out the European 
integration component in the Serbian development and outline key medium term 
standards on financial accountability which have been set up by the EU as benchmarks 
for further integration. 
The remainder of the chapter will focus on the examination of the for what financial 
accountability dimension of public money stewardship and mechanisms through which 
the accountability relationship operates. The development of a normative concept of 
"stewardship" of public money will be analysed through examination of a newly adopted 
legal framework. The focus of our inquiry, however, will be placed on the fourth 
financial accountability dimension - mechanisms through which the accountability 
relationship operates. As with Britain, France and the EU, we shall identify the key 
internal and external financial accountability mechanisms, pointing out their strengths 
and weaknesses. This will provide us a good starting point for an in depth comparative 
analysis of different systems of financial accountability and examination of ways of 
achieving European standards of financial accountability, to be discussed in the 
concluding chapter. 
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The Serbian state - a short historical overview 
Although the first foundations of Serbian statehood could be traced back to the XII -XIV 
century, the modem Serbian state was created only in the XIX century. After nearly five 
centuries under the Ottoman Empire, Serbia first gained its limited independence in 1804 
and started developing its state structure under strong European influence.645 The first 
steps towards full independence were laid in the mid 1830s, when Serbia obtained a 
limited form of autonomy from the declining Turkish Empire.646 In the late 1850s Serbia 
gained full autonomy under the Turks, and not much later full sovereignty at the Berlin 
congress in 1878. 
Being strongly influenced by the neighbouring political and legal systems, Serbia 
established a system of parliamentary monarchy, with Governments formed by the 
majority party or coalition.647 The Serbian legal system also developed under the strong 
influence of continental Austrian, German and French legal tradition, where the extensive 
legal regulation satisfied the need for a strict rule of law and an orderly bureaucracy, as a 
means of overcoming the legacy of the decaying Ottoman Empire. 
After the collapse of the Austro-Hungarian Empire in WW I in 1918, the Kingdom of 
Serbs, Croats and Slovenians was established by unifying the small Balkan kingdoms of 
645 Although being ruled by the Turks for centuries, Serbia managed to save its identity mainly due to the 
strong influence of the Serbian Orthodox Church and relatively weak rule of the Turks, who were mainly 
interested in collecting taxes and providing public order. Cf Z. Sevic, "Politico-Administrative relations in 
Yugoslavia", in T. Verheijen (ed.) Who Rules?Politico-Administrative Relations in Central and Eastern 
Europe, (NISP Acee, Bratislava), 2000. 
646 The first and rather advanced Serbian Constitution, so-called Sretenjski Constitution (Sretenjski Ustav) 
was proclaimed in 1835. However, only 3 years later in 1838, it was replaced by the new, so-called Turkish 
Constitution, which gave more power to the monarch and better reflected the needs of the then Ottoman 
Empire. 
647 Nevertheless, the role of the monarch was at times substantial, going beyond his formally established 
authorities. 
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Serbia, Montenegro with the south-Slav provinces of the ex Austro-Hungarian Empire 
(Croatia, Slovenia and Vojvodina) that were at last freed from foreign occupation. The 
country changed its name to Yugoslavia (so-called first Yugoslavia) in 1921, when the 
Vidovdanski Constitution of the new common state was proclaimed. The first Yugoslavia 
was also a parliamentary monarchy, ruled by the Serbian heirs. 
After WW II, the "Second Yugoslavia" was established as a Socialist Republic under the 
domination of the USSR. However, in 1948, Yugoslav President Marshall Tito broke 
away from the USSR and began a cautious journey towards a market society. 
The introduction of 'workers self-management" in 1950 with the "social property" of 
enterprises and limited private ownership was another turning point in Yugoslavia's 
development. The system of a full command economy was abandoned, which has 
provided a positive incentive and enhanced Yugoslav economic growth. However, while 
the Communist Party retained mild control over society, it preserved pretty strong control 
over state and party bureaucracies. This curtailed the introduction of stable and 
sustainable political development and hindered the introduction of full market economy. 
Nevertheless, the existence of moderate socialism enabled Yugoslavia to achieve much 
higher level of economic and political development in comparison to its Eastern Block 
neighbours. The openness of the country towards the West and its willingness for 
cooperation has been expressly acknowledged by the European Community, which, in 
the mid-1960s, started the negotiation process for the accession of Yugoslavia to the 
EC.648 
However, during the late 60s and 70s, the country suffered from stagnation and stubborn 
defense of the communist party monopoly in the name of the country's unity. As a 
consequence of this resistance to change, social conflicts grew into complete ethnic 
648 Cf. D. Kavran, A. Rabrenovic, D. Milovanovic, "Public Administration Education in Yugoslavia", in T. 
Verheijen, 1. Nemec (eds.), Building Higher Education Programmes in Public Administration in CEE 
Countries, (NISPAcee & EPAN), 2000, pp. 303 - 321. 
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intolerance. This has resulted in the breaking up of the country in unfortunate military 
conflict. 
The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, or so-called third Yugoslavia, was formed in 1992 
out of the Republics of Serbia and Montenegro, as the former Socialist Federal Republic 
of Yugoslavia (SFR Y) was breaking up in civil conflict. Although the 1992 Yugoslavian 
Constitution prescribed a number of competences for the federal authorities, many of 
them had never been exercised. From 1990, the Republics were gradually transferring 
powers from the federation, thus obtaining many features of independent states. At the 
time when the new federation was established, a number of competences were already 
obtained by the Republics, as centres of core political and economic power. Federal 
authorities, in tum, mainly played a role of rather passive observer, obediently following 
instructions from the RepUblics. 
In March 2002, an agreement on the new state status of Yugoslavia between Serbia and 
Montenegro was reached. In accordance with the agreement, Serbia and Montenegro, as 
two semi-independent states, entered a union called "Serbia and Montenegro" on 4th 
February 2003. The new state with sui generis con-federal features, however, only had a 
transitory nature. Upon the expiration of a period of three years, the member states were 
entitled to institute proceedings for a change of the state status. 
The Montenegrin referendum of 21 May 2006, at which most of people of Montenegro 
voted for independence, has finally resulted in the creation of two independent states of 
Serbia and Montenegro, as consequently proclaimed by their National Assemblies. The 
establishment of two independent states is expected to provide a more stable political 
background for their further economic development and facilitate their smoother 
integration in the ED. 
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The Serbian Government - Overcoming the Flaws of a Democratic Transition 
Failure 
More than ten years of poor economic management, regional conflicts and international 
isolation have resulted in a serious decline of the Serbian economy and overall 
deterioration of the state institutions and society. At the end of the 1990s, the Serbian 
administrative system suffered from wide-spread corruption practices and a high degree 
of state capture.649 The economic legacy of the previous regime left Serbia a number of 
state and socially-owned enterprises, loss-making and deeply mistrusted banks, and over-
committed, poorly functioning social safety nets that make economic recovery fairly 
difficult. The process was even more difficult due to large and mounting fiscal pressures, 
huge external debt, weakened governance, and post-conflict challenges such as rebuilding 
d d · c: 650 amage 111lrastructure. 
Since 2001, Serbia has made commendable economic and social progress in a number of 
areas. Substantial reforms have been underway in different sectors: restoring macro-
economIC stability, restoring the viability of the banking sector, privatisation of the 
extensive sector of socially-owned enterprises, rehabilitation of the energy sector, 
restructuring public utilities, reforming inefficient systems of pension and social security 
etc.651 Despite significant advancement, major efforts still have to be made to fully open 
the country to foreign trade and investment and establish a market economy. 
The reform progress slowed considerably in 2003, following the assassination of Prime 
Minister Djindjic. However, reform momentum was regained after the instalment of the 
new Government of Serbia in March 2004. A significant number of laws in economic and 
financial field have been adopted since then. Further progress in many areas of the 
649 Cf Kostic V. "Korupcija u Srbiji - fenomen zarobljene drzave" [Corruption in Serbia - Phenomenon of 
State Capture], Monitor, www.monitor.cg.yu. 2003. 
650 Cf The W orId Bank report, Serbia and Montenegro - Public Expenditure and Institutional Review, 
Volume Two: Serbia, February 2003, pp.2-6. 
651 Cf The World Bank Report prepared for the Donor Coordination Meeting of November 18,2003. 
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reforms, however, will depend largely on the reform of the public sector, whose 
institutions are critical for the implementation of the overall reform agenda. 
Key central Government institutions are still fragile and cannot adequately respond to the 
imposed transitional challenges. There is still a visible discrepancy between the legal 
system and legal order, which means that the level of law implementation is low and 
often discriminatory. 652 Furthermore, international surveys indicate that Serbia still 
suffers from a high level of corruption.653 This raises the feeling of legal insecurity and 
uncertainty and has an adverse effect on very much needed foreign investments. 
Although the process of reform of both public administration and judiciary has 
commenced, it has still a long way to go until satisfactory situation in these fields is 
reached. 
The Serbian legal system is based on a continental legal tradition. Both the French and 
German legal systems had an important impact on the development of the Serbian legal 
culture.654 Similarly to their administrative systems, the Serbian Government structure 
and functions are regulated by a special body of administrative law. The state 
administration is thus perceived as an autonomous domain apart from civil society. The 
structure of the state administration is based on a hierarchical bureaucratic model with 
strong emphasis on legality and proper fulfilment of regulatory functions. This 'over-
legalisation' poses problems for the functioning of the system which lacks flexibility in 
its operation, as the 'rules of the game' can often be changed only by Parliamentary 
amendments. 
652 Cf z. Sevic, "The Political Economy, Economics and Art of Negotiation and Reconciliation: The 
Production of Law and Legal Order in a Polycentric Federation of Yugoslav Type", paper presented at the 
9th Maastricht Workshop in Law and Economics, Maastricht: Univerisity of Limburg, 1996. 
653 In the Transparency International Report for 2005, Serbia scored 2.7 out of 10 (97th out of 146 countries) 
on the basis of corruption perception index, Transparency International, Global Corruption Report 2005, p. 
202-205. www.globalcorruptionreport.org 
654 This is mainly due to the fact that many leading Serbian intellectuals of that time had obtained their 
education in France and Germany. 
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One of the key reform issues is adoption of the new Constitution. General political 
instability and high degree of polarization between key political actors have adversely 
affected the possibilities for disentanglement of key Serbian constitutional issues. 
Milosevic's malfunctioning 1990 Republican Constitution is still in force, partially 
preventing enactment of new legislation, based on modem legal concepts and principles 
(especially in the field of structural reforms). 
According to the current Constitution, Serbia is a parliamentary democracy with a 
relatively strong role of the President of the Republic, who is elected by direct votes of 
the citizens for the period of five years. Serbia has a unicameral Parliament, called the 
National Assembly, which holds the Government to account for its operations. Over the 
last decade, all Serbian Governments have been coalition Governments, which has 
undermined the cohesion of designed policies, effective implementation of initiated 
reforms and possibilities of reaching a firm general consensus on the country's future. 655 
Serbia's winding path to the ED 
Interestingly, one of the rare issues of general national consensus is the Serbian peoples' 
wish to become members of the European Union. According to the latest public opinion 
poll conducted in September 2005, 64% of the population strongly supports the idea of 
accession to the EU, 12% are against it, while 16% are undecided. 656 All key Serbian 
political parties also proclaim EU accession as one of their and country's main objectives. 
The European Union, on the other hand, has given important signals to Serbia that it 
655 Cf. A. Rabrenovic, "Politico-Administrative Relations under the Coalition Government in Serbia", in G. 
Peters, T. Verheijen, L. Vass (eds.), Coalitions of the Unwilling? Politicians and Civil Servants in 
Coalition Governments, (NISPAcee, Bratislava) 2005, pp. 146-177. 
656 Opinion poll conducted by Strategic Marketing in September 2005, www.smmri.co.yu; 
www.seio.sr.gov.yu/code/navigate.asp?Id=89 
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wishes to accept it in its European family of nations when the time is right and the all EU 
accession conditions met. 
Shortly after the democratic changes in Serbia, the Copenhagen Council of December 
2002 and Thessaloniki European Council of June 2003 confirmed the European 
perspective of state union of Serbia and Montenegro and underlined the European 
Union's determination to support its efforts to move closer to the European Union.657 In 
April 2005 the European Commission approved a Feasibility Report that assessed 
positively the readiness of Serbia and Montenegro to negotiate a Stabilisation and 
Association Agreement.658 Negotiations for a Stabilisation and Association Agreement 
started in October 2005, symbolically marking 5 years from democratic change in Serbia. 
However, due to the failure of the Serbian Government to extradite General Ratko Mladic 
to the Hague Tribunal, the EU negotiations were suspended in May 2006 and will be 
continued only if full cooperation with the Hague Tribunal is established. 
The Thessaloniki European Council has introduced the European Partnership as one of 
the means to intensify the stabilisation and association process. The Council has been 
authorised to decide, by qualified majority and on the proposal of the Commission, on the 
principles, priorities and conditions to be contained in the European Partnership.659 On 
June 14 2004, The Council adopted a first European Partnership with Serbia and 
657The Thessaloniki European Council explicitly states that the Western Balkan countries are to become 
members of the EU "once they meet the established criteria". Cf. Presidency Conclusions of the 
Thessaloniki European Council, 19 and 20 June 2003, www.europa.eu.int 
658 Commission Staff Working Paper, Report on the preparedness of Serbia and Montenegro to negotiate a 
Stabilisation and Association Agreement with the European Union, Brussels, 12.04.2005, SEC(2005) 478 
final. 
659 Regulation CEC) No 53312004, OJ L 86, 24.3.2004. 
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Montenegro including Kosovo as defined by the UN Security Resolution 1244.660 The 
implementation of the European Partnership priories was examined through annual 
progress reports presented by the Commission which assesses progress made against 
established principles and conditions and notes areas where the country needs to increase 
its efforts.661 
In early 2006, the European Partnership was updated in order to identify renewed 
priorities for further work on the basis of the findings of 2005 Commission progress 
reports. 662 It is important to note that Community assistance under the stabilisation and 
association process to Serbia is conditional on further progress in satisfying Copenhagen 
criteria as well as progress in meeting the specific priorities of this European 
P h· 663 artners Ip. 
It should be noted that the funds from the EU are currently managed directly by the 
European Agency for Reconstruction (EAR), as an independent agency of the European 
Union, and not by the Serbian Government. The EAR was established in 2000 and is 
accountable to the Council and European Parliament and overseen by a Governing Board 
composed of representatives from the EU Member States and the European 
660 Council Decision of 14 June 2004 on the principles, priorities and conditions contained in the European 
Partnership including Kosovo as defined by the UN Security Council Resolution 1244 of 10 June 1999, 
(2004/520/EC), OJ L 227121, 26.6.2004. 
661 Commission Staff Working Paper, Serbia and Montenegro Stabilisation and Association Report 2003, 
Brussels, 26.3.2003, SEC(2003) 343; Commission Staff Working Paper, Serbia and Montenegro 
Stabilisation and Association Report 2004, Brussels, SEC(2004) 376. www.europa.eu.int. 
662 Council Decision of 30 January 2006 on the principles, priorities and conditions contained in the 
European Partnership with Serbia and Montenegro including Kosovo as defined by the UN Security 
Council Resolution 1244 of 10 June 1999 and repealing Decision 2004/520/EC, (2006/56/EC), OJ L 35/32, 
7.2.2006. 
663 Paragraph 5 of Serbia and Montenegro, including Kosovo: 2005 European Partnership, Annex to the 
Council Decision of30 January 2006, ibid. 
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Commission.664 The European Commission has not yet indicated that it would be 
prepared to consider any degree of decentralization of management of aid until it gets an 
assurance that Serbia possesses a reliable system of financial accountability in 
accordance with the benchmarks set out in the Chapter 32 of the Acquis (before 2005, 
Chapter 28). 
European Partnership priorities in the area of financial accountability 
The priorities listed in the 2006 European Partnership have been selected on the basis that 
it is realistic to expect that Serbia can complete them or take them substantially forward 
over the next few years. A distinction is made between short-term priorities, which are 
expected to be accomplished within one or two years and medium-term priorities which 
are expected to be accomplished within three to four years. The priorities concern both 
adoption of legislation and its effective implementation. 
Several medium term priorities identified in the European Partnership concern the area of 
financial accountability. These medium-term priorities are: 
"Develop and implement the principles of decentralized managerial accountability and functionally 
independent internal audit in accordance with the internationally accepted standards and EU best practice. 
Strengthen the operational capacity and functional as well as financial independence of the Supreme Audit 
Institution. 
664 The objectives of the EAR are: to support good governance, institution building and rule oflaw; to 
continue supporting the development of market economy and to support social development and 
strengthening of civil society. The Agency recently shifted away from reconstruction projects to projects of 
a more "institutional" and reform based nature. Cf. EAR Annual Report to the European Parliament and 
the Council, January to December 2003, Thessaloniki, June 2004. 
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Develop procedures and administrative capacities to ensure effective protection of the EU financial 
interest. ,,665 
Since the key aim of our research is to provide recommendations on how the existing 
financial accountability system of Serbia can be improved so that it satisfies the ED 
requirements, there is a need for an in-depth analysis of the features of the current 
financial accountability system. Following the pattern of the previous chapters, we shall 
start our analysis by focusing on the scope of the Serbian central Government and place a 
special emphasis on key financial accountability concepts and mechanisms. 
Ongoing reforms of the Serbian central Government 
Over the last couple of years, the Serbian Government has started the process of overall 
public administration reform. The first step was adoption of a comprehensive Public 
Administration Reform strategy in October 2004.666 The strategy is anchored in European 
principles of professionalisation, depoliticisation, rationalization and modernisation. In 
2005, a new legal framework on Government's organization has started to emerge 
through the adoption of several key public administration laws: Law on Government,667 
Law on State Administration,668 the Civil Service Law669 and Law on Public Agencies.67o 
665 Council Decision of 30 January 2006 on the principles, priorities and conditions contained in the 
European Partnership with Serbia and Montenegro including Kosovo as defined by the UN Security 
Council Resolution 1244 of 10 June 1999 and repealing Decision 2004/520/EC, (2006/56/EC), OJ L 35/32, 
7.2.2006. 
666 The Government of the Republic of Serbia, Public Administration Reform Strategy, November 2004. 
667 Law on Government, "Official Gazette of the RS", No. 61/05. The Law on Government clarifies 
structures and relations at the Centre of Government (COG). The policy development and strategy role of 
the COG is strongly emphasized, as opposed to its mainly technical role exercised in the communist and, to 
some extent, current system. The law further clarifies some key elements of the central organization of the 
government (cabinets of the prime minister and deputy prime minister, general secretariat and government 
services) and the relationship between the government and Parliament. 
668 Law on State Administration, "Official Gazette of the Republic of Serbia" No. 79/05. 
669 Civil Service Law, "Official Gazette of the RS", No, 79/05. 
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The rapid process of legislative drafting was justified by the urgent need to adapt much of 
the systemic legislation in Serbia, as much of it is outdated and, because of frequent 
amendments, incoherent. 
The new Laws on State Administration and Civil Service provide a framework for the 
depoliticisation of the civil service, in particular the senior civil service levels. The key 
senior civil service positions in the Serbian administration are a Secretary of the Ministry 
and Assistant Minister. Whereas a Secretary of the Ministry is in charge of running the 
day-to-day operations of the Ministry and coordinating the work of Ministerial 
departments (which could correspond to the post of the Permanent Secretary in the UK 
system and Director Generals in the French and EU systems), Assistant Ministers are the 
heads of sectors in charge of special Ministerial portfolios. Up to now all senior civil 
service positions were subject to Government appointment based mainly on political 
grounds and have therefore been removed from their positions with each change of 
Government, or Government reshuffle, which had an adverse affect on the continuity of 
the work in the Ministry. The new Civil service Law, however, sets out the overall firm 
conditions for competitive recruitment of senior civil servants and provides limited 
grounds for their dismissal. This is an encouraging development, which should provide 
conditions for depoliticization and professionalization of the core civil service and could 
also have implications for internal financial accountability mechanisms. 
In accordance with the Constitution and the Law on State Administration, state 
administration activities are performed by state administration organs, which can be 
established as ministries and special organisations. Whereas ministries perform state 
administration activities, special organisations carry out specific expert activities, and 
exceptionally, state administration activities, when stipulated by law.671 Ministries may 
also have internal organs which perform administrative, inspection and related 
670 Law on Public Agencies, "Official Gazette of the RS" No. 18/05. 
671 Article 1, paragraph 2 of the Law on State Administration, "Official Gazette of the RS", No. 79/05. 
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professional activities, if the nature or number of activities require broader independence 
h h . h· h M·· 672 t an t e sector WIt In t e InIstry. 
In addition to ministries and special organisations, the Serbian central Government 
structure comprises a number of regulatory agencies, whose status is regulated by the 
Law on Public Agencies.673 The Law provides a common legal framework for the 
establishment, management, and dissolution of regulatory agencies and represents an 
important step in clarifying the status of numerous government agencies created by the 
previous Government. It also highlights the independence of agencies and provides a 
clear scope for the creation of independent regulatory bodies, at arms length from the 
executive branch. 
When organisation of the Serbian central Government is looked through the budgetary 
prism, the distinction between different state bodies is made between direct budgetary 
users (DBBs) and indirect budgetary users (IBBs). All state administration organs 
(ministries and special organisations) and regulatory agencies are direct budgetary users, 
as they receive funds directly from the budget. Indirect budgetary users, in tum, are the 
second tier users receiving budgetary funds indirectly, through the direct budgetary users. 
Thus for example, whereas the Ministry of Education, the Ministry of Health and the 
Ministry of Labour, Employment and Social Policy are direct budget user, indirect budget 
users are educational institutions (schools, institutes etc.), health institutions (primary, 
secondary and tertiary health care institutions) and social security institutions, which 
receive their funds through respective ministries of education, health, employment and 
social policy and social insurance funds. 674 The judiciary is also an indirect budget user 
as it receives funds through the Ministry of Justice. 
672 Article 28, of the Law on State Administration, "Official Gazette of the RS", No. 79/05. 
673 Public Agencies Law, "Official Gazette of the RS" No. 18/05. 
674 Judiciary is also an indirect budget user as it receives its money through the Ministry of Justice. 
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In addition to DBBs and IBBs, Serbian central Government encompasses mandatory 
social security institutions, such as: Health Insurance Fund, Labour Market fund, 
Employees' Pension fund, Self-Employed Pension and Farmers' Pension Fund.675 Their 
financing comes mostly from mandatory payroll taxes, with republic budget financing 
being limited to the financing of the poor and for the clearance of arrears. Social Security 
funds are currently also undergoing significant reforms, which should bring about 
sustainability in their operation and efficient and effective performance of their duties. 
It should be pointed out that the scope of the Serbian central Government is fairly large, 
especially due to overt centralization processes during the 1990s. Excessive public 
spending is undermining the country's economic growth potential, decreasing the 
opportunities for private investment. 676 Therefore, there has been a pressing need to 
reduce the scope of the public sector and central Government in particular in order to 
generate savings for structural reforms and create better social safety net for those 
affected by reforms.677 To this aim, the Government has started implementing a 
diversified public employment reduction strategy which includes: privatisation, voluntary 
redundancy programmes, contained external recruitment, staff redeployment initiatives 
etc.678 The Government has also started working on the design of decentralization of 
delivery of services from the central to local level which should result in significant 
reduction of the scope of the central Government in Serbia in the years to come. 
675 Cf. Cf. World Bank report, Serbia and Montenegro - Public Expenditure and Institutional Review. 
Volume Two: Serbia, 2003, p. 2. 
676 The World Bank, The Serbia Economic Memorandum (2004): An Agenda/or Economic Growth and 
Employment, p. 14., http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTSERBIA/Resources/300803-
I 12118888816I!serbia-sem-complete.pdf 
677 IMF Country Report No OS1232, Serbia and Montenegro: Selected Issues and Statistical Appendix, July 
200S, http://www.imf.org/extemal/pubs/ft/scrI200S/crOS232.pdf. 
678 Cf. Ministry of Health of the Republic of Serbia, Human Resource Strategy, Interim Report on phase 1, 
2006-2007, May 2006. 
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In conclusion, the Serbian Government has made important strides in putting in place an 
overall framework for public administration reform and creating a smaller and more 
efficient public sector. However, effective implementation of well-designed reform 
framework will require firm and continuous efforts of all the involved factors. Serbia is 
undoubtedly a country in transition, which in itself is a very difficult and slow process 
that cannot yield obvious results in a short amount of time. Experience from other 
transitional countries show that the overall reform process can be sustained only if there 
is continuous consensus among all the main stakeholders and a firm political 
commitment.679 While both elements have been present in some aspects of reform, they 
have been clearly lacking in other, more sensitive, institutional matters. The field of 
financial accountability has fallen somewhere between these two ends of a continuum, 
with the stubborn intention of staying closer to the latter end. Nevertheless, important 
reforms have been commenced in all financial accountability elements, including the 
concept of stewardship of public money. 
Firming up the Concept of Stewardship of Public Money 
The concept of stewardship of public money is not unknown in the ex-Yugoslavian 
region. This concept existed to some extent in Serbia and Yugoslavia, primarily due to 
the functioning of an external audit institution, so called "Supreme Control" up to the II 
World War and "Social Accounting Service" during the communist/socialist rule. The 
Social Accounting Service was in many ways an exceptional, sui-generis institution, 
which carried out control of financial flows in both public and private sector, as will be 
discussed in more detail later in the text. At this point it should only be noted that its role 
of an external auditor comprised two main functions: control of the accuracy of accounts 
and control of legality of financial operations. 68o A similar function was performed by the 
679 Cf D. Coombes, "Re-building the Capacity to Govern: Setting Priorities for Public Administration 
Reform in Serbia", draft discussion paper for the round table 'Priorities for Institutional Development in the 
Reform Process in Serbia' Belgrade, March 2003. 
680 Cf Social Accounting Service Act, "Official Gazette of the SFRY", No. 15177. 
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internal unit of the Ministry of Finance, called - budgetary inspection, which conducted 
an administrative control of spending of public funds. 681 Therefore, it may be inferred 
that the post second-world-war Yugoslavia and the Republic of Serbia as its constitutive 
part, did legally recognise a narrowly defined concept of stewardship of public money, 
based exclusively on certification (financial) audit, without elements of performance 
audit. 
During the 1990s, however, the concept of stewardship of public money was grossly 
undermined and devalued. The external audit function was abolished, and a concept of a 
certification audit sustained only in a segment of administrative control of public money, 
i.e. budgetary inspection, which influence was fairly limited.682 Public money was 
blatantly misused by high officials and key political figures who dissipated public funds, 
using them for their private needs and purposes. Financial embezzlements and excessive 
use of public money became a commonplace of the system which did not entail a concept 
of public money stewardship and financial accountability.683 
The first democratic Serbian Government has early recognised the importance of 
developing a concept of stewardship of public money. The significance of this concept 
was for the first time explicitly recognised by the new Budget System Law,684 which 
introduces the concepts of both financial and performance audit. 
According to the Budget System Law, the budget inspection of the Ministry of Finance 
shall hold the users of public money (i.e. DBBs and IBBs) to account for: 
681 Cj G. Paovic-leknic, Budzetska kontrola - jugoslovensko i italijansko pravo [Control of the Budget-
Yugoslavian and Italian Law], University of Montenegro, Podgorica, 1999. 
682 Ibid. 
683 Cj D. Antonic et aI., Korupcija u Srbiji [Corruption in Serbia], (Centar za liberalno-demokratske 
studije), Belgrade, 200l. 
684 Budget System Law, "Official Gazette of the Republic of Serbia", No. 912002, 87/02,66/05. 
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1) The legality of the use of public funds, which encompasses control of confonnity 
with financial management legislation as well as assurance that the money was 
spent in confonnity with the intentions of the Parliament, i.e. Budget law;685 
2) The economy, efficiency and effectiveness in the use of public funds;686 
3) The legality, adequacy and effectiveness of internal control and monitoring 
systems.687 
Whereas the concept of legality as confonnity of financial transactions with existing 
legislation seems to be quite straightforward, the concepts of economy, efficiency and 
effectiveness are not well developed in the law and therefore there is a scope for their 
different interpretation in practice. 
This deficiency has, however, been addressed in the recently adopted Law on State Audit 
Institution,688 which defines three basic principles of public money stewardship: 
principle of accuracy of financial statements, as a requirement that all 
revenue, expenditure, assets and liabilities have been properly recorded and 
truly and objectively present the financial position of an auditee;689 
principle of regularity of transactions, which requires that all financial 
transactions be carried out in confonnity with law, other delegated 
legislation and regulations and are used for the planned purposes;690 
principle of purposefulness denotes a request that funds be used III 
accordance with principles of economy, efficiency and effectiveness as well 
as in compliance with the planned goals.691 
685 Article 68, paragraph 1, item 3 of the Budget System Law. 
686 Article 68, paragraph 1, item 4 of the Budget System Law. 
687 Article 68, paragraph 1, item 1 and 2 of the Budget System Law. 
688 The Law on State Audit Institution (LSAI), Official Gazette of the Republic of Serbia No 101/05. 
689 Section 2, paragraph 1 of Article 2 of the LSAI. 
690 Section 3, paragraph 1 of the Article 2 of the LSAI. 
691 Section 4, paragraph 1 of the Article 2 of the LSAI. 
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While the requirement of accuracy of accounts is quite straightforward, it is agam 
interesting to note that, similar to other European models, the new Law on State Audit 
Institution lays down the principle of regularity instead of legality, as defined in the 
Budget System Law. Similar to the UK and French systems, it appears that the concept of 
regularity is prioritized over the concept of legality, although the content of the regularity 
principle is exactly the same as of the principle of legality. Therefore it may perhaps be 
logical that the term 'regularity' is replaced with the term 'legality' in order to point out 
the seriousness of legal consequences that breach of this principle may entail. However, 
as the concept of regularity of financial transactions has become an international standard 
used in financial accountability and audit, especially when used in the context of external 
audit, changes in this respect will largely depend on the wider international agreement on 
this issue, as pointed out in the previous chapter. 
The principle of purposefulness of financial operations entails a request that public 
money is spent in accordance with principles of economy, efficiency and effectiveness. 
These three Es concepts are further elaborated as follows: 
principle of economy means that minimum consumption of funds will be used for 
a specific activity, taking into account that it does not undermine the expected 
quality;692 
principle of efficiency denotes the relationship between achieved results in the 
production of goods or in rendering services and resources used for production or 
for rendering services;693 
principle of effectiveness denotes the extent to which the set goals are achieved, 
as well as the relationship between the planned and realized effects of a specific 
.. 694 
actIVIty. 
692 Article 2, para 1, item 5 of the LSAI. 
693 Article 2, para 1, item 6 of the LSAI. 
694 Article 2, para 1, item 7 of the LSAI. 
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This rather exhaustive definition of principles of legality, regularity and purposefulness 
of spending of public funds represents a big step forward in the development of the 
concept of public money stewardship in Serbia. However, the key question to be posed is 
whether it is realistic to expect that these principles will be attained in the short or even 
mid term perspective in the Serbian transitional environment. The Serbian central 
Government institutions are still struggling to satisfy the requirements of basic public 
money stewardship of accuracy of accounts, legality and regularity of financial 
operations and do not seem to have sufficient capacity to implement high performance 
standards set out by the new legislation, especially since achievement of these standards 
presupposes existence of clearly defined policy objectives and targets, which are still 
lacking. Despite these difficulties, it is essential that the concept of public money 
stewardship, defined through requests of both conformity with laws and regulations and 
attainment of economy, efficiency and effectiveness in the use of public funds, has been 
put on a statutory footing. It is of utmost importance that all public sector institutions 
become aware of this widely defined principle and start working on the attainment of the 
public money stewardship standards and objectives. 
Building Effective Internal Accountability Mechanisms 
Over the last couple of years, Serbia has made important progress with its initial 
development of internal financial accountability mechanisms. The newly established 
legal framework provides a good basis for establishing management accountability and 
delegation, proper segregation of duties and central government monitoring of financial 
regularity. Nevertheless, lots of efforts still need to be invested in order to meet basic 
European standards and criteria in the main internal financial accountability areas of 
internal control and internal audit. 
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Emerging System of Internal Financial control 
Similar to the French and the EU system, the Serbian legal framework provides for the 
segregation of duties for payment order, financial control and accounting functions (in 
the French system - ordonnauteur, con tro lleur financier and comptable).695 The payment 
order function (ordonnateur function) is given to a head of DBB, who has the 
responsibility for the legal, regular, economical and effective use of a budget 
appropriation.696 A head of a DBB can delegate this responsibility to other personnel in 
the Ministry/special organization. This right of delegation, however, is not often used, 
due to the general unease of senior civil servants for taking responsibility for handling 
public money. The responsibility for the stewardship of public money is thus perceived to 
be a primarily political rather than administrative function. Accounting (comptable) role 
is performed by employees of both DBB and IBBs in question. The financial internal 
control function (controlleur financier function), however, is carried out both by the 
DBBs and IBBs and centrally, by the Treasury in the Ministry of Finance. 
In order to effectively perform their financial management duties, DBBs and IBBs have 
the responsibility for establishing their own financial services.697 Financial services are 
in charge of financial planning and execution and in particular: preparation of financial 
(budget) plans, asset distribution to indirect budget beneficiaries within the approved 
appropriations, preparation of documentation for executing financial plans, management 
of state property and accounting and book keeping.698 
In addition to financial services, most of DBBs which are organizationally complex and 
all major mandatory social security organizations are required to establish separate 
695 Article 51 of the Budget System Law. 
696 Article 50 of the Budget System Law. 
697 Articles 9 and 66 of the Budget System Law. 
698 Decree on Financial Department of Direct Budget Beneficiaries, Official Gazette of the Republic of 
Serbia, 2512005. 
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internal control units. This requirement IS set out III the Rulebook699 on Internal 
Controllers 700 issued by the Ministry of Finance in 2004. This Rulebook requires the 
establishment of internal control units in 18 DBBs and in the major mandatory social 
insurance organizations. The audit responsibilities listed in the Decree are focused on ex-
ante and ex-post inspection of commitments and payments.701 
If in the process of ex-ante control an internal controller determines any inaccuracy of a 
financial statement or illegality of a financial operation, he/she will warn the person who 
carried out that financial operation of such an irregularity?02 The reports on both ex-ante 
and ex-post controls are submitted to the head of a DBBs/head of a mandatory social 
insurance institutions twice a year. However, if findings of the report require urgent 
measures to be undertaken, internal controller makes a special report on ongoing control 
and immediately submits it to the head of an institution.703 
In most cases legality of operations of DBBs is ensured via the double signature of a head 
of DBB, who authorizes the commitment or payment, and internal controller of the 
internal control unit, who approves them. DBB and IBB which do not have separate 
internal control services ensure the legality of financial operations through the double 
signature of the head of DBB and the head of the financial service who approves 
commitments and payments. 
Although it may appear that emerging internal control systems are operating well, the key 
problem which arises is that DBB's/IBB's management do not take much interest and are 
699 The Rulebooks are general acts passed by state administration organs and have the legal status of 
tertiary legislation. 
700 The full name of the Rulebook is "Rulebook on Direct Budget Beneficiaries (DBBs) that Organize 
Special Internal Control Body and on Common Criteria for Internal Control Organization and Procedure of 
DBBs and Mandatory Social Insurance Organizations," Official Gazette ofthe Republic of Serbia No. 
22/2004. 
701 Article 7 of the Rulebook, ibid. 
702 Article 6, paragraph 2 of the Rulebook, ibid. 
703 Article II of the Rulebook, Ibid. 
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not responsible for the effective operation of their internal control units. The general 
perception is that the operation of internal control systems is a responsibility of the 
Ministry of Finance rather than of the DBB or IBB's management. The established 
internal controls are not designed, implemented or monitored by departmental managers, 
which have very limited responsibility for internal control matters. The Ministry of 
Finance, on the other hand, does not have the capacity to supervise and coordinate all 
internal control units throughout the administration (as is the case with the French 
Ministry of Finance in relation to controlleur financiers), which leaves internal control 
units in a sort of an institutional vacuum. Furthermore, control systems that do exist are 
driven by legal instruments with no flexibility for individual departmental variations. 
Due to still ineffective decentralised internal control systems in the DBB's and IBB's, 
there exists a second level of fairly centralised and detailed ex-ante internal control 
provided by the Treasury of the Ministry of Finance. The Treasury control is carried out 
by the two units of the Treasury: Treasury Control Coordinators and Internal Control 
Department. Treasury Control Coordinators perform ex-ante control of all commitments 
and payments requested by DBBs that are less than 10 thousand dinars (approximately 
EUR 115). The Treasury Internal Control Department controls all commitments and 
payments that are over 10 thousand dinars. It performs ex-ante control of documents 
provided by DBBs to check budget approval and availability. 
At first sight, having the payment transactions processing and second instance ex ante 
controls under the full responsibility of Treasury departments might seem to be an 
effective and efficient solution from the viewpoint of expenditure control. However, as 
we could see in the EU chapter, centralized controls can have adverse effects and 
increase corruption, as the accountability lines for public money stewardship are not 
clearly established but divided between different actors. Furthermore, centralised ex ante 
controls may also cause delays in budget implementation and hinder efficient 
management.704 Whereas a centralization of cash balances is desirable, this does not 
704 R. Allen, D. Tommasi (eds.), Managing Public Expenditure: A Reference Bookfor Transition 
Countries, SIGMA, OEeD, Paris, 2001, pp. 216-217. 
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mean that the treasury should be involved in the day-to-day control of invoices and 
payment documentation, as it slows down the payment execution and places an 
unnecessary burden on the Treasury staff with constrained capacity. 
In conclusion, although some elements of decentralised managerial accountability are 
emerging, the Serbian system of internal financial control is still overly centralised and 
does not meet the requirements of European Partnership which requires Serbia to 
"Develop and implement the principles of decentralized managerial accountability." In 
order to address these weaknesses, the Ministry of Finance has started working on a 
strategy for developing public internal financial control which should provide the 
platform for strengthening the existing elements of decentralized managerial 
accountability. The proposals on how to improve the current system will be analyzed in 
more depth in the concluding chapter. 
Combination of Budget Inspection and Internal Audit 
The internal audit concept is not well known and developed in the Serbian system of 
financial accountability. There is, instead, a traditional concept of budget inspection, 
which has a narrower meaning and would correspond to early development of financial 
inspection in France, carried out by the General Inspectorate of Finance (L 'inspection 
Generale des Finances). Whereas the budget inspectorate inspects finances of other 
bodies using quasi-judicial authorities, internal auditing reviews and appraises activities 
that are organised within an organisation. As pointed out in earlier chapters, through 
internal audits the Government is assured that procedures for minimising potentials for 
fraud, waste and abuse of public resources are put in place and operating. However, as 
there is no tradition of internal audit, the current budget inspectorate is the basis upon 
which the internal audit function is currently being built. 
The Budget System Law provides for the establishment of joint Budgetary Inspection and 
Audit Service (BIAS), initially solely within the Ministry of Finance and later in other 
administrative organs as well. The problem, however, is that the Budget System Law 
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does not clearly distinguish between the budget inspection function and internal audit 
function. This deficiency was addressed in the "Decree on the Method of Operation and 
Authorities of Budget Inspection and Audit" which was adopted in 2004.705 The Decree 
reflects modern internal audit terminology in accordance with the Institute of Internal 
Auditor's (IIA's) International Standards for the Professional Practice of Internal 
Auditing (ISPPIA). 
The BIAS has rather wide institutional jurisdiction. Thus, the BIAS has the right to carry 
out inspections and audits over DBBs and IBBs, organizations of compulsory social 
insurance, public enterprises founded by the government, enterprises in which the 
republic has direct or indirect control over capital or management and legal entities in 
which public funds comprise more than 50 % of total revenue.706 
The BIAS was first established as a sector of the Ministry of Finance, as a key Ministry 
in charge of budgetary inspection and internal audit and a future centre of coordination 
for other BIAS services in other administrative organs. Due to different nature of tasks, 
the BIAS work is performed by two different departments of the BIAS sector: Budget 
Inspection Department and Internal Audit Department.707 As an inspection service, 
Budget Inspection Department has quasi-judicial authorities, which consist of issuing 
decisions that order an action to be taken in relation to any fraudulent practices or serious 
irregularities discovered by the auditors.708 The Internal Audit Department, on the other 
hand, has quite a wide remit of assessment of internal control systems and performance 
audits and also has the role of providing advice to management on the reliability of 
705 "Decree on the Method of Operation and Authorities of Budget Inspection and Audit", Official Gazette 
of the Republic of Serbia, No 1012004. 
706 Article 67 of the Budget System Law. 
707 The World Bank, Staffing Needs Assessment o/the Government o/the Republic o/Serbia, June 2005, 
pp. 75-76, unpublished report. 
708 An inspection decision has a nature of an administrative act in administrative procedure and can be 
challenged in the second instance administrative procedure. The second instance act can further be 
challenged before the Court in administrative dispute procedure. 
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internal controls and audit implications relating to the introduction of new systems, 
d b · 709 proce ures or usmess processes. 
However, the BIAS sector has been facing a number of problems in its operation. First, 
the position of the head of the BIAS sector has been vacant for two years which creates 
significant management problems. Furthermore, the BIAS sector is understaffed and its 
staff insufficiently trained and lacking appropriate guidelines. Whereas serious efforts 
have gone into developing methodological guidelines and training of staff mainly through 
the support of the European Agency for Reconstruction, available staff resources are not 
at all adequate.710 Thus, while the Inspectorate has 15 staff (in comparison to 350 staff of 
the French Financial Inspectorate), the Internal Audit Department has only 11 staff 
(including the head of internal audit department). Such a staffing structure does not allow 
for carrying out wide inspection and audit responsibilities.711 
The above discussion leads to the conclusion that although significant efforts have been 
invested so far in the development of an internal audit system, a medium term 
requirement of European Partnership to "establish functionally independent internal audit 
in accordance with the internationally accepted standards and EU best practice" has still 
not been met. 
As will be discussed in more depth in the concluding chapter, the key recommendation 
which could be given at this point is that until Internal Audit Units in the major DBBs are 
fully operational, the capacities of the Budget Inspectorate and the Internal Audit 
Department of the Ministry of Finance should be significantly enhanced to provide 
assurance on financial regularity at the level of the Ministry of Finance and the 
Government. Strengthening of the Internal Audit Department is especially important in a 
709 Article 68 of the Budget System Law. 
710 The World Bank, Serbia: Fiduciary Assessment Update, 2005, Internal Document of the WB, p. 18. 
711 Support for the training of internal auditors is provided from a EUR 7 million project on "Public 
Finance" funded and implemented by the EAR. 
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view of its future role of a central coordination and harmonization unit for internal audit 
work and methodology. 
Strengthening Parliamentary Accountability 
Serbia has a relatively long tradition of parliamentary control of spending of public 
money. However, during the 1990s, there was a significant erosion of the budgetary 
process and of the budgetary powers of the Serbian National Assembly. Preparation of 
the Republic's budget followed a highly compressed timetable that did not allow for 
detailed analysis of budget issues and policies.712 Parliamentary discussions on the budget 
were almost absent and the budgetary proposals, as well as final budgetary reports were 
adopted by the Parliament almost without any remarks. 
Budget reporting to the Parliament was also greatly limited. The 1991law713 required that 
annual consolidated Government accounts (financial statements) be submitted to the 
Parliament by 28th February of the following year. Discussion on the budget proposal for 
the next year and consolidated Government accounts for the previous year would, 
however, last only for a couple of days, without any significant debate on the substance 
of budget execution, presented in the consolidated accounts.714 In this regard, there was 
an obvious lack of a professional body of external audit institution, which would be able 
to give its professional opinion on the state of Government consolidated accounts and 
point out strengths and weaknesses in the use of the public funds. 715 
An important feature of the new Budget System Law is that it leaves considerably longer 
time for the consideration and approval of the budget by the Cabinet and the Parliament 
712 Cf G. Paovic-leknic, Budzetska kontrola - jugoslovensko i italijansko pravo [Control ofthe Budget-
Yugoslavian and Italian Law], University of Montenegro, Podgorica, 2000. 
713 The Law on Public Revenues and Public Expenditures, Official Gazette of the Republic of Serbia, No. 
76/91,18/93,22/93,67/93,45/94,42/98. 
714 Cf G. Paovic-leknic, ibid. pp. 178-182. 
715 Ibid. 
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(2 months).716 Implementation of this new time-table should help emphasise the role of 
the budget as a key instrument for the realisation of Government policies and 
programmes. The Budget System Law further specifies more regular and frequent 
reporting on the expenditures, commitments, cash payments from the budget and other 
reports that would provide a comprehensive picture of the development of public finances 
throughout the year.717 
It should be noted that the adoption of the previous years' budgets seemed to be the 
subject of significant debate in the Serbian Parliament. The obligatory nature of the 
adoption of the budget was, however, used mainly as a political means of threatening the 
Government to be overthrown and in the same time the test if the Government has 
enough support in the Parliament. The lack of a more substantial debate on the budget 
proposal perhaps should not at all be surprising, bearing in mind that the members of the 
Parliament do not have sufficient knowledge to examine the details of the budgetary 
legislation and even lesser powers to keep the Government to account for the effective 
use of public monies within the approved legal budgetary framework. The absence of an 
independent external audit institution further undermines their accountability potentials. 
Significant delays in establishing an external audit institution have had serious 
consequences for the Serbian financial accountability system as Government annual 
consolidated financial statements for 2002, 2003, 2004 and 2005 have not been audited 
and submitted to the Parliament. The BSL provides a deadline of June 1 in the following 
fiscal year to submit consolidated annual reports to the National Assembly, which has 
obviously not been met. The only solution to address this problem in the short term was 
to commission a private external audit of accounts for the previous years. This solution 
was accepted for 2001 accounts, which were audited by a private firm. However, no 
qualified external private auditor was appointed to fill the external audit gap from 2002-
2005 and therefore Parliament did not have a chance to see and discuss Government 
716 Article 14 of Budget System Law. 
717 Articles 10-13 of the Budget System Law, "Official Gazette of the Republic of Serbia", No. 9/2002. 
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actual spending decisions for the last four years. This also means that currently there is no 
official record of government expenditures for these years. A tender for the external audit 
of the 2002, 2003, and 2004 government accounts has now been undertaken, which is a 
good step, but there is an urgent need to find sustainable solutions to these problems. 
The role of Parliamentary Committees 
The parliamentary committee system in Serbia is still underdeveloped in comparison to 
its western counterparts. There is a number of Parliamentary Committees which are 
responsible for the review of the legislative proposals. Their general authorities are 
prescribed by the Rules of Procedure of the National Assembly.718 However, civil 
servants are rarely called to account before the standing Parliamentary Committees. It is 
only the Committees for special inquiries, which are formed on an ad hoc basis to 
examine specific cases, that have the right to summon the civil servants involved in the 
case. This has also been given some attention in the media, which is still insufficient for 
provoking a strong public debate on the discussed issues. Committee support services are 
still weak and their organisation is not flexible nor adaptable to work-load changes. 
Therefore, there is unanimous consent across all political actors that Parliamentary 
Committees need expert, specialised research assistance to improve their review of draft 
legislation and fulfil their mandates as prescribed.719 
The public finance oversight function of the National Assembly is primarily carried out 
by the Finance Committee. The Finance Committee has 15 members and is set up to 
review draft laws, other regulations and by-laws and other issues in the field of public 
finance and not to scrutinise the activities of the Government. The chairman of the 
718 Poslovnik Narodne Skupstine Republike Srbije [Rules of Procedure of the National Assembly of the 
Republic of Serbia], the final text of 28 June 2005. 
http://www.parlament.sr.gov.yu/contentlcir/akta/poslovnik/poslovnik _I.asp. 
719 Southeast Europe Parliamentary Program (SEPP), Parliamentary Centre, Join Baseline Report on the 
Internal and Human Resources Management in the National Assembly of the Republic of Serbia, 
November 2003. 
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Committee has been appointed and is a member of an opposition party, in line with the 
best European practice. However, as the current president of the Committee at the same 
time discharges functions of the mayor of Belgrade, he rarely attends the sessions of the 
committee and leaves most of the work to his deputy, who is a member of a governing 
coalition party. The committee itself has neither a proper structure and resources nor a 
clear mandate and is obviously not a specialized committee for the scrutiny of public 
accounts, but carries out primarily legislative function. 
Nevertheless, it should be noted that a Sub-committee for "Supreme Audit Institution 
Establishment Law Drafting" was established in 2004 and prepared the draft Law on 
Supreme Audit Institution. This is an encouraging sign, as it should enhance the MPs 
awareness of the need to develop scrutinising role of parliamentary committees, in 
cooperation with the supreme audit institutions. However, as the independent external 
audit institution has still not been established, the Parliament still does not have a key ally 
to assist him perform its paramount function of being a guardian of the public purse. 
Developing external financial accountability mechanisms 
Today, Serbia seems to be the only European country which does not have an institution 
to perform independent external audit of public revenues and expenditures. Although the 
National Assembly adopted the Law on State Audit Institution in November 2005, the 
State Audit Institution (hereinafter the SAl) has not been established yet. The main 
reason for the delay in creating the SAl is a difficulty to reach a political consensus in the 
National Assembly of who should be elected as a member of the SAl's management. 
This raises serious concerns for establishment and operation of this new institution in the 
current unstable political environment in Serbia. The absence of a key financial 
accountability mechanism greatly undermines exercise of a democratic accountability to 
the Parliament, which simple does not have appropriate means of holding the 
Government to account for the public spending. 
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It should, however, be stressed that external financial accountability mechanisms were 
very much present throughout the Serbian history in different shapes and forms, 
depending on the broader political and social developments. In order to be able to provide 
recommendations on how the new Serbian financial accountability system could be built 
and strengthened, it would be important to outline a brief history of external audit 
developments in Serbia and ex-Yugoslavia, which could be used as a source of 
inspiration for the future times. Lessons from the past should not be forgotten and should 
duly be taken into account when setting up a new transitional system of financial 
accountability. 
External audit in Serbia - an overview of a forgotten tradition 
Serbia has a significant tradition in the field of external audit. Similar to Britain and 
France, the development of external audit in Serbia, and later in first Yugoslavia, was 
fairly dependent on the continuous struggle between the monarch and the legislature. 
During the XIX and the first decades of XX century, external audit gradually evolved 
from the instrument of autocratic control of state revenues and expenditures to a key 
supporting mechanism to the democratic parliamentary control of spending of public 
money. no 
It is interesting to note that the first Serbian Constitution (Sretenjski Ustav), proclaimed 
in the period of struggle for independence from the Turkish Empire in 1835, envisaged 
the creation of fairly advanced external audit institution. Article 107 of the Sretenjski 
Constitution proclaimed: "Prince and State Council (Drzavni Sojvet) 721 will establish the 
720 Cf N. Stepanovic, Opsta teorija 0 glavnoj kontroli Kraljevine Jugoslavije [General Theory on the 
Supreme Control of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia], doctoral dissertation, Faculty of Law, University of 
Belgrade, 1937. 
721 Drzavni Sovjet was the earliest form of Serbian Parliament, which performed legislative functions until 
the establishment of the National Assembly by 1869 Constitution. Drzavni Sovjet consisted of the 
Monarch's advisors and key political persons of that time and besides legislative, carried out other key state 
functions, such as the supreme court oflaw, with a power of declaring the law. 
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supreme accounting institution, which will audit all the financial accounts of the state and 
make sure that public money is not spent for other purposes than those approved by 
National Assembly". However, these provisions were never implemented in practice, due 
to continuous infighting between the Prince (Milos Obrenovic) and the legislature and the 
Prince's unwillingness to accept legal constraints to his power. 
The second Serbian Constitution, the so-called Turkish Constitution (1838), provided for 
the creation of an audit institution (racundzinica praviteljstvena ili glavna kontrola) as an 
organisational division of the Ministry of Finance. This division performed audit of all 
the state accounts and its findings were presented to the State Council by the Minister of 
Finance. In this way, external audit became a constitutive part of the executive and hence 
did not contain elements of a democratic audit. This, perhaps, should not be surprising, as 
the Prince's powers in this period were still prevailing upon the scarce, but growing 
powers of the legislature. 722 
Only a few years later, in 1843, the legislature won its first victory in the field of control 
of public money. Under legislative pressure, the audit division of the Ministry of Finance 
was transferred to the State Council. In 1844, the first Decree regulating the 
organisational structure and functions of the external audit institution was passed. The 
Decree formally created a Supreme Control institution (Glavna kontrola), which obtained 
a status of a division of the State Council. During the following two decades, the 
authorities of Supreme Control were gradually expanding, so that in 1862 it obtained a 
quasi-judicial authority to decide on damages emanating from irregularities, errors and 
mismanagement of public money. However, the Constitution of 1869, reinstated Supreme 
Control in the structure of the executive, transformed the State Council into an advisory 
body of the Government,723 thus taking away the democratic elements of its operation. 
722 Cf. N. Sijepanovic, ibid. 
723 Articles 56 and 63 of the 1969 Constitution. 
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The Supreme Control was able to regam and strengthen its democratic features two 
decades later, in 1888, when the new Constitution was proclaimed. The Constitution 
enabled the Parliament to reinforce its right to approve the budget as well as its right to 
control the execution of the budget. In order to help the Parliament perform these 
authorities, the Constitution considerably strengthened the position of the Supreme 
Control it devoted a special section (section XI) to the functions of the Supreme Control, 
which were further elaborated in the Law on its implementation (1892). According to the 
Constitution and the Law (1892), The Supreme Control obtained authority to exercise 
several important functions: 
1) the function of ex ante control of the execution of the budget, which consisted of 
checking the legality of sought amounts and their conformity with the budget. If 
the Control finds the payment request legal, it would grant a visa (authorisation) 
of the issue of public money to government departments.724 If, however, it finds 
that the request is in breach of the material legislation and the budget, it would, 
after communication with the Government department, issue a visa with 
reservation and inform the Parliament about the issue. 
2) the function of ex - post control of the budget execution, which entailed: 
a) financial audit of all the state accounts; 
b) quasi-judicial authorities in deciding on damages emanating from the 
accounts; 
c) certifying and providing the opmIOn on the Government consolidated 
financial statements (government accounts),725 which would only after the 
724 This function is similar to the UK Comptroller function of controlling the issue of public money from 
the Consolidating and National Loans fund to Government departments and other public bodies. 
725 The Consolidated Financial Statements were drawn up by the Ministry of Finance and included details 
of: the revenue and expenditure of the national Government, including both a budgetary income and 
expenditure statement based on a modified cash basis and a cash statement showing all sources of funds 
cashed and all disbursements made during the year. The final report included a general declaration of 
conformity and details of significant breaches of budgetary rules. 
251 
certification and provision of the Supreme Control's report be submitted to 
the Parliament for the final discharge. 
The Parliament, on the other hand, obtained the right to approve the members of Supreme 
Control, whose positions, according to the Constitution, were permanent and immovable. 
In this way the Supreme Control secured independence from the interference of the 
executive. Nevertheless, the Control still did retain some links with the Executive, as, 
interestingly, the Prime Minister was in the last instance held accountable for the 
performance of its tasks and duties.726 
The formal position of the Supreme Control did not substantially change in the following 
decades, although its functional independence was frequently jeopardised by the 
Monarch, who attempted to exercise greater influence on the Supreme Control's work. 
After the creation of first Yugoslavia, 1921 Constitution (so-called Vidovdanski Ustav) 
reinforced the organisation and functions of the Supreme Control as was prescribed by 
the 1892 Law. However, after the introduction of the so-called dictatorship of 6th of 
January 1929, when King Aleksandar temporarily abolished the Parliament in order to 
overcome serious obstructions in the Parliament, the position of the Supreme Control was 
substantially changed, as all the Parliamentary competences regarding external audit were 
transferred to the Monarch. Only two years later, the 1931 Constitution (so-called 
Oktroisani Ustav) returned the competences of financial control to the Parliament and 
again established direct reporting relations between the Parliament and the Supreme 
Control, whose status and competences remained largely unaltered until the beginning of 
World War II. 
The function of external audit was not alien to the second Yugoslavia, where a special 
kind of external audit institution - "Social Accounting Service" (SAS) was created in 
1959. The SAS, however, was not a specialised audit organ, but combined the audit tasks 
with functions which, elsewhere, are entrusted to national banks and/or treasuries. The 
726 Cf N. Sijepanovic, op. cit. pp. 129-130. 
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SAS had to watch over the legality of the disbursement of state and public (social) funds 
through pre-audits and post-audits. The SAS also exercised quasi-judicial authorities with 
regard to errors, irregularities and mismanagement of public funds by officials and civil 
servants. If, during the examination of the public accounts, the SAS would discover 
accounting irregularities and/or breaches of legal regulations, it had the right to require 
the organ in question to correct errors and irregularities and return the funds acquired by 
the irregular/illegal practice. 
It is interesting to note that all users of public funds as well as private firms were required 
to open accounts with the SAS. The SAS investigated whether enterprises fulfilled their 
financial obligations towards the state and, if necessary, made these payments itself from 
their accounts. This function was clearly outside the scope of western European's 
supreme audit organisations and enabled the Government to interfere and fully control 
the economy. The SAS also had responsibilities in the sphere of national financial 
recording and statistics. Perhaps the final proof of the totally different nature of the SAS 
was the fact that it actually charged for its services, and hence was not financed out of 
any fund of the state budgets.727 
Contours of a New External Audit Legal Framework 
Although Serbia still does not have an institution of independent external audit, it is 
encouraging that the new Law on State Audit Institution (hereinafter the LSAI) was 
passed in November 2005. The Law has been appraised as a very good piece of 
legislation by a number of international organisations and experts and definitely 
represents an important step forward in creating a functional system of financial 
accountability. 
727 Cf R. Szawlowski, "State Audit in Communist Countries", in B. Geist (ed.), State Audit - Developments 
in Public Accountability, (The MacMillan Press Ltd), 1981, p. 189. 
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The LSAI is quite detailed and comprises a number of sections which regulate the 
organisation, management, functions and procedures of the State Audit Institution 
(hereinafter SAl). As we have already discussed some of the concepts of the new law 
(such as the stewardship of public money) we shall pay attention to other important 
elements of the LSAI related to its structure, management, guarantees for independence, 
functional and institutional jurisdiction and audit process. 
Organisation and management of the SAl 
According to the new LSAI, a Council of the Institution is the supreme collegial authority 
of the SAL The Council members bear a collective responsibility for the decision making 
process,728 which should enhance the quality of the SAl's decisions, especially since it is 
a brand new institution yet to be established. The Council has five members: a President, 
a Vice-President and three members. Organisation of the SAl consists of audit units, 
headed by the Supreme State Auditors, and assisting services. In addition, the Secretary 
of the SAl carries out an important managerial function, by coordinating the activities of 
different audit units and services.729 
Although the SAl has a collegiate management, significant managerial powers have been 
provided to the President of the Institution. The President has the right to: manage the 
work of the institution by determining and implementing the work programme; prescribe 
rules for individual stages of audit activity; make decisions on supervision of 
implementation of the audit objectives; appoint the Supreme State Auditors and Secretary 
of the Institution, etc.730 Exercise of these authorities should enable the President of the 
SAl to prevent and remove any potential inefficiency in the collegiate work of the 
Council. 
728 Article 13 of the LSAI. 
729 Article 32 of the LSAI. 
730 Article 25 of the LSAI. 
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Personal independence of the Council members is expected to be secured through rather 
strict conditions and procedures for their appointment and dismissal. Council members 
ought to have an appropriate university education and relevant working experience 731 and 
must not be employees of any Government body for two years prior to their appointment 
to the Council. This should ensure at least some degree of political and personal 
impartiality of the Council members in conducting ex post audits of Government 
operations. The cornerstone of Council Members' independence, nevertheless, is 
provided by a requirement that Council Members are to be appointed by the National 
Assembly for a period of 6 years, at the proposal of the competent working body of the 
Assembly and cannot be reappointed to their respective posts more than twice. 
Although the legal framework providing for independence of the Council Members is 
quite well established, the problems in the implementation of these provisions have 
already appeared in practice, as the Council Members have still not be elected by the 
National Assembly. Namely, the transitional provisions of the LSAI foresee that the 
Council of the SAl will be established six months after the adoption of the LSAI. Council 
Members have still not been appointed. This is due to political sensitivity of the Council 
operation, which will not only have important administrative but also political influence 
on the governance processes. Since the Serbian Government is a minority coalition 
Government, it has not been easy to reach a political compromise on the appointment of 
the SAl's Council Members. This is just the first sign of the difficulties which this 
institution may encounter in practice, in spite of a fairly well designed legal framework. 
731 The Law requires the Council members to have a university degree and at least 10 years of working 
experience, out of which minimum 7 years on jobs related to the powers of the Institution. It is further 
stipulated that a minimum of2 members of the Council must be graduated economists with the 
corresponding auditing or accounting profession and working experience in the domain of public finances, 
while a minimum of one member of the Council must be a graduated jurist with passed juridical exam and 
working experience in legal activities in the domain of public finances. 
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Being aware of the challenges which the SAl will face in its work, the draftsmen of the 
law have underlined a need for securing organizational, functional and financial 
independence of this institution. First, the law provides that the SAl has the right to 
independently determine its internal organizational structure and staffing plans Gob 
systematisation), as well as to issue independently by-laws and other acts necessary for 
implementation of the present Law.732 Second,functional independence is secured though 
the right to independently define the scope, time and nature of audit; to conduct audit 
examinations on the spot; to have access to all necessary documents and to submit audit 
and other reports without any restrictions.733 This is fully in line with the Commision's 
and LIMA declaration's standards and provides a positive answer to Commission's 
baseline question mentioned in the chapter N on whether the SAl is free to decide what 
work it will carry out. Lastly, financial independence should be assured by determining 
the funds for work of the Institution as a separate budget item in the scope of an annual 
Law on Budget of Serbia.734 The financial plan of the SAl is determined by the Council 
and approved by the working body of National Assembly and only then submitted to the 
Ministry of Finance for inclusion in the general budget. This is also in line with the 
Commission's requests for an independence of the financial resources needed for the 
fulfilment of the SAl's mandate, as pointed out in the previous chapter. 
Functional and institutional jurisdiction 
As mentioned in the review of the concept of stewardship of public money in Serbia, the 
SAl is authorised to conduct three basic types of audit: audit of accuracy of accounts, 
audit of regularity of financial operations and performance/value for money auditing. 735 
Besides the 'usual' auditing powers, the SAl is also authorised to carry out other tasks 
that are closely linked with the audit function, such as: assessment of functioning of 
732 Article 12 ofthe LSAI. 
733 Articles 3,5,6,35,36,39 of the LSAI. 
734 Article 51 ofLSAI. 
735 Section 2, 3 and 4, paragraph 1 of Article 2 of the LSAI. 
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systems of internal control, general advisory function to auditees, giving proposals for 
changing of existing legislation, adoption of auditing standards and tackling the fraud and 
. 736 
corruptIOn. 
The SAl's institutional jurisdiction is also quite wide. It is authorised to carry out audits 
of a wide spread network of institutions which are using public funds, such as: all DBBs 
and IBBs of the Republic, units of territorial autonomy and local governments; 
organisations of mandatory social insurance; budget funds established by a special law or 
secondary legislation; public utilities, companies and other legal entities founded by a 
DBB or IBB which participate in its capital or management; National Bank of Serbia (in 
the part referring to operations with the State budget and public funds); political parties; 
legal or physical entities which receive state donations and other irretrievable funds or 
guarantees; users of EU funds, donations and assistance by international organizations, 
foreign governments and non-governmental organizations.737 
Since the SAl is authorised to audit all public funds, resources and operations (including 
EU funds and resources), regardless of whether they are reflected in the national budget 
and regardless of who receives or manages public funds, it may be inferred that its 
functional and institutional jurisdiction is quite satisfactory. However, it should be noted 
that such a jurisdiction will require intensive efforts on the part of the new institution and 
therefore it will be very difficult for SAl to manage to cover it, especially in the first 
years of its operation. 
In order to concentrate the SAl efforts, the law prescribes so called 'compulsory audits', 
which need to be conducted each year. These are: 
• annual budget of the Republic of Serbia; 
• organizations of mandatory social insurance; 
• National Bank of Serbia, in the part related to spending of public funds; 
736 Article 5 of the LSAI. 
737 Article 10 of the LSAI. 
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• a number of public utilities, companies and other legal entities founded by a DBB 
or IBB which participate in its capital or management; 
• budget of a suitable number oflocal self-government units.738 
Conducting even this limited number of mandatory audits would be a very demanding 
task for the SAl in the first years of operation. The Institution will need time to find 
appropriate staff and build its capacity, which will be a long and demanding process. 
Therefore, the initial expectations of the operation of this important institution should be 
kept fairly realistic. 
Audit Reports and Procedures 
Similar to its counterparts, a key SAl's weapon is issuance of audit reports and annual 
report on its work. The main instrument of reporting is the annual report on consolidated 
Government accounts and final accounts of organisations of mandatory social insurance 
which is to be submitted to the National Assembly every year. 739 The SAl is also required 
to submit an annual Report on its work to the Assembly by the 31 st of March of the 
current year for the preceding year.740 In the course of the year, the Institution may 
submit special reports on particularly important and urgent issues, whose content is 
defined in more detail by the Rules of Procedure of the Institution. 
The procedure of audit is regulated in quite a detailed manner in the LSAI. This poses a 
question of whether some of the procedural details could have been left for secondary 
legislation, as putting them on a statutory footing takes away the flexibility necessary for 
fine-tuning and adjusting to the real needs. 
738 Article 35 of the LSAI. 
739 Article 47 of the LSAI. 
740 Article 45 of the SAl Act. 
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The Audit procedure conducted by the SAl may be divided into three mam 
phases: 
1. Pre-Audit phase, relates to determining the annual audit plan and programme 
of the SAl and collection of information and documentation prior to the commencement 
of the process of audit. The Law grants the SAl the right of access to any information it 
requires to undertake its tasks.741 If an auditee fails to provide requested information, it 
will be fined by an appropriate penalty,742 determined by the penal provisions of the 
law.743 
2. Process of Audit comprises a number of procedures and principles, such as the 
right to a fair hearing (audi et alteram partem rule) and the right to object to the findings 
of the report in a two-instance procedure. Each audit starts with the adoption of the 
conclusion on undertaking of audit, which may be a subject of objection by an auditee?44 
The Council decides on such an objection and its decision is final (no right of appeal is 
allowed).745 When a draft audit report is completed, it is sent to an auditee for comments 
and objections. If an auditee submits an objection or comments, the SAl will organise a 
hearing to discuss these objections and acquire any additional information to be presented 
by an auditee at the hearing.746 After the hearing, the draft report, together with 
objections and comments is given to a Member of the Councilor a Supreme State 
Auditor, who will review the report. 747 After reviewing the report, a Council Member or a 
Supreme State Auditor will issue an audit report proposal, which will be sent to the 
auditee. An auditee has the right to another objection to the report, which is then sent to 
the Council for the final decision. The Council can decide to either take out the objected 
finding from the report or to leave in it in the report (as it already is or to reformulate 
741 Article 36 of the LSAI. 
742 5.000-50000 dinars which corresponds to around 50-5000 pounds. 
743 Article 57 of the LSAI. 
744 Para 1, Article 38 of the LSAI. 
745 Paragraphs 2 and 3 of the Article 38, of the LSAI. 
746 Paragraphs 1-9 of Article 39 of the LSAI. 
747 Paragraph 10 of Article 39 of the LSAI. 
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it).748 The final report is sent to the auditee, the National Assembly and other organs, 
which, in Council's view, should be informed of the audit findings. The Council's 
decision is final and there is no legal remedy which could challenge it. 749 
As we can see, the process of audit is rather complex and assumes active participation of 
an auditee in all stages of the process. Such a demanding procedure should make sure that 
a final audit report to be submitted to the National Assembly and the public includes only 
disclosures substantiated by credible evidence that corresponds to the actual state of 
affairs. It is further important to provide information to future audited subject and 
stakeholders awareness in general on their rights and responsibilities in their relations to 
the SAL 
3. Post-Audit Procedure. Provision for adequate follow-up procedures of SAl's 
recommendations in the post-audit process is of particular importance. An auditee is 
obliged to take actions in accordance with SAl's recommendations and to notify the 
Institution thereof not later than 90 days from the date of delivery of the audit report.750 If 
an institution fails to comply with the SAl's recommendations in case of a significant 
irregularity or non-purposefulness of operations, the SAl shall determine that there is a 
serious violation ofa 'good practice' in the auditee's operation.,751 
One of the key issues to be posed is whether the SAl should have any sanctioning powers 
in the case of non-respect of its recommendations. As we could see in chapter II, the UK 
NAO does not have any power of sanction of its own. Instead, its basic weapon is the 
PAC, which holds the executive to account for the stewardship of public money. In the 
French system of financial accountability, the Cour des Comptes, in tum, does have 
sanctioning powers through the process of judging of accountants. In the EU system, the 
ECA does not have any sanctioning powers on its own, but relies on support from the 
748 Paragraphs 11-15 of Article 39 of the LSAI. 
749 Paragraphs 16-17 of Article 39 of the LSAI. 
750 Paragraphs 1-2 of Article 40 of the LSAI. 
751 Paragraphs 3-4 of Article 40 of the LSAI. 
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COCOBU, Commission and Courts of Auditors of Member States. The question is what 
kind of sanctioning powers, if any, should be given to the Serbian SAL This question will 
be in more depth analysed in the concluding chapter. At this point, we shall outline the 
solutions presented in the new Law on SAL 
According to the Law, the SAl does have limited sanctioning powers over the auditees. 
Unlike the classical Westminster model or the French model of judicial authorities, the 
SAl has been given the power to directly issue orders to auditees for acting in the case 
when there is a serious violation of a 'good practice' in an auditee's operation. In the case 
when an auditee fails to take actions in the defined time limit to remedy identified 
irregularity, the SAl has the right to: 
• issue a call for dismissal of the responsible officer of the auditee to the authority 
which the Institution considers to be able to carry out or initiate the procedure for 
dismissal; 
• 
• 
inform the National Assembly; 
inform the public. 752 
If the SAl has a reasonable doubt that the auditee has committed a misdemeanour or a 
criminal offence, it will propose to the relevant authority to submit a request for initiation 
of a misdemeanour proceeding or bring charges in the criminal procedure.753 These 
sanctioning rights of the SAl are reasonably well defined, although they themselves do 
not provide sufficient assurance that the audit findings will be respected and followed-up 
by an auditee. Therefore, in order to effectively perform its role, the work of the SAl will 
need to be substantively supported by other financial accountability actors, such as 
Parliament and the Ministry of Finance, as will be discussed in more depth in the 
concluding chapter. 
752 Paragraphs 9-13 of the LSAI. 
753 Article 41 of the LSAI. 
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Overall, the adoption of the new Law on SAl is a very important step forward in creating 
a supreme audit institution in Serbia. However, the question remains on whether there are 
sufficient underlying conditions that will enable its effective operation in practice. As we 
could see earlier, the EU Partnership medium term priority for Serbia is to "Strengthen 
the operational capacity and functional as well as financial independence of the Supreme 
Audit Institution". This condition has obviously not been met at all, since a SAl has not 
been created yet. Therefore, it is important to examine what are the ways to establish the 
SAl as soon as possible and to secure its smooth operation in the first years of its 
functioning. 
Accounting and Reporting 
Public financial accounting system in Serbia operates on a cash basis, in accordance with 
the Decree on Budget Accounting adopted in 2003.754 The Decree requires that financial 
statements of all budget beneficiaries be prepared in compliance with the Cash Basis 
International Public Sector Accounting Standards (Cash IPSAS).755 The Decree, 
moreover, requires ledgers of all budget organizations and mandatory social security 
organizations be kept on the basis of double bookkeeping, chronologically, accurately 
and regularly updated.756 Although it may be argued that operation of the accounts on a 
cash basis is not in line with the modem principles of accrual accounting, it must be born 
in mind that the Serbian accounting system is still at a fairly early stage of development, 
in which even basic cash accounting principles are not properly implemented. Whereas 
the central accounting function of the Treasury appears to be fairly modem and well 
equipped the accounting systems of most budget beneficiaries are generally outdated. 
Once the cash accounting system starts operating properly, options for a more advanced 
system of resource accounting should be thought through. Nevertheless, it should be 
754 The Decree on Budget Accounting, "Official Gazette of the Republic of Serbia," No. 12512003. 
755 Article 3 of the Decree on Budget Accounting. 
756 Article 4 of the Decree on Budget Accounting. 
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noted that although periodical budget execution reports and financial statements are cash 
based, some accrual information, including on commitments, is already available from 
the Treasury's accounting system, which is a positive step and will be important for the 
future development of the accounting system.757 
Conclusion 
Although Serbia has made progress in building a democratic financial accountability 
system, the overall development is unsatisfactory, primarily due to the inability to 
establish a supreme audit institution. The Serbian legal framework for public sector 
financial control is still not aligned with EU Partnership priorities and requirements for 
internal audit and external audit. Considerable effort, including capacity building, will be 
needed to meet these requirements as well as the specific provisions of the Acquis for 
controlling and managing EU pre-accession funds. 
Development of procedures and administrative capacities to ensure effective protection of 
the EU financial interests will still require extensive efforts in order to be developed 
properly. Funds from the EU are managed directly by the European Agency for 
Reconstruction (EAR) and the European Commission has not yet indicated that it would 
be prepared to consider any degree of decentralization of management of aid, for instance 
from the CARDS 758 programme. As we could see in the previous chapter, in accordance 
with article 164 of the EC financial regulation,759 the Commission may decide to entrust 
757 The World Bank, Serbia: Fiduciary Assessment Update, op. cit., p. 23. 
758 Community Assistance for Reconstruction, Development and Stability, provided under Council 
Regulation (EC) No 266612000: http://europa.eu.intieur-
lex/pri/en/oj/dat/2000/l 306/1 3062000 1207enOOO 1 0006.pdf 
759 Council Regulation (EC, Euratom) No 160512002 of25 June 2002 on the Financial Regulation 
applicable to the general budget of the European Communities, OJ L 248/1, 16.9.2002. 
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management of certain actions to authorities of beneficiary countries only after having 
established that the beneficiary third country or countries are in a position, in the 
management of Community funds, to apply in whole or part a number of predefined 
criteria for financial management and control. At this stage it is however unlikely that the 
EAR or the European Commission will consider using a decentralized model for funds 
management in the short or medium term. 
Therefore, still a lot of work remains to be done on establishing a satisfactory financial 
accountability system in Serbia. The concluding chapter shall examine the ways this 
could be done and provide recommendations for its future development relying on the 
conducted analysis of financial accountability systems of the EU Member States (UK and 
France) as well as the EU system. 
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Concluding chapter VI 
In this concluding chapter we shall attempt to map the way for Serbia to establish 
effective financial accountability system, in the view of the European Union accession 
requirements. We shall first reiterate the importance of the European Union integration 
process as an incentive for building of a reliable system of financial accountability, as 
one of the conditions for the EU membership. In order make suggestions as to how the 
current system of financial accountability in Serbia can be reformed to be able to meet 
the EU requirements, we shall use comparative-historical and legal-sociological analysis 
of the financial accountability systems of the UK, France and the EU. We shall attempt to 
explain why different financial accountability systems have been applied on the British 
isles and the continent and how they influenced the creation of the specific EU system of 
financial accountability and, subsequently, spelling out of the EU financial accountability 
requirements towards the acceding countries. This shall provide us with a background for 
an in-depth analysis of the options for development of the Serbian system of financial 
accountability. The aim of this exercise is not to prescribe a particular model of reform to 
be applied, but rather to identify certain strategic choices, risks and constraints which will 
be faced in building a sound financial accountability system in Serbia and facilitate its 
integration into the complex EU financial accountability space. 
European perspective as one of the incentives for creating effective financial 
accountability framework 
The process and the prospects of Serbia's accession to the European Union serve as an 
important anchor for reform of financial accountability mechanisms, as a part of overall 
institutional reforms in Serbia. As pointed out in the previous chapter, the Copenhagen 
Council of December 2002 and Thessaloniki European Council of June 2003 confirmed 
the European perspective of state union of Serbia and Montenegro and underlined the 
European Union's determination to support its efforts to move closer to the European 
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Union.76o The successful completion of negotiations with some of Serbia's closest 
neighbours who joined the Union in May 2004 greatly contributed to making Serbia's 
own perspective for joining the EU real and visible and reinforce the message that hard 
work and at times painful reforms will payoff. 
The accession of Serbia to the EU will ultimately depend on two factors - Serbia's 
progress in meeting the conditions for membership and the continuity of the EU 
determination to accept Serbia as an EU member. In this sense, at the current stage of 
development, the key issue for Serbia in its path to the EU is establishment of full 
cooperation with the Hague tribunal, the lack of which has brought about suspension of 
negotiations for the Stabilisation and Association Agreement in April 2006. All the other 
issues, including the financial accountability, seem to be only of secondary importance. 
On the other hand, the actual accession of Serbia and other countries of the Western 
Balkans in the EU, will, naturally, depend on the current Member States wish to embrace 
the countries of Western Balkans in the union of European nations. It is still to be seen 
how the recently enlarged EU system will continue to develop (especially in relation to 
adoption of the EU Constitution)761 and what will be economic and social consequences 
of the latest enlargement. Nevertheless, it should be noted that up to now the EU 
institutions themselves have very much supported the accession of the Western Balkans 
countries, one of the reasons certainly being the wish to prevent possibility of breaking 
out of another military conflict in the Balkans in the aftermath of the war in ex-
Yugoslavia. Therefore, the sometimes forgotten role of the concept of European 
integration, as a tool for prevention of national conflicts through economic integration, is 
expected to fulfil its role in the turbulent Balkan countries region. 
76°The Thessaloniki European Council explicitly states that the Western Balkan countries are to become 
members of the EU "once they meet the established criteria". Cf. Presidency Conclusions of the 
Thessaloniki European Council, 19 and 20 June 2003, www.europa.eu.int 
761 Some commentators argue that the rejection ofthe EU Constitution at referenda in France and the 
Netherlands is the corollary of their citizens disapproval of the accession of the countries of Central and 
Eastern Europe in the EU. 
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Once political conditions are met it is expected that the issue of financial accountability 
will come to the forefront of the accession agenda. This is primarily due to a 
decentralised nature of the ED budget implementation, which makes the overall ED 
financial accountability framework very much dependent on the soundness of financial 
accountability mechanisms of the Member States and Acceding Countries. In the ED 
chapter we have pointed out the problems which the ED Commission is facing with the 
shared management of ED funds, as the ECA has not been able to provide statement of 
assurance for legal and regular use of the overall ED funds in 11 consecutive years. 
It is, however, interesting to note that a strong emphasis on financial accountability in the 
process of ED accession has started to yield positive results, as the specific area of 
management of the ED pre-accession funds has been assessed by the ECA as satisfactory 
in its last two reports for 2003 and 2004.762 Namely, the ECA has given a positive 
assessment on legality and regularity of the management of the ED funds only for very 
few areas of the ED budget implementation, one of them being the expenditure incurred 
on pre-accession strategy area, whereas in the areas of shared management with the 
Member States (large part of CAP, structural measures and internal policies) the ECA 
could not get sufficient assurance as regards the legality and regularity of payments.763 
This means the acceding countries have in general attained reliable systems of 
accountability, in some cases better than the Member States themselves. This conclusion, 
however, should be taken with some reservation, as not all acceding countries manage 
ED funds through their own financial accountability systems, i.e. on a decentralised basis. 
For most of the Western Balkans countries, it is the ED Commission itself through its 
agencies, such as the European Agency for Reconstruction, which handles the 
management of the ED funds. However, it is expected that this system will in the mid 
term be replaced with a fairly decentralised management of the ED accession funds, 
which will require lots of efforts on the part of the countries to improve their systems. 
762 European Court of Auditors, Annual report concerning the financial year 2004; European Court of 
Auditors, Annual Report concerning the financial year 2003, www.eca.eu.int 
763 Ibid. 
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Serbia, however, is still far away from meeting the conditions set out in the Chapter 32 
(before 2005, chapter 28) of the acquis and the management ofEU resources is still under 
the Commission's European Agency for Reconstruction. A sound financial accountability 
framework has been underlined as one of the priorities for Serbia in the European 
Partnership, as a main instrument of a Stabilisation and Association process, as a 
framework for the EU accession. As pointed out in the previous chapter, the Commission 
has identified the development of a Public Internal Financial Control Strategy as a short-
term priority that should be attained in the course of 2006. The medium term priorities, 
on the other hand, relate to: development and implementation of the principles of 
decentralised managerial accountability and functionally independent internal audit in 
accordance with the internationally accepted standards and EU best practice; 
strengthening the operational capacity and functional as well as financial independence of 
the Supreme Audit Institution and development of procedures and administrative 
capacities to ensure effective protection of the EU financial interest. 764 The progress in 
implementing the priorities is regularly monitored by the Commission, notably in its 
Annual Reports and through other structures set up under the Stabilisation and 
Association Process. 
In order to provide possible solutions for creating an efficient and effective system of 
financial accountability in line with both EU requirements and the local institutional 
environment and culture in Serbia, we shall draw on analysis from the previous chapters 
and make a comparison of financial accountability systems of the UK, France and the 
EU. As has been pointed out several times throughout this thesis, every financial 
accountability system operates in a specific socio-political environment with a distinct 
legal tradition and therefore it is of utmost importance to take into account the 
764 Council Decision of 30 January 2006 on the principles, priorities and conditions contained in the 
European Partnership with Serbia and Montenegro including Kosovo as defined by the UN Security 
Council Resolution 1244 of 10 June 1999 and repealing Decision 2004/520IEC, (2006/56/EC), OJ L 35/32, 
7.2.2006. 
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implications which specific social contexts have for financial accountability. Drawing the 
conclusions on different financial accountability models and making suggestions for 
Serbia will therefore necessitate careful analysis of respective historical, social, political 
and legal environments that have affected the creation of fairly different financial 
accountability models throughout the European continent. 
UK and French systems of financial accountability as possible models for financial 
accountability reform in Serbia 
Broadly speaking, Britain and France are representatives of two mam approaches to 
financial accountability, which are at times addressed as north/south divide.765 It is 
argued that in "Southern" States, financial accountability systems are based on detailed 
legal requirements and personal liability of officials. Key financial accountability 
mechanisms in these states are ex ante payments control and judicial control of accounts, 
i.e. judging the legality/regularity of financial operations.766 The 'northern' States, on the 
other hand, devolve ex ante internal control to agency management and do not exercise 
judicial functions over accounts. The focus here is ensuring that the use of resources 
achieves the set priorities and objectives and value for money.767 Although the concept of 
north/south divide represents an oversimplification of a variety of financial accountability 
models across Europe, a comparison between the UK and French systems, as basic 
representatives of two different models of financial accountability, definitely deserves 
closer attention. 
As we could see in chapter II, the accountability of the executive to parliament lies at the 
heart of the British system of financial accountability. For more than a century, the 
765 Harden, F. White, K. Donnelly, "The Court of Auditors and Financial Control and Accountability in the 
European Community," European Public Law, Volume 1, Issue 4, 1995, pp. 628-630. 
766 Ibid. 
767 OECD Policy Brief, Public Sector Modernisation: Modernising Accountability and Control, OECD, 
2005, www.oecd.org/publications/pol brief, p. 2. 
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British Parliament, assisted with its prestigious Public Accounts Committee supported by 
Comptroller and Auditor General, has been holding the executive to account for the 
stewardship of public money. The PAC is one of the oldest and most prestigious 
committees of the Parliament and its role in securing accountability is essential. The 
Executive, on the other hand, exercises control of handling the public money itself 
through internal, managerial accountability mechanisms. Internal accountability is based 
on a decentralised system in which the Treasury delegates to departments the authority to 
spend within defined limits. The basic link between external and internal accountability 
mechanisms is provided in the role of an accounting officer, who is a key manager of the 
department, simultaneously accountable to hislher Minister, Treasury and the 
Parliament. 768 The role of the accounting officer is governed by tertiary legislation 
produced by the Treasury and easily changed whenever there is a need. The whole 
system of financial accountability is based on trust and consensus of all the involved 
institutions and actors, which equally share the interest of securing public funds and 
where additional, external means of control, such as courts, are not needed.769 Efficiency 
and effectiveness in the use of the public funds are the key issues to be addressed through 
the operation of both internal and external financial accountability mechanisms. 
By contrast, the traditional French (Roman) system of financial accountability does not 
rest so much on the accountability relationship established between executive and 
Parliament, but much more on the strong internal accountability relationships between the 
Ministry of Finance and other line ministries and agencies and an external accountability 
mechanism established directly between the executive and the special Court of Accounts 
- Cour des Comptes (the Cour). In this system, payments are approved in advance by a 
controller outside the ministry, in the French case, the Ministry of Finance. As we could 
see in chapter III, the Cour makes a legal judgment on accounts, i.e. accountants, who are 
768 It should be pointed out that accounting officers were once personally liable for misuse of public funds. 
The last recorded instance of accounting officials personal liability appeared to have happened in 1920, 
when an accounting officer was called to repay the amount of misused public money. 
7691. Harden, F. White, K. Hollingsworth, "Value for Money and Administrative Law", Public Law, 1986, 
pp. 670-671. 
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personally liable for the use of the public money. The Cour stands as an institution of 
high reputation and influence in its own right, firmly established by the Constitution as 
one of the three Grands Corps of the state. Unlike the British NAO, the Cour is not very 
close to the Parliament and only in recent years there have been attempts to establish a 
more active, direct relationship between the Cour and the legislature. The Cour 
constitutes an accepted part of the French administrative elite and shares a common set of 
attitudes and beliefs with the executive, especially since many senior Cour staff have 
previously worked in the Ministry of Finance and other Ministries. The French system is 
further characterised by detailed legal regulation of behaviour of all the actors of 
financial accountability. 
It may be argued that distinctions between the two presented traditional models stem 
from differences in their political and legal systems and different understanding of the 
concept of the state, as mentioned in the Chapter I. Their financial accountability systems 
are placed within fairly different constitutional settings, which stem from their distinct 
historical developments. These differences will be shortly analysed to provide a 
background for examining the options for improving the Serbian system of financial 
accountability within its own constitutional and institutional setting. 
Historical explanation of differences between presented financial 
accountability models 
The central role of the UK Parliament in the operation of financial accountability, is 
related to historical roots of limitation of absolutist power on the British isles in the end 
of XVII century (see Annex 1). This prevented a creation of a centralised and hierarchical 
state administration with special authorities and separation of activities pursued in a 
public interest separated from the 'private interest' .770 Whereas mainland Europe was 
undergoing a process of state apparatus straightening, British isles were operating mainly 
770 P. Dimitrijevic, R. Markovic, Upravno pravo [Administrative Law}, Official Gazette SFRJ, 1986., pp. 
145-146. 
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within local communities which carried out activities of local interest. 771 In its long fight 
against absolutism, the English parliament has in comparison to its mainland counterparts 
relatively early obtained position of the organ of the supreme power with the right to 
enact laws and control taxation and expenditure.772 The Monarch's administration was 
subject to the common law principles and ordinary courts, instead a special body of 
administrative law and special administrative courts.773 Therefore comes the famous 
Dicey's statement that Britain does not have administrative law, and doesn't wish to have 
it. 774 
UK historical development has influenced the British understanding of perception of the 
governance processes and financial accountability. Thus, UK is usually perceived as a 
main representative of a 'public interest' approach, which characterises 'Westminster 
system' countries, such as Australia and New Zealand.775 In these systems, the concept of 
the 'state' is not developed as in the mainland of Europe, as Pollitt and Bouckaert nicely 
explain: 
'Government' rather than ('the state,) is regarded as something of a necessary evil 
whose powers are to be no more than are absolutely necessary and whose ministers and 
officials must constantly be held to public account by elected Parliaments and through 
other means. ,776 
771 Ibid. 
772 Cf. P. Einzig, The Control of the Purse - Progress and Decline of Parliament·s Financial Control, 
(London, Seeker & Warburg, 1959). p. 17. 
173 T. Fleiner, "The Common Law and Continental Law: Two Legal Systems", Institute of Federalism, 
Fribourg, 2005. 
http://www.federalism.ehlfiles/doeuments/tipsheet.pdf#seareh=%22differenee%20between%20English%20 
administrative%20and%20eontinental%20Iaw%22 . 
774 C. Harlow, R. Rawlings, Law and Administration, (Butterworths), 1997, p. v. 
775 Christopher Pollitt and Geert Bouekaert, Public Management Reform - A Comparative Analysis, Oxford 
University Press 1999, p. 53. 
776 Ibid. 
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Parliamentary scrutiny by calling the Government to account for its actions is a key 
means of controlling the executive, instead of designing the detailed rules and regulations 
to which the executive would need to adhere. Administration generally has extensive 
discretion in decision-making process with little supervision through the courts. Instead, 
Parliament and its committees are seen as a more democratic force to oversee the work of 
the administration and confirm their consent to the Government policy. Although there is 
a growing number of soft-law regulations within the UK Government, there is still no 
special body of law which administrators apply in their routine work or when dealing 
with citizens. 
The absence of a strong framework of administrative law makes the Westminster models 
much more flexible and adaptable to changes. Thus, with the (re) emergence of 
governance values of efficiency and effectiveness through New Public Management 
doctrine over the last two-three decades,777 the main objective of financial accountability 
has easily been shifted from ensuring compliance to ensuring the maximum productivity 
through maximum efficiency of expenditure.778 This, however, does not imply that there 
is no more interest in respecting established procedure and correctness. It is more to say 
that measuring performance has easily taken priority over checking compliance. 
The historical development of the French state has resulted in the creation of a fairly 
different constitutional setting and environment of a financial accountability system. 
Unlike UK, France continued to develop strong state apparatus throughout the XIX 
century, introducing a strict separation of powers between the parliament, executive and 
judiciary. In order to realise its vision of the state, as a key instrument for changing the 
society, Napoleon built a viable governmental machine, governed by a special body of 
public law, relatively independent from the parliament and ordinary judiciary. 
777 C. Hood, "A public management for all seasons?" Public Administration, 69:1, Spring 1991, pp. 3-19. 
778 C. Pollitt at aI, Performance or Compliance? Performance Audit and Public Management in Five 
Countries, (Oxford University Press), 1999, p. 54. 
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Establishment of special courts, such as the Conseil d'Etat and revival of the Cour 
contributed to the development of a rather detailed public law framework, which needed 
to be observed by a Weber style bureaucracy model, so called rechstaat model. The role 
of specialised courts in ensuring legality and accountability of the executive is here of 
utmost importance and civil servants experience greater pressure in fulfilling their tasks 
more strictly according to legal norms since they are more closely checked by judges and 
judicial institutions.779 
Against such a background, ensuring the legality of expenditure seems to be the key 
objective of financial accountability in France.78o This, however, does not mean that the 
issues of efficiency and effectiveness of the use of public money is not an important 
concern in France, but just that the system itself is operating in a way which primarily 
addresses issues of compliance rather than financial management of the use of public 
funds. The role of Parliament is not of essential importance in ensuring financial 
accountability, as the key Parliament's function is a legislative, instead of a scrutinising 
one.781 Furthermore, the financial irresponsibility of deputies under the parliamentary 
system of the Fourth Republic was the justification for putting the Executive firmly in 
charge of budget processes under the constitution of the Fifth Republic without giving the 
Parliament sufficient powers in the financial accountability framework. 
The logic of the French legal system have strongly influenced legal thinking within the 
liberal Europe, as well as in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, Serbia included. 
As was pointed out in the previous chapter, Serbia has embraced strong rechstaat 
tradition, with clear body of administrative law and special administrative Court - State 
Council (modeled on the French Conseil d'Etat). The ex ante control of payments was 
779 C. van den Berg, T. Toonen, "National Bureaucracies and Intemationalisation: the Weberian model in a 
New mould?," paper presented at the Blackburg conference of the Civil Service Systems Research Project, 
October 2005. 
780 C. Pollitt at aI, ibid. 
781 H.B. Street, "MPs attitudes towards scrutiny in Britain and France", draft prepared for the ECPR 
workshop on the renewal of Parliaments, March 2002, Turin. 
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exercised by the external auditor - Supreme Control, which granted ex ante approval for 
all payments and exercised quasi judicial authorities in deciding on damages emanating 
from accounts mismanagement. Nevertheless, the work of the Supreme Control was very 
early linked to the Parliament, which strengthened the Parliament's position against the 
Monarch. However, after the II World War, no democratic audit was performed, due to 
the introduction of the system of unity of powers. The work of Accounting and Payment 
Service focused exclusively on control of legality of financial operations of both public 
and private sector and therefore strong legalistic approach to issues of financial 
management has been kept to modem times. 
Gradual harmonisation of systems - emerging European model of financial 
accountability? 
Despite the outlined historical differences, there is increasing evidence of the gradual 
approximation of financial accountability systems of European countries. Public 
management reforms, based on the ideas of new public management, that started off 
more easily in the Westminster model countries, have recently spread, albeit to a more 
limited degree, to the mainland of Europe.782 The main priority within control and 
monitoring systems is therefore being gradually shifted from the values of economy and 
regularity towards the values of efficiency and effectiveness and from detailed ex ante 
controls to increased ex-post accountability for performance. 
In this respect, the French example is quite indicative. As we could see in Chapter III, 
with the adoption of the Constitutional bylaw on budget acts in 2001 (so-called LOLF)/83 
centralised ex-ante internal controls performed by controlleurs financiers are gradually 
changing towards the a posteriori control framework, placing instead a high degree of 
782 F.F. Ridley, "New Public Management in Europe: Comparative perspectives", Public Policy and 
Administration Volume 11, No" 1 Spring 1996., pp. 16-29. 
783 Loi organique relative aux lois definances, LOLF - Constitutional bylaw No. 2001-692 of 1 August 
2001 on budget acts (1), French Official Journal No. 177 of2 August 2001, p. 12480. 
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autonomy on organisation's management (ordonnateurs).784 Furthermore, the UK model 
of close parliamentary scrutiny for the use of public monies exercised through the work 
of Parliamentary Committee was also introduced in France, through a creation of the 
MEC (Mission d'evaluation et de controle) in 1999. Thus, it may be argued that a strong 
influence of new public management ideas which spread first in the Westminster 
countries have prompted France to introduce more radical approach to performance 
management in the use of the public funds. 
The EU model of financial accountability represents an interesting mixture of the British 
and French systems and another good example of gradual approximation of the two 
systems. The internal control mechanisms were initially modelled on the French strict 
differentiation between ordonnateur, controlleur financier and comptables. However, as 
we have shown in Chapter IV, this system proved ineffective in the EU context and 
eventually brought about a series of mismanagement of public money in the EU resulting 
in the resignation of the Santer Commission. Right after the French reforms undertaken 
through LOLF in 2001, the Commission also reformed its internal control framework 
through new Financial Regulation adopted in 2002,785 shifting the loci of accountability 
from controlleurs to ordonnateurs and thus moving towards the UK decentralised model 
of internal control. The UK model of external financial accountability was an inspiration 
for creating the Court of Auditors (ECA), which has been linked to the European 
Parliament through the Parliamentary Committee of COCOBD. This relationship, 
however, has not been as effective as of the British NAO-PAC, which has to some degree 
undermined the effectiveness of the work of ECA. The absence of the strong Ministry of 
Finance in the EU institutional setting is another reason for general underachievement of 
the overall financial accountability framework. 786 However, the most fundamental 
problem of divided accountability for implementation of the Community budget and lack 
784 NAO study, State Audit in the European Union, 2005, 
www.nao.goY.ukipublications/stateaudit/state.htm. p. 89. 
785 Council Regulation (EC, Euratom) No 160512002 of25 June 2002 on the Financial Regulation 
applicable to the general budget of the European Communities, OJ L 24811, 16.9.2002. 
786 Harden, F. White, K. Donnelly, op. cit. pp. 631-632. 
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of incentives for Member States to pursue sound financial management in their 
administration of Community spending poses is definitely the most important problem in 
the EU financial accountability framework, which the Commission has started to address 
through the creation of a common internal control framework. 
The gradual harmonisation of all these systems triggers the question if we can talk about 
a general European model of financial accountability, to which the acceding countries 
need to adhere? We would argue that although there is still no specifically elaborated 
European model of financial accountability, the contours of such a system are clearly 
emerging. 
If we go back to our definition of financial accountability in Chapter I, as a relationship 
where citizens hold the Government to account for the stewardship of public money, we 
could attempt to define the main elements of the emerging European system of financial 
accountability. Whereas the who and to whom dimensions of accountability are clear, the 
remainingfor what and how to secure it, can be defined as follows: 
1) for what dimension of financial accountability assumes regular/legal but also 
economic, efficient and effective use of public money 
2) How to secure it dimension finds its answers in interdependent operation of 
several financial accountability mechanisms, such as: 
a) internal financial accountability mechanisms based on: 
decentralised internal financial control, placing 
responsibility for the use of public money to organisation's 
management; 
decentralised internal audit. 
b) external financial accountability mechanisms based on: 
external audit performed by independent supreme audit 
institution 
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Strong parliamentary oversight through operation of a 
Parliamentary Committee for public accounts, as a key link 
between the external auditor, Parliament and the executive. 
c) establishing other accountability lines between internal and external 
mechanisms, such as for example direct cooperation between external 
auditor and auditee's management, internal and external auditors, etc. 
The way forward for Serbia 
What are the lessons for Serbia to learn from the presented comparative experience which 
expenences gradual hannonisation towards a single European financial accountability 
model? 
While giving any advice to Serbia, the issue which has to be kept in mind is that legal 
rules, principles and institutions cannot simply be transplanted from one legal system to 
another.787 This is especially the case if we are talking about fairly different systems on 
the different stages of development. One might therefore question whether any of the 
Western earlier explored systems in this dissertation would be able to function properly 
in the still fragile democratic environment of Serbia at the moment, including the 
emerging European one. There are certainly a number of risks which will be faced in an 
attempt to introduce such a model. If we, instead, take a historical approach, we could 
think of going back to principles of old Serbian audit tradition, modelled on the French 
system. However, the question is again whether it would be feasible or desirable to re-
establish such a system after more than 60 years of its absence? 
787 Cf J. Bell, "Mechanisms for Cross-fertilisation of Administrative Law in Europe", in lBeatson, T. 
Tridimas New Directions in European Public Law, (Hart Publishing, Oxford), 1998, p. 147; S. Cassese, 
"Toward a European Model of Public Administration", in D. Clark ed., Comparative and Private 
International Law, (Duncker & Humblot), Berlin, 1990, pp. 361-362. 
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Although it is quite difficult to gIVe answers to all complex questions of financial 
accountability, there are general conclusions which may be inferred from the above 
comparison. As Serbian legal system is based on a strong rechsstaat tradition, there is no 
doubt that detailed legal regulation of financial accountability system would be of utmost 
importance for its proper functioning. In this respect, the French extensive legal 
regulation of the system could be a good example on how to establish a proper legal base 
for the system of financial accountability. However, one has to be careful not to go into 
overt regulation as this would have an adverse effect on the flexibility of the system. It is 
therefore very important to properly assess what level of detail is needed to be included 
in the primary legislation and what should be left for the secondary and tertiary 
legislation. 
However, establishment of the pure French system of financial accountability is not very 
likely in Serbia, despite a historical institutional similarity of the French and Serbian 
constitutional and legal backgrounds. The absence of a democratic external auditor in 
Serbia for almost a century cannot be substituted so easily and it will take many years 
until (once established) Serbian Supreme Audit Institution will acquire the prestige of the 
French Cour des Comptes, as a key external guardian of the use of the public funds. As 
we have already discussed earlier, civil servants of the Ministry of Finance and of the 
Cour des Comptes represent the part of the same elite and therefore can work well 
together even without an important role of the French Parliament. This is not to be 
expected in the Serbian context. Nevertheless, some elements of the French model could 
undoubtedly be well applied in the Serbian context. In line with the French model and 
Serbian tradition of personal liability of accountants in the first Yugoslavia, establishment 
of some degree of personal liability of persons dealing with the public funds would be 
important for the proper functioning of financial accountability system. However, it 
would be important not to limit the accountability concept to tackling individual cases of 
mismanagement and irregularities, but to ensure both administrative and political 
accountability for stewardship of public money through effective Parliamentary scrutiny 
of use of the public funds. 
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In this respect, the British system of financial accountability, based on parliamentary 
accountability, could serve as a good model to look to. However, it is obvious that the 
pure British system would not function very well in Serbian context due to fairly weak 
powers of the Serbian parliament, the under-developed operation of the Parliament and 
its committees and lack of capacity of the Serbian civil service to adequately monitor 
itself. As we have seen earlier, the whole system of financial accountability in Britain is 
based on trust and consensus of all the involved institutions and actors, which equally 
share the interest of securing public funds and where additional, external, means of 
control are superfluous. This is in sharp contrast with the Serbian fairly underdeveloped 
sense of trust between different financial accountability actors, which reinforces the need 
for strong external means of control. Nevertheless, the important concepts of the British 
system could without reservation be applied in the Serbian environment and add to the 
creation of effective financial accountability system. 
On the basis of these general concluding remarks and the European Union standards in 
the area of financial accountability, the remainder of this chapter shall provide more 
detailed recommendations for each of the mechanisms of financial accountability in 
Serbia in line with acquis communautaire requirements. As the for what dimension of 
financial accountability has been reasonably well defined in the Serbian legislation, 
comprising both regularity/legality and value for money in the use of resources, the key 
issue is to ensure the implementation of these principles through strengthening the 
interplay of internal and external financial accountability mechanisms. 
Proposals for Strengthening Internal Financial Accountability Mechanisms 
As we could see in the previous chapter, the Serbian Government administration has 
made important progress in developing internal financial accountability mechanisms. The 
280 
Budget System Law788 provides a legal framework for segregation of internal control 
actors duties and establishment of internal control and audit, which has been further 
regulated in more detail by secondary legislation, as pointed out in the previous chapter. 
Furthermore, internal control units have been created in a majority of ministries and 
social security funds, and a number of internal auditors have been trained under the 
support of the European Agency for Reconstruction. 
However, significant challenges for the establishment of an effective internal 
accountability framework in line with the EU requirements remain. Although lots of 
efforts have been invested in creating a functional internal control system, principles of 
decentralised managerial accountability framework, required by the EU Commission, 
have still not been implemented, as the management of the organisation is not responsible 
for the establishment of a sound internal control systems. The internal audit system is 
also in a fairly early stage of development and will require substantive strengthening. 
Capacity constraints in the Serbian administration represent an important impediment for 
the future development of effective internal financial accountability mechanisms. 
Internal financial control- towards the UK accounting officer model? 
As we could see earlier, the decentralised managerial internal accountability framework 
has recently become a standard to which the EU Commission aspires and requires the 
acceding countries to adhere to as well. Learning from its own negative experience with 
overly centralised internal financial control, the Commission is now insisting on the 
decentralisation of internal control framework. In this way, it is moving away from the 
French system of ex-ante internal control performed by the Ministry of Finance towards a 
British and consequently EU model of devolved responsibility for the use of the public 
funds given to management of individual institutions. 
788 Budget System Law, "Official Gazette of the RS," No. 9/02, 87/02,66/05. 
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The first question which, however, anses is whether the decentralisation of internal 
control framework is appropriate for unstable transitional governance processes. The 
devolved internal control systems leave considerable leeway to individual organisations 
to manage their own funds and are therefore more prone to financial irregularities and 
mismanagement. It may be argued that in the first phase of building up of a reliable 
financial accountability system more emphasis should be placed on establishing a sound 
control and compliance ex-ante mechanism instead of moving further to more advanced 
models of managerial accountability. Therefore, it seems that the French traditional 
model of internal control with the strong role of the Ministry of Finance IS more 
appropriate for the current stage of development of the Serbian system. 
However, the negative sides of ex ante centralised internal control approach should again 
be duly taken into account. In particular, possible implementation of the traditional 
French system in which a financial officer appointed by the Ministry of Finance is posted 
in line ministries can create problems in implementation and potential conflicts between 
the officials in line ministries and seconded officials of the Ministry of Finance. 
Furthermore, the division of responsibility for internal control between the line ministries 
and the Ministry of Finance would prevent establishment of clear internal accountability 
lines which may bring about problems encountered in the EU system of financial control. 
The best answer to these complex issues could perhaps be found in trying to combine 
various principles of decentralised managerial accountability exercised by individual 
institutions, strong coordinating role of the Ministry of Finance by creation of an internal 
control and audit unit in the Ministry of Finance and keeping an appropriate degree of ex 
ante control exercised by the Treasury. Achievement of decentralised managerial 
accountability will require separation between political and managerial roles in carrying 
out financial operations and securing a degree of personal liability of staff engaged in this 
process. We shall devote closer attention to each of these elements. 
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Attainment of managerial accountability for establishing a sound internal control 
framework will undoubtedly require revision of the current Serbian legal framework, 
either the adoption of a new Public Internal Financial Control specific law or substantial 
amendments to the existing legal framework, the Law on Budget System and the Decree 
on Internal Control. This legislation should emphasise that management of a state organ 
will have a duty to establish an appropriate system of internal control and will become 
responsible for the secure and efficient operation of an internal control system. 
The question which needs to raised in this respect is to who should be a key accountee of 
the internal financial accountability mechanism - a Minister or a senior civil servant? The 
ultimate accountee for performance of all duties in the Ministry is, of course, a Minister 
who is politically responsible to Parliament for hislher performance of duties as well as of 
his/her Ministry. However, if the loci of financial accountability is placed only at the 
political ministerial level, the issue of financial accountability may become overly 
political and therefore unstable. The issues of financial management and accountability 
are not of changeable political nature, but are in essence established on administrative-
economical principles of stewardship of public money, such as legality, economy, 
efficiency and effectiveness of the use of the public funds. When there is no distinction 
between the political and managerial roles, politicians actually take over the role of 
managers, often having responsibility for signing routine documents such as orders for 
goods and making ordinary payments. If this role is given only and primarily to 
politicians, then the management of an organisation will not take substantive interest in 
financial issues and will not sufficiently understand the risks and introduce appropriate 
safeguards. 
Therefore, it is necessary for any organisation to separate between political and 
management functions and have an apolitical professional official who will be aware of 
these issues and be able to provide a good and reliable advice to his/her Minister. That 
person would play the role of an Accounting Officer - Permanent Secretary in the UK 
system or Director General in France or in the EU system. As pointed out in the previous 
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chapter, in the Serbian civil service system the equivalent role is accorded to a Secretary 
of the Ministry. In the case of Special Organisations, the head of the special organisation 
could be held accountable for financial management of the Organisation as he also has a 
status of a civil servant (in accordance with the new Civil Service Law). In this light, it 
would be very important to set out a clear role for the Secretary of the Ministrylhead of 
Special Organisation to be responsible and accountable for the financial transactions 
within the state organ, the role close to the UK role of an accounting officer. Adding the 
responsibility of an accounting officer would only add to the importance of the place of 
Secretary General of the Ministry which would give him/her stronger role when dealing 
with his/her Minister. 
The establishment of clear internal accountability lines of is not only important for 
effective functioning within the Ministry, but also for an efficient operation of external 
financial accountability mechanisms. The UK experience shows that giving an explicit 
statutory responsibility to the most senior civil servant for the financial affairs of their 
departments may allow Parliament and its Committees the ability to assign clear 
accountability lines for problems of financial management. The establishment of 
statutory responsibility of the Secretary of the Ministry to Parliament for matters of 
administration would add potential clarity and focus of investigations of once established 
Parliamentary Committee for public accounts. This would enable the senior civil servants 
to be held to account to a Parliamentary committee without confusing this with hislher 
responsibility to Ministers. 
One important reservation, however, has to be made when talking about the 
establishment of a variant of a UK accounting officer model in Serbia. As noted in the 
previous chapter, the post of a Secretary General is still regarded as primarily political 
instead of a key senior civil service post. Although a number of Secretary Generals in the 
Serbian Government are not politicians, they do have a strong political affiliation and 
have been appointed by the Government for the period of 4 years, to follow the cycle of 
elections. The process of depoliticisation in Serbia has just began by the adoption of the 
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Civil Service Law in 2005 which requires all senior civil service posts to be subject to 
internal/open competition that should enhance professionalisation and reduce 
politicisation. However, the process of depoliticisation will take time and therefore it 
should not be expected that the Secretary General of the Ministry would obtain the status 
of the British Permanent Secretary over night. Therefore, although we strongly support 
the introduction of accounting officer model, we would still advise that it be introduced 
in the mid term period of 3-5 years to follow and support the ongoing process of 
depoliticisation of the senior echelons of Serbian administration. For the moment, it 
would be sufficient to leave the responsibility for the use of the public funds to the head 
of an organisation and at the same time build capacities of civil servants to obtain more 
important role in the financial management issues. 
Another point of concern for establishment of the UK accounting officers model in 
Serbia, as will be discussed in more depth in the next section, is the still underdeveloped 
role of the Serbian Parliament and its Committees in scrutinising the work of the 
executive. In line with strong rechstaat tradition, and similar to the French case, civil 
servants work in Serbia is mainly supervised by specialised courts. In cases when 
personal liability for civil servants in carrying out of their duties is at stake, the usual way 
to secure legality of operation is to set out pecuniary sanctions for breach of particular 
provisions of the law. Such cases are to be decided in the misdemeanour procedure.789 
More serious breaches of legal financial provisions are naturally subject to criminal 
procedure. It is important that these elements of personal liability, similar to ones existing 
in the French system, remain until much more stable and effective system of financial 
accountability is established. Once a more reliable system of trust between all financial 
accountability actors is in place, provisions of personal liability of civil servants could be 
gradually relaxed, as it is the case in the UK system. 
789 Thus, at the moment, the Budget System Law prescribes a number of pecuniary sanctions for civil 
servants in breach of obligations to secure legality in the use of the public funds. They amount from 5000-
50.000 dinars (around 500-5000 pounds). Article 74-75 of the Budget System Law, Official Gazette of RS, 
No. 9/02, 87/02, 66/05. 
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In order to strengthen internal accountability lines and reduce risks of financial 
irregularities of staff dealing with public funds, all Ministries and other state organs 
should have an obligation to develop written internal procedures in the form of 
rulebooks/regulations, similarly to the EU case. The further step could be a publication of 
a set of internal control regulations, issued to all relevant staff, which should establish the 
detailed processes to be followed by finance and operational staff (similar to the UK 
system of Government Accounting).790 These regulations must conform to general 
principles issued by the Ministry of Finance and be approved by the Central 
Harmonisation Unit of the Ministry of Finance. 
Another important point for establishing a sound internal control framework is a need for 
stronger inter-ministerial coordination and harmonisation mechanisms for internal control 
(and internal audit, as will be pointed out in the next section). In the Serbian context of 
strong individual ministries and weak inter-ministerial coordinating mechanisms, it is of 
utmost importance to establish a Central Harmonisation unit to provide advice to 
departments and define common minimum standards for internal controls as well as 
advising on their application. A central harmonisation unit for PIFC should be established 
in the Ministry of Finance. This unit should be responsible for developing methodologies 
and standards for public internal financial control and internal audit. In order to 
strengthen the role of the central harmonisation unit, the Head should report directly to 
the Minister of Finance. 
The involvement of the Treasury in the ex-ante financial control process is another 
important issue to be discussed. As pointed out in the previous chapter, at the moment 
there are centralised accounting controls within the treasury and all requests for payment 
and documents justifying them are sent to the Treasury, which controls them and plans 
their payment, even for very small amounts. Since early 2006, all the payments for direct 
790 The World Bank, Serbia. Fiduciary Assessment Update. 2005, Internal document of the World Bank, p. 
77. 
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budget users have been executed through the treasury single account, which is a positive 
development. However, although stronger Treasury controls are necessary to ensure 
accountability especially in the early phases of transition, overt Treasury controls could 
potentially lead to inefficiencies and increase of corruption and therefore should be 
gradually relaxed. The current overly centralised system should therefore in the mid to 
long term be replaced by so-called "passive Treasury Single Account", where payments 
would be made directly by spending agencies, but through the Treasury Single Account. 
In such a system, the Treasury would set cash limits for the total amount of transactions, 
through the budget implementation plan, but would be involved in control of individual 
transactions, which would enhance efficiency and reduce possibilities of corruption 
. 791 practIces. 
Finally, it should be noted that the Serbian Government is currently preparing a Strategy 
or Policy Paper for PIFC development and for the creation of sustainable training 
facilities for financial controllers, managers and internal auditors. When compared to the 
European Commission's four requirements for PIFC development (listed in the previous 
chapter), the adoption of the Government strategy for the development and modernization 
of its internal financial control system is of significant importance, as it represents a short 
term EU Partnership priority. It would be important that all earlier discussed issues of: 
decentralised financial management, establishment of a clear apolitical lines of 
accountability in the mid term, strong internal control coordination mechanisms and 
gradual relaxing of Treasury controls are entrenched in such a strategy, that will provide 
a comprehensive basis for establishing of sound internal financial control. 
Gradual Introduction of Internal Audit 
As we could see in the previous chapter, Serbia has no tradition of modem internal 
auditing, but a tradition of a "government control office" or "control activity", such as the 
791 R. Allen, D. Tommasi (eds), Managing Public Expenditure, A Reference Bookfor Transition Countries, 
SIGMA, OEeD, 2001. 244-245. 
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Serbian budgetary inspection. The budgetary inspection investigates complaints received 
about staff from either civil servants or the public and may also investigate allegations of 
irregularity or fraud and refer cases to fiscal or criminal police. The inspection possesses 
quasi-judicial authorities, which consist of issuing decisions that order an action to be 
taken in relation to any fraudulent practices or serious irregularities discovered by the 
inspectors. 
Although this concept of "policing nature" of budgetary inspection seems to be outdated 
when compared to modem internal audit practices, it does represent a powerful tool for 
the Serbian Ministry of Finance to oversee and ensure implementation of financial rules 
and regulations. This concept perfectly fits within the context of Serbian rechstaat , being 
modelled on the prestigious French General Inspectorate of Finance (L 'inspection 
generale des finances). Therefore, notwithstanding the need to move from the 'policing' 
and 'controlling' internal mechanisms, to 'prevention and detection' internal audit 
mechanisms, it is necessary to keep and strengthen the capacity of the budgetary 
inspection of the Ministry of Finance at least until the internal financial accountability 
system is effectively established. 
At the same time, it is important to start changing the overall logic of the system from 
merely taken action upon individual cases of mismanagement, irregularities, corruption 
or fraud to be pro-active and make sure all parts of the prevention, detection and follow 
up chain functions well together and strengthened.792 This will require substantive 
training and time in order to change the mindset of not only of internal auditors but also 
of organisations in which they operate. 
Whereas the rules and practices of the budget inspection are relatively well understood in 
the Serbian system, due to long practice of existence of such an institution in Serbia, the 
792 Cf PIFe Expert Group, Internal Control Systems in Candidate Countries. Volume II, February 2004, p. 
76. http://www.oecd.orgldataoecd/35/37/34891262.pdf 
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development of an internal audit function will require much more effort and time. As we 
could see in the previous chapter, the Serbian Government currently has only one 
centralised internal audit unit in the Ministry of Finance. That unit certainly does not 
have the potential to provide the decentralised independent government-wide internal 
audit service, especially with a fairly limited number of staff it contains. It is therefore 
important to create a critical mass of auditors in key direct budget users. The first step in 
this respect is setting up clear legal requirements for establishing individual internal audit 
units in the direct budget users. This should be done by amending the Budget System 
Law and subsequent Government decree on Budget Inspection and Internal Audit. Once 
established, audit units of direct budget users should also carry out the audit of any 
indirect budget beneficiaries for which the organisation is responsible (e.g. Ministry of 
Education for network of schools, etc.). In cases when the direct budget users have only a 
fairly small number of employees (such as for example the Ministry of Religion, with 
only 8 employees), the internal audit unit in the Ministry of Finance could carry out 
internal audit activities on its behalf, due to limited capacities of such small institutions. 
It is further important to establish clear accountability lines in the organisation. The 
internal auditor should be responsible to the Minister and, in the mid term, to the 
Secretary of the Ministry/other state organ, giving technical advice on the efficient 
management of resources without becoming involved in political questions. The internal 
audit activity should be free from interference in determining the scope of internal 
auditing, performing work and communicating results. Since the internal auditor is not 
completely independent of the ministry or organization in which he functions it is 
essential that the internal audit function achieves an appropriate status and weight in the 
. . 793 
orgamzatIOn. 
Similar to internal control systems, establishment of effective internal audit units III 
individual institutions will require strong coordination by the Ministry of Finance Central 
Harmonisation Unit. In this sense, the current internal control unit of the Ministry of 
793 Cf. PIFC Expert Group, Internal Control Systems in Candidate Countries, Volume II, op. cit., pp. 77-78. 
289 
Finance should be strengthened to be able to provide standards and methodologies of 
work for all internal audit throughout the Government. 
Finally, it needs to be stressed that the establishment of an effective internal audit system, 
similar to other elements of financial accountability, will not be an easy exercise and that 
expectations of such a service should not be too high. This is due to underdevelopment of 
all other elements that internal audit has to provide assurance of: accounting systems, 
internal controls systems, managerial responsibility for overall control framework etc. In 
such circumstances, the internal audit function should not aim for more advanced forms 
of internal audit, such as risk assessment or performance audit, but mainly focus on more 
basic issues of regularity/legality and fraud detection, which characterised early 
development of internal audit function in Western democracies.794 Only when these basic 
elements of accuracy and regularity/legality are put in place, should more advanced 
formulas of internal audit be sought. 
Possible ways to enhance the role of the Parliament and its Committees 
As we could see in the previous chapter, the Serbian Parliament exercises little control 
over public finances. Similar to the French Parliamentarians, Serbian MPs are still 
primarily interested in the legislative process and are not accustomed to carry out 
substantive supervisory and scrutiny role over the work of the executive. Most MPs are 
unfamiliar with their role in reviewing budgetary estimates and holding budgetary 
hearings and lack sufficient knowledge in the field of financial monitoring and control. 
The fact that the governing coalition is comprised of many political parties with often 
opposing views reinforces the old tendency to make decisions behind closed doors, rather 
than in a transparent parliamentary setting. 
794 N. Hepworth, "Is the modem UK/US approach to internal audit appropriate in all circumstances and 
especially for countries with less developed systems and less well trained public officials?," October 2004, 
pA, unpublished manuscript. 
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Strengthening parliamentary oversight capacity is vital for establishing a viable system of 
financial accountability in Serbia. This can be accomplished by increasing the role of 
parliamentary committees and establishing strong links with the Supreme Audit 
Institutions, once it is established. As the new Supreme Audit Institution, as was pointed 
out in the previous chapter, will not have substantive sanctioning powers, it will need to 
rely heavily on the assistance from the National Assembly in order to be able to discharge 
its duties and endorse its findings. Based on experience of many countries, political 
pressure exerted at the political level of Parliament is a strong lever to force the 
Government to comply with external audit recommendations.795 Therefore it is essential 
that MPs take an active role in financial accountability issues, primarily through 
strengthening the role of Parliamentary Committees. 
Experience of other countries, primarily the UK, are very useful for providing food for 
thought on what is needed for a specialised Parliamentary Committee dealing with 
financial management to function properly. General recommendations are the following: 
1. First, there is a need for establishing a special Parliamentary Committee that will 
deal solely with issues of financial accountability, modelled on the British PAC 
(and subsequently French MEC and the EU's COCOBU). This would require 
changes of the rules of procedure of the Serbian National Assembly. The 
Committee members should be extensively trained in order to obtain the 
knowledge necessary to provide support to the SAl and the Parliament in 
exercising the financial accountability relationship. 
2. It is important to ensure that the composition of once established Serbian 
Committee for Public Accounts reflects the political composition of all parties in 
795 F. Cazala, "The Supreme Audit Institution and Parliament: How Can their Relationship Support 
Implementation of the Audit Reccommendations?", paper presented at INTOSAI 2nd International 
Conference on Internal Control, May 2000. 
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parliament.796 However, gIVen that Serbian political system is still highly 
polarised on two major blocks - parties of ex regime and parties of so-called 
democratic block,797 potential strong disagreements between these parties could 
be very damaging to the newly established Committee. These partisan differences 
could easily reach a point where the government is unwilling to accept any 
criticism or to act on valid complaints, especially if they come from the opposing 
political block. It is therefore important to try to ensure a close working 
relationship among members from different parties and blocks, which will also 
depend on the further development of the political process in Serbia. 
3. In order to reduce the political pressure from the work of the Committee it would 
be important to focus on accountability of civil servants for administrative and 
financial operations rather on sole political accountability of ministers, as 
explained earlier. The focus should therefore be on implementation of policy and 
not on its substance, without questioning the objectives themselves.798 In this 
sense, giving more explicit statutory responsibility to the Secretary of the Ministry 
for the administrative and financial affairs of their departments in a mid-term 
perspective may allow committees and others the ability to assign clear 
responsibility for problems to either Ministers or Secretary Generals. Secretary 
Generals would be obligated to account for their actions primarily to Parliament, 
rather than explaining issues to them while still primarily responsible to their 
Ministers and subject to their discipline. Therefore, as argued above, the 
796 SIGMA papers: No. 33, Relations between Supreme Audit Institutions and Parliamentary Committees, 
CCNM/GOV/SIGMA (2002)1, OECD, pp. 28-34. available at 
www.eca.europa.eu/cooperation/publications/docs/sai pari 136 en.pdf. 
797 A. Rabrenovic, "Politico-administrative relations under the coalition Government in Serbia", in G. 
Peters, T. Verheijen, L. Vass, Coalitions of the Unwilling? Politicians and Civil Servants in Coalition 
Governments, NISPAcee, Bratislava, 2005, pp. 146-177. 
798 R. Stapenhurst, V. Sahgal, W. Woodley, R. Pelizzo, "Scrutinizing Public Expenditures, Assessing the 
Performance of Public Accounts Committees", World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 3613, May 
2005, p. 20. 
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establishment of greater statutory responsibility by Secretary Generals to 
Parliament for matters of administration would add potential clarity and focus for 
the Committee on Public Accounts. This would enable civil servants to be held 
more to account to Parliament without confusing this with responsibility to 
Ministers. 
4. Another UK safeguard to ensure the Parliamentary Committees function in a non-
political way is to appoint the chair of the Committee from an opposition party. 
Although this principle has generally been applied in the Serbian parliamentary 
committees, the interesting example of the Finance and Budget Committee shows 
that this principle can be circumvented in practice, simply due to the disinterest of 
the President of the Committee to attend its sessions. Therefore it is very 
important to work on raising the awareness of the members of the future 
Committee for Public Accounts and other MPs on issues of financial 
accountability and stewardship of public money. 
5. The Committee for Public Accounts should have the authority to call for any 
person to testify in the Committees meetings and request any additional (written) 
information from any person relevant to the audit issue. In this way, the 
Committee would indeed hold government to account for its actions. It is hoped 
that appearance before the Committee will not taken lightly by public servants 
and will provide powerful and transparent follow-up of the Supreme Audit 
Institution investigations. 
6. It would be helpful to allow media to follow the hearings, as it has already been 
done in the case of several ad hoc established committees. This is to encourage 
transparency and awareness of the general public of the matters being addressed. 
If hearings are public and open, they provide a powerful opportunity to hold the 
executive to account by testing the audit results in the testimony of executive 
officials and other experts. Hearings also can build public interest in important 
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policy issues. In addition, hearings create greater understanding of the Supreme 
Audit Institution function and of oversight more generally and alert interest 
groups, the rest of parliament and the public to the issues that might arise in the 
future. 799 
Achievement of effective parliamentary support for financial accountability issues will, 
however, ultimately depend on further consolidation of political and stable parliamentary 
life in Serbia. Namely, around 80% of the current MPs in the Serbian parliament have 
obtained a MP's status for the first time at the last elections of 2003 and therefore have 
obtained their knowledge of Parliamentary work and procedures only in the course of the 
last couple of years. MPs in Serbia usually perform various duties and are in rare cases 
devoted only to Parliamentary work and therefore the general attendance of 
Parliamentary sessions is low. The political party process in Serbia is still in the process 
of gradual consolidation of political parties and overcoming the overt fragmentation of 
political system which occurred in 2000, (when the coalition of 18 parties of fairly 
different political ideology united in order to defeat Milosevic). It is expected that the 
gradual consolidation of political parties will bring about more stable Parliamentary 
membership which will be able to devote itself primarily to issues of Parliamentary work 
which will be necessary for building any kind of expertise, including the financial 
accountability issues. 
In the view of the above, we again underlie the need to inform and educate not only the 
members of the Parliamentary Committee for Public Accounts but also all the MPs on 
financial accountability issues. Special focus of such training should be laid on 
functioning of SAIs in other countries, their relations with Parliaments and overall 
799 W. Krafchik, "What role can civil society and Parliament pay in Strengthening the external auditing 
function?", The International Budget Project, http://www.internationalbudget.orgiauditorgeneraI.htm. p. 2. 
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Parliamentary role in scrutinising the operation of the executive, rather than performing 
h '1' 1 . l' 1 800 t e preval mg egIS atIve ro e. 
Creating an effective Supreme Audit Institution 
In accordance with our previous general conclusion, a solid, stable and applicable legal 
framework is an indispensable prerequisite for institutional strength and long-term 
development of external audit in Serbia. Importance of stability of the legal framework of 
the Supreme Audit Institutions has also been stressed by the Lima Declaration and the 
INTO SAl auditing standards.80l In order to enable stability and coherence, the legal 
framework of a SAl should be defined at different levels - Constitution, laws, 
regulations, rules and procedures. The Constitution and laws form the institutional base 
while the regulations, rules and procedures have the objective of ensuring that the 
responsibilities of the SAl (as defined in the Constitution and laws) are exercised in the 
most effective way. 
An important question to be posed in this respect is what level of regulation should be 
reserved for different hierarchy of legal norms to ensure stability, but in the same time 
allow sufficient flexibility for evolving nature of any institution. Some practitioners argue 
that the Constitutional provisions should comprise the following elements: the 
establishment of the SAl and its independence, its status and type (an audit office or a 
court of auditors, a single executive or collegiate leadership); nomination, removal and 
dismissal of its Head; basic auditing powers and duties; reporting responsibilities, 
including a clear definition of its relations with parliament and government.802 We are, 
800 SIGMA papers: No. 33, Relations between Supreme Audit Institutions and Parliamentary Committees, 
op. cit, p. 33. 
801 Cf Lima Declaration of Guidelines on Auditing Precepts, available on the INTOSAI web site, 
www.intosai.org . 
802 Cf. Resolution of the Presidents of Supreme Audit Institutions of Central and Eastern European 
Countries, Cyprus, Malta and the European Court of Auditors, "Recommendations concerning the 
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however, of the opmIOn that such detail regulation would not be appropriate for 
Constitutional provisions as it would freeze any attempts of potential reform of once 
established SAL We would, instead, opt for more general reference to the SAl in the 
Constitution, in line with the French solution, which would refer to establishment of an 
independent institution that is to assist the Government and Parliament to ensure legal, 
efficient and effective use of public financial resources. All other issues should be 
reserved, in our opinion, for primary and subsequently secondary and tertiary legislation. 
Ensuring the independence of SAl is definitely an area to be regulated by the primary 
legislation. As we could see in the previous chapter, personal, organisational and 
financial independence is indeed governed by the Law on SAl, which requires that 
members of the SAl's Council be elected by the Parliament. The requirements for 
election of the SAl's members are also quite demanding (in terms of education, 
professional experience and request that have not been employees of any Government 
body in the last two years) which should secure professionalism and prevent possible 
political interferences in the work of this important institution. The democratic elements 
in the work of the SAl are secured by the role of the Parliament in its election, which 
points out the importance of the link between the SAl and the Parliament. However, we 
have already seen that in practice that even well defined legal provisions are subject to 
difficulties in their implementation and are not immune to political interferences, which 
has prevented the election of the SAl Council so far. Therefore, although establishment 
of a proper legal entrenchment of this body is important, it cannot be perceived as only 
and ultimate guardian of the real independence and professionalism of this institution. 
Lots of efforts and time will need to be invested in the work of this institution when it is 
established in order to achieve the prestige that their Western counterparts enjoy in their 
own institutional settings. 
functioning of Supreme Audit Institutions in the context of European integration,", 
http://www.eca.europa.eu/cooperation/publications/docs/recommendations en.pdf, pp. 1-3. 
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The adoption of a collegial approach to deciding important issues, with considerable 
central direction and management of the institution, may be considered as appropriate for 
the new institution such as this one. The UK model ofNAO, as headed by a single officer 
of the Parliament, (Comptroller and Auditor General) would place too much 
responsibility on one person for performing duties of new institution. The French 
collegiate model therefore appears to be better applicable in the Serbian context. 
However, it should not be expected that the French model of separate components of 
"chambers' which operate to a great extent independently of each other will be 
applicable, especially in the first years of SAl's operation. In the beginning of the 
operation of the new SAl it would be important to secure unified audit approach through 
stronger management, which would later be possible to decentralise to specialised audit 
units, headed by High Supreme Auditors. 
Another important issue that should be discussed is ensuring that conclusions which arise 
from SAl's audit findings and the subsequent actions taken by the auditee are properly 
followed up. The natural response in this respect in the Serbian context is to provide the 
SAl with sanctioning quasi-judicial powers, similar to those exercised by the Social 
Accounting Service and the budgetary inspection. The logic behind this is very simple: if 
this institution does not have firm enforcement powers, there is a risk that it will be just a 
passive observer of financial irregularities with no possibilities to intervene in any way, 
except to refer it to other organs with sanctioning powers. As Serbian civil servants are 
accustomed to various forms of judicial and quasi-judicial accountability, establishing 
another body with quasi-judicial powers would not be perceived as a big novelty. 
However, the historical development of supreme audit institutions point out gradual 
loosing of powers of sanction auditees and instead development of advisory and 
partnership role between external auditor and the executive. The British Court of 
Exchequer lost its sanctioning powers in the end of XIX century,803 while the French 
803 1. Molinier, "Parliament's Financial Powers: A Comparison between France and Britain", in D. 
Coombes (eds.), The Power of the Purse, (London George Allen & Unwin ltd), 1976. p. 172. 
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Cour des Comptes, although it does judge accounts, has lost its power to impose 
sanctions to comptables, leaving this authority to the Conseil d' Etat. Creation of an 
external audit institution with sanctioning quasi-judicial powers in Serbia may create 
adversarial relations between the executive and auditees, which would perceive the SAl 
as formidable sanctioning body rather than a partner in securing financial accountability. 
Therefore, we support the current solutions of the new Law on SAl with fairly restricted 
sanctioning role, which comprises merely in referring more serious mismanagement 
cases to other bodies (such as misdemeanour court and Criminal court) and calling 
officials responsible for serious irregularities to resign from their functions. 
In the absence of clear sanctioning powers of the SAl, we reiterate the need for the 
establishment of a proper relationship between the SAl and the Parliament. Once the SAl 
in Serbia is established, it should give appropriate attention to parliamentary concerns in 
setting its audit priorities. It would be desirable that the SAl is aware of parliament and 
the Executive's needs and interests and should take them into account in setting priorities. 
However, it is important that the SAl would retain its discretion to accept or reject 
suggestions from parliament and to perform audits on its own initiative.804 The French 
Cour des Comptes clearly demonstrates that high degree of independence from both the 
executive and the Parliament is possible to be attained. However, this is not to suggest 
that the French fairly adversarial model between the external audit institution and the 
Parliament should be applied, but just that the SAl should primarily keep its focus on its 
own long-term issues of improvement of financial management. The danger is that if the 
SAl becomes too focused on responding to parliamentary interests, its work may be 
undermined by partisan short-term concerns in ways that would put its independence and 
credibility in jeopardy. 
Finally we would like to address concrete issues related to the actual establishment of the 
SAl in Serbia in the near future. In this sense, there is an urgent need to create and 
804 SIGMA paper: No. 33, Relations between Supreme Audit Institutions and Parliamentary Committees, 
op. cit. p. 30. 
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develop a proper strategy to set up the institution. Although the Law contains transitional 
provisions on gradual establishment of its functions, much more detail strategy is needed, 
as it is clear that the institution will not be operational over-night. It is obvious that the 
institution will not be able to fulfil its mandate as currently spelled out in the text in the 
short term, not even in the middle term. The issue here is to plan for the progressive 
installation of this new public body and what it implies in terms of resources, human, 
material and financial and how to take a prompt but step-wise start while developing the 
institution building aspects of the implementation of the law. It is further important to 
provide information to future audited subject and stake-holder's awareness in general and 
coordination and harmonisation with other laws or law drafting processes and very 
specifically the progress with the development and progress of internal financial control 
and audit. 
Even once the SAl is established, it will need a whole range of detailed planning 
mechanisms, that should help it deal with its heavy workload. These include various 
instruments such as: mission and vision statements, corporate plans (to outline the 
business mid-term plans and targets of work), strategic plans for each of its major work 
components, operational plans, appropriate information systems and internal follow-up 
and results analysis. 80S It will be therefore important for the new institution to share the 
experience of other relatively young SAIs in the region as well as with its more mature 
and experienced counterparts in the EU Member States. 
Cooperation with EU financial accountability institutions 
Cooperation between Serbian emerging financial accountability institutions and the EU 
institutions is still at the very early stage of development. As pointed out earlier, 
European Union funds in Serbia are at the moment managed centrally by the European 
805 SIGMA paper: No. 34, Achieving High Quality in the Work of Supreme Audit Institutions, 
OEeD/SIGMA, 2004, p. 21, available at http://appJi 1.oecd.org/olisI2004doc.nsf/linkto/gov-sigma(2004) 1. 
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Agency for Reconstruction and there is still no decentralised management of EU funds. 
Therefore, except for the technical advice provided by SIGMA/OECD on how to 
establish a sound financial accountability framework in Serbia, there seem to be no direct 
cooperation between the Serbian and the EU financial accountability actors. 
However, if Serbia becomes a member of the EU, it will need to set out a clear legal 
framework for cooperation with the EU financial control and audit bodies. Thus, for 
example, the Serbian Supreme Audit Institution will need to be obliged to cooperate with 
the European Court of Auditors, as pointed out in Chapter IV. The Supreme Audit 
Institution will also be asked to nominate a liaison officer to act as a contact point with 
other EU national audit bodies and the European Court of Auditors. It will be also 
necessary to provide the European Court of Auditors explicit rights of access to ultimate 
beneficiaries of the EU funds, etc.806 
It is further expected that more specific obligations in area of financial control will arise 
from the membership, such as the need to establish a separate body for managing the 
agricultural and structural funds, in accordance with the EU financial regulations outlined 
in the chapter IV. Serbia will be obliged to set up one or more paying agencies for 
disbursement to beneficiaries of monies from these funds and select a certifying body to 
audit the annual accounts of each paying agency. Such a paying agency will also be 
subject to audit by the European Court of Auditors. 807 
Whereas at this point of the accession process it is too early to get into all the details of 
future more specific requirements of management of EU funds, it is important to bear 
these issues in mind and gradually prepare the ground for their introduction when the 
time is right. At the moment, it would be important for Serbia to establish working 
806 SIGMA papers: No. 20, Effects of European Union Accession, Part 2: External Audit, OCDE/GD(97) 
164, OECD, Paris, 1997, available at www.oecd.org/dataoecd/20/38/36953294. 
807 SIGMA papers: No. 19, Effects of European Union Accession, Part J: Budgeting and Financial 
Control, OCDE/GD(97) 163, OECD, Paris, 1997, p. 45, available at 
www.oecd.org/dataoecd/25/59/36975642.pdf. 
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relationships with the EU anti-fraud body, OLAF. Establishment of a formal contact 
point for cooperation and coordination with OLAF will enable sharing of experience and 
joint efforts in combating fraud and corruption in Serbia and facilitate meeting general 
EU financial accountability requirements. 
Conclusion 
The final conclusion of this dissertation is that Serbia is still far from meeting the 
financial accountability conditions for EU membership. Whereas significant progress has 
been made in establishing a sound internal financial accountability framework, external 
accountability mechanisms have not been set up yet, giving Serbia the unfortunate status 
of the only European country in the region without an institution of independent public 
external audit. 
The comparison between the UK, French and the EU model of financial accountability 
has proven that neither of these systems would work well in the transitional Serbian 
environment. However, specific elements of all these systems, exemplified in the 
emerging European system, could be applied, but with a considerable sense of caution. It 
is therefore important not to have unrealistic and high expectations of newly established 
financial accountability system, especially in the next couple of years, until the external 
audit institution is properly established. 
Once Supreme Audit institution is established, it will be important to link and support its 
work by the Serbian Parliament. Although lots of ink has been spelled out on the 
deteriorating role of Parliaments in holding the executive to account for stewardship of 
public money, recent developments of state audit in France and in the EU reiterate 
importance of role of the Parliament and its Committees for improving effectiveness of 
financial accountability systems, especially as far as the follow-up of audit 
recommendations is concerned. Therefore, it would be important to create a specialised 
Parliamentary Committee for Public Accounts in Serbia and provide it with necessary 
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powers to follow up on implementation of recommendations of the Supreme Audit 
Institution. Furthermore, it will be important to establish clear accountability lines 
between parliament and the executive, through gradual adoption of the UK accounting 
officers model in Serbia. However, this process will have to go hand in hand with 
depoliticisation of the Serbian administration, which in itself will be not an easy and 
smooth process. 
Lastly, there is no doubt that a creation of a sound financial accountability system will 
take a significant amount of effort and time on the part of all financial accountability 
actors: the Government and especially the Ministry of Finance, the new Supreme Audit 
Institution and the Parliament and its Committees. It will be essential that roles of all 
these actors be enhanced simultaneously so that the balance of the financial 
accountability system and its mechanisms is achieved. The aim is therefore to establish a 
balanced partnership between all financial accountability actors, sharing a common 
objective of stewardship of public money. Only once a sound partnership between 
Serbian actors of financial accountability is established will the Serbian citizens be able 
to call the Serbian Government to account for the use of their money and Serbia will be 
ready to enter the complex and intricate network of financial accountabilities spreading 
throughout the veins of the EU. 
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Annex 1 
History of the Development of Financial Accountability Arrangements 
in the UK 
The historic development of British financial accountability arrangements is in many 
ways exceptional. The continuous struggle over finances between Parliament and 
Monarch has given strong and crucial impetus for overall constitutional development. 808 
Unlike other countries where power of parliaments was being built on broader social 
movements requesting various political rights - independent justice and administration, 
freedom from alien domination, freedom of speech, etc., the English parliament owes its 
origin and existence almost entirely to the English age-old determination not to be taxed 
without their consent. 809 Interestingly enough, it was through the achievement of this end 
that British representative institutions secured political freedoms for British citizens much 
earlier and much more effectively than the Parliaments which had originated through 
fight for political freedoms. 810 
The right of imposing taxes and controlling public expenditure has for a number of 
centuries been the common and most convenient test of parliament's power over the 
Monarch.811 While this power was on more or less regular basis exercised by the English 
Parliament, the Scottish Parliament, in the early times, has never had the exclusive right 
808 S. Walkland, "Parliamentary control of public expenditure in Britain", in D. Coombes, The Power of the 
Purse, (London George Allen & Unwin Ltd.), pp. 179-198. 
809 P. Einzig, The Control of the Purse - Progress and Decline of Parliament's Financial Control, 
(London, Seeker & Warburg, 1959), p. 17. 
8!0 Ibid. 
8!! C. Innes, Lectures on Scotch Legal Antiquities, (Edinburgh, 1872), 111. Cf I.E. O'Brien, The Scottish 
Parliament in the 15th and 16th Centuries, Ph.D. Thesis (Glasgow, 1980), p. 180. 
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to levy taxation. 812 Its power of controlling the spending of public monies was even 
weaker. This should not be surprising, having in mind that the development of the 
Scottish central administration was considerably slower than it its counterparts of that 
time. 813 This is usually explained by the disruptive effect which the war of independence 
had on the political and economic life of the country as well as the subsequent weakness 
of the Scottish crown following the death of Robert I to reorganise the royal 
administration.814 
Early medieval history of British financial control mechanisms is marked by two 
coinciding tendencies. While representative institutions were struggling to keep the 
Monarch accountable for its finances, at the same time Monarchs were working on 
strengthening financial scrutiny within the administration of their Courts. 
The origins of public expenditure control in England could be traced back to XII century. 
During the reign of Henry I (1100-1135) the royal administration was expanded and the 
rule of law solidified. The key Royal institution dealing with financial matters, the 
medieval Exchequer, was established. The Exchequer was the most powerful and 
prestigious of all Royal offices.8lS It not only had the role ofrecording and controlling the 
Royal revenue, but also provided a forum for settling financial matters and disputes.816 
The Exchequer was structured into two levels - lower and higher. In the Lower 
Exchequer, which was also called the Receipt, the money was handed over to be counted, 
and was put down in writing and on tallies, so that afterwards, at the Upper Exchequer, 
812 I.E.O'Brien, ibid. 
813 C. Madden, The Finances of the Scottish Crown in the Later Middle Ages, (Ph.D. thesis, Glasgow, 
1975), p. 2. 
814 Ibid. 
815 N. Richard, The Course of the Exchequer, (London: Nelson), 1950, p. 33; R. Poole, The Exchequer in 
the Twelfth Century, (Oxford, Clarendon Press), 1912. 
816 N. Richard, op. cit., p.34. 
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an account may be rendered of them.817 Everyone holding king's money was under the 
legal obligation to render account for it and to answer for what was then found to be due. 
Enforcement of such obligation was enabled through establishment of the Court of 
Exchequer. 
The Court of the Exchequer evolved originally as the court concerned with tax and 
revenue matters, deciding cases between the Crown and taxpayers. By the Fourteenth 
Century the Court had acquired a jurisdiction to deal with ordinary civil claims between 
one subject and another.818 The Court has also performed a function of control of Royal 
expenditure, which was of judicial and non-administrative nature. Through its ancient 
audit, the debts of accountants were ascertained and enrolled on the record, followed by 
the judicial process and enforcement of payment through the agency of the sheriffs.819 
The Treasurer and Barons, leading officers of the Upper Exchequer or Court Side, were 
judges and their discharge of an accountant was full and sufficient in law. Through its 
practice, the Court of the Exchequer developed numerous rules and courses which gained 
the status of non-statute law. The rolls of the Court were considered the unchallengeable 
authority in law, unless it was proved they suffered from manifest error. 820 
The administrative aspect of the work of Exchequer was based on numerous hierarchical 
accountability relationships, starting with the scribes and the clerks at the bottom, up to 
the chief Exchequer Justiciar and ultimately the King. The Exchequer functioned as a 
bureaucratic organization with records being written and taxes collected in a fairly 
organised way.821 It represented quite an advanced institution of the feudal system, which 
817 P. Halsall (eds.), Internet Medieval Source Book, (Fordham University Center for Medieval Studies), 
www.fordham.edu/halsalllsbook.html. 
818 A.1.H. Morris, WS Gillbert and Sir Arthur Sullivan's Trial by Jury - A Legal Commentary, 
www.lexscripta.comlpdf/TrialByJury.pdf 
819 J.E.D. Binney, British Public Finance and Administration 1774-92, (Oxford Clarendon Press), 1958, pp. 
4-5. 
820 Ibid. 
821 N. Richard, ibid. 
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basic concepts are preserved to modem times. It should be noted that the earliest found 
reference to the Auditor of the Exchequer, as a public official specifically charged with 
administrative auditing of government expenditure, goes back to 1314.822 The Auditor of 
the Exchequer function was the one of the general comptroller, consisting of authorizing 
the issue of public money. 
The period of XIII and XIV century in England was marked by the rise of the power of 
the Parliament, which on a number of occasions challenged the ancient Royal prerogative 
to unlimited public monies spending. Although the English Parliament still did not have 
strong enough power to actually enforce its appropriations, its right to criticize public 
spending represented quite an important limitation of the powers of Monarchs at that 
time. 823 
The Parliament used a number of different means to control excessive Royal spending. It 
required that the accounts be audited by institutions outside the Court,824 or that special 
Parliamentary committees or commissions be established to audit the accounts of the 
Monarch and its agents.825 Although Monarchs on many occasions resisted the demands 
of rendering the accounts before such bodies, they would in the end comply with these 
requests, often frightened by the Parliament's threats to withhold supply. 
822 Cf The History a/the National Audit Office, UK National Audit Office web site, www.nao.gov.uk. 
823 P. Einzig, op. cit. p. 87. 
824 For example, the Great Council audited the Royal accounts in 1216, when grants contained provisions 
for a special audit independently of the annual audit by the Court of the Exchequer, on the assumption that 
the influence of the Royal court was liable to be too strong there. 
825 For example, in 1340, the Joint Committee of Lords and Commons for the examination and auditing of 
the financial transactions of Kings agents was established; in 1341 Parliament appointed another 
commission to examine the state accounts (to which Edward III agreed under certain conditions); in l379, 
at the request of Commons, a Committee of Barons was set up to examine the accounts' of estates of 
Edward III. Cf. P. Einzig, op. cit., pp. 87-90. 
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The next important step in strengthening financial accountability of the Monarchy was 
the establishment of the accountability relationship between Royal officers, responsible 
for handling of public funds, and Parliament. On a number of occasions, misuse of public 
monies was one of the key reasons for the initiation of impeachment procedures~ with the 
main objection being that funds intended for financing wars were diverted into the King's 
household.826 Alleged maladministration of public funds at times provided a good excuse 
for calling Royal officers to account when both Monarch and Parliament wished to 
remove Royal officers for political and personal reasons. Nevertheless, even though the 
weapon of impeachment for misuse of public moneys was at times abused, the 
establishment of the principle of the accountability of Royal officers to Parliament was of 
great constitutional importance. 
The English Parliament's efforts to achieve control of public finances were greatly 
undermined during the Tudor reign (1485-1603). Although Parliament criticized the 
expenditure occasionally, no attempts were made to actually obtain accounts. Thus, the 
King acquired the full control of the proceeds of taxation. Financial control was exercised 
by Committees set up by the Executive and proved to be quite efficient. However, 
Parliament was fully excluded from this process. 827 
It should be noted that under Queen Elizabeth I, in 1559, the Auditors of the Imprest 
Office was created, as a predecessor of the today's National Audit Office. The formal 
function of the Imprest Office was audit of Exchequer payments. The accounts audited by 
the Imprest Office were those of all persons to whom money was issued by imprest and 
upon account for the services of Crown and Public. In addition, the Imprest Office 
audited the accounts of an important group of revenue accountants such as those handling 
the duties of Customs, Stamps, Salt, Postage etc.828 It should be stressed that all audit 
826 Ibid. 
827 Ibid. 
828 J.E.D. Binney, op. cit., pp. 195-197. 
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conducted in this division was administrative and not judicia1.829 This system gradually 
lapsed two centuries later, when the new Office for Auditing the Public Accounts was 
established. 
Financial accountability mechanisms in neighboring Scotland throughout the XIV, XV 
and XVI century were rather underdeveloped in comparison to its English counterpart. 
The power of the Parliament over public finances was much weaker than the English 
Parliament had at that time.83o The Scottish Parliament did not have exclusive right to 
impose taxes, mostly due to the fact that taxation in Scotland was exceedingly irregular, 
which had undoubtedly weakened the bargaining position of the estates.83 ! Furthermore, 
it seems that Parliament itself lettpublic finances be taken out of its control and given to 
other institutions such as general councils and convention of estates. It appears that at that 
time there was an accepted awareness of the need for the estates to give their consent to 
matters of public revenue and expenditure, while there is no record of parliament ever 
having expressed the view that it alone should be accorded this privilege. 832 
The turning point in the development of Scottish financial administration was the return 
of James I from captivity in England. His first hand experience of the highly developed 
English administrative system enabled him to start to reform the existing governing 
system into the new style bureaucratic government, which would restore the power and 
prestige of the Scottish crown. 833 The first steps undertaken by James I were the 
829 Ibid. 
830 The first trails of the Scottish Parliament can be traced back to the second half of the XIII century. At 
first, a parliamentum was most probably a full and formal meeting of the King's advisors (the council), 
where they were able to discuss matters of particular importance. The parliament, however, carried out 
other functions, being in the same time the supreme court oflaw, with a power of declaring the law.830 
However, the actual power of the Parliament in state affairs was scarce. Cf W.e. Dickinson, Scotland from 
the Earliest Times to 1603, (Oxford at the Clarendon Press), 1977, p. 99-100. 
831I.E. O'Brien, op. cit., p. 180. 
832 Ibid. pp. 180-184. 
833 e. Madden, op. cit. p. 2. 
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establishments of the new offices of exchequer and comptroller, as well as the gradual 
formation of the body of professional civil servants.834 
The Exchequer was at the centre of Scottish financial administration. In contrast to the 
system employed in Mediaeval England, the Scottish Exchequer was the sole organ of 
financial government, corresponding to the English Upper Exchequer. However, despite 
certain similarities, it may be argued that the Scottish Exchequer was quite an 
underdeveloped institution, using only a few methods of the English Upper Exchequer.835 
Furthermore, until the second half of the XI century, the Scottish Exchequer was not a 
permanent institution. The Lords Auditors, drawn from the larger body of the Lords of 
the Council, were appointed only for the duration of the audit and were relieved of their 
duties after completion of their tasks.836 The actual number of auditors appointed for each 
year varied significantly. 
The actual organization of the annual audit of the Exchequer in the XIV and XV century 
was also unsystematic and unprofessional. 837 The date of the commencement of the 
annual audit of accounts was fixed at least six weeks in advance and accountants were 
entitled to receive a prior warning of proceedings of forty days. Accountants who failed 
to appear on the appointed day were liable for a fine, which was irregularly enforced. 
Many royal financial officials remained absent from the Exchequer for long periods 
without incurring massive fines. 838 The main function of the traditional exchequer was 
the prevention of fraud. 839 
834 Ibid. 
835 A. L. Murray, "The Procedure of the Scottish Exchequer in the early Sixteenth Century", The Scottish 
Historical Review No. 130, Vol. XL, (1961), pp. 95-97. 
836 Ibid, p. 91. 
837 C. Madden, op. cit. pp. 12-40. 
838 Ibid. 
839 1. Goodare, State and SOCiety in Early Modern Scotland, (Oxford University Press, 1999), pp. 104-105. 
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During the XVI century, despite temporary setbacks, the revenue of the Scottish state was 
increasing and fiscal administration was becoming more sophisticated. Unlike the earlier 
system of income driven expenditure, where all the raised revenue was spent and almost 
no limitations of expenditure existed, the XVI century witnessed a tendency to realign 
expenditure towards desirable ends. 84o The struggle for the royal signature,841 fought 
between the royal Court on the one hand and privy council (a body of administrators 
collecting the revenue) and Parliament on the other hand, demonstrated the increasing 
opposition to unlimited financial Royal power and gradual establishment of efficient 
expenditure controlling mechanisms. The traditional exchequer, as ad hoc passive body 
which met annually to receive accounts, became a permanent institution in 1584. 
Although the main initial function of the permanent exchequer was judicial, his financial 
administrative aspect was gradually evolving, especially after 1590.842 The permanent 
exchequer eventually became an active administrative department, with auditors freed 
from personal liability of treasurer and comptroller.843 Under the Act of Union between 
Scotland and England (1707), the Scottish Exchequer underwent legislative 
reorganization and became known as "The Court of Exchequer in Scotland", continuing 
to carry out most of the functions it had traditionally performed.844 
While the financial accountability mechanisms did not undergo significant changes in 
Scotland during the XVII century, the English financial control system experienced 
genuine reform, mainly due to urgent needs to resolve burning political issues. This 
enabled the gradual establishment of "public" financial accountability system in England, 
which main features are preserved to modem times. 
840 Ibid. 
841 The royal sign was a means of granting land and other forms of patronage. 
842 Cf. A. L. Murray, "Sir John Skene and the exchequer, 1594-1612", Stair Society Miscellany, (1971), p. 
126. 
8431. Goodare, op. cit., p. 121. 
844 J.E.D. Binney, op. cit. pp.233-237. 
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The Revolution of 1688 is generally recognized as the landmark between the period of 
autocratic Monarchy and that of constitutional Monarchy in England. Applied to the area 
of financial accountability, the Revolution is assumed to mark the beginning of the period 
of full Parliamentary control over the public purse.845 The Revolution undoubtedly 
removed the main obstacle of efficient Parliamentary control. Its most important result 
was that it became necessary to summon Parliament every year, which provided the 
Commons with a good position in the financial control process. 
However, apart from some early progress under William III, it took almost a century 
before even a beginning was made with real and lasting progress towards a genuine and 
well-established Parliamentary control of public finance. 846 During the reign of William 
III annual accounts of public revenue and expenditure were examined by the 
Parliamentary Commissioners who were appointed under several successive Acts of 
Parliament. The first Public Accounts Committee in modem times was appointed shortly, 
in 1690.847 However, Parliament's strong efforts to control public expenditure by 
supervising public accounts were not long lasting. After a while the Commons lost their 
power of ensuring accountability and under the Hanoverian Kings no Public Accounts 
Committees were appointed until 1780, nor were accounts presented any longer 
systematically to Parliament, even though they continued to be systematically audited by 
officers of the Exchequer. 848 
It took considerable efforts during the last quarter of the century and during the first half 
of the XIX century to re-establish and apply financial accountability even to the extent to 
which it was actually applied during the last decade of the XVII century. The British 
defeat in the American war of independence brought existing criticisms of British 
financial control system to the fore. The Exchequer's constitutional monopoly, excessive 
845 P. Einzig, op. cit. pp.l17 -13l. 
846 Ibid. 
847 Ibid. 
848 Ibid. 
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centralization of audit with still survlvmg judicial fonns were criticized for their 
malfunctioning and rigidity.849 Members of the political opposition took the lead in 
calling for refonn of financial administration. First effective movements towards refonn 
were taken in 1780, when the statutory Commission for Examining Public Accounts was 
set up. It is interesting to note that the Commissioners were concerned not only with 
regularity of expenditure, but also with its economy and efficiency, avoidance of waste, 
extravagance and better management of resources.850 In this way, a basis for broader 
understanding of the financial accountability in Britain was established. 
First few decades of the XIX century have announced substantial changes in assuring 
financial accountability. The Office for Auditing the Public Accounts, a successor of 
Auditors of the Imprest Office, underwent significant changes. 851 The size of the office in 
both structural and functional sense greatly expanded. The most important change, 
however, was the shift from reporting its findings from executive to the House of 
Commons, which occurred in 1832. 
In 1834 the Office of Comptroller General of His Maj esty' s Exchequer was created. The 
head of this office was the Comptroller General of the Exchequer. Although his main 
function, responsibility for authorizing the issue of public money, was basically the same 
as one the medieval Exchequer, it was for the first time perfonned on behalf of 
Parliament and not the "Crown".852 These changes undoubtedly marked the beginning of 
the modem period of financial accountability in the United Kingdom. 
The most important figure of the modem period of financial accountability is William 
Gladstone, who was the Chancellor of the Exchequer from 1852 to 1866. Gladstone 
849 J.E.D. Binney, op. cit., pp. 7-19. 
850 D. Dewar, "Value for Money Audit: the first 800 years", Public Finance and Accountancy, 1985. 
851 Cf. F. White, K. Hollingsworth, Audit, Accountability and Government, (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 
1999), p. 35. 
852 Cf. E. L. Nonnanton, Accountability and Audit in Governments (Manchester: Manchester University 
Press, 1966), p.20. 
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introduced a number of substantial reforms of the control of public expenditure. In 1854 
Parliamentary control was expanded over the expenditure of the Revenue Departments. 
In 1861 the Public Accounts Committee was set up, becoming fully effective only after 
the Exchequer and Audit Departments Act was enacted five years later. 853 
In 1866 the Exchequer and Audit Departments Act created the post of Comptroller and 
Auditor General (C & AG), who was given two main functions: to authorise the issue of 
public money to government from the Bank of England and to audit the accounts of all 
Government departments and report to Parliament accordingly.854 C & AG was to be 
appointed by the Monarch, on the advice of the Prime Minister. The Act also established 
the Exchequer and Audit Department, as a merger of the office of Comptroller of the 
Exchequer and Office for Auditing Public Accounts. Its task was to assist the 
Comptroller and Auditor General in auditing of the accounts and providing support to the 
Public Accounts Committee in holding the executive to account for public money 
stewardship. In this way, in Gladstone words, the 'circle of control' was closed.855 
The 1866 Act is considered to be a vast improvement to the system of audit which had 
existed previously in Britain.856 The Act stipulated the obligation of government 
departments to produce appropriation accounts for independent audit. 857 It was the task of 
the Treasury to determine which departments shall actually prepare and render accounts 
to the Comptroller and Auditor General. Section 27 provided the C & AG the right to 
examine every appropriation account and verify whether payments were supported by 
vouchers (proofs of payment) and whether the money has been spent for the purposes 
intended by Parliament. 858 
853 Cf. F. White, K. Hollingsworth, pp. 35-36. 
854 Cf. The Exchequer and Audit Departments Act 1866. 
855 1. Mo1inier, "Parliament's Financial Powers: A Comparison between France and Britain", in D. 
Coombes D. et aI, The Power a/the Purse, (London George Allen & Unwin Ltd), 1976, p. 173. 
856 Cf. F. White, K. Hollingsworth, op. cit., p. 37. 
857 Section 22 of the Exchequer and Audit Departments Act 1866. 
858 Cf. F. White, K. Hollingsworth, op. cit. p. 37. 
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In the first decades of the XX century, the system of audit established by the 1866 Act 
was already out of date. During several decades in the end of XIX and beginning of the 
XX century, public expenditure greatly increased, necessitating changes in public 
accounting and audit. Therefore, in 1921 The Exchequer and Audit Departments Act was 
enacted, repealing and amending a number of the 1866 Act's provisions. 
The 1921 Exchequer and Audit Departments Act gave C&AG greater discretion in 
conducting of audit. Since the increase of expenditure made the checking of every 
account almost impossible, the Act allows the C&AG to rely on the individual 
department's checking system and, instead of examining all the accounts, test only 
particular transactions to ensure the effectiveness of the departmental check, without 
further evidence of payment in support of the charges to which the sums relate.859 The 
Act also extended the audit of C&AG to new types of accounts, which emerged in 
previous decades (trading accounts etc.).860 However, the 1921 Act did not address the 
key issue of C&AG independence towards the Executive, which still exercised strong 
discretionary powers over the C&AG. 
Pressure for substantial reform of the public audit system grew from the 1960s, following 
concerns expressed by academics and Parliamentarians that the scope of public audit, 
which at that time covered only around half of public expenditure, needed to be 
substantially extended. Furthermore, it was argued that there was a need for a specific 
power to allow the C&AG to report to Parliament at his own discretion on the value for 
money achieved by government departments. 861 Reformers also argued that more robust 
arrangements should be put in place to ensure the independence of public auditors from 
government. 862 
859 Section 1(2) of the Exchequer and Audit Departments Act 1921. 
860 Section 4 of the Exchequer and Audit Departments Act 1921. 
861 The History a/the National Audit Office, UK National Audit Office web site, www.nao.gov.uk. 
862 Ibid. 
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Continuous reformist pressures resulted in the enactment of the National Audit Act 
1983.863 Under the Act, the C&AG formally became an Officer of the House of 
Commons, and was given the express power to report to Parliament at his own discretion 
on the economy, efficiency and effectiveness with which government bodies have used 
public funds. The Act also established the National Audit Office (NAO) to replace the 
Exchequer and Audit Department in support of the C&AG.864 Staff of the National Audit 
Office was placed outside of the civil service, which provided conditions for fuller 
independence from the Executive. 
As we could see in chapter II, these financial accountability arrangements, although with 
some important changes along the way, remain relevant to this day. Historical 
development of the UK parliamentary system and reforms undertaken to firm up the 
position of external auditor, laid the foundations of Parliament's full scrutiny of public 
money and established a firm platform of financial accountability, which enables 
additional improvements and adaptations to be made without risks of a systematic failure. 
Such robust financial accountability arrangements have served as an inspiration not only 
for other countries of the Westminster tradition, but also for European continental 
countries and the supranational EU system, which have already been 'infected' by UK 
financial accountability concepts, attempting to entrench and attain the Gladstone 
sparkling 'circle of control'. 
863 Cf. F. White, K. Hollingsworth, ibid, pp. 41-46. 
864 The National Audit Act 1983. 
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Annex 2 
List of key persons interviewed (in alphabetical order) 
Alventosa Jean-Raphael, Conseiller-maitre at the Cour des Comptes, Paris 
Andrews Matthew, Lecturer at the Harvard University, former semor financial 
management specialist of the World Bank 
Arsic Vesna, Deputy Minister of Finance of the Serbian Government 
Barjaktarevic Mila, Head of Internal Audit unit of the Ministry of Finance of Montenegro 
Cazala Francois-Roger, Principal Administrator in the Audit and Financial Control unit 
of the SIGMA Programme on secondment from the French Cour des Comptes 
Cho Junghun, Senior Financial Management Specialist, the World Bank 
Coombes David, former Head of the Capacity Building Fund, UNDP, Belgrade 
Dautry Philipe, Conseiller des services, French National Assembly, Paris 
Djordjev Dragica, Senior Advisor in the Treasury Administration of the Serbian Ministry 
of Finance 
Farmer Richard, Team Leader, Support to the Ministry of Finance Treasury Serbia, An 
EU-funded project managed by the European Agency for Reconstruction 
Gavrilovic Zoran, Head of the Budget Inspection Department in the Treasury 
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lezdimirovic Mila, Advisor to the President of the Commercial Bank in Belgrade, Former 
Assistant Minister of Finance in Budget Department 
10lovic Ljubislav, senior adviser in the Budget Department of the Ministry of Finance in 
Serbia 
Obradovic Radojko, Vice President of the Financial and Budget Committee of the 
Serbian Parliament 
Paovic-leknic Gordana, President, the Supreme Audit Institution of Montenegro 
Pavlovic Veselin, Advisor in the Treasury Administration of the Serbian Ministry of 
Finance 
Perron Christophe, Charge de mission EUROSAI, SAl, Paris 
Popovic Dejan, Professor of Finance at the Faculty of Law, Principal of the Belgrade 
University, former Deputy Minister of Finance in the Serbian Government 
Steandback Madsen 10hanes, auditor of the European Court of Auditors, former senior 
finance sector specialist of the World Bank 
Tekijaski Aleksandra, Local Project Officer, Support to Parliamentary Institutions in 
Serbia and Montenegro, an EU-funded project managed by the European Agency for 
Reconstruction 
Van Heesewijk Piet Hein, Senior Public Sector Specialist, the World Bank 
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Vanini Gianluca, Programme Manager, the European Agency for Reconstruction 
Belgrade Office 
Woodward David, Assistant Auditor General, UK National Audit Office 
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